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THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN LIFE

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THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN LIFE

AS VIEWED BY THE GREAT THINKERS FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT TIME

BY

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

It is a genuine pleasure to me to see "The Problem of Human Life" in an English Version, particularly as the translation has been prepared with great care by esteemed friends, and is, I think, entirely successful.

The present book forms the essential complement of all my other works. It is designed to afford historical confirmation of the view that conceptions are determined by life, not life by conceptions. Under the guidance of this conviction the book traverses the whole spiritual development of the Western world, in the hope that the several phases of the development, and, above all, its great personalities, will be brought nearer to the personal experience of the reader than is customarily done. Particularly in an age of predominant specialisation, when the pursuit of learning too often endangers the completeness of living, such an endeavour is fully justified.

I hope that the English-speaking public will give the book a sympathetic reception. With their own thinkers, the problem of life has always stood in the foreground, and scientific research steadily regarded the whole life of man. Thus my book presents nothing foreign to the genius of the English-speaking peoples: may it be felt and welcomed by them as something kindred to their own aims!

Rudolf Eucken.

Jena.

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TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

THE following translation of Eucken's "Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker: Eine Entwickelungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschheit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart" is based substantially upon the seventh German edition, Leipzig, 1907. But, owing to the rapidity with which the three last editions have succeeded the fifth, and to unavoidable interruptions of the work of translation, the above statement requires a word of explanation. The translation was begun from the fifth edition, and had progressed as far as the section on Origen, when the sixth edition appeared. This edition presented no changes, other than purely verbal ones, in the portion already translated, except in the account of Plato, particularly the important section on the Theory of Ideas. The passages affected were, of course, revised in accordance with the text of the new edition. The seventh edition being almost immediately called for, and Mr. Boyce Gibson having consented to undertake the translation of Part Third, the relatively extensive alterations and additions designed for this edition were communicated to the translators in MS. The new material, however, with but two or three exceptions, concerned only the portions not yet translated, and was accordingly readily incorporated into the text. The translation as it stands, therefore, is in all essential respects a version of the seventh German edition.[1]

But mention should be made of certain omissions from the text of the original in Parts First and Second. The author gave his ready assent to the exercise of a minor editorial privilege in this regard; and, solely with a view to condensation, a few para-

[1] The eighth edition, which has appeared since the translation was in type, contains, as the author has assured the translators, "no material changes or additions, but only verbal improvements of the German text, which may be entirely ignored, so far as the translation is concerned."

graphs, and an occasional sentence or even phrase, particularly in the relatively long accounts of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine, and in the section on Origen, have been omitted, entirely at the discretion of the first-named translator. No attempt has been made to indicate the points at which such omissions occurred; but their whole number would not aggregate more than a few pages.

The work of translation has been divided as follows, each translator being solely responsible for the portion undertaken by him. Parts First and Second, on Hellenism and on Christianity respectively, and the Author's Preface to the English Edition, have been translated by Mr. Hough; Part Third, on the Modern World, and the Introduction, have been translated by Mr. Gibson. It should be said, however, that nearly all of the first draft of those parts for which Mr. Gibson is responsible was made by his wife, and that her collaboration upon the whole work of this portion has been of the first importance. For the preparation of the Indexes the translators are further indebted to Mrs. Gibson, and, in part, to Mrs. Hough.

The translators have felt keenly the difficulty of deciding upon an English title for the work which would be wholly free from objection. The title finally adopted may at first appear to be a bold substitution; but familiarity with the work will make it clear that in reality it sounds the key-note of the book. If it be objected that the virtual transposition of the principal and the subordinate title of the original could only result in a change of emphasis, the reply is that this alternative was chosen as the least of many evils. It may be added that the author preferred the title adopted to any of the others proposed.

In preparing the English Version the translators have set accuracy before all else. They are, however, of opinion that fidelity is in general not to be secured by literal transcription. Moreover, since the present work is designed for the larger public as well as for academic uses, they have endeavoured to keep the diction as free as possible from technical expressions and from traces of German idiom. At the same time it should

be said that the style of the original, by virtue indeed of the very qualities which give it its distinction and individuality, presents certain difficulties which the translators cannot hope wholly to have surmounted; and, particularly in view of the distinguished recognition which the literary value of the author's work has recently received, they submit their translation to the public with no little diffidence.

In conclusion, the translators desire to express their obligations to Lady Welby, who kindly read Part First in MS., and made numerous valuable suggestions; to Professor Arthur C. McGiffert, who similarly read the MS. of Part Second, and gave it the benefit of his intimate knowledge of early Christianity; but particularly to the author, who not only read the entire translation in MS., but has throughout assisted the translators with advice on any points of unusual difficulty.

W. S. H.
W. R. B. G.

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INTRODUCTION

WHAT does our life mean when viewed as a whole? What are the purposes it seeks to realise? What prospect of happiness does it hold out to us? To ask these questions is to set ourselves the Problem of Life, nor need we stay to justify our right to ask them. They force themselves on us to-day with resistless insistence. They are the cry of an age rent inwardly asunder, its heart at enmity with the work of its hands. The labour of the preceding centuries, nay, of the last few decades, has indeed been immeasurably fruitful. It has given birth to a new culture and to new views of the universe. But its triumphal progress has not implied a simultaneous advancement of the inward life; its dazzling victories have not been won for the spirit and substance of man. With relentless energy it has driven us more and more exclusively upon the world without us, subduing us to its necessities, pressing us more and more closely into the service of our environment. And the activities of our life ultimately determine our nature. If our powers are wholly concentrated on outward things and there is an ever-diminishing interest in the inner life, the soul inevitably suffers. Inflated with success, we yet find ourselves empty and poor. We have become the mere tools and instruments of an impersonal civilisation which first uses and then forsakes us, the victims of a power as pitiless as it is inhuman, which rides rough-shod over nations and individuals alike, ruthless of life or death, knowing neither plan nor reason, void of all love or care for man.

A movement of this nature, the disintegrating influences of which affect so closely the feelings and the convictions of the individual, cannot subsist long without reaction. In matters such as these, the problem is no sooner felt than the reaction

begins. Men cannot for long deny their spiritual nature and suppress all concern for its welfare. Their inner life holds its own against all pressure from without; it persists in relating all events to itself and summoning them for judgment before its own tribunal. Even opposition serves but to remind the Subject of the fundamental and inalienable rights of its own inwardness and freedom. So a slumbering giant needs only to be roused to the consciousness of his power to show himself superior to all the forces the world can bring against him. And when simultaneously with these changes an elemental passion for individuality of life and inner well-being asserts itself, when the rationality of existence, the salvation of the soul, become pressing, torturing problems, of a sudden the whole aspect of the world is transformed; that which was once held a sure possession now becomes a matter of painful perplexity and an object of weary search.

A regenerative movement of this kind is now in perceptible progress: and though the Powers of Mechanism still continue to extend their outward sway, our faith in them is shaken and the struggle against them has begun. Great movements are abroad to-day which, despite manifold differences of tendency, converge to a common issue. The passionate impetus of the social movement, the evidences of increasing religious earnestness, the ferment of artistic creation, all express one and the same desire, an ardour of longing for more happiness, for a fuller development of our human nature, for a new and a loftier order of life.

And yet, despite its progress, the movement is still in many respects very incomplete and chaotic. It is not only that certain of its side-currents variously intersect and frustrate each other; the main stream itself is a curious blend of higher and lower, nobility and meanness, youthful freshness and senile punctiliousness. Instead of seeking to transform his inward experience into an ordered cosmos and to strengthen freedom into law, the Subject is apt to measure his progress by the extent to which he can dispense with all authority, not excluding

that of his own nature. Breaking free from all restraint, he is borne aloft like some vain empty bubble, the plaything of wind and weather, and falls an easy prey to every kind of irrationality and folly. Thus we are conscious primarily of an atmosphere of ferment, restlessness, passion. We preserve our faith in the rationality of the movement only by treating it as a mere beginning and trusting that the spiritual necessity at work within it will in the end prevail over all individual illusions and conceits and build up the inward life on a systematic and well-ordered plan. To this end, however, our untiring co-operation is essential: we must sift and separate, clarify and deepen. Only through the strain of self-conflict can the Age truly realise itself, and accomplish its part in the evolution of the world's history.

Nor can Philosophy stand aloof from the struggle; she also has her part to play. Is she not pre-eminently fitted to give this movement a large and generous meaning, to clear it from confusion and direct it toward its ultimate goal? Her first duty indeed is to the present and to the problems of the day; nor is she at liberty to take refuge from present issues in a near or a distant past. Historical considerations are—for the philosopher —subsidiary; and yet, if he respects the limitations under which they can alone be of service to him, they may most effectively support his own personal conviction. We would then briefly consider the following view: that it is both possible and useful to represent to ourselves in a living way the various philosophies of life as they have taken shape in the minds of the great thinkers. For with this contention is bound up the whole success or failure of our present undertaking.

If these philosophies are to be of any help to us, we must give to the term "philosophy of life" a deeper meaning than it usually bears. We cannot interpret it as a set of select utterances on the subject of human life and destiny, or as a collection of occasional reflections and confessions. For such deliverances spring frequently from the mere mood of the moment, and serve to conceal rather than reveal the essential

quality of their author's thought. Moreover, shallow natures are not infrequently prodigal of confession—natures that have little that is worth confiding—while deeper souls are apt to withdraw their emotion from the public gaze, holding it sacred to the heart or bodying it forth only in their work.

No; we are not concerned with the reflections of these thinkers about life, but with life itself as it is fashioned forth in their world of thought. We ask what light they have thrown upon human existence, what place and purport they assign to it, how they combine its active with its passive functions; in a word, what is the character of human life as they conceive it? This question draws together the different threads of their thought and reveals to us the very depths of their soul. They become easy of access and of comprehension; they can make themselves known to us quite simply and speak in plain, straightforward fashion to all who will give them a hearing. Surely this quest offers strong inducement to every receptive mind. From the abundance of these great personalities must there not be some overflow of strength, something that will purify, ennoble, and level up our own endeavour?

Nor need we be troubled with the question whether these great thinkers supply everything that is essential and valuable in human achievement. We can at least say that they constitute the soul of it. For true creative work, the upbuilding of a realm of spiritual meanings and values, is not the product of mediocrity, but arises rather out of a direct antagonism to all that is petty and small in human affairs. On the lower level, spiritual activity is much too closely blent with alien and inferior elements, too solely at the disposal of small-minded aims, for it to be capable of producing any clearly defined and distinctive conceptions of life. At all periods, it has been only the few who have possessed the greatness of mind, the inward freedom, the constructive power which alone make it possible to pursue the path of creative activity as an end in itself, to wrest unity from chaos, to win through the stress and strain of true creative work that glad and sure self-confidence without

which thought has no stability and work no profit. This, however, does not mean that the creative genius is independent of his social and historical environment. Even that which is greatest has its necessary presuppositions and conditions. The soil must be ready, the age must contribute the stimulus of its special problems, enthusiasm must be trained to willing service. To this limited extent a genius is but the ripe expression of his epoch, and the luminous idea only serves to intensify aspirations already alive in the community. But none the less does the great man lift the common life to an essentially higher plane. He does not merely unify existing tendencies, but brings about an inner transformation: he ennobles the whole message of the age. For it is he who first clearly distinguishes the spiritual from the merely human, the eternal from the temporal, who first gives to life an independent worth, a value of its own, who first attains to the conception of universal and imperishable truth. In so far as the Eternal can be apprehended under time conditions, it is so apprehended by the great man; it is he who first frees it from its temporal setting to become a possession for all time. If then the creative geniuses of humanity are the true foci of all spiritual life, if in them its rays, else scattered, are concentrated to burn thereafter with an intensified, inextinguishable flame that in turn reillumines the whole,—then surely we may take comfort and rest assured that in studying the work of such men we are touching the very pulse of all creative activity.

And the same reason that makes it worth our while to study them individually renders it equally advisable to consider carefully the relations of each to his contemporaries and successors. In the contemplation of these various types we become more distinctly and vividly aware of the different schemes of life open to us. The extremes between which we ordinarily oscillate are here set forth in most palpable form, and help to explain each other while defining their own positions ever more clearly. But as the ages pass and one set of conditions is replaced by another, there is a tendency for the permanent to

become confused with the transitory. On the one hand, our multiplicity of systems seems to admit of reduction to a limited number of simple types, which, like the motifs of a tune, constantly recur through all changes of environment, and yet we perceive at the same time a steady progress, a constant influx of what is new. Life and the world open out in ever-broadening vistas. Problems of increasing difficulty arise; the current flows swifter and stronger. The whole detailed story would be needed to show us what this movement has achieved for us. We may not forestall the conclusion by any hasty generalising. So much, however, we may say, that if at first the history of philosophy seem like a battle in which every man's hand is against his fellow, in which the leaders are so engrossed with the development of their own individuality that they repel rather than attract each other, yet we must not on this account despair of unity and progress. One doctrine defies another only so long as the respective systems are regarded in the light of finished results and the intellect is called upon to be the sole and final arbiter of every question. Now it is precisely from such inadequate conceptions that this study of ours can rescue us. When we ask how our great thinkers looked at life, we see that their thought had its source in the depths of the life-process itself, that its course is determined by certain vital needs, that it is but the expression of an inward struggle toward truth and happiness and spirituality. On the larger plane of this life-process many things help and supplement each other which in the more narrow and definite region of conceptual thinking are frankly antagonistic. It were even possible that all divisions should be included within one general progressive movement, and that in the friction of one mind with another we should find the true seat of creative activity. Now the principal phases of this movement are given us by the great thinkers, if we but pierce to the heart of their endeavour. It is under their guidance that we may be led from a remote past to the very threshold of our own day. It is they who can make the past live again for us, put us in possession of all that human

effort has achieved, and transplant us from a present of mere immediacy into a present that transcends our time-experience. It is this wider, more significant present that we so sorely need to-day; we need it to counteract the rush and hurry of everyday life, the narrowness of party spirit, the looseness of prevalent standards. Surely in fighting these things we do well to summon to our aid the life-work of the great thinkers.

But, with all its attractions, the undertaking is fraught with difficulties of no ordinary kind. Can we bring the object of our study close to us, can we enter into sympathetic communion with him, and yet observe the necessary amount of objectivity in our treatment? The answer must depend on what we mean by objectivity. What we certainly do *not* want is an objectivity which fights shy of all subjective verdicts; for such objective treatment, no matter how exact and thorough, can do no more than collect and arrange the data, and if it gives even a passable presentation of its object, it only does so inadvertently by filling in the gaps with merely conventional appreciations. No! At every moment our task compels us to judge for ourselves, to classify and divide, to sift and to separate. This is true even as regards such relatively external matters as the choice of material; much more do we need to exercise independence of judgment if we would penetrate to the unity which underlies and dominates the most varied forms of expression, if we would share the inward experiences of the great men whom we study, and recognise that they are organically related to each other and linked together in one unbroken sequence. And yet, whilst we discountenance an unspiritual objectivity, it must not be supposed that we give ourselves over to an unbridled subjectivity. It cannot be right for us to interpret the personality we are studying in the light of our subjective preferences, or develop his meaning only in so far as he seems to confirm our previous convictions. Such a procedure would never allow us to penetrate to his real self; still less would it acquaint us with the inner currents of human progress, or conduce to that larger thought and wider horizon which we hope to gain through our

inquiry. We conclude, then, that while striving to get into close contact with each thinker, we must yet not obtrude ourselves too far. We must allow him to speak for himself and to make good his own position. Our final verdict must not be the result of individual reflection; it must be reached through a vivid portrayal of the man himself and of the influence he has exercised on the world at large. Nothing should be to us more vitally important than the endeavour to re-establish a direct relation between reader and Thinker. That such an undertaking implies at the same time an independent stand-point, particularly in relation to the Philosophy of History, will be at once obvious to all who are familiar with such questions.

Other difficulties arise out of our relationship to learned specialisation. We have no quarrel with specialisation in itself. For not only does the very growth of detailed inquiry call for the syntheses that shall gather the detail together; these more comprehensive pictures themselves gain their richness from the detail. The more exact our information as to the relation of the Thinker to his historical and social environment, the more skilful the analysis of his work into its component threads, the more clear-cut and vivid will the outlines of our picture become. A quarrel becomes inevitable only when the specialist brooks no other work than his, when he thinks his apparatus sufficient to fathom the whole personality, when he tries to explain greatness as the accumulated result of infinitesimal accretions; for what really makes the Thinker great is that which transcends mere historical explanation: it is the power of original creation, the Unity which animates and illumines everything from within. And to this, mere learning and criticism are necessarily blind. It reveals itself only to an Intuition whose mode of apprehension is sympathetically creative. It is even possible that the merely learned study of a personality may remove us further from him, by interposing between the spectator and the object something that claims attention for itself, thus disturbing the total impression. Let us beware then of confusing accidentals with essentials, means

with ends; of overlooking ideas in our anxiety about facts, and making original research do duty for spiritual intuition.

We are bound, in entering upon the present work, to observe the utmost care and caution. But we must not let the difficulties daunt us and cloud the joy with which we embark upon our task. Despite all perplexities, there is a quite peculiar charm—and profit, too, shall we add—in trying to understand how the great thinkers looked at life. The deep yearning for truth and happiness which breathes from all their writings carries us away by its intensity; and yet there is something magically soothing and strengthening in the mature works into which such yearnings have been crystallised. Different though our own conviction may be, we rejoice none the less in the victories of creative genius and the transparent lucidity of its productions. Our culture is constantly bringing us into close touch with these master-minds; our work is linked with theirs by a myriad threads. Yet, closely as they concern us, their personality as a whole is often strangely unfamiliar; there may be an utter absence of any real intimacy between us and them. We gaze into the Pantheon from without, but the gods do not descend from their lofty pedestals to share our trials and sorrows, nor do they even seem to be fellow-workers with each other. How different when we turn to the inner sources of their creative activity, when we penetrate to those deep regions of the spirit in which their work reveals itself as the expression and assertion of their true nature. The frozen forms then warm into life and begin to speak to us. We see them impelled by the same problems which determine our own weal and woe. We also see them linked together as workers in one common task: the task of building up a spiritual world within the realm of human life, of proving our existence to be both spiritual and rational. The walls of division break down at last, and we pass into the Pantheon as into a world that belongs to us, as into our own spiritual home.

PART FIRST

HELLENISM

HELLENISM

A. THINKERS OF THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE GREEK CHARACTER AND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF HELLENISM

A JUST estimate of the Greek thinkers is often rendered difficult by an overestimate of the average character of the Greek people. What the intellectual leaders produced at the cost of supreme effort is vaguely attributed to the natural endowment of the people as a whole. Because creative activity at its height found joy and felicity in itself, and from this elevation shed abroad a bright serenity of mood, Greek life in general puts on the appearance of a perpetual festival; and because among the great a distinguished sentiment scorned all considerations of mere utility, the thinking and feeling of the whole nation seems raised to intellectual nobility. Thus the creations of genius appear to be scarcely more than a precipitation of the social atmosphere. But this impression rapidly vanishes on closer view. Whoever follows the average political activity of the Greeks, with its unrest and passion, its envy and malice; whoever considers the multitudinous forms of Greek avarice and Greek craftiness; whoever turns from Greek comedy to cast a glance at the often downright repulsive everyday life —will soon be convinced that even the Greeks were men like ourselves, that they too did not acquire their greatness as a simple inheritance from nature, but had to achieve it by hard struggle, even against themselves. Accordingly, the position of the great thinkers is relatively raised, and we see that

their life-work extends its influence far beyond their immediate surroundings.

But to contend for the great superiority of the thinkers as compared with the average does not imply that we would detach them from the intellectual character of the nation. Rather, the common intellectual life, with its strength and freshness, its mobility and buoyancy, prepared the way for the thinkers, and surrounded them with a stimulating, formative, and guiding influence. True, they could not realise their aims without trusting above all to their own genius, and without unhesitatingly waging war upon the popular traditions. But their labours had not the depressing isolation and loneliness which later ages, with a more erudite culture and more complex conditions of life, often show. This close relationship of the thinkers with their people is particularly noteworthy during the epoch of the moulding of civilisation by national forces, which will first occupy us; but it is not lost in the Hellenistic period, when the tendency is to pass from the national to the broadly human standpoint, and when thought is rather the work of isolated individuals. Indeed, even in the later, confused times, when Hellenism was submerged by the enormous influx of foreign elements, the smaller arteries of the national life still showed traces of the classical way of thinking; thus even upon the approaching night was shed a ray of the same sun under whose full splendour the immortal masterpieces were perfected.

Accordingly, to form a just appreciation of the Greek thinkers, we must first recall their intellectual environment. Nothing about the Greeks impresses one more than their great energy of life, the strong impetus toward the development of every faculty, the youthful, ever-fresh pleasure in creative activity. Indolence is unsparingly condemned; action does not need the endorsement of a reward—it fascinates and delights in itself. To take up an active relation to things was ever the essence of Greek wisdom. But, with all its mobility, action here never leaves the sphere of the present world; it does not presume to create things of its own initiative; it rather assigns to the objective world a

nature of its own, and seeks to effect a fruitful interaction, by which it at once fashions the world and adjusts itself to it. Consequently, we find here no senseless brooding, no dreamy weaving of detached sentiments; the mood always springs from and follows activity. But if action unites us so closely with things, the latter can be of use to us, and our intellectual nature will communicate itself to them. The Greek habit of thought personifies its environment; it throws out on all sides a reflection of human life. Since, however, it does not rob things of their peculiar character, they have a reciprocal effect upon human life, and enlarge, clarify, and ennoble it. Hence the personification of nature by the Greeks is incomparably more refined and fruitful than that of other peoples; and human life, by being thus mirrored objectively in the universe, receives a thorough purification and outgrows the crudity of nature.

Action, too, is the best defensive weapon amid the dangers and trials of human existence. Whatever fortunes befell the Greek, his attitude was active; he always sought to bring to bear his own powers, and hence to wrest something rational from every experience, even from suffering. Whatever was hostile he attacked with spirit, and if he could not completely conquer it, he at least energetically repelled it. In such a strife man unfolds his powers, indeed attains that greatness of soul which makes him superior to the world. Such an attitude is the opposite not only of all trifling with moral evil, but also of a comfortable optimism. Where the experience of life is reflected so fully and clearly in the minds of men as appears in the intellectual work of the Greeks, the antagonistic forces also will be deeply felt. In fact, Hellenism wrestled in good earnest with all manner of obstacles; it steadily modified both the world of things and itself; in time its activity necessarily became more and more purely inward. But so long as it endured, it found the means of remaining active; and from such an active attitude it drew ever fresh courage, and even under the growing harshness of life it steadfastly asserted that the core of existence is rational. Hence prominent modern scholars are in error when they declare

that the Greeks were pessimists. For no one is a pessimist merely because he feels deeply the suffering of life; rather it is he who yields to it, who gives up striving because of it. And that the Greeks never did.

Just as man here places his chief reliance on activity, so also his creations are instinct with life and action. Human societies, particularly his own native state, appear as living beings, animate individuals; furthermore, nothing is more characteristic of the works of Greek art than that they are embodiments of spiritual movement. This animation extends to the smallest elements; even what is otherwise rigid and dead here manifests the pulsation of inner life.

This eager attitude toward the world of things leads us to expect both that man's activity will do full justice to the wealth of the actual world and that it will itself be developed into greater versatility. And we find, in fact, that the work of civilisation extends with wonderful universality into every sphere; all the realms of experience are successively explored, and to each is rendered its due. Movements which elsewhere exclude one another are here taken up with equal vigour and sympathy, and all the chief tendencies shown by the development of civilisation down even to the present time are found in germ. Whoever disputes this, and denies that the Greeks were great in religion, for instance, or in law, in exact science or in technical inventions, either estimates their achievements by alien standards or confines himself to the period alone celebrated as classical. In particular, the attention of modern critics often dwells too exclusively on what may indeed be the greatest, but is by no means the sole, characteristic of the Greeks, namely, their power of synthesis, of artistic shaping into a whole. But that the Greeks were also strong in sober observation, in acute analysis, and in illuminating reflection, is equally true, and belongs no less to the complete picture of their intellectual traits.

Such breadth prevents their work as a whole from being cramped and narrowed by the peculiar nature of a single domain; rather it is left free and receptive enough to assimilate something

from all sides; and by these many-sided experiences progress is made. This elasticity renders possible a significant history; great changes may take place without a loss of the traditional character and without destroying the continuity. The Greek considers himself distinguished from the barbarian in nothing so much as in the breadth and freedom of his life, when compared with the torpid narrow-mindedness of the latter.

Kindred to freedom is lucidity. Whatever touches and moves man, whatever befalls him from without, and what is given to him from within, must alike attain complete transparency. Not until it does so, not until all the obscurity of the first stages is removed, and the result stands forth clear as sunlight, can any experience be recognised as forming part of human life and activity.

This striving for clearness, however, differentiates itself into two movements, which at once oppose and supplement each other, namely, a theoretical and an artistic movement.

On the one hand, there is the eager impulse to understand, to dispel all obscurity from the world by vigorous thought. What is here required is to bring order out of the given confusion, to concatenate all phenomena, to refer the various expressions of life to a common basis, to discern amid all change abiding entities. Such an effort is indeed much older than theoretical knowledge; even the earliest literary creations contain, although in veiled form, the thought of a universal order of things, a disavowal of vague, blind chance. But the theoretical movement cannot rise to the plane of science without shifting the point of view from the visible to the invisible world. Indeed, by its growth in independence, thought eventually becomes strong enough to trust solely to its own necessary laws, and to sacrifice the whole sensuous world, *i. e.*, degrade it to the rank of mere appearance, in order to achieve knowledge of true being. By this development the Greeks become the creators of metaphysic. But the metaphysical trait characterising their work extends far beyond academic science; for great thoughts pervade their whole life and creative activity. Even in the mental life of the individual, the same impulse leads to clearness and to

definite consciousness; whatever cannot give a rational account of itself is esteemed of little value; lucid knowledge must accompany and illuminate all conduct. Indeed, insight becomes the innermost soul of life; goodness appears to depend upon correct knowledge; evil, on the other hand, is an intellectual mistake, an error of judgment.

But this predominance of the intellectual, this resolution of existence into abstract conceptions, is counterbalanced by the strong desire for sense-perception and for artistic form. The Greek wants not only to understand but to see; he wants to have the image as a whole before him, and to hold fast to its sensuous existence; exact thought finds a companion in light-winged fantasy; yet even the latter is not without laws, but steadily aims at proportion, order, and harmony. Everything here tends to assume completely definite shape; all form is outwardly limited and in itself graduated; all relations are duly considered and definitely established; everything individual, by imposing a limit, receives one. The extension of this formative activity over the world of experience transforms the original chaos into a cosmos; it also banishes everything uncouth and grotesque. Above all, the eye must be gratified; for its perceptions reveal the full splendour of beauty, and lead up to the mountain tops of life. Such an attitude is intolerant of any chasm between inner and outer; it is not satisfied with dreamy intimations or symbolic allusions; for it, delineation is not an accessory, but the indispensable completion of the thing itself. By this demand for sense-perception, activity is continually being brought back to the immediate world, and held fast there. The recognition of the multiplicity of things, which threatened to disappear before the unity sought for by thought, here upholds its undoubted rights; while beauty shows herself to be the twin-sister of rigorous truth. The union of these two tendencies, the artistic form taken by intellectual forces, represents the highest attainment of the creative activity of the Greeks. On the one hand, the instinct for form prevents the search for truth from detaching itself from the world and becoming lost in the

pathless and the illimitable; on the other, artistic construction is supplied with a noble material, and avoids sinking to the level of mere sensuous charm and pleasure. By means of such reciprocal relations, the whole acquires inner movement, inexhaustible life, and perennial freshness.

A thoroughly unique character is revealed even in these few traits; and this is the character which furnishes the environment for the work of the philosophers and for the formation of views of life. But views of life of the philosophical stamp do not appear until late; and when they do appear, a considerable intellectual labour, in the form of inner liberation, has already been accomplished. The more naïve state, in which man's life was closely interwoven with the visible environment, such as we see depicted in the Homeric poems, had already passed away. And the growth of the new conditions unfortunately cannot be traced, owing to the profound darkness that obscures the inner movements of the eighth and seventh centuries; and because in the sixth century the development was already fully unfolded, and in the fifth its triumph was consummated. All the principal spheres of life were by this time pervaded by a free and serious spirit.

This was the case, first of all, with religion. True, the ancient gods were still held in honour, but their traditional representation was none the less subjected to a searching critique. Indignation was now aroused by anything which gave offence to the purified moral ideas; open conflict with the older views was indeed not shunned, but also in a quieter way, perhaps hardly noticed, a transference of interest to the moral and intellectual spheres took place. At the same time, the desire for unity grew; although the plurality of divinities had by no means disappeared, polytheism was no longer a simple belief in coexisting deities; for a single divine Being was discerned as pervading all phenomena. Also, there now appeared germs of new developments, developments in different, indeed conflicting, directions. From the side of theoretical investigation arose a pantheistic tendency, the conviction that there is an all-compre-

hensive life, an impersonal Déity, from which the soul of man is derived, and to which it returns after life's course is run. On the other hand, from a deeper sense of the injustice of earthly things, and from solicitude for personal happiness and welfare, sprang an effort to rise above immediate existence, a detaching of the soul from the body, a belief in personal immortality, and a hope of a better Beyond. This was seen in the Orphic and Pythagorean societies.

At the same time, the ethical life also won a greater independence and inwardness; in particular, the idea of the Mean as a moral criterion rose to power, and afforded at once a support for the mind and a standard for conduct. In the ethical sphere, and also in general, poetry exerted a powerful influence toward the deepening of spiritual life; indeed, an influence far above that exerted by the maxims of the aphorists. The development of lyric poetry, too, created a rich emotional life and increased the self-consciousness of the individual; love, or Eros, found an expression both in plastic art and in poetry. But the more inward and sensitive life became, the more difficult were the problems, and the deeper grew the feeling of the contradictions of human existence. The drama courageously attacked these profounder problems, and in its own way cast up the sum of human destiny. Before philosophy gave a support to life the poets were the teachers of wisdom, the intermediaries between the old traditions and the future world of thought.

The changes in the life of the State, moreover, affected the total welfare of man. The growth of democracy roused individuals to activity and to the employment of all their powers; there resulted an increase of the points of contact, and of the rapidity of the development of life. It was no longer possible to take the traditional régime as self-evident: the laws were codified, and thence arose general problems; people began to inquire into the rationality of the existing order, to compare the political arrangements of other states with their own, and to try new schemes. Thus, much passed into a fluid state, and a wide field was opened to critical discussion. There also took place

an outward expansion of life due to the rapid growth of trade and commerce, and particularly to the founding of the colonies, which, owing to the contact afforded with the civilisations of other peoples, powerfully stimulated the minds of the Greeks. It was therefore no accident that philosophy took its rise in the colonies.

With the change in the manner of life, the outlook upon the world changed. Philosophy, which in the case of the Greeks does not start from man and the problem of his happiness, but from the universe as a whole, aims to comprehend the world in a natural way, by means of its own interconnections; it seeks for an immutable substance, or for fixed quantitative relations. It is forced to discard the first impression of things, and to destroy their visible image; but with a sure instinct for the essential it reconstructs the world in outlines whose simplicity bears the marks of genius and excites our perpetual wonder. Thus, the mythological view of the world is successfully transcended, but less by direct attack than by providing a substitute.

The effort to reach an independent explanation of things received additional assistance from astronomy. By showing that the movements of the stars are constant and conform to law, by discovering fixed systems in the structure of the universe and uniting the whole into the view of a cosmos, it was proved that even the Deity must put aside all arbitrary power and submit to the sway of law. The independent order and harmony of things proclaims the rationality of the world far more emphatically than the most marvellous interference with the regular course of things could do. That such a rationality not only sways the great world, but extends also to what is minute, to the apparently intangible, as it appears in the relations of number and limit, was disclosed in a startling manner by the discovery of the mathematical relations of tones. A strong influence upon the view of the world was exerted also by medicine. Not only was this science forced by its care for health into ascertaining with more exactness the causal connections within its own field, but

it increased the precision of the conception of causation in general; it also revealed the close relation of man to nature, and recognised in him a miniature universe—the microcosm, which was conceived to bear within itself all the principal fluids and forces of the great world.

Finally, man's own life and conduct were subjected to the scrutiny of an objective examination. The historian's art had barely attained independence before it manifested also a critical spirit, discriminated and sifted authorities, and in its judgments of human destiny diminished and restrained the element of the supernatural. Although writers personally maintained a pious reverence for the invisible powers, the trend of investigation was toward the explanation of events by the linking of causes and effects, and toward the connecting of individual destiny with personal conduct.

The simultaneous development of all these movements presents a marvellous drama, which is without a parallel in history. There was a progress of incomparable vigour and freshness, rising from dreamy perplexity and childlike submissiveness to an alert, free, manly existence; the inner life steadily grew in independence, and the narrowness of a merely human view yielded more and more to one illuminated by knowledge of the universe. In the midst of such changes, the sense of man's power emerged and grew; great personalities appeared and made their individual traits felt; spiritual unrest seized the world; general problems sprang up and dominated thought; everywhere there was an impulse to have matters cleared up, explained, and mentally assimilated; everywhere there was a strong development in intellectual work and in general culture.

Yet this progress of the new and decline of the old did not at first result in an abrupt break or complete revolution. In strengthening his own powers, man had not yet cut himself loose from things, nor shaken off the common associations. The time had not come when the individual takes his stand solely upon his own resources and boldly bids defiance to the whole world.

But this time had to come, and it came. The increased power of the individual, which is the result of every intellectual movement on a large scale, eventually produces in excitable and active minds a feeling of unlimited superiority, of complete independence. Such a tendency transforms intellectual liberation into "enlightenment"; and, so long as a counterpoise is wanting, enlightenment must become increasingly radical. Thinking resolves itself into unrestrained rationalism, which recognises as valid nothing that does not fall in with its processes of reasoning; it accordingly develops into a power of dissolution and dissipation, and becomes in particular the mortal enemy of historical tradition. For whatever ancient practices and customs it brings before its tribunal are already judged and condemned by the summons. If there is nothing constructive with which to offset this disintegrating process, life necessarily becomes more and more empty, and is steadily impelled toward a disastrous crisis.

Such a trend toward radical enlightenment is exhibited by the Sophists. A just appreciation of these teachers is rendered especially difficult by the fact that the principal account we have of them is transmitted by their severest critic, and that the conclusions which he draws may easily be mistaken for their own assertions. Above all, the Sophists were not theorists or pure philosophers, but teachers, teachers of a versatile cleverness in practical life, *i. e.*, in general conduct no less than in persuasive argument. Their aim was to fit their pupils to do something with success; they sought in particular to give them an advantage over other men by a thorough training in rhetoric and dialectic. These aims corresponded to a need of the times, and served to rouse and develop men's minds. But closely interwoven with what was valuable lay not a little that was questionable, indeed unsound. For the whole movement rested upon the conviction that there is no such thing as objective truth, that we are bound by no sort of universal order, that, on the contrary, everything depends upon the opinions and the interests of men. Thus man became "the measure of all things." This saying

may be differently interpreted, and may indeed be understood as an expression of a profound truth. But in circumstances where the accidental and the essential in man had not yet been distinguished, where a conception of humanity had not yet detached itself from its immediate manifestation in individuals, the phrase meant a renunciation of all universally valid standards, a surrender of truth to men's momentary caprice and fluctuating inclinations. In other words, it implied that everything may be turned this way or that, and differently judged, according to the point of view; that what appears as the right may be represented as the wrong, and conversely; and that any cause may be championed, according to the necessities of the case, or to one's whim. In this manner life is gradually degraded into a means of the profit, the self-indulgence, even the sport, of the single individual, who acknowledges no restraints, feels no respect, and scoffs at the laws as being mere statutes, as an invention of the weak, to which he opposes the power and advantage of the stronger as the real natural right. Thus the good yields to the profitable; all valuations become relative; nowhere does conviction find a secure foothold, nowhere does conduct find a goal that lifts man above himself, or that commands his respect. To be sure, such a doctrine of relativity also has a justification, and every philosophical view must give it due consideration. But raised to a sovereign position, it becomes the deadly enemy of everything great and true. Its dialectic will then inevitably disintegrate all solid foundations, its clever play destroy the seriousness and all the deep meaning of life: the subjective sense of power, and all the talk about power, less and less conceal the lack of genuine force, and the hollowness of the whole Sophistic structure. Finally, such shifty and flippant doings end in frivolity. Yet there is nothing which mankind tolerates less in the long run than a frivolous treatment of the chief problems of its happiness and its intellectual existence.

Still, it is easier to find fault with the Sophists than to transcend their position. The liberation of the individual subject does not admit of being simply revoked, for it has forever destroyed the

power of mere authority and tradition to carry conviction. The position can be surmounted only by an inner development of life, in which the subject discovers within himself new relationships and new laws, and finds rising in his own soul a spiritual world, which shall free man from arbitrary power and give him an inner stability. To have accomplished this is the greatest service rendered by Greek philosophy; and it also marks the highest point reached in its development.

The movement is started by Socrates. The character of his activity so closely resembles that of the Sophists in its outward aspect that, in the judgment of many of his contemporaries, he is simply to be classed with them. He too is active as a teacher, and seeks to prepare young men for life; he too argues and discusses; he too wants to establish everything before the bar of reason; for him also man is the chief object of interest: in short, he seems to be an "enlightener," like the rest. But, unlike them, he attains a stable position, from which all thought and life are transformed. To him is revealed an insight into the profound difference between the varied and changing opinions of men and the concepts of scientific thought. In these concepts there appears something fixed, immutable, universally valid; something which exerts a compelling influence, and excludes what is arbitrary. Thus the whole of life becomes a subject of investigation. For the aim now is, by the analysis and criticism of concepts, to test the whole content of human existence as to its validity, to dispel every illusion, and to reduce life and action to their true terms. In this effort, Socrates does not achieve the result of a completed system; his work remains a quest, a quest that ever begins anew. True, he devises special methods for the discovery and definition of concepts; yet he cannot apply them alone, but only in converse with other men, in regulated discourse. Hence his life and labour become a ceaseless dialogue. He remains in close touch with men, since his investigations are throughout concerned with the practical moral life. By establishing this life upon rational insight, the good is raised above the caprice of individual opinion, and a new conception of virtue

won. The vital thing now is not the outward performance, and the consequence for human society, but the inner conformity, the health and harmony of the soul. The inner life thus attains independence and individual worth; and it is so completely absorbed in itself that all questions of outward fortune fade into insignificance. The new ideas, indeed, are but imperfectly carried out; not a few aspects of the movement are trivial and pointless, and conflict with the main direction of effort. Nevertheless, the revelation and acceptance of the independence of the inner nature remain in full force; and whatever is incomplete and unreconciled sinks into insignificance before the truth and earnestness of Socrates's life-work, and particularly before the heroic death which put the seal upon that work. Thus a firmer foundation was laid, and a new path opened upon which, at the hands of Plato, the Greek view of life swiftly reached its philosophical zenith.

II. PLATO

(a) *Introductory*

To describe Plato's view of life is, indeed, the most difficult task of our whole undertaking. The principal reason for this is that the great personality, of which his works are the expression, includes fundamentally different, indeed conflicting, tendencies. Plato is above all the kingly thinker, penetrating beyond all appearance, and rising triumphantly above all figurative thought and speech to the invisible essence of things: with a transcendent power he sets worlds over against worlds, moves inert masses as with the lightest touch, and makes fluid the most stubborn of contradictions. But the great thinker is also by divine prerogative an artist, who is everywhere impelled to creative vision, who sketches powerful images with a convincing vividness, and whose versatile fantasy moulds all the work of thought into a thing of splendour. So powerful is the action of this fantasy, even in the inner structure of his work, that didactic statement and poetic myth often merge imperceptibly into one

another. But Plato's thought and poetry are the outpouring of a great moral personality, which is itself the supreme touchstone; and only that is accounted good and valuable which elevates the whole of the soul, and serves to strengthen, purify, and ennoble life. "All the gold above and beneath the earth does not outweigh virtue." Here a lofty mind banishes all that is impure and common; and the consciousness of the invisible bonds and the heavy responsibilities of human conduct lends to all effort a profound seriousness, indeed an unspeakable solemnity. Moreover, both the sentiment and the diction of Plato betray the influence of the new tendencies of the age toward an increasing inwardness in religion.

That such different forces meet and mutually accentuate each other in the life-work of Plato gives to it its unique greatness. But the same fact also gives rise to inconsistencies which are never completely reconciled. Each trait unfolds itself far too independently not to come into frequent conflict with the others; there are numerous interferences and cross-currents; the result is that the whole is developed, now more in this direction, now more in that.

In view of such a variety of conflicting tendencies, the obscurity which still veils both the chronological order of Plato's writings and the inner history of the man himself is particularly tormenting. Certain principal phases, indeed, stand out distinctly enough; but where the single divisions and transitions lie, what the chief motive of each of the different periods was, and what formed for the thinker himself the final conclusion of his long life's work—these points, notwithstanding the exhaustive researches of experts, are still so far from being decisively cleared up that it is even now impossible to do without the aid of bold conjectures. Such, however, must be avoided in this sketch, which accordingly will concern itself chiefly with the works in which Plato appears as the forerunner of Idealism. For in the Doctrine of Ideas Plato attains his greatest independence, while by it he has exerted his profoundest influence upon mankind.

(b) *The Doctrine of Ideas*

Plato's aims originate in a deep discontent, indeed in a complete rupture, with his social environment. Directly it is the Athenian democracy that excites his wrath, the behaviour, namely, of "the many," who without sincerity or insight, and impelled by vacillating desires and by caprice, pass judgment upon the weightiest matters, and by the influence of their noisy clamour divert those in pursuit of culture from their true aims. But, for the philosophical mind of Plato, the need of his own time and country expands into a problem of all lands and all ages. Every human undertaking which seeks to be self-sufficient, and to avoid all responsibility to superior authority, he looks upon as petty and necessarily inadequate. Dominated by a hollow show of independence, such efforts can never produce more than the appearance of virtue and happiness, which is rendered repulsive by its self-complacency. So the thinker turns his gaze away from men to the great All: from the affairs of everyday life, with its envy and hatred, he bids us look up to the ever-just order of the universe, which is constantly prefigured to our imagination in the serene expanse of the firmament. This relation with the universal order makes our life wider and truer, purer and more constant. Hence Plato seeks to rise above humanity, and to turn from a social to a cosmic regulation of life.

But the new life encounters at once an apparently insuperable difficulty. The sensible world was seen to be shattered and disintegrated by the work of science; especially was the mutability of its forms, the ceaseless flux of all things, far too distinctly recognised for life and aspiration to be safely based upon it. Hence, if the realm of the senses be the only world, all hope of finding a secure foundation for life by starting from the great All disappears. But can there not exist, beside it, above it, still another world? Socrates's doctrine of thinking and of the nature of concepts had, in fact, opened an outlook toward such a higher sphere. In concepts, as opposed to fluctuating opinions,

was recognised something fixed and universally valid. For Socrates, indeed, this universality appeared to be confined to the domain of human thought. But Plato, whose whole nature turned more toward the cosmic order, was led to take an important step forward. The concept, he contends, could not be true, unless it extended beyond human thought, and corresponded to a reality in things. This view is in harmony with the general attitude of the Greek mind, which does not sever man from the world and set him over against it, but unites him closely to it, interpreting whatever is found existing in human thought as a manifestation of things. The lesser life here follows the greater, since, according to Plato, the fire of the All does not kindle and nourish itself from our fire; rather, mine and thine and that of all living beings derive all that they have from the former. If, however, there is such a close relation between us and things, and the soul derives its possessions only through its community of nature with the All, then it is a sure inference from the content of the lesser world to that of the greater. Now in Plato's mind it is incontestable that, distinguished from shifting and uncertain opinions, there is such a thing as knowledge by permanent concepts: hence he concludes that there certainly exists in the All an invisible, immutable world, a realm of thought-entities beyond the fleeting world of sense.

In this manner, Plato comes to the core of his philosophical convictions, to the Doctrine of Ideas. The word Idea, originally meaning *appearance, image, shape,* and employed even in philosophy before Plato, received and retained from this time forth a technical sense; it now denotes in the world of things the counterpart of concept, an immutable essence or being, accessible only to thought. The Doctrine of Ideas gives stability and objectivity to our concepts: a bold logical fantasy here transfers the latter to the universe without, hypostatising them into independent essences standing over against us. The world of thought which thus originates becomes for Plato the core of all reality, the bearer of the world of sense.

That is a revolution and a revaluation of the most radical

description: the intellectual history of man knows none greater. The world of the senses, hitherto the dwelling-place of the mind, retreats to a distance, and a world accessible only to thought becomes the first, the most certain, the immediately present world. The nearness and the knowableness of things are now measured by their transparency for thought, not by the strength of the sense impression. Since the sensible world, with its extension in space, offers an obstinate resistance to being resolved into pure concepts, it remains, with all its tangibility, in obscure twilight, while the Ideas enjoy the full light of day. With such a transformation, the soul constitutes our essential being, the body becomes something extraneous, even foreign. Likewise, only spiritual goods should now call forth our efforts.

But this spirituality acquires a peculiar character owing to the unqualified dominion of knowledge. Knowledge alone, that eye of the mind which beholds the invisible world, guides us away from the illusion of the senses to the realm of reality. On its development hangs the independence and inwardness of our lives; indeed, in strictness, it must form life's sole content.

The result is a complete change, but also one which is in danger of an extremely one-sided development. Were life turned wholly into the spiritual channel, the varied fulness of actual existence would be sacrificed to the desire for a completely immaterial and immutable being. Plato, however, adds the complement of an artistic tendency, as being no less essential to a stable and worthy existence; thus a desire for beauty is joined to the desire for knowledge, and the Doctrine of Ideas is completed only by the union of the two. The insensible essence of things appears also as pure form, the form which, by its superior power, binds together the manifold phenomena, and, as contrasted with the ephemeral existence of individual things, endures as with an eternal youth, and ever afresh exerts its formative power over the sensible world. Such a Form Plato finds active throughout nature, as well as in the inner life of the soul and in the upbuilding of human society; hence we may say that the world-wide phenomenon of Form is here for the first

time grasped by thought, and also that there is now won a new valuation of the world of things. Form is not only constant, it is also beautiful and attractive. Accordingly, true being reveals itself also as the Good and the Ideal, the world of essence also as that of worth. Thus, immediate existence takes on a far more congenial aspect. It becomes indeed a copy of the perfect prototype, directing man's thoughts steadily toward the latter, and producing an unceasing aspiration.

This union of truth and beauty implies a firm conviction of the universal power of reason. Where the essence of things is also beautiful and good, where things are viewed as better in the proportion that they partake of being, there the Good has a sure preponderance, there it enjoys a sovereign rule over the world. No place remains for radical evil, for a paralysing original sin: evil tendencies, indeed, may degrade and pervert, but they cannot corrupt and ruin. So directed, the eager desire for life is ennobled and justified, and, in spite of all the dangers and conflicts, a happy mood results.

However much that is problematic may remain in Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, the latter discloses a great truth which we cannot relinquish. And that is the recognition of the fact that there is a realm of truth beyond the likes and dislikes of men; that truths are valid, not because of our consent, but independently of it, and in a sphere raised above all human opinion and power. Such a conviction is the foundation of the independence of science, and of the secure upbuilding of civilisation; only a self-dependent truth can provide laws and norms, which elevate human existence because they unite it. But this is the central thought of all idealism; hence the latter ever remains linked with the name of Plato.

(c) *Life's Goods*

The Platonic view of the conduct of life follows directly from the Doctrine of Ideas. Its characteristics may be summarised in a few words. All intellectual life rests upon trained insight;

without this, it speedily falls a victim to error. But in its actual working out, life tends to shape itself according to the artistic principles of symmetry and harmony. Thus, the two chief tendencies in Greek civilisation, the insistence upon definiteness of knowledge and upon comeliness of form, here unite with and interpenetrate each other to their mutual furtherance. Accordingly, Plato represents the highest point reached in the intellectual labours of his people. At the same time, in his creative work he pours forth the whole greatness of his mind, the force of a pure and noble and sovereign personality, and so contributes something new and individual to the national development: in all the search for truth and beauty, his mighty soul is really seeking for the good, the ennobling, whatever elevates the whole nature.

Knowledge is the undisputed guide of life. Nothing can be accepted as valid which has not passed through the crucible of thought. Intelligent insight alone renders virtue genuine, since it alone penetrates beyond appearances and emancipates us from the hollow conformity of conventional morality; it alone establishes virtue in the individual nature of the man, and makes his acts really free. For that which is generally called virtue, but which in truth is not very different from physical accomplishments, is more a product of social environment, more a result of custom and habit, than one's own act and decision. It is right insight which first makes possible the independence of conduct and of the inner nature.

The beautiful likewise must be baptised in the element of thought, in order that it may be purged of the common view which is intent on low pleasure. For it is thought that removes from the beautiful all that serves merely for sensuous charm and gratification; and it is only when freed from what is carnal, only when it rises to pure spirituality, that beauty perfects its nature. It is here that Winckelmann's words: "like a spirit drawn forth from matter through fire," find application. Thus the Greek striving for beauty finds expression also in philosophy and becomes a power even in the world of scientific thought.

Just as beauty is inseparably bound up with the search for truth, so it is with the Good. In Plato, philosophy is no mere theory, in the later sense of the word, but a rehabilitation of the whole being, an elevation of the entire man from appearance to truth, an awakening out of the deep sleep that holds ordinary life captive, a purification from all sensuousness and its lower impulses. The striving toward the world of essential being springs from the innermost will of the whole man; it is an impulse of veracity, which means breaking with appearance and seeking the reality. Truth and goodness meet also in another respect, inasmuch as immutable being here counts as the highest good, yet such being is revealed only through the search for truth. Finally, according to Plato, the Idea of the Good, the highest of all Ideas, affords guidance in the search for truth, in so far as it teaches us to interpret all that happens in accordance with ends, and thus becomes the key to the whole of reality.

Still closer is the bond between the Good and the Beautiful: it is operative in all the departments of life with a force that surmounts all obstacles. Plato's treatment of the beautiful shows him to be in close touch with his people, since he gives a philosophical version of that classic beauty which had just then attained its zenith. The beautiful is here principally of the plastic sort; it requires a distinct separation of the manifold elements, strength in the moulding of each, and concentration toward a powerful unity of effect. Hence typical classical beauty is a beauty of fixed relations and clear proportions, of definite and vivid form, and yet one which is full of inner life.

Beauty of this description the penetrating glance of the thinker discerns beneath the sombre appearance of things, both in the great world and in the sphere of human activity; limits and order, symmetry and harmony, are everywhere revealed to him. So, from out the deep vault of the heavens, the fixed constancy of the stars, notwithstanding their ceaseless movements; so from out the inner mechanism of nature, the formation of everything in accordance with strict mathematical relations.

But what thus goes on in the great world with far-reaching and

certain effect becomes in human life a problem to be wrought out by action: the most important of all harmonies is the harmony of life, of which the Hellenic nature alone seems to be capable. Our being, indeed, with its multitude of impulses, is necessarily forced into metes and bounds. But the full realisation of symmetry in the details of life requires our personal initiative, under the guidance of right insight. The problem is, with the help of such insight, to dispel the original confusion, to develop all our native endowments, to prevent them from encroaching upon one another, and finally to unite all attainments into a well-balanced life-work. Here everything limitless and indefinite is excluded, all movement has a fixed goal, even efficiency may not be arbitrarily increased. When each performs his individual task, the whole fares the best, life becomes beautiful in itself and can produce nothing but happiness. Such a conviction implies its own ideal of education. A man should not train himself for everything, and undertake everything. Rather let each choose some single aim, and dedicate to that his whole strength. It is far better to do one thing well than many things indifferently. In other words, it is an aristocratic ideal in harsh and conscious opposition to the democratic one of an education of all for everything, that is, a training as many-sided and uniform for everybody as possible.

Inasmuch as the harmony of life thus virtually becomes our own creation, by incorporating in it our volition, our disposition, it develops into an ethical product, into the virtue of justice. For justice consists precisely in this, to perform one's own task and to render to every one his due; instead of encroaching upon another's sphere, to devote one's self wholly to the work which nature and fortune have assigned to one. Accordingly, justice is nothing other than the harmony of life incorporated into one's own volition. As such, it becomes for Plato, in common with the Greek people, the central conception of the moral life, the all-inclusive virtue. Beyond the human sphere, moreover, it is active as the moral order of the universe. In the end, we fare according to our conduct; if not in this life, then certainly in

another, the good done must receive its reward, and the evil its punishment.

If, accordingly, virtue consists in the vitalising and harmonious ordering of one's own being, it becomes wholly self-dependent; and the effort to attain virtue becomes a ceaseless occupation of the man with his own inner life, and consequently a liberation from all the oppression of social surroundings. The prescriptions of custom had a peculiar power over the southern nations; but since the time of Plato there is to be found even there in all sovereign personalties the most strenuous resistance to its pressure. With the spiritualising of the aim, the chief end became, not gratifying the expectations of other men, but meeting the demands of one's own ideals; not the appearing, but the being, good. Just as this turning to the inner nature first made life independent and honest, so it promised an incomparably more exalted happiness, a purer joy. The forceful and virile nature of Plato is not the one to renounce happiness; yet Plato does not find it, as do the masses, in outward events and successes. Rather, seeking it in activity itself enables him to undertake a great life-work in developing the inner nature. What is required is first to fill the entire circuit of life's activities with eager aspiration, and then to unite all into a harmony. On the result depends the success or failure of life, and also our happiness or unhappiness. For, according to Plato, whatever harmony or discord there is in life will be clearly perceived and actually felt, will be felt just as it exists, without illusion. Hence the actual state of the soul is truthfully reflected in joy or sorrow; justice with its harmony yields blessedness, a form of happiness exalted far above all other kinds; viciousness, on the other hand, with its discord, its disruption and hostility toward our real nature, produces unbearable suffering.

This inseparable connection between active virtue and happiness forms the highest development of the wisdom of an active and happy race: such is the ideal for which Greek philosophy fought to the last. According to this conviction, happiness forms the natural consequence, but not the motive of action;

where the good has its worth in itself, in its own inner beauty, the perception of which always delights and fascinates, there all petty concern about rewards vanishes. To give happiness this inner foundation means to break the power of destiny over men. All the privations and antagonisms of outward circumstances cannot alter the condition of soul created by the soul's own act; its superiority and self-sufficiency are only strengthened and made more obvious by the contrast. Possessed of all the favour of fortune, the bad man remains miserable; indeed, prosperity renders him only the more wretched, since evil flourishes more rankly in a rich soil: but to the good man, the inner splendour of his life is first fully revealed in the presence of obstacles and suffering. Holding such convictions, Plato draws an impressive picture of the suffering just man, who is pursued until his death by the apparent injustice that afflicts him, but whose inner nobility shines with transcendent lustre in the midst of trial—a picture which in its outward approach to Christian ideas only renders more obvious the inner divergence between the two worlds.

(d) *Asceticism and the Transfiguration of the World*

Absolutely essential to the Platonic view was the separation between the realm of truth, as that of pure forms, and the realm of immediate existence. Between these there is an impassable gulf; historical research has failed to lessen the separation. The more energetically Plato insists that spiritual goods have their worth within themselves, and that that worth is incomparable, the more certain he becomes that they constitute a realm of their own opposed to a world of lesser truth and completeness. What consequences for human conduct has such a rigorous separation of the ideal from the actual? Can conduct embrace both, or should it be directed exclusively toward the ideal? The latter course is unconditionally enjoined by Plato. For why should we divide our energies, when the world of real being demands our unreserved devotion? why concern ourselves with the transitory, when the way to the eternal stands open? why

linger in obscure twilight amid shadowy reflections, when we may gaze upon the full pure light of the archetypes? Plato is impelled in this direction by his eager longing for essential being: measured by the constancy and simplicity of reality, the sense-world, with its myriad shifting forms, sinks into a deceptive appearance. Hence it becomes the problem of problems to free oneself wholly from this illusion, and to dedicate all love, all strength, and all effort to immutable being. In this manner Plato develops a type of asceticism which is individual and distinctive.

Viewed from this elevation, the worthlessness and falsity of the life that immediately surrounds us is obvious. It is not so much that it is defective in detail, as that it fails as a whole, and particularly as to its basis. Here where sensuousness draws everything down to its own level, there is no such thing as pure happiness; everything noble is distorted and perverted, all effort is directed to the appearance and not to the thing itself, while the ceaseless change of phenomena yields at no point a lasting good. Into the dark cave of sensuousness, to which we are here banished, the great and luminous world of truth throws but faint and fleeting images. If thought opens to us a way of escape from such bondage, ought we not joyfully to enter upon it? ought we not courageously to cast off every tie that binds us to the realm of shadows? But everything that is there prized as a good holds us fast—beauty, riches, strength of body, distinguished connections; hence the real friend of truth must inwardly renounce even these. To the soul the body is a prison, indeed a grave. It can rescue itself only by putting away all pleasure and desire, pain and fear. For these passions weld it to the body, and cause it to mistake the world of sense-appearance for the true world. Yet the soul cannot free itself from the passions, so long as the events of everyday life possess the slightest value for it, for then they rule it; consequently it must rise to complete indifference to them, and find happiness exclusively in intellectual activity, *i. e.*, in the knowledge of true being. The blows of fortune glance from a wise and brave soul that partici-

pates in immutable goods. "It is best to remain composed and not to be excited in the presence of misfortunes, inasmuch as neither in such matters are good and evil easily discerned, nor does he who takes disaster hard gain anything thereby, nor in general does anything in human affairs merit great eagerness." And we ought not to grieve like women over the calamities of others, but manfully to help the sick and set the fallen upon his feet. Only he attains a complete victory who leaves the whole life of sensation behind him, and lifts himself heroically above the world of joys and sorrows. With such a release of life from the thraldom of sensuous existence, death loses all its terrors; it becomes an "escape from all error and unreason and fear and wild passion and all other human ills." To the disembodied soul alone is the full truth revealed, for only what is pure may come into contact with the pure. Thus the escape from the earthly, the preparation for death, becomes the chief problem of philosophy; it now means the awaking out of dazed dreaming into perfect clearness, a return from a strange land to one's home.

Here we have asceticism in the full sense of the word. There remains, indeed, a wide divergence between the Platonic and the mediæval asceticism. It is only the sensuous and merely human existence, not the world in general, that is surrendered; and the eternal being that is the object of striving is not located in the distant Beyond as an object of faith and hope, but it surrounds the soul of kindred nature even in this life with an immediate presence; also it does not appear as the gracious gift of a higher power, but as a result of one's own activity, as a product of human freedom.

But even with such an interpretation, the break with the whole immediate condition of mankind remains. For with the rejection of all the pains and joys, all the cares and problems of humanity, existence threatens to lose all living content, the infinite wealth of being to sink into the abyss of a formless eternity.

In such asceticism as this, we have the true Plato and the consistent Plato, but by no means the whole Plato. For the ascetic

tendency in Plato underwent a considerable modification, in fact it suffered a complete reaction, as has happened indeed with all exponents of asceticism who, in their concern for the individual, did not forget the claims of humanity in general. The individual thinker, it is true, may cut himself off from the sensuous world, but mankind as a whole cannot follow him: thus regard for the weaker brethren would have sufficed of itself to lead Plato back to the sensuous world. Hence a concession which, in the Orient, and often even on Christian soil, was only a reluctant one, found Plato predisposed in its favour. As a Greek, and as the friend, indeed the discoverer, of beauty, so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned, he is bound by a thousand ties to the actual world; and that fact compels him to search out the good in the sensuous also, and to rejoice in it.

In particular, an effort peculiar to Plato, to insert an intermediate link between the spiritual and the sensuous, between reality and appearance, between the eternal and the transitory, operates to exalt the sensuous world, and so to preserve life from disruption. That is, the soul appears as a mediation between the spirit and the sensuous nature, in that it receives the eternal truths from the former, but lives its life in the latter; within the soul itself, strenuous effort mediates between the intellectual faculties and the senses, and, in cognition, correct opinion mediates between knowledge and ignorance. Similarly, in the theories of the state and of nature, opposites are connected by intermediate links, and all the phenomena arranged in a graded series. Finally, the beautiful becomes a connecting link between pure spirit and the sensuous world, inasmuch as order, proportion, and harmony dominate both worlds, and give also to the latter a share in divinity.

With Plato, however, the union of higher and lower results not only from an impartation from above, but also from the direct aspiration of the sensuous and human toward the divine. Throughout the whole finite world there stirs the longing for some share in the good and the eternal, in order that the finite itself may become imperishable. Love, or Eros, is nought but

such a striving for immortality. This longing attains full development only in the pursuit of knowledge, which leads to a perfect union with the true and the eternal. Yet it pervades the whole universe in an ascending progress, and the contemplation of the thinker joyfully traces this mounting stairway of love.

Such a transformation increases the significance of the immediate world and augments the wealth of human life. Knowledge no longer forms its exclusive content, but only the dominating height which sheds forth light and reason in all directions. But the lower sphere acquires worth as being an indispensable step toward that height; for our eyes can accustom themselves but gradually to the light of the Ideas. Moreover, the Idea of justice and harmony uplifts the lower sphere by making it a part of the whole, and by setting it a special task whose accomplishment becomes essential to the completion of the whole work, both in the human soul and in the state. That sphere becomes evil only when the order is reversed, and the higher supplanted; hence, even the sensuous is no longer as such to be condemned, but only in its excess and when it subjugates the mind.

To this there corresponds a different personal attitude toward human things; the thinker cannot now look coldly down upon them from a distant height. Rather he shares feelingly in the common lot: all good becomes his joy, all evil his pain. Hence he is impelled with a mighty force toward the furtherance of the good and the combating of evil. The ascetic thinker becomes a bold and passionate reformer; he devises vast plans for the radical amelioration of human conditions, and does not shrink from abrupt changes. Instead of the earlier suppression of the emotions, we are now told that without a noble anger nothing excellent can be accomplished. Plato here appears as an ardent champion, whom the battle with its excitement stirs to joyful enthusiasm, only the more since, in his view, the Deity ever leads the combat.

Accordingly, Platonism embraces at once asceticism and a transfiguration of the world. But the latter, too, is a consequence of the world of Ideas; for even the reason in the immediate world

is descended from the Ideas. So, in spite of the cleavage, life remains directed toward one chief goal: in both worlds, all good is spiritual in nature, all reason derived from right insight. That, however, everything has not been reconciled, that in the common stream there remain conflicting currents, is indicated, not to mention other points, by the discrepant treatment of the emotions. But perhaps the blame for the contradiction should not fall upon Plato alone; perhaps there reside in human life in general impulses toward opposite goals. Can we attain the independence and original purity of intellectual life without breaking away from experience? Can we develop and perfect it without returning to experience? However that may be, it has not been those thinkers who have hastily seized upon a simple unity and fortified their position against all possible contradictions who have exerted the profoundest influence, but those who have allowed the different tendencies to conflict strongly with one another and to expend themselves fully: by this means they have started a self-accelerating movement, an inner forward impulse of life. Who would deny that such has been the case with Plato?

(e) *The View of Human Life as a Whole*

All the principal aspects of Plato's thought coalesce in his comprehensive view of human existence. The chief antithesis of the two worlds applies also to man, who consists of body and soul, or rather appears to do so. In truth, the soul alone constitutes the self, to which the body is only externally appended. The soul shares in the world of eternal being and pure beauty, while the body draws us down to the sensuous realm, and subjects us to its vicissitudes. So conceived, the immortality of the soul is beyond all doubt. If the essence of life lies beyond all temporal change and all relation to surroundings, and immutability is the chief characteristic of spiritual existence, then must the soul, each individual soul, belong to the eternal elements of reality. It never came into being, and cannot pass away. Its

connection with the body appears as a mere episode in its life, indeed as the result of guilt, of an "intellectual Fall" (Rohde); and the serious work of life is designed to free it from the consequences of this guilt, and finally to bring it, although after manifold transmigrations, back to the invisible world.

Plato's powerful development of these convictions has exerted the profoundest influence upon mankind. It was not the average intelligence of his surroundings that provided him with a belief in the immortality of the soul. For the old idea of a shadowy existence of souls in Hades—fundamentally different from that of a true immortality—still held sway over men's minds: even for a Socrates immortality was a moot question. True, in smaller religious circles, belief in immortality had taken root, but rather as a subjective conviction than as part of a comprehensive system of thought. Plato was the first to make the belief the central point in a view of the world, and to connect it with the whole of human striving.

The principal direction of human effort is also herewith determined. For all thought is now concentrated upon the inner state of man, upon the liberation and purifying of the immortal soul. Life attains in fact a thoroughly spiritual character; and the pursuit of truth demands our utmost exertion only the more because the material world encompasses us with the deceptive appearance of truth, and our souls are as if covered up and buried, and our faculty of knowledge weakened and dimmed, by the sensuous. So a complete inversion of the ordinary view is necessary: in an abrupt break with his first state, let man turn his spiritual eye and even his whole being away from gloomy darkness to the light of truth. The movement of life, like all training and education, does not develop from mere experience; nor does progress arise from the mere contact of inner and outer; rather, active effort is a recollection of the true nature of the mind, a return to the real, ever-present, merely obscured nature. For the soul must have brought with it into this life a spiritual capital, which was to abide as an imperishable possession. Hence the well-known doctrine of reminiscence and innate

(better, native) Ideas, which, notwithstanding all that is problematic in its nearer definition, is unassailable in the fundamental conception that all true living is an unfolding of one's own being, and that the external world can only arouse, but not create, mental activity and particularly knowledge. The attempt to impart genuine insight and virtue by means of the influence of custom and practice Plato likens to the effort to confer sight upon the blind externally. All knowledge in the end is drawn, not from experience, but from the eternal nature of the mind. "Individual things are specimens which remind us of the abstract concepts, but they are not the reality to which those concepts refer." (Zeller.)

Intimately connected with this view of life's problem are certain convictions regarding the actual conduct of life. Individuals there are, in Plato's belief, who really devote themselves to true being; genuine virtue—such, in fact, is the common assertion of the Greek thinkers—really exists among men. But such individuals constitute the rare exceptions; the great majority cling to the world of illusion, and mistake the nature of the good. The contrast between sterling and worthless men is here felt more acutely than are their common problems and common destiny; in fact, a conspicuous separation of the noble from the vulgar appears indispensable to the maintenance of the moral order. But when it is said that the multitude, because of its propensity for sensuous enjoyment, approaches the manner of life of animals, while the sage in his contemplation of the eternal world leads a life akin to the divine, all ties between them threaten to dissolve, and mankind to be separated into two completely unrelated classes. And, indeed, permanently so. For here every sort of faith in an intellectual and moral progress is wanting. As in the universe, so also in human life, the relation of good and evil is regarded as in the main unalterable. The sensuous, the source of all the hindrance, is abiding; and the positive opposition between the sensuous and the spiritual, between the fleeting world of change and immutable being, permits of no faith in any sort of real progress. But that does not

mean doing away with all movement and readjustment in human affairs. Plato accounts for these, in agreement with older thinkers, by the assumption of cycles, great world-epochs, which were first known to astronomy. After completing their circuit, things come round again to the starting-point, and then repeat the same course *ad infinitum:* thus historical movement is resolved into an endless series of cycles having like contents. And this order amid change is presented as a picture of eternity. Hence here we have no historical development with its hopes and prospects; here there is no appeal from the evils of the present to a better future.

Accordingly, the Platonic view of the conduct of life is deficient in a number of motives which the modern man regards as indispensable. On the other hand, many cares and doubts are unknown to it; and the spiritual nature of man, his kinship with the Deity, here offers an abundant compensation for all the defects of average existence. The virtuous man can escape from the dim twilight of human relations, and fill his soul with the pure light. If he puts forth his utmost effort, the high aim is indeed attainable. For Plato recognises no impassable gulf between the striving mind and the truth, no erring on the part of him who earnestly seeks: the thinking that follows the right method is infallible. Just as the innermost secrets of things can be penetrated by a powerful and courageous act of thought, so such thinking exercises control over all conduct and feeling. True knowledge makes the whole life rational; there is no radical evil which could prevent such progress. So each moment an inspiring present may be won, and life be lifted above all the defects of the sensuous sphere to a state of stability and gladness. Activity is ever the source of well-being; but since all human initiative is firmly rooted in the kinship of our nature with eternal being and perfect beauty, such activity, notwithstanding its heroic uplift, engenders no stormy excitement nor confusing unrest.

Let us now pursue these convictions in their application to the various departments of life.

(f) *The Several Departments of Life*

(*a*) RELIGION

Plato's nature is deeply religious in the sense that the dependence of man upon the universe, which pervades all his work, both finds full recognition in his positive convictions and appears transmuted into the intimacy of feeling. His thought is permeated with the belief that a "kingly mind" rules the universe. Even his diction, which is replete with expressions borrowed from religion and worship, shows how profoundly he feels that he is surrounded by the working of a divine power. But the religion of Plato remains to the end the religion of a Greek thinker; and between this and the Christian religion there exists a wide chasm. For to the Greek, religion is not a deliverance from direst extremity, not the restitution of the disturbed, even destroyed, union with the Deity, not the consolation of the helpless and the weak. Rather, to him, the secure relationship with the divine which exists by nature is not so shattered by waywardness that it cannot be restored by human agency at any moment. Furthermore, religion is here so identified with every form of activity that it enhances the importance of human life and gives grandeur to all its relations. The consciousness of being protected and supported in the battle of life by the Deity, fills the mind of the sage with deep piety. Yet this religion does not create a world of its own, and accordingly does not form any special sphere opposed to ordinary life. Likewise, it does not give rise to a spiritual community, or anything that could be called a personal relationship; and no uplifting and inner renewal of life results from the exercise of the divine sway.

Consequently no need is felt of a special historical revelation, in distinction from the general manifestation of the divine in the universe and in human nature. Just as little is there any need felt for a religious doctrine, a theology;

Greek piety accords perfectly with a distinct consciousness of the great distance between God and man. The immutable and pure must not be drawn into the impure sphere of sensuous change; only by means of intermediate steps can it communicate itself to the lower realm; God does not mingle with men. Hence Plato's saying: "God, the father and creator of the universe, is difficult to find, and, when found, impossible to impart to all."

This religion of active, healthy, strong men follows, in its further development, the twofold direction of Plato's work. To the metaphysician, the search for truth is itself the true religion. God means the absolutely immutable and simple Being, from whom all unchangeableness and simplicity, but also all truth, are derived: He is the measure of all things. It is when man turns from the broken reflection to the pure source of all light, that his life is guided from appearance to truth.

In the other direction, God is the ideal of moral perfection, the completely just and good Spirit. To become like God means to be intelligently pious and just; piety, however, is nothing else than justice toward the Deity, the fulfilment of the whole obligation due to the Godhead. The central point of this conviction is the conception of the moral order of the world, of a full retribution for good and evil. But, while thus adopting the fundamental conception of the Greek religion, Plato broadens and deepens it. In the opinion of the people, retribution was to be expected in this world; if it did not fall upon the individual, it would fall upon his house. Plato, too, looked for justice in this life; but its complete triumph he believed would come only in the Beyond. He developed the conception of a judgment after death, which would be a judgment of the soul in its nakedness, and would be incorruptible in its verdict; and the marvellous power of his delineation has engraved this picture upon the imagination of mankind for all time. But it is not Plato's intention to direct the thoughts of men mainly beyond the grave. Of the dead, we ought to think that they have passed

away, after their work is ended and their mission fulfilled; but for ourselves we must give heed to the present.

The Platonic justice never passes into severity; it is tempered with mercy. Nevertheless, it always stands before love, and the moral realm here appears as a world-state ruled by the Deity—a view which profoundly influenced later times, including Christianity.

That Plato in this particular does not abandon so much as develop the popular belief is of a piece with that other fact that, notwithstanding his energetic defence of a unity dominating the world, he does not surrender the plurality of divine forces, but, by teaching the immanence of the life of nature, transplants the mythological conception to the soil of philosophy. But wherever the popular views contradict the purified notions of philosophy, Plato does not shrink from making vigorous protest, nor even from open hostility. He rejects all that is ignoble and unworthy in the customary representations of the gods; he rejects with even greater indignation a form of worship which, instead of inculcating an approach to the Deity by means of good deeds and moral worth, teaches the purchase of His favour by outward observances, sacrifices, and the like, and thus shamefully degrades religion to the level of a traffic. Only small men, only weaklings, will make use of such means; in reality it is the man of action who may be certain of the divine help: the thought of the Deity, which is a terror to the evildoer fills the former with glad anticipations.

(β) THE STATE

Plato's ascetic tendency implies a decidedly negative attitude toward the state. Where the immediate world is a thing of change and illusion, where, moreover, a mind immersed in intellectual pursuits finds itself out of sympathy with its social surroundings, there political life can hardly appear as an attractive field for co-operation. None the less, the state strongly attracts Plato; and the fact bears ample testimony to the force

with which he is recalled from the world of abstract thought to an active interest in the community. In reality, political theory occupies a large place in Plato's world of thought; and the principal stages in his inner development are reflected in its successive ideals.

The latest view, which is contained in "The Laws," may here be disregarded, since, notwithstanding the wisdom of many individual utterances, it possesses too little completeness. On the other hand, the two views of the state which "The Republic" presents must be considered.

In the first, we find Plato an energetic reformer of the Greek state, along the line of an enlargement of the Socratic doctrine. The state is treated—with a sustained analogy to the individual soul—as exhibiting the ideal of justice writ large. To this end, all its affairs, and particularly education, should be regulated in strict accordance with the laws of ethics; the principal functions of society should be definitely distinguished, in conformity with the stages of soul life, and represented by the activity of fixed classes; each individual should perform his special task with whole-souled devotion, yet all should work together under the reign of intelligence toward one harmonious result. In order not to be drawn away from the service of the common end by private interests, the higher classes must relinquish private property and family ties; hence communism on ethical, not economic, grounds forms the copestone of the Platonic theory.

Thus the state becomes an ethical ideal, an empire of virtue based upon insight. Drawn in bold lines, this picture appears at first to present a sharp contrast to reality; closer inspection, however, reveals a number of threads of connection between the daring speculations of the thinker and actual Greek conditions. For at this time Plato still believed in the possibility of great reforms in the institutions of Greece.

The later sketch of the state surrenders this hope. The longing for the realm of immutable being has in the end so estranged the thinker from the conditions of human existence

that he looks back upon life as he might upon a gloomy cavern seen from a lofty elevation. If, nevertheless, he returns thither, he does so, not to please himself, but for the sake of the brethren, and less in the hope of any result than in order even there to proclaim the eternal truths. The state which originates from this attitude is above all an institution for the preparation of men for the realm of eternal truth; here the task is, by an orderly ascent, gradually to free the soul from the sensuous, and win it over to the supersensuous; thus the whole of life becomes a stern education, a spiritual purification; and this education gradually raises man to a world in the presence of which all political life vanishes. By means of the state itself there results an emancipation from the sphere to which the state belongs.

Thus the two views are not only different but incompatible. Yet, in spite of the disagreement, there are important features which are common to both, and which give to the Platonic state a unity of character. In both, the state is man magnified; all authority rests with superior intelligence; spiritual and moral goods are the principal content of the life of the state; the individual is everywhere subordinated to the whole. Without an elimination of individual initiative and the establishment of irrevocable ordinances, the state cannot enter into the service of reason. But this permanence of conditions and strict subordination of the individual Plato demands at the same moment that he raises human personality high above the state, subjects traditional conditions to a searching criticism, and devises the boldest schemes for complete reconstruction. Accordingly, he demands for the philosopher a privilege which he denies to the rest of mankind: the state ought to receive a content free from all subjective opinion, yet it must receive it through the mental labour of the sovereign personality. This contradiction alone was sufficient to prevent Plato's doctrine from exercising the slightest contemporary influence: such valuable suggestions and fruitful seeds as it contained were forced to await for their appreciation entirely different conditions.

(γ) ART

Plato's labours on behalf of art and of the state illustrate the irony of fate. He expended upon the state, a subject foreign to his innermost nature, an incalculable amount of trouble, while art, to which the deepest chords of his being responded, failed of an adequate theoretical consideration. In fact, the very thinker who, more than any other, was an artist in his thinking, heaped accusation after accusation upon art. The metaphysical and ethical sides of his nature conspired against the artistic. As, in his view, a mere imitation of the sensuous, a copy of the copy, art retreats to the farthest distance from essential being. The varied and changing forms for which art, particularly the drama, demands our sympathetic interest, are only a hindrance, since one's own individual rôle in life offers quite enough for consideration. Offensive also is the impure content of the poetry dominated by mythological ideas; finally, the feverish excitement of the emotional life, which Plato sees taking possession of the art of his time, is highly objectionable. In all this we miss a proper æsthetic valuation of art: such an estimate was rendered peculiarly difficult for a Greek thinker by the intimate connection of art with the ethical and religious life of the nation. Hence there followed a severe conflict; in spite of personal sympathy, whatever endangered the moral welfare had to go. Entire species of art, such as the drama, are rejected without qualification; what remains must conform unconditionally to the requirements of morals. In this conflict between ethical and æsthetic interests, morals win an unqualified victory. Still, for Plato, the subordination of art does not mean any depreciation of beauty. For him, there is a way from the evils of human conduct to the beauty of the universe. And, just as in the cosmos, the good allies itself with beauty, with a severe and chaste beauty, so also the search for truth, the work of science, receives an artistic form. In other words, the structure of science itself becomes the highest and truest work of art.

(δ) SCIENCE

Science as understood by Plato is radically different from modern science. It does not seek for the minutest elements in order to construct the real world out of their combination; rather, it embraces all phenomena from the first in a single view; explanation proceeds from the greater to the less, from the whole to the part; synthesis governs analysis. "To see things together," to recognise relationships—that is for Plato the chief characteristic of the philosopher, whose peculiar greatness lies in creative intuition.

Similarly, Platonic science is not, like modern science, a translation of existence into terms of a gradual evolution, an explanation of being by change; on the contrary, its aim is to find eternal being amid fleeting change, a perfectly ordered cosmos amid the chaos of the phenomenal world. But, finding the essence is not so much a matter of long and tedious labour as it is an act of insight; mental power transports us to the realm of truth at a stroke. Here science is free from the gnawing doubt that otherwise attacks it at the very root. Only thus can it provide a support to life and fill it with a joyful confidence.

In this view of knowledge, all the emphasis falls upon the fundamental questions, and the subordinate sciences are regarded merely as preliminaries to philosophy. Only mathematics, as the science which conducts us from the sensuous to the supersensuous, receives full recognition. On the other hand, all concern with the varied content of the sensible world appears of small worth, and any assertion regarding it merely as a more or less plausible assumption. Moreover, all interpretation of nature proceeds from the soul, which is also the ground of all motion in the universe. By the vigorous development of such convictions, Plato did serious injury to the pursuit of natural science: a network of subjective notions here overspread the actual world, and prevented an unbiassed estimate of things in their natural relations; as a consequence, the important begin-

nings of an exact knowledge of nature contained in the pre-Socratic philosophy were lost for more than two thousand years. The strong point in Plato's achievement lies in the pure philosophy of concepts, the dialectic, which accepts nothing from without, and even gives a full justification of its own bases. Here there is consummated a triumphant emancipation of thought from all material bonds; while a complete confidence of the mind in its own faculties is taught by example. When Plato calls the dialectic method "the highest gift of the gods, and the true Promethean fire," such an estimate possesses for him the fullest personal truth.

(g) *Retrospect*

The most important and most fruitful in results of all Plato's achievements is undoubtedly the basing of human activity and the whole structure of civilisation upon theoretical knowledge: it meant a new inner stability of life and a substantial elevation of our existence. But we saw that the granting of such prominence to theoretical knowledge by no means entailed the dwarfing of the remaining forms of man's activity; on the contrary, all the chief directions of human labour were permitted to develop without obstruction and mutually to strengthen and further one another. As the various aspects of Plato's mind were bound together by the powerful, broad personality of the man, so all the diverging tendencies of his own life inevitably again converged and united themselves into a single life-work. In later times, indeed, the diverging currents of man's activity flowed further apart, and forbade so complete a reunion. Yet this subsequent tendency toward specialisation makes the life and labour of Plato only the more valuable. For the latter present vividly to our minds that unity of a many-sided activity which he attained, and which even we may not surrender, although now it rises before us only as a remote ideal. So, in general, antiquity regarded many aims as speedily attainable, which in the course of history have ever displayed new complications and ever re-

ceded further from us: should we, therefore, look upon them as worthless?

Plato represents the zenith of the intellectual development of Greece. Its two chief tendencies, the desire for knowledge and the sense for form, the scientific and the artistic impulses, found in him their most intimate union and most fruitful mutual interaction. His view of life brought the characteristic Greek idealism to its most clearly defined expression. Its peculiar type consists in the inextricable interweaving of these convictions: that the indomitable work of thought discloses a new world of true being and genuine happiness, that this world is in ceaseless conflict with the actual world and can never fully overcome its resistance, that, however, in its own inexhaustible life it remains superior to all assaults, and by its immutable truth and beauty it lifts men securely above the sphere of strife and suffering. The kinship of this view of life with that later developed by Christianity is as unmistakable as is their wide divergence within the same limits. In both, the aim is to gain a higher world; but in Plato true insight is the way thither, in Christianity purity of heart; in both, the Deity is at work in human affairs; but with Plato the divine is operative equally at all times and in all places, in nature as well as among men, while Christianity shows the divine revelation as culminating at a single point in human history, and hence arrives at the doctrine of an historical development, a thing unknown to Plato, and something which he must necessarily have rejected.

The inexhaustible influence of the great idealist of Greece is due quite as much to the spontaneous life animating all his work as to the diverse tendencies which freely unfold and culminate in him. Throughout the whole course of history Plato's philosophy has acted as a powerful stimulus to men's minds, resisting every tendency of thought to relapse into the formal and the pedantic, and continually turning the gaze away from the petty toward the great, and away from the limited and the bounded toward the broad and the free. Moreover, out of the

abundance of his riches Plato has offered diverse things to diverse epochs. In later antiquity, he became the protagonist of those who sought to satisfy by means of philosophy the growing religious longing: he was recognised as the priestly herald of the true wisdom, which freed men from the beguiling illusion of the senses and guided their thoughts back to the eternal home. Yet the same philosopher, with his many-sided life, his artistic charm, and his youthful joy in beauty, became the favourite thinker of the Renaissance: reverence for him was in that age the bond of union between the greatest masters. And do not such names as Winckelmann, Schleiermacher, and Boeckh show how far Plato's influence extends into our own time? Thus, his life-work has woven a golden cord about the ages, and the saying of the later Greek philosopher, "The Platonic grace and charm are forever new," has perfect truth even to-day.

III. ARISTOTLE

(a) *General Characteristics*

Aristotle's (384–322) view of life was determined by quite other conditions of fortune and personal character. The son of a Macedonian court physician, he was not involved by birth and education in the inner conflicts of Greek life, as was Plato, nor was he driven by indignation at the sordidness of actual conditions into antagonism to them; rather he came from the borders of the Greek world to its centre, impelled by the sole desire to appropriate the accumulated riches of a fully matured civilisation. Furthermore, he found there an entirely different state of things than did the reformer Plato. The intellectual ferment, the ferverish excitement, the brilliant creative work of the fifth century were long past. The time had come for calm, deliberate research; and it was to this work of research that Aristotle gave himself, and his labours represent its culmination. Thoroughly Greek in character and disposition, he was yet far enough removed from the turmoil of daily life to survey

with impartiality the total achievement of the Greek people, and to find in his joy in this employment consolation for the evils of the time.

At the first view, the sober prose of the Aristotelian narrative, the simple objectivity of his method, and the severe repression of all personal feeling might easily create the impression that the thinker had already outgrown the associations of classical antiquity, and belonged to the learned period of Hellenism. Unquestionably Aristotle was a great scholar, perhaps the greatest the world has known; but before all else he was a profound thinker, a man of all-comprehensive ideas and great power of statement. That he assimilated to his own ideas a vast material, and so prescribed the course which science and philosophy followed for centuries, constitutes his principal title to greatness. As a thinker, however, Aristotle is wholly rooted in the classical world: its fundamental views, its valuations, work on uninterruptedly in him. Whoever traces his doctrines and conceptions back to their source soon becomes aware of the peculiar Greek quality concealed beneath their apparent universality. In a word, Aristotle's system brings the substance of the classic world of Greece to marvellously perfect scientific expression, and so hands it down to future humanity.

The sympathetic attitude toward tradition, and the endeavour to maintain a friendly relation with actual conditions, of themselves indicate a disposition different from that of Plato. Instead of the latter's powerful and independent personality, with its inevitable antagonism to its surroundings, its passionate fervour and the strong, harshly contrasted colours of its view of the world, we have in Aristotle a simple, serious, never-wearying effort to comprehend the objective world, to discover its actual state, and to trace all its relationships. With this appeal to the actual world, this linking of thought with things, activity resolves itself into the tireless industry that energetically explores the world and brings forth its hidden riches for the service of man. Thus, out of the philosophy created by a sovereign personality there grows the philosophy resulting from an all-con-

quering industry; this too is a permanent type, and the source of a particular view of life.

(b) *Elements of the Aristotelian View of the World*

The peculiar character of the Aristotelian view of the world appears most readily by comparison with the Platonic. Aristotle himself is chiefly conscious of his opposition to Plato; whereas, in truth, they have a great deal in common. First of all, he shares with Plato the conviction that human life is to be comprehended only from the stand-point of the whole of reality: with him, also, our existence finds its source in the cosmos; our deeds are true through conformity with reality; all activity follows its object, all method the matter in hand. But it is intelligence that unites us to the universe; hence, here also, intelligence is the essence of our being. Truth is revealed only to thought, and to thought in the form of concepts; hence, here again, philosophy becomes pre-eminently the science of concepts; investigation should transform the world into a realm of concepts. Finally, Aristotle shares with his master the high regard for form; it constitutes also for him the abiding essence as well as the worth and beauty of things.

With such decided agreement in the general point of view, Aristotle's philosophy retains enough kinship with Platonism to admit of its being harmonised with a broad view of the latter. But apart from this general similarity, it presents the furthest conceivable divergence from Platonism. For, while for Plato there is no eternal truth and no pure beauty without the strictest separation of the world of essence from that of appearance, Aristotle's chief concern is to show the unity of all reality. According to the latter's conviction, we only need to understand the world aright in order to recognise in it an empire of reason, and to find in it all that human beings require. The Platonic Doctrine of Ideas is rejected as an inadmissible separation of the actual world from the world of real being. Moreover, there is no room here for a religion. To be sure, Aristotle affirms the

existence of a transcendent Deity as the source of reason, and as the origin of the motion which from eternity to eternity pervades the universe. But he denies to this Deity any activity within the world; concern with external things, not to say petty human affairs, would destroy the completeness of the Deity's life. So God, or pure Intelligence, himself unmoved, moves the world by his mere being; any further development of things arises from their own nature. Here, accordingly, there is no moral order of the world, and no Providence. Likewise, there can be no hope of a personal immortality. True, the power of thought in us does not spring from a mere natural process; and it will not be extinguished with the dissolution of the body, but return to the universal reason. But such indestructibility of the divine in us does not mean the continuance of the individual.

With the disappearance of religion the spiritual inwardness and greatness of soul of a Plato are lost. Life receives narrower limits, and its dominant feeling becomes more sober. But the above negation has not the significance for Aristotle of a surrender of the rationality of the actual world, or of the ideality of life. The world with its own undisrupted being here seems equal to the attainment of all aims, while the present life now becomes of sufficient importance fully to occupy and to satisfy mankind. But the rationality of the world does not lie exposed upon the surface; science is necessary, in order to free the appearance of things from illusion and to penetrate beyond the confusions and contradictions of the first impression to the harmony of the whole. Out of the effort to attain this unity there springs a thoroughly individual view of the world and of life, a system of immanent idealism, which is incomparable in the poise and precision of its achievement.

The first antithesis Aristotle undertakes to solve is that of Matter and Form. Plato, to insure its independence and purity, severed Form completely from sensuous existence, and ascribed it to the latter only in a derivative sense. But Aristotle knows Form only as united with Matter; it is actual only within the living process which always includes Matter also. This living

process is a striving upward of Matter toward Form, and a seizure of the Matter by the Form. For the principal movement always resides with the Form, as the animating and shaping Force. Hence the developed being must always precede the one which is evolving, and every attempt to derive the actual from non-rational beginnings must be rejected. In the case of terrestrial life, it is true that the Matter is confined only for a limited time, and in death disappears from the structure. But in generation the Form continually seizes new Matter, so that evolution is a constant victory of Form over the formless, and also of the good over the less good. For in view of the readiness with which Matter receives the Form, it would hardly do to speak of a principle of evil. Aristotle, indeed, is proud of the fact that his own system does not ascribe an independent power to evil, and hence avoids any duality of principles. Such evils as exist in human affairs spring from the tendency in Matter not to carry out fully the movement toward Form, but to remain arrested upon a lower stage. In this way much that fails of its purpose originates. Yet the philosopher is reassured by the reflection that evil nowhere manifests an independent nature, but always consists in an abatement from the good, a deprivation of excellence.

Such a solution of the antithesis alters the view of development inwardly as well. If Form is less an archetype superior to things than a force at work within them, what we may call the artistic view of reality fades before the dynamic; the evolution of life itself becomes the main thing. The world now appears ruled by ends, that is, by life-wholes, which comprise within themselves a multitude of processes and unite them to a joint result. Such life-wholes are seen first of all in organisms, which exist in an ascending scale according to the degree of articulation. That is to say, the more sharply the organs and functions are separated the greater will be the total efficiency: man accordingly constitutes the highest form of natural life. But the sphere of ends extends beyond the realm of organic beings to the universe; or rather, the conception of the organic em-

braces the whole of nature. Nowhere in the universe do motions appear to intersect each other confusedly, rather every motion takes place in a determinate direction, and arrives at a fixed point of termination, where it passes into a permanent state, namely, some equivalent effect. Herewith we encounter the sharp distinction between an activity directed merely to an end beyond itself, and the complete activity that has its end within itself, called in Aristotelian phrase "energy." This complete activity, with its development of all latent capacities, and its union of all multiplicity into a living process, is in no wise a mere play upon the surface, but moves the whole being and discloses the uttermost depths of things. This holds good both of the individual and of the universe. Traversed by movement, complete activity itself remains at rest, and forms, with all its complexity, a living, organic whole—not something "episodic," like a bad tragedy.

A similar effort to attain unity appears in Aristotle's treatment of the mind and the body, or the inner and the outer. He neither knows of, nor looks for, a separate existence of the soul. The soul forms with the body a single life-process; it needs the body, just as vision needs the eye, or any function its organ. Hence the sensuous ought never to be decried; even in the process of knowledge it stands in high honour. True, this primary view is summarily sacrificed to the necessity that thought should surmount all natural processes. It could not grasp an enduring truth, nor reproduce faithfully the varied multiplicity of things, were it entangled in the changes and contradictions of the sensuous world. We must, therefore, assign to thought a position of supremacy, a share in the divine and the eternal. Yet whatever transpires upon this summit alters nothing of the outlook upon the rest of the world; this shows soul and body closely intertwined and co-ordinated.

In harmony with his fundamentally monistic tendency, Aristotle is likewise unable to separate inner from outer in the matter of conduct, and so to build up a moral realm of pure inwardness; rather he places inner and outer in a relation of unceasing

reciprocity, and everywhere unites energy of will and compliant outer conditions into a single organic whole. In his view, all volition tends to become externally visible, and since such an outward embodiment requires external means, the environment acquires far greater worth than it possessed for Plato. Likewise, the soul is here not furnished with ready-made concepts, but must acquire them at the hands of experience; so, too, social surroundings exercise a decisive influence upon moral development. For such capacities for moral growth as slumber in us are aroused and developed only by action: yet conduct must at first be imposed from without in the form of customs and laws; then, finally, the outward requirement becomes transformed into personal volition. Hence, in direct opposition to Plato, for whom there could be no true morality, *i. e.*, virtue founded upon insight, without a liberation from all social bonds, we have in Aristotle a recognition of the beneficent influence of society.

Aristotle further brings about a nearer approach of the universal and the particular. Thus, he does not sever the universals from individual things and oppose them to the latter, as does Plato; instead, he ascribes reality to them only as existing in concrete individuals. Nor is he fond of dwelling upon some summit of the highest universality; rather his thought is persistently drawn back to the world of perception and captured by its wealth of life. Whatever belongs to a thing exclusively and as a *differentia* he recognises as the completion of its being. Thus, *e. g.*, that which is peculiar to man forms the perfection of his nature, not what he possesses in common with other living beings.

The principal contrast under which effort is viewed by Aristotle is that of mere existence on the one hand, and of complete activity on the other; of empty, unsatisfied life, which ever looks vaguely beyond, and of life which realises its end and finds satisfaction in itself; of the being given by nature (*ζῆν*), and that well-being (*εὖ ζῆν*) which is achieved by one's own acts. The state of nature is indeed the necessary presupposition of all development; and, viewed from this stand-point, the

higher stages may appear to be superfluous. But it is in rising above the plane of mere necessity that life acquires content and worth; then we attain something that pleases in itself; then we find ourselves in the realm of beauty, and hence of real joy in life.

Aristotle, in fact, is profoundly convinced that complete activity, with its transformation of the whole being into living reality, yields at the same time the full sense of happiness. Hence happiness is principally our own creation; it cannot be communicated from without, nor put on like an ornament; rather it is proportional to rational activity and increases with it. If it be true that all life possesses a "natural sweetness," it must be particularly satisfying to the virtuous man, who knows how to give it a noble content. Whoever condemns pleasure, considers only its lowest forms, since it may accompany activity on all its higher levels. Moreover, pleasure may lead to the refinement and perfecting of activity, as, *e. g.*, delight in music promotes its creation. With this vindication of pleasure as the accompaniment of all normal activity, we reach the classical expression of "eudemonism," which teaches that the pleasure inseparable from activity stands far above all selfish enjoyment.

Hence only when activity attains complete, substantial efficiency does it lift human existence up to happiness. All show in conduct yields only the show of happiness. Accordingly, Aristotle insists upon veracity, and denounces every form of pretence: "solid," "genuine" (σπουδαῖος), is his favourite expression for the man who is the embodiment of virtue.

But excellence rises into distinction by the working out of the difference between beauty and utility, or that which pleases in itself, and that which is valued as a means to something else. Whoever makes utility the chief consideration is guilty of an inner perversion of life. For the service of utility continually directs activity to outward, alien things, while, with all the supposed advantages, the self is left inwardly empty. The result is a sharp contrast between a noble and a mean, a free and a servile, conduct of life. It is the business of a free and large-

minded man everywhere to seek beauty rather than utility; indeed, from this point of view, the lack of any useful results becomes an evidence of the inner worth of an occupation. Just this forms the proud boast of pure philosophy, that it offers no advantage whatever for the material life, but has its end wholly within itself. Thus we see that Aristotle's stronger leaning toward the actual world, and his rejection of the world of Ideas, have by no means sapped the power of ideal feeling.

(c) *The Sphere of Human Experience*

We have seen that human life must find its tasks and its rewards exclusively in this earthly existence, yet also that this limitation caused no serious conflicts for Aristotle. For this life affords opportunity for the full employment of all our faculties, and therefore for the attainment of the highest happiness. Hence there remain no wishes or hopes which cannot be fulfilled; nor is any need of individual immortality felt, or any impulse to cross the boundaries of existence prescribed by nature.

It thus becomes all the more important to make full use of this present life, and to raise it to the highest point of efficiency. With this in view, we must have special regard to our peculiarly human faculties, and determine our activity accordingly. The characteristic faculty of man is reason, which means, according to Aristotle, the power of thought, with its capacities for forming general concepts and arriving at general truths. Intelligence must, on the one hand, develop itself, and, on the other, react strongly upon those lower forms of mental life which we possess in common with the animals. This constitutes our life-work. Activity in accordance with reason, unobstructed and extending over the whole of life—not for a short time only, for one swallow does not make a spring—this and nothing else constitutes the happiness of man.

Possessed of such a conviction, Aristotle insists strongly upon filling the whole of life with strenuous activity. Even excellence

does not suffice, unless it is brought into exercise. For in sleep we experience no true happiness; nor in the Olympic games are the laurels won by the spectators, but by those who take part in the contest. But with Aristotle the unfolding of the active powers encounters no great obstacles. The soul is not estranged from itself, nor does it need to undergo a complete transformation, as with Plato; rather, human reason is merely undeveloped, and needs only to rise from latent capacity to a perfected faculty, while natural impulse always aims at the right mark.

Aristotle is unable to pursue the development of human life further without investigating more closely the relation of the inner motives of activity to the external surroundings and conditions. But in doing so, he shows the influence of opposing tendencies. On the one hand, the close connection between the inner and the outer, involved in his view of the world, and his dread of severing the bonds which unite the individual to kindred, friends, and countrymen, forbid a complete detachment of activity and destiny from the environment: it is impossible to withdraw ourselves from what there takes place and exerts its influence upon us. Tending in the opposite direction is Aristotle's effort to make conduct as independent as possible, and to exempt it from the contingencies of external relations, bondage to which throws us into a vacillation incompatible with true happiness. The result of these conflicting tendencies is a compromise, whereby the main thing in conduct becomes the inner act, the power and capacity of the agent, while its complete success depends partly upon outward circumstances. Just as a drama requires a scenic mounting, so our conduct requires for its completion embodiment in a visible performance, presentation upon the stage of life. But the inner act remains by far the chief factor. External goods serve only as the means and expression of action; they have value only so far as the latter appropriates and uses them; beyond this limit they become a useless accessory, indeed an impediment to life. Hence any effort toward the unlimited accumulation of external goods

must be emphatically condemned. For it is possible to attain the highest happiness with only moderate means; one can do what is beautiful, *i. e.*, act nobly, without ruling over land and sea. But the opposition of fortune must not be too great. Not only are certain elementary conditions, such as a normal physical stature, health, etc., essential to a happy life, but, on the other hand, overwhelming adversity can destroy it. Yet Aristotle's calm good sense, intent upon the average experience, and less concerned for the destiny of the race than for the welfare of individuals, is not deeply agitated over the possible calamities. The capable man, in his opinion, can face the battle of life with a stout heart. Our mental powers are quite equal to the ordinary evils. The heavy blows of fortune, such as befell Priam, are rare exceptions; but even they cannot make the noble man miserable. For when he patiently bears the heaviest misfortunes, not from stupidity, but out of greatness of soul, the beauty of his spirit shines through all his suffering. Hence all the disasters and inequalities of life do not shake Aristotle's faith in reason, nor prevent him from entering confidently upon a closer analysis of life's scope and content.

In doing this, he distinguishes two divergent aims in life: the development of the mind in and for itself, and the subjugation of the physical nature, or, the theoretical and the practical lives, as he terms them.

Of these two lives, Aristotle accords unqualified pre-eminence to the theoretical. It makes us freer from outward circumstances and more self-reliant. Then, science is concerned with the universe and its immutable elements; insight can here attain a stability and an exactness which are denied to the practical sphere by its ceaseless change. Aristotle's various expressions on this point culminate in the view that the acquiring of knowledge is the purest form of a large and self-sufficing activity, and that it most nearly fulfils the conditions demanded by the idea of happiness. Hence he says that true happiness is coincident only with the search for truth. It is not in our human capacity that we have a share in it, but only in so far as the

divine dwells in us; and this indwelling of the divine constitutes the only human immortality.

On the other hand, the practical sphere appears at first at a distinct disadvantage; its one problem is to subject the natural impulses to the mastery of the intellect. But this does not mean a control so to say by compulsion, but by an inward rationalising of the man's desires, by an incorporation of reason into the individual will; thus there is developed the conception of moral virtue, of a certain bearing and disposition of the whole man; at the same time, too, an inner relation of man to man. Aristotle's full and sympathetic account of this sphere readily creates the impression that he is not here concerned with some lower stage, but with a whole realm, indeed with the heart of life itself.

This impression is created in particular by Aristotle's treatment of the conception which, for him, dominates the whole of the practical life, the conception, namely, of the Mean. This conception is reached by a simple reflection. If the physical life is to be subject to reason, or, what is the same thing, reason is to be exhibited in the physical life, dangers arising from two opposite sources must be avoided. The physical life may either resist the sway of reason with unbridled violence, or it may prove to be too weak and meagre to afford reason the necessary means of a full development. Hence the just mean becomes the sum of practical wisdom. Moral virtue must avoid both a too much and a too little. For example, the brave man occupies the mean between the foolhardy man and the coward, the thrifty man the mean between the spendthrift and the miser, the agreeable man the mean between the wag and the dullard. In this doctrine of the mean, Aristotle shows himself to be in close touch with the Greek people, his full descriptions often appear to be pictures of actual life, and even his diction follows the vernacular. At the same time, many fundamental convictions which remind us of Plato pervade his work. Thus, in his doctrine of the mean, Aristotle expressly appeals to the analogy of art, whose masterpieces neither permit anything to

be added nor to be taken away. Likewise, the ethical idea of justice exerts an influence. For every aim within the system of human ends should receive its precise due, in accordance with the individual case; any departure therefrom, toward the more or toward the less, involves an injustice. Even if Aristotle surrenders the Platonic idea of a moral order, of an all-pervading universal law of justice, he none the less asserts its power within the sphere of human conduct.

The demand that the just mean be followed makes conduct vital rather than conventional. What the just mean is cannot be settled once for all, owing to the ceaseless change of life's conditions; nor can it be deduced from general propositions; on the contrary, it must be freshly determined every moment, in accordance with each particular situation. This requires, above all, accuracy of estimate, an unerring tact. Conduct thus becomes the Art of Life; existence is every moment tense, since the good helmsman must each time steer his way between Scylla and Charybdis with the same care.

Consequently, the just mean is unattainable unless we perfectly comprehend both the attendant circumstances and our own capacities. To avoid undertaking either too much or too little, we must know precisely how much we are capable of achieving; we must not only be efficient, but also know that we are so, and how far our efficiency extends. We should, therefore, be as free from all empty vanity and idle boasting as from faint-hearted self-depreciation. In other words, a just self-consciousness here appears indispensable to the perfection of life; hence self-knowledge in the early Greek sense, *i. e.*, a correct estimate of one's own capacities, in distinction from a brooding over one's inner state, attains with Aristotle its most important philosophical development.

Thus, the principle of the Mean works its way into every ramification of life and adapts itself to all life's varied aspects. The result is that everywhere intelligence is introduced and action subjected to thought. As a further consequence, the relation of instinct to reason becomes such that the supremacy of the

mind is preserved without violating the rights of the natural disposition. For whatever nature has implanted in man, as, *e. g.*, self-love, is forthwith accepted; to attempt to eradicate it would be as perverse as it would be vain. Yet it must conform to the law of the mean, and recognise its limit, if it would work in harmony with reason; and for that mind and thought are required. Accordingly, the notion of the Limit signalises a triumph of mind over crude nature, and at the same time a harmonious adjustment between true nature and reason. The Aristotelian mean is not an endorsement of humdrum mediocrity, which shrinks from everything great. For its aim is not to keep everything down to a medium level, but merely to preserve the harmony of reason and nature within the sphere of conduct. How little the thought of the mean excludes that of greatness appears most clearly from the fact that Aristotle finds his ideal of human life in the high-minded man (μεγαλόψυχος), and bestows upon the delineation of his character the most sympathetic care.

The high-minded man has greatness of mind, and is fully conscious of it. He represents the just mean between the man who is vain of his capacities and the one who has a certain greatness, but does not know it, and hence does not sufficiently develop his powers. The high-minded man is not only fully conscious of his own importance, but will everywhere make it emphatically felt; and in all that he does and leaves undone he will, above all, preserve his dignity and greatness of soul. Possessed of such a disposition, he will speak only the plain truth, love openly and hate openly, be free from all fear of men, accept favours reluctantly, and return those received in superabundant measure, gladly confer benefits himself, be proud and reserved toward the great, but friendly toward those beneath him. He will always esteem beauty above utility and the truth above appearance. And he will choose for himself the most difficult and the most thankless of tasks. His outward demeanour will correspond with such a disposition. That is, he will always conduct himself with composure and dignity, speak deliberately, never be precipitate, etc.

Although there is much in such a picture to astonish one, it manifestly represents the active life developed into a rounded, self-sufficient personality. Whoever expects as confidently as Aristotle does that happiness will be found in a calm, self-contained activity, cannot make the effects of conduct the principal thing, but will look chiefly to the state of the agent himself. And in truth, it is the inner conditions of conduct that Aristotle investigates with particular care. Such conceptions as those of intention, and of voluntary and involuntary acts, he subjects to searching analysis, and gradually shifts the centre of gravity from the outward performance to the inner attitude of the agent. Hence the notion of self-contained conduct deepens into that of a self-contained life; the idea of moral personality detaches itself and life becomes wholly self-centred.

True, these developments are left by Aristotle largely in an unfinished state. The majestic personality described above is primarily an affair of the individual: if man measures himself less by an ideal of reason than by comparison with other men, moral worth becomes a matter of individual eminence in contrast with others. Accordingly, the idea of personality develops more disintegrating than unifying force. Thus, in the midst of what is new, we discern the limitations of the time.

But whatever aims, either in the practical or the theoretical sphere, are brought to light by Aristotle, they must necessarily appear as attainable to such an exalted faith in reason as his. He is not, indeed, unconscious of the difficulties. His mind is much too open to the impressions of experience to see nothing but reason everywhere. And his judgment of mankind is too much influenced by the national habits of thought not to distinguish two classes, a large majority of bad, or at least commonplace, natures, and a small minority of noble ones. Men are ruled by passion and appetite; and the sense of the masses is not for the noble and the beautiful, but for the useful. They are brought to wrong-doing, however, mainly by inordinate desire and selfish greed. "Appetite is insatiable, and the multitude live only to gratify it."

But Aristotle does not so lightly deliver up the human sphere to unreason; rather, he finds abundant means of correcting the above impression. In the first place, he is of opinion that the evil in man is easily exaggerated, inasmuch as what is only a consequence of natural conditions is often set down as guilt. Thus, *e. g.*, man is taxed with ingratitude, because the recipients of favours usually manifest less feeling than those who bestow them, children less affection than their parents, etc., whereas the simple explanation is that giving causes more pleasure than receiving, and that this satisfaction makes the object of our bounty pleasing to us. Then, Aristotle is not ready to jumble together in one lot all the less capable men; instead he distinguishes several degrees, and recognises in the highest an approach to the ideal. On the other hand, the really vicious, the criminal, are to be excluded; but the number is not large, and the average condition represents rather venial weakness than positive evil. Furthermore, there exists a not unimportant difference between those who aim at gain and self-indulgence, and those who pursue honour and power. Particularly honour, the reflection of virtue, lifts conduct to a higher plane. But even the residue of imperfection is exalted in Aristotle's mind by the conviction that also in the lower there is a natural impulse toward the higher, an impulse that carries it beyond its present condition and its limited consciousness; for, "everything has by nature something of the divine." Associated with this tendency to see in the lower less the degenerate and the abandoned than what is struggling upward is a highly characteristic belief that the life of the community represents a summation of reason. Granted that the average man individually accomplishes very little: yet let men unite themselves into a community, and they become as one personality; the good in all can fuse into one, and the whole become morally and intellectually superior even to the greatest individuals. Inasmuch, namely, as each contributes his special faculty, and the various capacities become organised, the whole which results is freer from anger and other passions, more protected against blunders,

and, especially, surer in its judgment, than the mere individual. Even with music and poetry, the great public is the best judge. In making such an apology for the multitude, Aristotle is not thinking of just any haphazard, motley public, but of the more stable community of a city possessing a homogeneous civilisation. Yet without a strong belief in an element of good in men, this apology would not, even so, have been possible.

Aristotle's convictions as to history accord excellently with such a faith. Their basis is to be found in the Platonic philosophy of history. With Aristotle, as with Plato, there is no ascent *ad infinitum*, but a cycle of similar periods. Given the eternity of the world—which Aristotle was the first to teach with perfect distinctness—and an infinitude lies behind us; periodically, whatever has been evolved up to a given time is destroyed by great floods, and the process begins over again; only the popular religion (rationalistically interpreted) and language unite the several epochs by transmitting, at least in remnants, the wisdom of earlier periods. But to this general view Aristotle adds the special one, that in classical Greece the culmination of such a revolution had been reached shortly before. Hence attention should be concentrated upon it, rather than upon the future, which does not give promise of great progress. Theoretical investigation, however, has assigned to it the task of scientifically probing the grounds of whatever may be brought to light by circumstance and custom, and so of translating into concepts the actual historical world.

Accordingly, the course of the argument justifies Aristotle's own attitude toward the Greek world. If in the civilisation of Greece the highest has been attained that ever can be, then the effort to seek out the reason immanent in it, and, so far as possible, to make it the point of departure for his own work, is amply justified. Aristotle is thus enabled not only to place himself in a sympathetic attitude toward the foundations of Greek civilisation, but also to esteem public opinion as a sure index to the truth.

(d) *The Several Departments of Life*

The several departments of life attain with Aristotle a far greater independence, and they offer more special problems and demand more work than with Plato. Here the particular is not a mere application, but a further development, of the general. Life reaches out in all directions; and since its span covers a greater area, notwithstanding its ceaseless movement it gains in essential repose. The vast increase of detail destroys neither the unity of the whole nor the dominance of certain all-pervading convictions; for however much the leading ideas adapt themselves to the peculiarities of the several spheres, the bond of analogy holds all together. Everywhere there is a high estimate placed upon activity, everywhere the detection of an inner reason, everywhere a reconciliation of contradictions; everywhere, too, there is a simple objectivity, a nearer approach to the immediate life of the soul, and a greater transparency in the articulation of the system.

(*a*) THE FORMS OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION

More independent and richer in content appears, first, the sphere of human intercourse. How Aristotle is drawn from the universe to man is shown, among other things, by his judgment as to the relative value of the senses. Plato and the other Greek thinkers had declared the eye to be the most important sense, owing to its perception of the great world; and Aristotle, too, does not reject this estimate. But, on more careful consideration, he declares the ear to be more important for the intellectual development, on account of its relation to language and hence to human society. Furthermore, the difference between human speech and the sounds made by animals he regards as an evidence of the greater intimacy of our intercourse.

Aristotle displayed the liveliest interest in the differentiation of human life and action. He was an acute observer and de-

lineator of the various types of human nature, and his school introduced descriptions of the several "characters." Likewise, his followers were only imitating the effort of the master when they devoted special attention to the virtues of social life. Finally, the higher estimate which Aristotle placed upon man and upon human society is closely connected with the careful consideration of history which distinguished him. The achievements of his predecessors were kept constantly in view in his own studies, and it was from his school that the history of philosophy sprang.

But the fullest development of human life still leaves the main structure of society simple enough. Two principal forms comprise the whole: the relation of friendship, and life in the State, the one covering the personal relations of individuals and the other the wider human intercourse and the organisation of intellectual work.

Friendship has an incomparable worth for Aristotle because, first of all, after the surrender of religion, it alone affords a richer development of the life of sentiment, and scope for the full realisation of individuality. "A life without friends no one would desire, even though he possessed all other goods."

Friendship in the sense of Aristotle, however, means the association with another man—his thought is particularly of one friend—in a steadfast community of life and conduct, and with such a complete reception of the other into one's own world of thought, as to gain in him another "self." Friendship is here no mere affinity of minds, but a union of the conduct and effective work of both; even in this case everything depends upon activity, the state of feeling being always closely connected with and determined by it. Hence the interest lies beyond the disposition and in the achievement, and friendship grows with the greatness of the man. The aim is to interchange the fruits of corresponding attainments, and so to keep pace in a noble rivalry. Thus friendship merges into the idea of justice. There is here no place for a forgetting of self and a naïve devotion, for an unmerited and immeasurable love. The Aristotelian friendship is

no liberation from self, but a widening of self. For it is rooted in a genuine self-love, in a friendship of man with his own being. Just as only the virtuous man is at one with himself in all that he does, or is a good friend to himself, so only he can show true and lasting friendship. And friendship enhances happiness, since not only is one's activity increased, but the friend's noble deeds are more visible than one's own.

As this conception of friendship involves harmony of action, and indeed, of regulated, visible action, so it allows of a full justification of family life with its fixed limits. On the other hand, compared with the relation of friendship, the idea of humanity is much too shadowy to exert an influence upon life. True, we are told that every man feels the bond of man to man, that we have a natural inclination to help one another, and desire companionship even without any thought of advantage; but all that remains in the background, and leads to no fixed relationship, no community of work. It is the smaller, more easily surveyed, groups that engross men's attention; seldom does the glance extend beyond one's own nation. The Greek people, however, with their union of the courage of the European and the intelligence of the Asiatic nations, appear to be the flower of the race. United in a single state, they could rule the world.

But this thought of a universal empire ruled by the Greeks—noteworthy enough in the tutor of Alexander—is not further pursued; rather, the chief form of human association remains for Aristotle the single Greek state, the city-state with its limited territory, its fixed summary of all human problems, and its close personal union of the individual citizens. Nowhere more than here, where its glory already lay behind it, is this city-state illuminated and glorified by theory. In defence of its narrow limits, Aristotle urges that a proper community is possible only where the citizens can form a judgment of one another; but the deeper reason lay in the fact that only a circumscribed community, inseparably uniting all intellectual aims with actual companionship, could become a personality after the manner of the individual. That the state should have such a personal

nature is, however, the essence of the Aristotelian doctrine. From this conviction, we have the direct corollary that the ends of both state and individual are identical, and that there is the closest connection between ethics and politics. If the highest good of man is a self-contained, self-sufficing completeness of activity, the state should seek its welfare in nothing else. There follows the most emphatic disapproval of all aggressive foreign politics, all greed for unlimited expansion, all wars for conquest, etc. Instead of pursuing such a course, let the state find its tasks in peaceful activities, in the development and organisation of the capabilities of its citizens into a compact, vigorous society.

Rational activity here implies, above all, the mental and moral efficiency of the state and of its individual members; hence the chief effort must be directed to spiritual ends. Even under the conditions of life in common, material goods have a value only as a means to activity, and they should be kept well within the implied limits. For the most serious disturbances arise from the importunate demands of the multitude for the unrestricted accumulation of property and riches. Moreover, the delusive expectation that happiness can be found in worldly possessions is disastrously increased by the introduction of money with the opportunity it offers for unlimited hoarding; for the lust for material wealth then possesses men more exclusively than ever. Hence, uncompromising war must be waged against it, even on the part of the civic community, whose duty it is to keep the citizens' thirst for gain within reasonable bounds, and particularly to oppose the dominion of money. In this spirit, all profit from the loaning of money is condemned, every form of interest declared to be usury, and in general this whole inversion of means and end stigmatised as immoral. Thus we have the foundation of the distinctly ethical type of political economy, which dominated economic theory during the Middle Ages and also profoundly influenced practice. With Aristotle the two presuppositions of this doctrine are clear: an exact limitation of material goods by a fixed and easily recognisable end in

life, and a complete correspondence between the welfare of the community and that of the individual.

If, however, the individual is but a miniature of the state, then in their reciprocal relations the unqualified supremacy belongs to the latter. As a fact, Aristotle defends the complete subjection of the individual: he reduced this subordination to formulas which have been handed down throughout the whole course of history as a classical expression of the doctrine of the omnipotence of the state. The state he calls the self-sufficient community; only in it can man realise his rational nature; accordingly, he says of it that it was prior (*i. e.*, in its nature and conception prior) to man.

For the illustration of his doctrine of the state, Aristotle is fond of employing the metaphor of an organism; for he it was who introduced this conception into political theory. As, in the case of an organism, any single organ lives and performs its function only in connection with the whole, but so soon as it is severed from the whole, becomes dead matter, so it is with the relation of the individual to the state. Yet this theory appears to be particularly adapted to allow the powerful development within the whole of the peculiar capabilities and effective activity of individuals.

An organism, namely, is viewed as the higher or more perfect the greater its articulation, or differentiation of functions and organs. So, likewise in the state there should be the greatest possible division of labour. This conviction, enforced by Aristotle's keen observation and sober judgment, resulted in a decisive rejection of communistic theories. Work is well executed only when it is carefully organised; and the strongest motives to care and devotion arise from man's ownership of property and from his personal associations; for it gives him an unspeakable pleasure to call something his own. Moreover, the adherents of communism are the victims of an optimistic delusion when they expect from the mere community of property a harmony of all wills and the disappearance of crime. For the chief root of evil is not poverty, but the love of pleasure and in-

satiable cupidity: "one does not become a tyrant merely to escape the cold."

The idea of an organism in its ancient interpretation not only enhances the importance of the individual, but it effects also a thorough animation of the whole; it does not look upon the state as an artificial mechanism directed by superior insight, but as a living being sustained by its own powers. Hence it is essential to gain the loyal adherence of the citizens to the constitution of the state, and to give them all some share in political work. This, together with his view of the summation of reason in the state, makes Aristotle an advocate of democracy—to be sure, a democracy which is considerably limited in being worked out. At the same time, in direct opposition to Plato, he sets the universal order above even the most eminent personality: "Whoever lets law rule, lets God and reason rule alone; whoever lets man rule, lets the animal in him rule too."

The total effect of Aristotle's discussion of political questions far exceeds the influence of his particular theory of the state. Himself expatriated, his clear vision and calm judgment none the less so penetrated into the peculiar character of this domain, and his thinking developed so purely the inner necessity of things, that his work forms an inexhaustible mine of political wisdom. The immense material that accumulated he subdued by means of simple concepts and analyses; ideals he energetically upheld, but they do not interfere with the due appreciation of real, and particularly of economic, conditions; the manifold conflicting interests are weighed in the balance with painstaking conscientiousness and without feeble compromises; the political view attains the closest relation to history, and accordingly becomes more elastic and fruitful; the significance of the living present, the right of the existing state of things, meets with full recognition. But the insight and sagacity of Aristotle's political views are equalled by his strong sense of justice and truth; everything that dazzles without being instructive, and, especially, whatever tends toward individual advantage at the expense of others, he decisively rejects. Characterised by such a union of technical

greatness and ethical purpose, Aristotle's politics, notwithstanding all that is problematic in its detailed execution, remains a wonderful masterpiece.

(β) ART

Although his doctrines are in all essential points an echo of Plato's æsthetic views, Aristotle himself lacks an intimate personal relation to art. But his objective method again affords him such a clear insight into the nature of his subject that he is not only successful in elucidating a variety of particular points, but also is the first to formulate the main principles of art. Like Plato, he understands art to be an imitation of reality. However, he does not find the subject of imitation in the several accidental, changeable features, but in the universal and typical aspect of things. The artist is not concerned with what happens at any particular moment, but with what happens always or usually. Hence Aristotle claims that poetry is more philosophical and richer in content than history, that Homer stands above Herodotus. The revelation of a new world, wherein the creative fantasy comes to its full rights, is still far distant; but art here acquires a spiritual worth and has a specific task assigned to it. Aristotle, however, turns rapidly from general considerations to the particular arts; and of these he lays bare the psychological motives and follows out their effects with marvellous insight and clearness. The copestone of his æsthetic theory is provided by the doctrine of tragedy, which has exerted the profoundest influence even in modern times. And it has a particular value for our present consideration, since tragedy implies both a comprehensive view and a creed of human life. Aristotle's doctrine of tragedy, however, is seen in its true light, not when it is understood as a product of free reflection, but when it is taken as a translation into concepts and laws of the actual achievements of the Greek drama. Here again the thinker's attitude is altogether retrospective; he does not offer new suggestions, but seeks out the *rationale* of the great works

of the past. He finds that the problem of tragedy does not lie so much within man himself as in his relation to the world; not in the complications and contradictions of his own being, but in the conflict with the world: it is the incongruity between inner guilt and outward prosperity which arouses the tragic sympathies. In accordance with such a fundamental view, the action must possess more unity, coherence, and brevity than in the modern drama with its inner conflicts and spiritual struggles. For, when it is not concerned with inner changes, but with the essentially fixed character of a man who is in direct conflict with destiny, the plot will appear to be the more happy in proportion as everything rushes swiftly to the *dénouement.* Hence the doctrine of the three unities of Time, Place, and Action could claim Aristotle's authority, although not without a forced interpretation of the master's teaching.

Likewise, in considering the effect of tragedy, we must avoid any intrusion of modern thoughts and feelings. Aristotle does not speak of the purging of the whole soul, but of the exercising of the emotions of pity and fear. What he expected from their exercise is still a moot question, upon which we will not enter. Plainly, however, what Aristotle seeks is the effect upon individuals of a concrete, personal situation; *i. e.*, he means to have characters and fortunes represented which will affect every one directly with pity and fear. Corresponding rules and limitations follow. The desired end seems to be most readily attainable by the introduction of great reverses of fortune, especially a reverse from happiness to misery, provided it befall a man who has not removed himself from our sympathies by unnatural or extraordinary deeds, nor met with his misfortunes so much from depravity as from pardonable error. Thus the thought of the Mean, the Limit, appears here also, and not without a tendency to substitute the average man for all men. Accordingly, the heights as well as the depths of human conduct are excluded. The sobriety of Aristotle's theory would be more distinctly felt if every one did not unconsciously supplement it from the very masterpieces from which it drew, yet without exhausting their whole depths.

In this domain, also, Aristotle's handling of his subject exerts an influence which far exceeds that of his conceptions and rules; clear, comprehensive, and objective, his method produces results of permanent value.

(γ) SCIENCE

In science we reach the culmination of Aristotle's life-work. The high estimate which he places upon theory is fully matched by his actual achievement. He appears at first to follow an entirely different course from that of his great predecessor. Intuition yields to discussion and the explanation of things by causes; analysis comes to the fore; minutiæ find sympathetic consideration; the several theoretical disciplines attain their first independence. Moreover, emotion disappears from scientific investigation, which no longer deeply involves the thinker's practical nature; instead, research means a calm examination of the object and a clear unfolding of its nature; and by extending this effort to the whole of the actual world, investigation becomes synonymous with painstaking, inquisitive, unwearying intellectual toil. It is with this severance from immediate feeling that science first acquires a technical form and its own nomenclature. While Plato felt the unyielding terms borrowed from art as a restriction upon the free movement of his thought, Aristotle became the creator of scientific terminology. The Aristotelian "science" is accordingly far more like science in the modern sense. It can embrace the whole sphere of human experience, and it produces a characteristic type of life, the life of research.

But, notwithstanding this progress, Aristotle remains in close relation to Plato and the classical Greek world. Even the Aristotelian method of research presupposes intuitive truths; the growth of analysis does not endanger the supremacy of synthesis, since all the elements obtained belong from the outset to a whole; nor does the development of separate disciplines destroy the firm coherence of a system. In particular, the relation of man to the world of things is not so changed as might appear

at first sight. For, even if Aristotle restrains subjective feeling, and subordinates it to the necessity of the objective fact, the conception of the objective fact is itself formed under human influence. With his translation of reality into forces, tendencies, capacities, and ends, he, too, is guilty of a personification (although a slight one), and a personification which is the more dangerous, since it easily escapes notice and conceals its own presuppositions. Aristotle's conceptions of the world, in fact, all suffer from a confusion of the psychical and the material, *i. e.*, from a hidden metaphor. And the effect was only the more disastrous the deeper his untiring energy implanted his leading ideas into the world of facts. Thus the rise of modern science was not possible without the destruction of the Aristotelian world of thought.

In truth, Aristotle's incontestable greatness lies less in the investigation of principles than in the extensive contact between his general ideas and the wealth of his observation: to develop the common factors in such contact, to reduce to scientific knowledge an inexhaustible material by the introduction of fruitful ideas—this constitutes his incomparable strength. Here he appears pre-eminently as "the master of those who know" (Dante).

The development of this capacity enables him to wander through the whole realm of knowledge, and everywhere he is fruitful, systematic, and masterful. Constantly we marvel at the even balance of his interest in the universal and in the particular; this leads him at one time to extol pure speculation as the glory of life, the perfection of happiness; and at another it makes him an enthusiastic friend of natural science, and leads him to quote (*apropos* of the attacks upon anatomical study, which were still frequent) the saying of Heraclitus: "Enter; here, too, there are gods."

Possessed of such qualities, Aristotle was the first to discover the elements and principal functions of human knowledge, and to create a system of logic that has reigned for centuries; he first freed from obscurities such fundamental concepts as time

and space, motion and end; he led thought from the structure of the universe as a whole through all the gradations of nature up to the level of organic life, which also marks the culmination of his own research; he sketched the first system of psychology; he traced human life and conduct both in the ethical and political spheres and in those of oratory and art; and everywhere he was intent upon incorporating into his work the experience and the total achievement of his people. But above all the separate disciplines rises the metaphysics, the earliest systematic science of first principles; this sketched in pure concepts a great outline of reality, the historical influence of which contributed much toward winning a secure position for dialectic, and toward elevating the whole of life to the plane of reflection.

The net result of this herculean task may easily be criticised. Even Aristotle was a child of his time; and it was inevitable that in the then incomplete state of knowledge his indefatigable pursuit of a final, closed system should have had a disastrous effect. For the extraordinary logical power with which in several departments an insufficient material is spun out and woven together often results in the vindication of error instead of truth. But Aristotle, indeed, could not foresee what would come after him, and thus keep his world of thought open for a distant future. Any impartial estimate of him must concede his towering eminence; and particularly such a review as the present owes him gratitude and reverence for having revealed to mankind whole domains of the actual world, and for proving himself a triumphant creator of intellectual life.

(e) *Retrospect*

A just estimate of Aristotle rests primarily upon a clear conception of his relation to Hellenism. No longer a participant in the movements of the classical period, but an observer from a distance of its achievements, his intimate relation with the characteristic civilisation of Greece has often failed of recognition; and, as a thinker who translated into concepts and traced back

to causes the vast information he amassed, he has too often been set down as a philosopher of the most abstract type.

That, notwithstanding the developed technique of his investigations, and the elaborate logic of his treatises, his doctrines and conceptions, and his own personality, are firmly rooted in classical Greek soil, was shown even by the consideration of his view of life. For, as surely as this revealed a powerful capacity for independent thought, it also showed that Aristotle's thinking kept steadily in close touch with the Greek world, in fact was permeated with the fundamental views of his people. Cut off from Hellenism, his personality loses all that is most characteristic of it; for to this relation he owes at once his peculiar greatness and his limitations.

But, notwithstanding this intimate relation with his environment, it is possible to distinguish a characteristic Aristotelian type of life. By the force of manly strength, trained efficiency, and simple veracity, knowledge and action here fuse into an all-absorbing life-work, and give a secure foothold in the actual world. Scientific investigation, by advancing from appearance to reality, makes the surrounding world incomparably more significant; to an instructed vision things reveal, even when in apparent inaction, a life of their own, a life regulated according to ends, self-contained and self-sufficing. At the same time, the world resolves itself into a profusion of varied forms, possessing interest alike for science and for practical life. To comprehend, and to unite into the harmony of a cosmos, this far more living and richer world, is the chief task of the life of research. Thus the world acquires stability, life becomes calm, and every form of well-being is expected to result from assiduous labour and steady development. Aristotle, accordingly, is the first of the line of thinkers who look upon life and the world as a continuous process.

The contention that Aristotle's unquestionable greatness lies less in the inner unity of his view of the world and of life than in his subjugation of vast domains of knowledge by means of simple and fruitful ideas is further corroborated by the influence which he has exerted upon history. For Aristotelianism never

has led a progressive movement of thought, nor even afforded to any a powerful stimulus. But it has always proved to be valuable, in fact, indispensable, whenever existing bodies of thought required extension, logical arrangement, and systematic completion. This was shown in later antiquity in its influence upon the work of the compilers; so, too, Christianity, although at first unfriendly toward Aristotle, eagerly turned to him so soon as the immediate excitement was allayed and the time came for thinking out the new ideas; so, finally, he became the chief philosopher of the mediæval Church with its rigid organisation of thought and life. But also in modern times, systematic thinkers of the highest rank, such as Leibniz and Hegel, have placed the very highest estimate upon his services to the history of thought. In short, wherever Aristotelianism has attained an influence it has operated to further logical training, to promote the formation of great systems, and the establishment of a secure foundation for the whole work of civilisation. Without its educative and organising influence, modern science and culture, no less than the ancient, are unthinkable.

Undeniably, this service has often been dearly bought. In times of less intellectual tension, the sheer weight and compactness of the Aristotelian system tended to repress independence of thought; it often seemed as if nothing new could challenge its firmly rooted authority. That, however, was less the fault of the master than of his followers, who possessed no independence to oppose to him.

Quite incontestable, on the other hand, are Aristotle's greatness and beneficial influence in the various departments of knowledge and of life. Here he left deeper traces than any other thinker in the whole course of history. In the most essential points he was the first to direct effort into sure channels; hence, without a due appreciation of his life-work no historical comprehension of our own world of thought is possible.

It was of the greatest consequence for classical antiquity that the epoch-making genius of Plato was followed by the executive

genius of Aristotle; that the comprehensive, clear-sighted, laborious mind of the one took up and carried forward the bold creative work of the other. Hence, on the one hand, there was unfolded in its purity whatever the culture of classical antiquity had to contribute to the deepest things in life; and, on the other, the desire for knowledge wrought itself out into a gigantic intellectual achievement. Thus, the two principal manifestations of an ideal view of the world and an ideal feeling for life, namely, the striving beyond the world, and back to the world, found in Plato and Aristotle respectively embodiments of such importance that they may be regarded as typical.

By philosophy Greek civilisation itself is freed from the contingency inherent in historical development and its innermost essence illuminated and made more accessible to mankind. Its aims and achievements are appropriated by the work of thought in a purified and ennobled form, and given permanent efficacy. Out of this appropriating and refining arises an ideal of intellectual power and of constructive work which unites the true and the beautiful, science and art, in a remarkably perfect manner. And this creative activity is not divorced from moral character, as it often is in later times, but combined with nobility of personal disposition, and a plain faith in the dignity of goodness. For the rest, this ideal of life includes contradictions which later clash violently. While it displays a frank confidence in our intellectual capacity, and in the victory of courageous action, this bouyancy does not overleap itself in presumptuous self-assertion; on the contrary, man here recognises that he is subject to a higher order, and willingly acquiesces in the prescribed limits. Again, he is summoned to supreme effort and to ceaseless activity, but the activity attains at its height a self-poise which protects him from the daily turmoil and sheds a pure joy over existence. Everywhere there should be system and organisation, nothing should be isolated, nothing dissipate itself; yet the organised systems do not repress or destroy individuality, but give it a more secure place and a higher worth within the whole.

This union of all the principal tendencies and contrasts of

life in a readily intelligible whole makes the view of life of the classical thinkers incomparable and irreplaceable. For the progress of civilisation has steadily dispersed the forces of life, steadily increased the outward obstacles, the inner complications, and the sharpness of contrasts. But we cannot relinquish the effort for unity—that would be suicidal; hence we shall always look back gladly to a view of life which vividly presents to us, as a realised fact, the ideal of wholeness. The particular form in which this Hellenic ideal was worked out has, of course, been rendered invalid by the great changes of history: the presuppositions, which seemed safely to bear the weight of the old system of life, have been found to contain difficult problems; the connection with reality and the starting-point of trustworthy constructive work, which a naïver condition of life believed to be ready to hand, or at least easily attainable, we must attain by laborious effort, and by profound changes both in the world of things and in ourselves. But, for all that, the ancient ideals retain their full historical truth, and the ancient mind its loftiness; and these will ever attract, stimulate, and delight us.

The perennial charm and suggestiveness of the Hellenic ideal of life are mainly due to the historical position of the ancient world at the inception of European civilization. Since the problem of life was then first taken hold of by science, the constructive handling of it had full originality. The freshness and joy which belong to the first perception—the discovery—of a thing; the naïveté of sentiment; the simplicity of description; all are found quite unobscured at such an absolute beginning. On the other hand, the discursive extensions, the added reflections, which almost inevitably appear in later treatments, are absent. Much, once here said, is said for all time; it can never again be said so simply and so impressively.

Hence, in spite of the mortality that clings even to them, the ancient thinkers remain the teachers and educators of mankind. In work and in the recreations of life, in happiness and in sorrow, humanity has ever returned to them, as to heroes of the spirit; they hold up before us imperishable ideals, and usher us

into the rich world of classical antiquity, which awakened all human interests, embraced all activities, knew the joy of creating, loved vivid form, glorified nature, and possessed the inexhaustible vigour of youth.

B. POST-CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

In recent times, historical research has thrown a much more favourable light upon the period of later antiquity; but the lay mind still often refuses it due recognition, because it does not view it in its historical perspective but measures it by extraneous standards. At one time it is represented as a mere preliminary to Christianity, and hence as something immature and incomplete; at another, as the mere end and echo of the classical period, and thus likewise as inferior. In both cases, an extended epoch, full of inner movements and changes, is treated as a homogeneous whole, and summarily disposed of. The fact is, however, that it is precisely the views of life of later antiquity which give evidence of an independent and individually valuable character; they even require a division of the whole period into two, one filled with the calm work of civilisation, the other with religious agitation. The philosophy of the former may be characterised as rational worldly wisdom, that of the latter as speculative and mystical exaltation. It is principally this antithesis which gives to later antiquity a characteristic intensity.

I. THE SYSTEMS OF WORLDLY WISDOM

(a) *The Intellectual Character of the Hellenistic Period*

The post-classical period, which is customarily called the Hellenistic, lacked the principal motives of the classical view of life, namely, the stupendous creative work and the co-operation of all forms of effort in and through the native city-state. This state, indeed, outwardly preserved the traditional forms for a considerable time, but the life had vanished from them; national destinies were now decided elsewhere, particularly at

the courts of princes, while petty states shrivelled up into dreary *bourgeois* communities. Politics thus loses its connection with the activity and sentiment of a larger body, and becomes the affair of a few prominent individuals. At the same time, the citizen gains freedom in his relation to the community; he is no longer supplied by it with settled convictions; nor do the faith and customs of his countrymen fetter him and prevent him from choosing his own paths. On the other hand, life now oversteps national barriers; a cosmopolitan sentiment arises and, even if it is not characterised by all the storm and stress of modern cosmopolitanism, it still tends, by the kindling of more refined emotions, to bring about a reconstruction of relations.

Ancient cosmopolitanism found its chief support in a new trend of life, in the development, namely, of an erudite culture, and in the associations of literary learning. As contrasted with the classical age, what followed was a complete revolution. There man felt himself dependent upon the universe and also inwardly at one with it; but perfect fellowship and the highest realisation of his own being were to be won only by severe struggle; yet in the conflict man attained to heroism, and his work rose to the plane of original creation, the production of new realities. This period of intellectual heroism is now closed. The individual no longer recognises himself as in sure relation with the universe, and as kin in being with the deepest things in reality. Rather, the general consciousness is dominated by the conviction that between man and the world lies a deep chasm which only arduous toil can bridge, and then but imperfectly. The subject being thus thrown back upon himself, the inner character of life also is changed; a large place is now assigned to reflection and to mood; the inner life of the individual becomes the chief abode of the spirit.

Such reflection and brooding would shortly have plunged the subject into vacuity, had not the classical age handed down to him a splendid culture. The assimilation and utilisation of this culture now constitutes the substance of his life. At the same

time, scholarship becomes the basis of urbanity and all the higher accomplishments; study and knowledge alone procure a share in spiritual goods; they also produce a special fellowship of men; cultivated society detaches itself more sharply from the people, and elevates its members above all national and class distinctions. There results a cosmopolitanism of scholarly labour and literary cultivation.

In such diligent and specialised work, through which there flows the stream of a silent joy springing from the incomparably rich and beautiful classical culture, the age finds its full satisfaction. As its pursuit of new aims is not passionate, so it does not assail the barriers of human existence; so, too, it knows nothing of the depths and the conflicts of the religious problem. Among the people, indeed, religion is fostered, and continually puts forth new shoots; but the cultivated man knows how to make terms with it after the rationalistic fashion, and feels no deeper religious need. The ethical core of the Greek faith, the belief in a retributive justice, is not surrendered; but in these times, which exhibit such stupendous catastrophes, and such remarkable reversals of individual fortune, there develops with peculiar force a belief in the power of the goddess Tyche, *i. e.*, either a completely blind chance or one possessed by envy and malice. But even if the impression of the irrationality of human fate should grow, and oft compel a sentimental resignation, still man is not so overwhelmed and terrified by evils as not to look for an adequate remedy in calm reflection and thoughtful prudence; and it is particularly philosophy from which these are to be expected.

In all the foregoing developments the later age shows itself pitched in a much lower key than the classical; in intellectual power, in fact, it falls far behind its predecessor. But that its direction of attention to the individual, and its more vigorous unfolding of the inner life, constitute a valuable innovation, appears with special distinctness from the views of life set forth by the philosophers. Also, let it be remembered that the several sciences now first attain full independence and extend their in-

fluence far and wide, that in technical capacity man acquires far more power over things, that plastic art brings subjective emotion to increased, indeed to exaggerated, expression, that the drama finds an inexhaustible material in the relations of middle-class life, and finally, that the idyl and the portrayal of manners flourish. In every respect the individual attains greater freedom and consideration. The fact that "the Hellenistic poets first elevated love to the rank of the chief poetic passion" (Rhode) testifies to the growth of individual life and to the existence of a refined, but self-occupied, self-complacent sentiment; so does the other fact that, in marked contrast with a decadent civilisation, there here first dawns a sentimental joy in nature, a longing for simple rural conditions, and for a purer life amid their beneficent influences.

In all this we may recognise an approach to certain modern tendencies; and, in fact, in several instances an historical connection is unmistakable. Yet, notwithstanding the similarity, there remains a wide divergence. The unfolding of the later life of Hellenism is much tamer, more prosaic, and also, it is true, more moderate, than that of the modern world. While here the individual, with the self-conscious vigour of youth, rises superior to the world, and would fain draw it wholly within his grasp, indeed, shape it to his own will, man in the Hellenistic epoch looks upon the world as something unalterable; he attempts no changes in the traditional culture, he aims only to give it a new direction, by connecting it more forcibly with his subjective feeling and reflection. This difference between an age which, if not venerable was yet becoming senile, and one which is fresh, aspiring, and exultant in its creative power, so alters all the manifestations of life that the similarity of the two never amounts to agreement.

Such an intellectual situation involves a characteristic philosophy. This does not strive for new glimpses into the heart of things, nor for a renovation of the whole of civilisation. But it holds out to individuals the promise of a secure footing in life and a trustworthy chart for life's guidance; it aims to help men

to happiness and to make them self-reliant; and for the cultivated world it becomes the chief instructress in morality. This practical tendency, it is true, comes fully into play only in the course of centuries and under the influence of the Romans; it is not given undue prominence in the merely fragmentary records we possess of the early movement. Undeniably, however, at a time subsequent to the classical systems the individual and his craving for happiness form the pivot about which everything revolves.

It is also significant of the change that now a small number of convictions are at once formulated into a dogmatic creed which thenceforth persists through a number of centuries, while previously every achievement of thought immediately called forth further developments and also reactions. What the general intellectual life of the Hellenistic age shows in a striking manner the philosophy also exhibits, namely, that the great epoch-making heroes, with their high-souled aims of regenerating humanity, are replaced by aggregates of individual powers, by the formation, that is, of small societies of the nature of sects. Accordingly, as the plan of this work necessitates comparative brevity, we shall be justified in confining ourselves to the two principal schools of the Stoics and the Epicureans. The contrast they present corresponds to the twofold relation which man, once he has ceased to be a part of the world, may assume toward it. Either he may boldly defy the world, or he may make the surrender of himself to it as agreeable as possible. In the one case, he will seek for true happiness by rising superior to the influence of his surroundings, and by attaining, through union with universal reason, an imperturbable independence and an inner mastery over things. In the other, he will avoid all conflict with the world, and find his pleasure in a clever use of what life provides. Both tendencies have a similar starting-point, and they frequently coincide in their results; but in their attitude toward life they are irreconcilable, and the conflict between them lasts until the close of antiquity. It will be more expedient to begin with the Epicurean school, because it adheres

tenaciously to a simple, fundamental type through all the vicissitudes of centuries without becoming involved in other movements.

(b) *The Epicureans*

The Epicurean school displays in a marked degree the character of a guild or sect, little affected by the vicissitudes of time. The life-work of the master, Epicurus (342-341—270), exerted a supreme influence. Not only was the image of his personality retained as a living presence, but even the formulas in which he summed up his philosophy preserved from generation to generation their authoritative force. Besides Epicurus, we may mention the Roman poet, Lucretius (97-96—55), whose warmth of conviction and fervid style made him—as late as the eighteenth century—a favourite with circles affected by the Enlightenment.

The popular conception of the Epicureans is badly distorted. They readily appeared, and appear, as the champions of every kind of indulgence, while in truth their aim was merely to free men from all the entanglements of a responsible share in the world's work, and to provide them, within the sphere of a private circle, with a calm and serene life. The result was worldly wisdom of the fastidious sort that keeps everything vulgar at a distance.

Hence, as compared with the classical systems, the sphere of life is here narrowly restricted. It is not from any desire to understand the nature of things that Epicurus occupies himself with the problems which the world presents, but in order that knowledge may free him from the illusions which weigh life down and embitter joy. First and foremost he attacks the doctrine of an interference in human affairs by supernatural powers; for life can never be calmly and serenely enjoyed so long as the bugbear of eternity stares us in the face. Epicurus does not deny that there are gods; on the contrary, he reveres them as ideals of celestial life. But we are not to suppose that the gods trouble themselves about us and our world. They could neither dwell in perfect bliss, were they constantly occupied with human

affairs; nor, if they really exercised such providence, would the evil that pervades the world be explicable. That, however, we have no need to assume a divine government is shown by science, since this proves that everything in the world takes place naturally, and that such order and system as things possess may be sufficiently explained from their own nature. Thus, natural science is the liberator of man from the delusions and oppressions of superstition; it is the irreconcilable foe of the fear of the gods which has brought upon mankind so much hatred, passion, and misery.

But Epicurus rejects all philosophical fetters no less emphatically than the religious ones. The metaphysical bondage is represented by the doctrine of Fate, of a necessity that surrounds us with an inescapable compulsion. Fate, in fact, would result in a far more awful oppression than superstition. Self-direction and free choice are indispensable to human weal; freedom of the will, which was usually stoutly attacked, at a later time, by the gainsayers of a supernatural order, is here postulated as an essential condition of human happiness. Epicurus could hardly show more convincingly how much his concern about happiness hampers his theoretical studies.

A system which so scrupulously avoids all complications has no place for immortality. Why should we want to live on at all, since there is ample opportunity to taste every kind of good thing during our present life? Having feasted to satiety, why should we not surrender to others our places at the table of life? After all, life is conferred upon us only for use; with the expiration of our allotted time, let us cheerfully pass on the torch to other men. Death with its annihilation need not agitate us. The simplest reflection, in fact, teaches us that death can in nowise touch us. For so long as we live, death has not come; and when it comes, we no longer exist. Why, then, should we pother about it? Hence there is nothing to prevent us from living wholly for the present, and seeking our whole happiness in our immediate surroundings.

Such happiness, however, is not to be found without the con-

stant use of insight; this alone teaches us a correct valuation of life's goods. Things have a value for us only when they convey pleasure or pain. Human effort cannot set itself any other goal than the pleasantest possible life. "The beginning and end of blissful life" is pleasure. But let not pleasure be blindly seized, just as it falls to us; it is not the first impression, but the full issue with all its consequences, that decides upon the worth of any experience; the consequences must be weighed and considered; and it requires art to estimate and measure pleasures. What else can supply this art but philosophy?

Thus philosophy is converted into the art of life, in fact, into the technique of enjoyment. In appearance the task is not very intricate; but the difficulty increases with the execution, owing to the limitless resources of civilisation and to the taste of cultivated people. Indulgence in pleasure must be refined by a process of selection—not to satisfy any moral appraisal, but in the interest of happiness itself. Thus, spiritual joys are to be preferred to sensuous ones; inner goods to external, as being the purer and more lasting; and the control of the mind over enjoyments, the being able to enjoy without being compelled to indulge, yields more happiness than the slavish dependence upon pleasures. In fact, it is less the things, than himself, the cultivated person, in the things, that a man enjoys; and the highest aim of all is less a positive pleasure than a freedom from pain and excitement, a serene peace, an unassailable repose of soul. But for this is needed moderation in the indulgence of appetite, and a proved clearness of vision and nobility of sentiment. For, "one cannot live agreeably without living intelligently, beautifully, and justly; nor intelligently, beautifully, and justly without living agreeably; for the virtues are intertwined with an agreeable life, and an agreeable life is inseparable from the virtues" (Epicurus). But the principal source of happiness will ever be the correct estimate of things, the liberation from the fear of the gods and from the dread of death, the knowledge that the good, rightly understood, is undoubtedly attainable, that pain, when severe, is usually brief, and when it lasts long, not

sharp. A man with such convictions will "be disquieted neither awake nor asleep, but will live like a god among men." This view is developed into an elaborate doctrine of virtue, expressed in fastidious ethical maxims. Many of Epicurus's sayings were held in high esteem even by his opponents, and have been incorporated into the common store of worldly wisdom. That even this philosophy of pleasure is designed to make men superior to outward circumstances appears from the saying of Epicurus, that it is better for intelligent action to meet with misfortune than for imprudence to meet with success.

The Epicurean demand that the individual should be completely independent gives a peculiar form also to the recognition of social relations. Man is warned against forming any ties, on account of the inevitable complications. Thus, the Epicurean philosopher regards civic life with cold indifference. And in order to insure his immunity from that quarter, he advocates the absolute form of government. Likewise, marriage cannot attract him. So much the more, he advocates the free relations of individuals, such as friendship, intellectual intercourse, and philanthropy. And this movement was not confined to a small circle; its organising power extended far and wide. "Epicurus and his disciples proselytised, and closely organised their society. It extended throughout the whole of Greece, a state within a state, having a fixed constitution, and held together not only by correspondence and itinerant preaching, but by the interchange of material assistance. Epicurus knew how to create an *esprit de corps* which has rightly been likened to that existing in the early Christian communities" (Ivo Bruns). Thus philosophy recognised that it had an important task to perform even in this field, namely, to bring together into new societies resembling religious communities the individuals which had been scattered like atoms by the breaking up of the old orders, and so to give them moral and religious support.

But the effort to do justice to the Epicureans must not blind us to their narrow limitations. With them, man accepts the

world as an established order, and adroitly and shrewdly accommodates himself to it; an active, integral part of it, he never becomes. Rather, in order to make sure of unalloyed happiness, he shuns all the turmoil and uncertainty of co-operative effort, and retreats within himself. Since, however, he considers only his own state of feeling, the inwardness into which he has withdrawn reveals to him no new world, nor are there any impulses or capacities produced which might arouse and develop his soul. This plan of merely utilising existing capacities offers nothing by way of compensation for all the inner and outer losses, except the reflection that at bottom evil is weak and the good strong; in other words, it cannot do without a large optimism; and, in fact, Epicurus adheres to optimism with all his strength. But, suppose that unreason and suffering cannot be so easily silenced? Then the anticipated bliss of the wise man may quickly turn into an inner vacuity, into a hopeless pessimism. Furthermore, such a view of life implies presuppositions which it cannot itself justify, which, taken strictly, contradict it. It implies a highly developed state of civilisation, refined taste, and noble sentiment, a joy in the good and the beautiful; without all these life would become empty or rude. But Epicureanism does not tend to produce such a civilisation by its own toil and sacrifices: for the sensuous, natural being, above which its conceptions do not rise, there is arbitrarily substituted a cultivated personality swayed by moral and intellectual interests. Thus this view of life feeds as a parasite at strangers' tables; the labour of others must create what it forthwith appropriates to its own enjoyment, or, in meditation, resolves into maxims of prudence. Although Epicureanism may thus offer much to the individual at particular epochs, on the whole it cannot inspire or produce anything; it remains a mere side-issue, a phenomenon accompanying a mature, indeed an over-mature, civilisation; and, as such, we must expect it constantly to reappear in some new guise, and to find adherents. But all the shrewdness, cleverness, and amiability it possesses cannot compensate for its fatal lack of spiritual productivity.

(c) *The Stoics*

Incomparably more was accomplished for the problem of life by the Stoics; their school also shows far more inner movement. Although pure theory was gradually forced into the background, Stoicism preserved throughout a consistent character; during the early Christian centuries the tendency toward the practical and parenetical wholly gained the upper hand; and the moral reformation which later antiquity undertook by reviving classical ideals owned the leadership of the Stoics. It must be our effort to bring into relief the common character which unites the various historical phases and the several individual peculiarities.

What the Stoa historically achieved for the problem of life was to give morals a scientific basis, and to elevate ethical problems to a position of complete independence and of recognised pre-eminence. In respect of morals, the Stoics did not merely further develop transmitted data, not merely consolidate more firmly existing elements; rather, an elaborate and specific doctrine of morals, such as they supplied, had not previously existed at all, not even in the Socratic school, *i. e.*, not in a scientific form. For, although the Cynics taught that happiness arises exclusively from excellence, they disdained all theoretical inquiry, and therefore were without any fundamental philosophical views: with such a beginning morals could not become a world-power. But, with the starting-point of the Stoics, it could; since for them there was no such thing as moral conduct without a foundation of theoretical convictions and a coherent system of thought

Stoicism is more closely related to the classical way of thinking than the first impression might lead one to suppose; the principal difference is that the Stoics considered everything more in the abstract, and worked out their conclusions mainly by meditation. Thus, they regarded man as a member of the great world, only not as in so close and obvious a relation to it; the world as a realm of reason, but less as a harmonious work of art than as a system of logical order and appropriate arrangement;

man as by nature impelled and qualified to comprehend universal reason, but rather in general thoughts than as manifest throughout the infinite detail of the actual world. Even with this view, man derives the problem of life from his own rational endowment, from his faculty of thought. The universe is much too rigidly organised and too strictly self-contained for man's acts to alter the condition of things or to direct their course into new channels. But the thinking being can take up either one of two attitudes toward the world. It makes a vast difference whether one lets the world's happenings pass over him unfeelingly and stolidly, and performs whatever he has to do under the blind compulsion of its superior force, or whether one intelligently masters the world, inwardly assimilates it, comprehends its necessities, and so transforms their compulsion into freedom. Here is a point of intimate personal decision, which, at the same time, draws a line of distinction between men. Whatever must happen, will happen; but whether it occurs without us, and in spite of us, or whether it takes place with our concurrence, changes radically the character of life, and decides whether we are the slaves or the masters of things. In free obedience lies the unique greatness of man. "To obey God is freedom" (Seneca).

But we can find satisfaction in the thought of the world only when all doubt is removed from the rationality of the universe; only then has the will a good and sufficient reason to adapt itself to the order of the world. Hence an important part, indeed an indispensable presupposition, of the Stoic view is the justifying of the state of the world, the dispelling of the appearance of unreason which the first impression creates. It seemed, indeed, particularly in later times, as if the philosopher were called upon, like an advocate, to defend the Deity against accusations, and to recommend the world to mankind as something good and acceptable. Thus arose the notion of a theodicy, to which, it is true, Leibniz first gave the name.

In the working out of this principal thought, various lines of reflection cross, and also merge into, one another. In the first place, the idea of a thorough-going causal connection, of a uni-

versal conformity to law, was so energetically defended that it forthwith became an integral part of the scientific consciousness. This causal order, however, appeared to the Stoics as being at the same time the expression of a divine government; they argued that there must be a Deity underlying the world, since a universe, which has animate parts, must also be animate as a whole. Furthermore, the Deity has adapted the world to rational beings, and even included individuals in his care. Such evil as exists is only a secondary consequence of the development of the world, and even this subordinate result is turned to good by the divine reason. The unreconciled, even unreconcilable, elements in these processes of reasoning do not trouble the Stoics. For their convictions spring far less from any theoretical demonstration than from a faith which is indispensable to their spiritual self-preservation. They are strengthened and confirmed in this faith, moreover, by the practical problem it imposes upon them, since the solution of this absorbs their whole energy.

The contemplation of universal reason can lead us to complete freedom and complete happiness only if our whole being goes out in thought, and everything is excluded from it that would make us dependent upon external conditions. But feeling and the emotions cause such a dependence, since they involve us in all the turmoil and misery of existence. The chief reason for their influence is a false valuation of things. For the evils, like the rest, of the outside world, have a power only over the person who wrongly ascribes reality to them: "it is not things that disquiet us, but our opinions about things" (Epictetus). To overcome this tendency to put a false value upon things is itself an act that demands the fullest exertion of our powers. Thus, thinking itself becomes conduct; it is no mere theorising, but ceaseless activity, a putting away of all lassitude, an effort of our whole being; in a word, it is a thought-action which inseparably unites wisdom and virtue, in fact fuses them into one. This thought-action alone yields true happiness; whoever seeks for happiness in the outer world, and thus becomes exposed to the

impressions of things, whoever is bent on enjoyment, and so falls a prey to greed and fear, sinks into certain misery. Not only excessive emotion, but every kind and degree of emotion, all pleasure and sorrow, all desire and fear, must be put away by a manly soul. Adversity becomes even valuable as a training in virtue, which if unexercised easily falls asleep: it is a misfortune never to meet with misfortune. The goddess *Fortuna* customarily bestows her favours upon commonplace natures; the great man is called to triumph over great obstacles and great vicissitudes. One's attitude toward the griefs of others, as well as toward his own, should not be sentimental, but active; let us give help swiftly by deed, but not be betrayed into sympathetic lamenting and wailing which profits no one. Let perfect "apathy" rule, *i. e.*, not a dull insensibility, but an unmovable firmness, an elimination of all sympathetic feeling.

Such a liberation from the power of temporal destiny includes the right freely to cast life itself away, so soon as it no longer affords the conditions of a rational activity. Suicide does not appear here as an act of despair, but as a matter of calm consideration and as an exercise of moral freedom. And as the Greek thinkers made their lives conform to their convictions, so there were several of the leaders of the Stoa who met voluntary deaths. To the great majority of the Stoics death indeed did not mean complete extinction. Individual souls, they thought, will continue to exist until the periodically recurring universal conflagration brings them back to the Deity, the substratum of all things. But even the thought of total extinction contains nothing terrifying. For the mere length of time effects no change in happiness. The virtuous man possesses already, and for so long as he lives, all the blessedness of Deity.

Thus, in theory, everything fits easily and smoothly together; life seems removed from every source of danger. But the Stoics by no means underestimated the difficulty of the practical problem. With them, the characteristic joy in creative activity, which distinguished the work of the classical thinkers, disappears; existence acquires a profound seriousness, and life seems

filled with toil and struggle. The conception of life as a conflict (*vivere est militare*) owes its origin particularly to this source, whence it has passed into the common consciousness of mankind.

The thinker is called upon to contend first against his environment, which is dominated by the false valuation of things; so let the judgment of the multitude be treated with indifference, and let no one fear to use even the harshest paradoxes. Grave dangers arise also from the effeminacy and excessive refinement of civilisation; to this tendency the Stoics oppose a high regard for homely conditions, for the simple, indeed rude, state of nature. More zealously, however, than against external conditions, the thinker must contend against himself, against the perils in his own nature. For the deadly enemy of true happiness, namely, a compliant attitude toward things, ever lurks in his breast, and entices him to abandon his high aims: this enemy must be combated with untiring vigilance and invincible courage. Such inner courage becomes the chief characteristic of the virtuous man; perfect virtue is heroism, greatness of soul. The hero rises far above the average of his fellows; the destruction of the world could not move him; his conduct is a drama for the gods. But in his supreme eminence he isolates himself from men and things; he attains less a dominion over the world than an indifference toward it; he remains rather in premeditation of activity, in preparedness for conduct, than exerts his power in actual doing, in which it would be fully spent. The question inevitably arises, how many will actually soar to the height of heroes, how many will possess the power to liberate themselves? For the Stoics rest the whole of life upon this one point of moral power. Whither shall man turn, and on what shall he found his hope, if he becomes conscious of falling far short of the goal, and feels the helplessness of his own faculties?

So the Stoic view of life contains much that is problematical. Yet behind it all there remains, as a permanent service of the highest value, the discovery and development of an independent ethics. In the decision to rise to the plane of universal reason,

in the act of free obedience, we have the work of the whole, the inner, man; therein is revealed man's capacity to act as a self transcending his particular faculties, and to make his whole existence dependent upon his own deed. Such an inner deed is far superior to all outward activity. Inwardness thus attains complete independence; a depth of soul is discovered and made the chief aim of all endeavour. A number of important changes result. Self-knowledge acquires the sense of an examination and judgment of the inner constitution of man; conceptions such as consciousness and conscience become fully clear and attain a fixed meaning; and the worth of conduct is now determined by the disposition alone.

At the same time, the supremacy of morals is fully recognised. Notwithstanding all the paradoxes, we have here simple and unassailable truths. The morally good alone may be called good; compared with virtue, all life's other values are as nought; it alone gives true happiness. Likewise, the distinction between good and evil is accentuated to the point of a complete antithesis; all transitions and mediations disappear; throughout life man is confronted with an abrupt, Either—Or. And the decision is not according to one's mere liking. For above us reigns the universal law, demanding our obedience. Mightier than ever before rises the idea of duty, which now acquires a definite meaning and a distinct name.

But the conduct of life was not only spiritualised by the Stoics; it was also universalised by them in a manner new to antiquity. When the inner aspect of conduct is elevated to a position of supreme importance, all the differences among men pale before the fact of their common humanity. It is now both possible and necessary for men to esteem and to labour for one another merely as men; for it is not so much the particular state or nation that binds us together as it is the universal reason. In this way arises a humanitarian or cosmopolitan ethics. What the earlier Stoics taught on this point was actually felt and practically carried out by the thinkers of the time of the Roman Emperors. The idea of a fraternal community of all men be-

comes a power; the metaphor of the organism is extended from the state to the whole of humanity, and all rational beings appear as members of one body; human nature is respected even in its least worthy representatives, and the common humanity in an enemy is loved. Thus the conception of philanthropy, which was unknown to Plato and Aristotle, is added to the world's moral consciousness. All men are citizens of a universal empire of reason. "The world is the common fatherland of all men" (Musonius). "As Antoninus, Rome is home and fatherland to me; as man, the universe" (Marcus Aurelius). The growth of the idea of God increases the warmth of humanitarian feeling. As children of one Father, we should hold together, and fraternally love and help one another. From such a fellowship there flows a stream of humane sentiment even into the general conditions of life, where it tends to suppress slavery, and to promote the care of the poor and the sick. Emperor and slaves alike are included and united in the same forward movement. Now, too, a common natural law, superior to the special laws of individual states, is recognised and developed; and of its effects we have ample evidence in Roman law.

The Stoic view of things has a limitation, it is true, in the fact that all it achieves lies within a given world; it makes no attempt to establish a new community, or to marshal all the individual forces to a combined attack upon unreason. So far as the ancient world is concerned, the tendency toward philanthropy and cosmopolitanism remains a matter of individual feeling and conviction rather than becomes a general movement. But even so, it had its value; for it forms the beginning of all further development.

The history of the Stoa does not fall within the plan of the present work. But it may be noted that the progress of centuries has brought out only the more distinctly the unsolved problems and the defects of the system, such as the discrepancy between the over-wrought ideal and the actual conduct of men, the want of any positive content to life, the isolation of the individual, and the rigorous suppression of all feeling. Even in

earlier times there were not wanting accommodations, relaxing the severity of the strict principles; but these concessions only gave rise to fresh complications. By lowering themselves from the lofty ideal of life of the wise man to promulgate a set of rules designed for mediocrity, the Stoics became the originators of the precarious doctrine of a twofold morals; and by recognising any sort of an admissible supposition (*probabilis ratio*) as a sufficient argument, instead of attempting a strict scientific deduction, they introduced the ill-famed probabilism.

Yet, notwithstanding all the obstacles and limitations, the Stoa fought a good fight, and, particularly in the early Christian centuries, proved itself to be the nucleus of a moral reformation. No more than others could it ignore the fact that the times were altered, and that the problem of happiness was pressed into the foreground with ever greater insistence and passion. To the Stoics of the time of the Roman Emperors, philosophy became primarily a support and a solace amid the unrest and the miseries of the age; the retreat into the inmost self, the awakening of the divine that dwells in every man, promised a sure liberation from all evil, and the prize of pure happiness. Thought here soars above time and sense, to rest in the eternity of an invisible order. But all the soaring of the spirit, all the self-exhortation of the sage, cannot restrain an overwhelming sense of the emptiness and worthlessness of human existence. Thus we see, *e. g.*, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, the last eminent Stoic, tossed hither and thither by conflicting moods. In the *Meditations*, which introduced the monologue into literature, he extols the glory of the world and the dignity of man. "The soul traverses the whole world and the void that surrounds it and its total structure, and it reaches into the infinity of eternity and comprehends the periodic re-birth of all things." Eternity may become fully present in human conduct. For in the deed of the moment the whole life, the past and the future, may be comprehended. So man should raise himself above all that is petty, and "live as upon a mountain." But the thought of the possession of eternity and infinitude may easily assume the meaning

that all temporal things weigh as nothing in the balance, and that there is no powerful motive to action. Nothing new is achieved, notwithstanding all the appearance of development. "He who has seen the present has seen all that was throughout eternity, and that will be throughout eternity. For it is all one in kind and form." "Whoever is forty years of age, if he but possess some understanding, has in some sort seen all the past and future according to its homogeneity." But where all eager interest has so completely disappeared, human existence is vain. "The world is incessant change and life mere opinion." Indeed, the admission of this futility appears to be the surest safeguard against every kind of unrest and danger; hence the disposition arises to represent not only life's sorrows but also its joys as wholly insignificant. "The whole earth is a point"; "Everything human is smoke"; "Human life is a dream and a journey in a strange land"; "Soon eternity will hide all."

Such moods tell of a languid and an enfeebled age. Where man thinks so meanly of himself and of his task the buoyancy and energy of life are speedily exhausted; there remains no power of successful resistance to life's inner desolation, nor to the sudden decline of civilisation. The age of the systems of worldly wisdom was, in fact, over. They had their mission in an epoch of richer and more luxurious civilisation. At such a time they disclosed to the individual the inner wealth of his own nature, and gave him a stay and support within himself which raised him above the vicissitudes of the world. They eagerly undertook the moral education of mankind; they not only produced writings which reached all classes, and exerted an uplifting influence upon beliefs, but they also afforded personal examples of living which inspired reverence. But a movement based primarily upon subjective reflection and individual impulse proved inadequate the moment the structure of civilisation began to totter and man had to take up the fight for his spiritual existence; in short, confronted by radical innovations, the systems of worldly wisdom broke down. Still, they produced fruitful results which extended far beyond their immediate circle and

their own time. Early Christianity drew in large measure from the Stoic ethics; the modern Enlightenment also fell back upon the Stoics; and, notwithstanding all the differences in intellectual conditions, such men as Hugo Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza, and even Kant and Fichte, display kinship with them. Not only have individual works of this school become a permanent part of the world's literature, but the whole view of life here developed has maintained itself in history as an independent type of a manly and dignified sort.

II. RELIGIOUS SPECULATION

(a) *The Trend Toward Religion*

The last great achievement of antiquity was a movement toward religion and religious speculation. We cannot estimate this development so lightly, as is still frequently done; we see in it far more than a mere decline of intellectual energy, or a loss by Hellenism of its true character. For even if the movement, viewed broadly, presents an unattractive picture, exhibiting much that is depressing and barren, in the background nobler forces, spiritual necessities, are at work; and in the end, creative activity rises out of the chaos to a height which had not been attained since Plato. The age was weary of cultivated life; and the religious movement shared in the general exhaustion. But the new tendency did not end in weariness. Rather, it gradually manifested an original vital impulse; the yearning for positive happiness, for the realisation and satisfaction of the self, which had been so long stifled, again passionately asserted itself. At the same time, the minds of men were seized with a vague dread, a tormenting anxiety, concerning the invisible relations of life and their consequences; hence a disquieting fear of dark powers and eternal punishment spread upon all sides. Man was shaken to the depths of his being; but the very shock itself called forth a faith in the indestructibility of his nature, and impelled him to seek passionately for new paths. Such a state of feeling could find no satisfaction in the systems of worldly wisdom with their

passive surrender to the course of the world, their reduction of life to calm contemplation, their repression of all strong emotion. Likewise, the last revival of ancient civilisation in the second century after Christ, with its return to the old standards of taste and its preference for formal culture, offered nothing upon the questions that then stirred men's hearts: all the outward splendour of the revival but thinly veiled its inner hollowness. With the third century the illusion also vanished, and there followed a sudden collapse. Even art, the most faithful companion of the spirit of Hellenism, now loses its power; the last prominent figure is that of Caracalla (d. 217).

In the third century, accordingly, the field was left wholly to the religious movement; after slowly gathering headway since the beginning of our era, the new tendency now burst forth in a mighty conflagration. And the third century also produced, and upon Greek soil, the only great philosopher of the movement, the sovereign-minded Plotinus. But properly to appreciate his greatness, we must first glance at his predecessors.

Philosophy, by sharing in the trend toward religion, again gained a closer touch with its surroundings. For, although the enlightenment of the Hellenistic period had crowded religion out of the intellectual sphere, it had not eradicated it from the usages nor from the hearts of the people. And now that an approach again took place between the cultured class and the multitude, the old religious tradition acquired a new value, although, it is true, not without the boldest revisions of the inherited doctrine.

But philosophy also possessed connections with religion in its own traditions. The highly cultivated were for the most part adherents of Platonism, the religious side of which now first attained its full development. Furthermore, Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines displayed a strong power of attraction; they kindled a longing for the liberation of the soul sunk in sensuousness, and offered in compensation not only an ascetic life, but a faith in miracles and divinations. To these were added powerful influences from the Orient, chiefly in the form, at first, of

curious and even repulsive cults, which none the less yielded a fruitful stimulus to the world of thought.

Thus there was produced a decidedly mixed atmosphere; old and new, absurdity and wisdom, mingled in it in confusion. The manner in which the various factors could be united in the same personality, and the leaning toward religion be harmoniously combined with a retention of the wealth of the old civilisation, is strikingly shown in the figure of the refined, serious, and gentle Plutarch (c. 50–120 A.D.). It would be difficult to find elsewhere such a happy picture of the religious moods of the age as is contained in his treatise, "On Isis and Osiris."

The new religious movement—also in this instance we must unite the various phenomena in a comprehensive view—exhibits above all an altered attitude toward the problem of evil. It will be remembered that the Greek thinkers showed a pronounced tendency to treat evil as a subordinate consequence of the moral order of the world, and that the Stoics in particular did their utmost to resolve it into an illusive appearance; now, however, a potent reality is assigned to it. Since, if God were the cause of all things, nothing evil could exist, the unreason of the world must have had some other origin; exaggerating an old view, sensuous matter with its unintelligibility is accordingly regarded as the source. Evil no longer appears as a force which willingly yields to the good, but as a hostile power dividing the universe in twain. The world becomes the arena of a fierce, irreconcilable conflict. The great cleavage which disrupts the universe is repeated in man; in him also reason and sense are ever at variance, ever involved in a feud. The more closely classical antiquity had interwoven the sensuous and the spiritual in a single life-process, the greater the determination with which they are now sundered. Disgust at the ever-increasing refinement of the sensuous life seems to have seized entire circles of people; it was impossible to go to excess in denouncing the same varied richness of life which had previously enchanted the Greek spirit.

Amid such changes, although at first silently and imperceptibly, the position and content of religion become shifted. While

at an earlier time, and even for a Plato, religion was closely connected with the intellectual life, and the entering upon a relationship with the divine was held to uplift all human endeavour, now religion begins to separate itself from everything else; it promises man a new and higher life, but demands in exchange the allegiance of his whole soul. Here there arises for the first time a specific religion and even religiosity. To turn to the Deity now means to renounce entirely the impure and inconstant world; all other aims sink out of sight before the one great summons.

There is a change, likewise, in the character and position of the Deity. Perfect Purity ought not to concern itself directly with a discordant world; a transcendent majesty is its due, a complete aloofness, an exaltation high above all human conceptions. But there exists at the same time a fervid longing to secure some form of access to the divine. Thus nothing remains but a mediation by intermediate powers of superhuman though subdivine character; hence the doctrine of spirits, which possessed a basis in the popular faith, and was also made use of incidentally by Plato, now attained an enormous influence and absorbed men's minds with a steadily increasing insistence. Man believed himself to be surrounded on every hand by such mediate beings, and to be everywhere dependent upon their help. But with the good spirits were associated evil ones, who tormented him and made him afraid; so that all his going and coming was encompassed by a conflict of invisible powers. In the view of the throng this fear sank to a vulgar belief in ghosts, and the heavy mist of superstition cast a gloom over the light of knowledge. Subjective emotion surged in the breast without restraint; the passions of a heart engrossed with its own happiness crowded out the calm consideration of material needs and the rational organisation of existence. In its stead there begins the development of a life of religious feeling. The idea of a transcendent Deity gives to human meditation a tendency toward vague yearning, and also at times the character of a dreamy hope; the immediate world becomes a mere preparation, the

symbol of a higher reality hidden from the common gaze. But there is no ascent to this world of divine truth without a complete purification from the sensuous; the subjection of the sensuous to the ends of the spirit no longer suffices; rather, its complete eradication is an indispensable condition of the highest good, viz., fellowship with God.

But, notwithstanding all the changes, the Greek character is still preserved in the fact that the fellowship with God is understood to be knowledge of God; for the Greeks never ceased to look upon knowledge as the essence of the life of the spirit. Still, the knowledge must be of a peculiar kind if it is to grasp supernatural or pure being. At first the prospect of success seems slight; since "for the souls of men, encumbered with bodies and passions, there is no sharing in the life of God; only a faint hint may be obtained by philosophical thought" (Plutarch). More confident appears the hope that what is hidden from our logical reasoning may possibly become accessible to immediate intuition in a state of "enthusiasm" or "ecstasy." In this state, where man ceases from all effort of his own, and becomes a mere vessel for the divine revelation, the divine light may reach him unobscured. This light illuminates the historical religion also, the "myth," and discovers in it a profound truth. For as the rainbow is a vari-coloured reflection of the sunlight upon a dark cloud, so the myth is a reflection of divine reason in our understanding (Plutarch). Thus the cultivated man, too, may hold the popular religion in honour; if he illuminates it through and through with the most perfect insight, he will be able to find the true mean between disbelief (*ἀδεότης*) and superstition (*δεισιδαιμονία*).

Accordingly, even in the religious movement a philosophical aim maintains itself, while in individuals piety and joy in knowledge are often harmoniously united. Nevertheless, in general, philosophical effort is not only outwardly seriously repressed, but it bears within itself the contradiction of forcing the new ways of thinking into the old, unsuitable forms; the movement fails as yet to transcend eclecticism and syncretism; it lacks an inner fusion and an organised development of the new bodies of

thought. This was reserved for neo-Platonism, or rather, for Plotinus.

Before we turn to him, however, let us briefly notice the attempt to evolve a religious philosophy with the aid of an historical religion, viz., Judaism. In the national tradition of Judaism, religion possessed a far greater importance and was more rigidly self-contained; it opposed to philosophy far greater independence. But, at a time of the triumphant supremacy of Greek civilisation, it was impelled to seek a reconciliation with philosophy, alike by the personal need of the cultivated man to justify his faith before the bar of reason, and by the desire, not yet eradicated by bloody violence, to make his ancestral religion the common property of all men. In this effort a place of special prominence must be assigned to Philo of Alexandria (c. 25 B.C. to 50 A.D.), who was the first to undertake on a grand scale the fusion into one whole of the faith of the Orient and the wisdom of the Greeks; in this attempt he entered upon a path upon which he has found followers for centuries. His own achievement is of a broad and discriminating character, but it does not rise above the plane of skilful combination to that of constructive work.

In the union of these two worlds of thought Judaism supplied a fixed body of doctrines and usages, an historical view of things, a community of an ethico-religious character, a piety already becoming inward; Hellenism, on the other hand, contributed universal concepts, a strong impetus away from the narrowly human toward the cosmic, a thirst for knowledge, a delight in beauty. In their mutual interaction, the Hebraic element received enlargement and a new intellectuality, the Hellenic concentration and a spiritual inwardness; but in the total result the opposing elements were forced together rather than harmonised.

Among the resulting changes in the view of the world particularly noteworthy is the altered position of the Platonic Ideas. For Plato, these were independent sovereign forms; with Philo, they become thoughts of the Divine Spirit. Accordingly, we

here not only have a unity as a source of all multiplicity, but the whole of reality is upborne and animated by a universal Spirit. Likewise, mighty movements were introduced by the fact that the powers mediating between the Deity and mankind were combined into the unity of the "Logos," the first-born Son of God.

As regards the view of life, the Stoic ideal of the imperturbable sage is fused with that of the devoutly pious man. Common to both is the withdrawal from the world and the concentration upon the moral aim. Now, however, the Greek element present in the new ideal appears in the desire for deeper knowledge, even of the Deity, and also in the desire to base conduct upon rational insight; in the denunciation of all the things of sense as unclean, and in the conviction that everything that shares in change sins. Judaism, on the other hand, contributes a more direct relation of life to God, a stronger sense of obligation, and an intensity of personal feeling. The whole of life here appears under the figure of a service of God; we may approach the spirit of sublimity only by perfect artlessness and simplicity of heart, just as the high priest lays aside his gorgeous robes and clothes himself in simple linen when he enters the holy of holies. And as the common relation to God binds men closer together, so the doing and the suffering of the one may avail for another; the sage appears not only as a support, but as an atonement, a ransom (λύτρον) for the bad man.

Peace and amity between the two worlds of thought could not have reigned in this manner without the introduction of an expedient to moderate the antagonisms and lessen the shock of their conflict. This was found in an allegorical interpretation of the belief handed down by religious tradition, that beneath the letter was hidden a spirit accessible only to profound insight. Such a procedure was not wholly new in philosophy. Plato and Aristotle incidentally made use of it, in order to bring their doctrines into harmony with popular beliefs; and the Stoics had treated the myth in this manner throughout. But the method first acquired considerable importance when religion appeared

with a fixed tradition and a compact doctrinal content, and when, in consequence, its collision with philosophy created serious anxiety. Now, however, the allegorical interpretation became a chief means of reconciliation; in fact, with its adjustment of individual freedom and general conformity, theoretical investigation and historical authority, it profoundly affected the whole attitude toward life. The letter of tradition was nowhere tampered with; it remained an inviolable canon. But the freedom of interpretation permitted philosophy to make of it what it found to be necessary; all the difficulties of inflexibility disappeared, and strictness of method gave place to the free sway of fantasy. In this process, present and past, time and eternity, subjective moods and objective facts, are constantly confounded; a mysterious twilight closes in about us, and life assumes a dreamy aspect. This dreaminess persists throughout the Middle Ages, and is dispelled only by the energetic conduct of life in the modern era.

Thus, in this instance also, Greek philosophy is operative beyond the national boundaries in spiritualising and universalising life. Yet everything that the Hellenistic period accomplished up to the beginning of the third century after Christ is mere patchwork; reflection and simple combination usurp the place of spontaneous creation; we have popular philosophy instead of systematic, constructive work. Plotinus brings the change; for in him there again appears a thinker of the first rank.

(b) *Plotinus*

(*a*) INTRODUCTORY

In the whole line of great thinkers there is not one about whom the judgment of men has been and is so divided as it is about Plotinus, the founder of neo-Platonism (205–279). His truly great achievements are so inextricably interwoven with what is problematic, and even certainly erroneous, that complete concurrence concerning him is nearly everywhere excluded; more-

over, philosophy with Plotinus remains too much a matter of broad outlines; there is no advance from a general view of the world to exact knowledge; finally, his whole system is pervaded with the conflict between a soaring abstraction and a profoundly intimate emotional life. Plotinus, therefore, if his actual achievement be regarded, falls far behind the other great thinkers; but if we penetrate to the forces underlying his work and follow his influence upon the development of the intellectual world, we must hold him equal to the best. For then there appear, often concealed beneath highly questionable assertions, new and fruitful intuitions; in fact, even error now and then serves as the lever of important discoveries. Intuition constitutes the true greatness of Plotinus; and this is nowhere so apparent as in his view of life. The impression of supreme spiritual power which emanates from him increases in proportion as we realise how unfavourable were the influences of his age; these must inevitably have restrained the freedom of investigation, and fostered the doubtful and fantastic rather than the true and valuable elements of his work. There is, indeed, no more splendid witness to the power of the Greek spirit than the fact that Plotinus could rise to such a height of contemplation from such miserable intellectual surroundings. Moreover, the profound influence upon humanity of his work as a whole is incontestable; here we have in its original conception, and in the clearness of its primitive state, much that has moved mankind throughout nearly two thousand years. Particularly in his influence upon the attitude toward life, Plotinus is without a peer; here he marks the boundary between two worlds.

Viewed historically, his work appears at first as a continuation and completion of the ascetic movement which dominated later antiquity with steadily increasing exclusiveness. But it was with Plotinus that the movement first became strong enough to result in a new construction of reality and the creation of a characteristic view of the world. In fact, the trend toward religion here undergoes an ennobling transmutation of its inmost contents. Hitherto it had been dominated by undue solicitude

for the happiness of the individual; infinitude and a transcendent world were proclaimed merely in order to lead individuals from unendurable misery to bliss and to secure for them an immortal life. With Plotinus, on the other hand, the individual in his isolation appears much too narrow, insufficient, and helpless; there arises an ardent longing for a new life springing direct from the fulness of infinitude. The anthropocentric character of the process of life yields to a cosmocentric, or rather a theocentric, character. At the same time every effort is made to bridge the chasm between man and the world, between subject and object, which had dominated thought ever since Aristotle; this is accomplished by the transference of reality to an inner life of the spirit, by including all antitheses in a world process, from which everything issues and to which everything returns.

Plotinus's efforts are directed toward a consolidation of Greek culture and toward its defence against all hostile attacks by epitomising and intensifying it. What is peculiarly Greek again stands out in stronger relief; indeed, many a characteristic Greek conviction is now for the first time fully thought out. But we shall see how, in these completely altered times, the fullest development of Greek ideas leads to a total collapse; amid stormy movements the Greek character disintegrates with the Greeks themselves and a new epoch is introduced by their last great philosopher. Christianity experienced the direct opposite. Plotinus's mind was altogether hostile to it; and his assault was the more dangerous, because it took place in the field of its own strength, and was made in the name of religion. But, as a matter of fact, Christianity is indebted to Plotinus for furtherance of the greatest importance, since it not only drew upon the world of speculative thought extensively in detail, but also first found in the latter a general intellectual background for its spirituality and for the new world it proclaimed. With the exception of Augustine, no thinker exerted a greater influence upon early Christianity than Plotinus; consequently, the further history of Christianity is incomprehensible apart from his doctrines. Thus Plotinus experienced with peculiar force the contradiction which

human destiny not infrequently exhibits: where he meant to build up, he destroyed; and where he aimed to destroy, he built up.

(β) THE BASIS OF THE VIEW OF THE WORLD

Plotinus turns with fervour and eager yearning to seek God and the highest good above and beyond the immediate world with its inconstancy and impurity. Thus the conception of other-worldliness is here accentuated to the last degree; the School of Plotinus, in particular, revels in the notion of the supermundane, a conception which must have excited the amazement of an ancient Greek much as the idea of the superdivine would do a Christian. The connection with the tendency of the age is unmistakable; but what in general remained a matter of subjective feeling, of moral and religious yearning, became at the hands of Plotinus a reasoned conviction related to his theoretical doctrine respecting the nature of reality. With obvious dependence upon Plato, but with an individual development of what he borrowed, Plotinus worked out a doctrine which maintained that only being thought of as indeterminate—being that is absolutely nothing but being, and hence that precedes and includes everything—could form true reality. But the varied world of experience does not present us with such indeterminate being; hence it must be sought for beyond the world, and postulated as existing by itself in transcendent exaltation.

If, however, pure being in this exalted isolation is also to form the true essence, the sole substance, of things, there results a complicated and contradictory condition. What things present in their immediate existence is not their true being; between existence and essence, accordingly, there is here a wide divergence, even an apparently impassable chasm: this cannot be spanned without profound changes in the first impression of the world, and without a wholly new construction of reality.

But, now, pure being—and this is essential to the Plotinian conception—is identified with the Deity: to penetrate to pure being means also to unlock the deep things of God. Thus

speculation becomes religion; the triumph of abstraction ought also to still the craving for happiness. Herewith the opposition between pure being and its varied manifestations is transferred in all its harshness to the relation between God and the world. On the one hand, God exists in unapproachable isolation, inaccessible to appeals and thoughts alike; on the other, as being the sole reality, He is the Omnipresent, and that which is nearest to every one of us; in truth, He is nearer to us than are our individual selves, which belong only to the world of phenomena. Thus God is at once removed to the furthest possible distance and brought the closest possible. This vacillation between opposites which it cannot and hardly cares to reconcile proclaims the unclassical character of the Plotinian view of the world.

But such an extreme opposition cannot continue; the contradiction between God and the world, between essence and existence, must somehow be adjusted. Several solutions present themselves: of the thinkers who, like Plotinus, made pure being the root of reality, some resolved the world wholly into God, others God into the world. Plotinus himself—concealing rather than solving the contradiction—attempts a middle course, and ascribes to the world a partial reality, less than that of God, and wholly dependent upon Him. He then unfolds, by developing an early Greek and genuinely Platonic conception, the doctrine that all being by nature, and so above all the highest being, feels the impulse to create something similar to itself, to produce the completest possible representative of itself, not for any particular end, least of all a selfish one, but as a natural manifestation of indwelling goodness. But since the creature, too, receives this impulse to create, the movement propagates itself, stage is added to stage, until non-being threatens to outweigh being, and therewith progress encounters a limit.

Accordingly, the universe is transformed from mere coexistence into succession; a chain of life arises, a realm of descending stages. Each succeeding stage is less than the preceding one, for—so Plotinus, like most of the Greek philosophers, thought—the perfect cannot originate from the imperfect, the copy can

never fully equal the original, the higher must always precede the lower. But all later generation remains in harmony with the original perfection; whatever is real is good in kind, indeed divine. The lower, too, in virtue of its inner kinship with the higher, strives backward toward its origin; hence there issues also from it a movement extending throughout the universe, so that the whole of reality is involved in a cycle of occurrence. This movement is not temporal in kind, not a succession of individual stages, but a timeless process of essence and worth, an eternal becoming of the world out of God. Thus a diversity of ages exists only in the sense that there is an unending series of cycles in the realm of phenomena. Beyond all change, however, eternal being abides in transcendent majesty, itself unmoved, though the source of all motion.

There appears in such doctrines a strong desire to subordinate the manifold to a unity, to elevate human existence to the significance of a cosmic, indeed a divine, life. The energetic development of these tendencies meant a momentous historical change. From the outset Greek philosophy had taught the rigid coherence of all reality and had bidden man to submit himself to the universe. But the several spheres of life touched one another externally only; in his innermost being each individual was still thrown upon himself. Now, however, an all-embracing, all-penetrating unity became the source of the whole of life; each point became inwardly united with it; each particular thing must draw its life from it; for any individual being to separate itself from the unity in selfish isolation meant to incur the penalty of vacuity. Thus the narrow spheres are burst asunder and a boundless universal life surges through the wide expanse. But this universal life is through and through divine in its nature; whether we seek the good beyond the world or in it we come upon God; all the various channels of life are only so many ways to God; in each particular sphere there is nought of worth except that sphere's revelation from God.

Here for the first time we have a religious conduct of life based upon philosophy, a thoroughly religious world of thought,

a religious system of culture. But life, although one in its root, is divided in its development into two chief tendencies, in accordance with the belief that the Divine Being is active and accessible in a twofold manner, namely, immediately in His transcendent majesty, mediately throughout the whole universe according to its degrees of subordination. There result different, if kindred, realities and forms of life. The search for the divine in the world is dominated by the idea of a pervasive order and gradation. Each individual thing has its fixed position; here and here only it receives a share in essential being and perfect life; it receives this life through a revelation of the next higher stage, and communicates it to the next lower stage; it can accomplish nothing, indeed it is nothing, apart from this relationship. That is the fundamental philosophical conception of a hierarchy; but it is also the origin of a magnificent artistic conception of the world, in which "the forces of life ascend and descend and hand to one another the golden vessel."

Opposed to this line of thought is that of an immediate revelation of God beyond the world of phenomena, in a sphere where there are no copies, and the original perfection is everything. In this transcendence alone there is revealed the whole depth of being and the fulness of bliss. All mediation has disappeared along with the phenomenal world; here God is immediately all in all. This is the mystic realm; and it is just as much a contrast of, as a complement to, the hierarchical order.

(γ) THE WORLD AND THE LIFE OF MAN

At first Plotinus follows in the footsteps of Plato, and distinguishes matter and form as constituting the world's principal antithesis. Like Plato, too, he is filled with a strong antipathy to sensuous matter, which fetters us and drags us down. He views it as something thoroughly irrational, crude, and animal; a product of elemental, non-divine nature (recalling the old doctrine of chaos). There is no place for such matter in a world of pure reason; hence the coherence of reality is destroyed, and

two worlds originate, one of self-contained, pure spirituality, and the other of the lower forms of soul life, sunk in matter and bound to sensuousness. It becomes a duty sharply to separate the two worlds; and the sensuous is to be rejected not only in particular forms and in abnormal developments, but in every form and as to its whole nature. Asceticism, or the escape from sensuous existence, could not find a deeper theoretical basis than is here given to it.

The more sharply a higher world separates itself from the coarseness and darkness of matter, the more powerfully it develops its own character of pure spirituality. And spiritual life attains a more independent position, indeed an elevation to a self-dependent world. At the same time, there begins a shifting of all categories into the non-sensuous, the living, the inward; the transformation of ideas into purely spiritual entities is taken in full earnest; time is recognised as the product of a timeless soul; even space seems projected from the mind itself. The process of life is now no longer, as formerly, a commerce with an external although kindred reality; it is a movement purely within the spirit. Within lie its problems and achievements, the beginning and end of its activity.

By such a transformation the inner life outgrows the immediate form of soul life, and to the realm of the conscious are added the realms of the superconscious and the subconscious. Thus arise the three domains of spirit, soul, and nature—all of them stages of the world-forming inner life. In this relation, the lower is encompassed and supported by the higher, nature by the soul, the soul by the spirit, the spirit by absolute being. Hence the soul is not in the body, but the body in the soul.

Plotinus, however, is impelled to look beyond even the most general concept of inner life to an all-dominating chief activity. This he finds, in accordance with the old Greek conviction, in thinking and knowing. In fact, by tracing all spiritual being back to thinking, and by resolving even the stages of the universe into stages of thinking, he develops intellectualism to its farthest extreme. Thus Plotinus, like Aristotle, distinguishes

three chief activities: knowing (*θεωρεῖν*), acting (*πράττειν*), and artistic production (*ποιεῖν*). But thinking alone has genuine life; creating is a close rival, since its essence consists in filling being with thought; conduct, on the contrary, falls far behind. Only when executing a theory has it a certain value; for the rest, it is a mere phantom with which those may concern themselves who are not fit for theory. Thus intellectualism destroys itself by exaggeration. For here knowledge calls a halt only when it ceases to be really knowledge and becomes feeling. Thus the altered times force the Greek view of life to give up its own presuppositions and to destroy the relationships out of which it grew. But amid the dissolution it leads to new paths, and even in its downfall it proves its greatness. But the definiteness and plasticity which characterised the ancient conduct of life are now past and gone; upon the native soil of Greek philosophy the classical is transformed into a romantic ideal.

But what significance has man in this universe, and what is the purpose of his life? We find that no special sphere is assigned to him, nor is he occupied with any particular work. Life in common with his fellows, *i. e.*, the social sphere, remains wholly in the background. Human existence receives its content altogether from the universe, and is completely bound up with the destiny of the whole. In this, however, man finds a peculiar dignity, since he is enabled to share inwardly in the infinitude of the universe and in its aims and processes. Accordingly, there develops an incomparably higher estimate of the human soul. It is of like essence with God (*ὁμοούσιος*, the same expression which Christian dogma uses for Christ), and hence of eternal and boundless nature. "The soul is much and everything, as well what is above as what is below, as far as life extends. And we are each of us an 'intelligible' world (*κόσμος νοητός*)."

Man shares with the universe the contrast of a purely intellectual and a sensuous being. The human soul has fallen from pure spirituality and is encumbered with a body; that involves it in all the perplexities and troubles of sense; by a succession of

births it must wander and wander, until a complete purification leads it back to the world of ideas. Hence the first aim, preparatory to all further effort, must be severance from sense; this means nothing less than the uprooting of everything that binds us to sensuous existence, or a complete withdrawal within the spiritual self. In the execution of this aim there are not wanting regulations in the spirit of ordinary asceticism: thus, we should mortify and subdue the body, in order to show that the self is something different from external things. But, in general, Plotinus treats the question in the large sense of a man who does not insist upon the outward detail, because he is concerned above all with the whole and with what is inward. What he requires is a purification (*κάθαρσις*) of being, a complete alienation of desire from external things, an unqualified turning of the will inward. We ought not to succumb to the impressions made by our surroundings, but to receive with indifference whatever fortune imposes upon us; superior to mere nature, and to the behaviour of the crowd, we should parry the blows of fortune like sturdy athletes. Such a detachment from the material world and from all external welfare is at the same time an exaltation into the realm of freedom. For our dependence extends only so far as our entanglement in sensuous existence and its obscure compulsions; and it is open to us to abandon that whole sphere, and to attain perfect freedom in a supersensible world.

But this self-dependent spiritual life finds a substantial purpose in the gradual progress toward an increasingly coherent understanding of things; and the problem assumes varied aspects, since the chief domains of reality appear as stages in the work of life, and thus place man in a progressive development. Let us follow rapidly the steps in this movement.

(δ) THE STAGES OF SPIRITUAL CREATION

The lowest stage of inner or spiritual life is nature. For, according to Plotinus, even in the external world all form and all life come from the soul, which is active in matter as the

formative power; indeed, the process of nature is in its essence a soul-life of a lower kind, a state of sleep of the spirit, a dreamy self-perception of the world soul.

But the self-contained life of the soul stands free above matter. The penetrating acuteness with which Plotinus points out the soul's characteristics, particularly its unity and the self-activity of its processes, has also a practical application: the soul-life, namely, produces within itself its power and also its responsibility; it is not compelled from without, but decides by its own faculties.

In distinguishing the spirit from the soul as a still higher stage, Plotinus falls in with a strong tendency of his age. But whereas this tendency attained elsewhere only vague expression, at his hands it received a comparatively exact formulation. Peculiar to soul-life in its narrower sense is consciousness with its desires and deliberations. But it is impossible that consciousness should be the essence of the inner life and the source of truth; the fountain-head must be a world behind consciousness. For the activity of consciousness always rests upon a deeper foundation. When we reflect upon ourselves, we always come upon an already thinking nature, only it is, as it were, in repose; in order to seek for reason, we must already possess reason.

In a similar manner, Plotinus elevates the good not only above all dependence upon anything external, but even above the state of subjective feeling, maintaining that it resides exclusively in a self-contained, spiritual activity. In the first place, no independent value is ascribed to pleasure. Pleasure is always pleasure in something, and therefore it can never dispense with a basis in an object. The subjective state is a consequence of the content of life; effort does not produce goodness, but goodness effort. Moral excellence and happiness do not require reflective consciousness nor positive feeling. As we remain healthy and beautiful, even when unconsciously so, so we do not need always to bear in mind wisdom and virtue. The more we are absorbed in our activity, and the more closely our condition is identified with our own being, the more the feelings of pleasure and pain

pale, indeed vanish. For we feel distinctly only what is alien, not ourselves, not our own inmost being. Hence to become inwardly independent means to free oneself from the power of pleasure.

Plotinus remained true to the old Greek connection of happiness with activity; but we saw that he did not understand activity as a visible performance affecting one's surroundings. Hence, in his opinion, no outward manifestation is needed for the completion of virtue; else we would be forced to wish that injustice should arise, in order that we might exercise justice, distress, that we might relieve it, war, that we might show bravery. In truth, the inner attitude, the living disposition, constitutes a complete, ceaseless activity. Once more the extreme development of a conviction threatens to destroy its original form. The joyful, buoyant spirit of the Greek looked to activity alone for happiness. But the greater the obstacles of life became, the further activity had to retreat, until now it surrenders all relation to the environment, and becomes merely an inner movement of the being, a self-contained attitude of the mind. It has now no other aim than the comprehension of absolute being, the union of its nature with God; it makes man indifferent to the visible world and a hermit among his fellows. Furthermore, every impulse is wanting for the improvement of the conditions of human existence. Hence, also, the idea of the good soars in a transcendent region high above the world of practical effort.

Nowhere, however, is the change introduced by Plotinus so obvious as in the case of the idea of the beautiful. A predominantly spiritual character had been attributed to the beautiful by Plato; but a large sensuous element nevertheless entered into the elaboration. Plotinus was the first to take the conception in full earnest; and, as a result, he was driven to a wholly new view. Beauty, that is, cannot lie in proportion (*συμμετρία*), where thinkers had hitherto sought it. For then only composite things could be beautiful. But, even among sensuous objects, simple things please, such as sunlight, gold, and the stars; and, in the spiritual realm, relations of size lose all meaning. In

truth, the beautiful consists in the triumphant sway of the higher above the lower, of the idea over matter, of the soul over the body, of reason and the good over the soul; the ugly, on the contrary, springs from the dominance of the lower, from a suppression of the idea by matter. So taken, beauty rests upon the good, as that which has worth in itself; and it must never relinquish this dependence. The outward manifestation becomes incidental, since beauty does not arise from a union of inner and outer, but merely from the inner and for the inner. Artistic creation does not embody itself in the marble, but abides with itself; the external work, the visible performance, is only a copy, an impress, of the inner creation in the mind of the artist, and therefore inevitably inferior to it. This transcendence of inner activity implies that art is more than an imitation of nature. Rather, it should be said, that nature itself imitates something higher, and that art does not copy the sensuous form in nature but the reason active in the form; above all, however, that in virtue of the beauty inwardly present to the mind of the artist, art adds much from its own resources, supplementing the defects. Here we have unfolded for the first time the conviction that art builds up a new, ideal reality, opposed to the world immediately revealed to the senses. But this recognition of its higher mission did not lead Plotinus to turn his thoughts to art as an independent field. His efforts, even in the case of the beautiful, are much too exclusively directed to the fundamental relation of man to the universe, for him to be impelled toward any particular development or any definite formulation. Thus beauty bids fair to transcend art, just as truth did science, and goodness practical activity.

Consequently, in every sphere life is deepened, there is a free soaring of the mind above all material things, an unreserved spiritualising of all activity and creativeness. From being a part of the world, the life of the spirit becomes the sole support of the whole of reality. Yet it remains in remote transcendence, without a nearer definition, or any visible content. And from this transcendent height Plotinus is forced to take the last step,

to turn, namely, from the whole realm of mediate demonstration to an immediate grasp of absolute essence, to union with God.

(ε) UNION WITH GOD

The problem of finding God in his innermost being forms in this system the supreme attainment of life. All revelation in and through the universe points indeed back to Him, as the copy points to the original; but now the aim is to reach immediately and in its entirety what hitherto had been attainable only piecemeal and by means of intermediate steps. Hence it will readily be understood that Plotinus's emotional nature, which hitherto has entered into his work only under restraint, now wells up rapturously and pervades his whole account with a passionate fervour. This last development means a return to ourselves quite as much as it does a breach with all that previously concerned us. What we seek is not far from us, and not much lies between it and us; it is in fact our own hitherto estranged nature that we seek; let us accomplish the return into our true and happy fatherland. But since we yielded ourselves to strangers, a complete change will be necessary, an inner revolution; the new cannot gradually grow out of the old, it must break forth suddenly. "Then may one believe he has caught sight of it when the soul suddenly receives light." Instead of a continuous upward striving, now it is calm waiting that is required. "One must remain in repose until it appears, and be only an observer, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun." In truth, he who would attain a vision of the innermost nature must close the outward eye.

But conceptions can communicate nothing of what immediate intuition discloses concerning the Divine Being; only what He is not can be told; any further affirmation remains a mere comparison. Even of the state of exaltation, of "ecstasy," only figurative expressions can give a certain idea.

But the Divine Being may be brought somewhat nearer by the ideas of the One and the Good. The strict notion of unity,

which is raised far above the unity of mere number, forbids every kind of distinction within the Supreme Being. Whence it is concluded that the Absolute Being cannot possess self-consciousness, or be a personality. But this only in the abstract. For yonder pure, indeterminate Being is in reality continually having an inner life attributed to it: the impersonal Substance transforms itself imperceptibly into the all-animating Deity; the absorption in infinitude merges into a complete surrender of the heart and mind to the Perfect One, and speculative thinking is lost in a profoundly inward form of religion. Thus Plotinus's world, too, is far richer than his abstract conceptions. Hence, likewise, he does not hesitate to identify the idea of the good with the Absolute Being.

But such difficulties and contradictions as remain did not disturb Plotinus in his full surrender to the Supreme Being. Just as the state of union with God immeasurably transcended all other life, so also does the happiness attainable in it. The possession of the whole world would not counterbalance this happiness; and from this exalted height everything human appears puny and worthless. The philosopher in fact revels in the thought of exclusive withdrawal into the transcendent unity, which is at the same time the root of reality. That thought here first displays the mighty power over the human heart which it often displayed later, and can ever manifest anew. To rouse men to aspire to this high goal now becomes the chief aim of philosophy. But in the case of a purpose which requires so emphatically the devotion of the whole being, philosophy can do no more than point the way; each of his own accord must supply the will. "The teaching leads to the pathway and to the journey. The vision is the affair of him who would see."

Thus we reach life upon the summit of mystic union with the Absolute. Plotinus himself regards this attainment during the earthly life as a rare exception. If the idea of God afforded us nothing more than this, it would but exalt certain solemn moments of life, not elevate its total condition. But, in truth, by

means of the work of reason the effects of this idea extend far beyond immediate intuition and result in a transformation of the whole of reality.

A powerful influence upon the whole of life is exerted furthermore by the conviction that in the Absolute Being all the contradictions of reality are solved, indeed that they finally merge into one whole. This has already been shown in part; but some other points may now be added.

The Supreme Being knows no movement in the sense of change; rather there reigns for Him a perfect peace, a perpetual repose. But notwithstanding its changelessness, the repose of the Divine Being is not of an idle and lifeless sort; it implies a ceaseless activity, it is the highest and completest life. Hence there are united in this Substratum both essence and activity. Also, all discrepancy between existence and its cause disappears, since the Absolute Being creates itself, is its own cause (*causa sui*). Consequently, freedom and necessity also coincide as one and the same. The Divine Being knows no chance and no uncertain caprice, but also no dependence on what is external and alien; He lives solely out of Himself. By an ascent to the Supreme Being, man too may share in such divine freedom, which means incomparably more than the mere liberation from sensuousness.

Finally, the problem concerning the rationality of the actual world attains from this supreme and all-comprehensive altitude a peculiar solution. The theodicy here offered to us has, indeed, borrowed many features from the Stoics; but what it appropriates receives a fresh treatment, so that it becomes the most important achievement of antiquity in this direction.—Plotinus does not in the least dispute that evil is widespread, but he holds that we can successfully combat it by making knowledge more profound. In the first place, man should consider the problem not from the point of view of himself, or of any part whatever, but from that of the whole; "One must look not at the wish of the individual, but at the universe"; "because the fire has gone out in thee, it follows not that all fire is extinguished." Accord-

ingly, all the lines of thought of the Plotinian system are laid under contribution in order to vindicate the state of the world: particularly a metaphysical and an æsthetic consideration proffer their assistance. Evil in the strict sense has no essence; in its nature it is not anything positive, but only a lesser good, a spoliation of higher qualities, a defect (ἔλλειψις) in the good. Even upon the lower levels of reality the good predominates; hence it is better that these lower levels exist than that they do not. They are further necessary for the reason that a manifold is essential to the perfection of the universe, since in addition to the higher there must be a lower. A statue cannot be all eye, nor a painting all vivid colour, nor a drama all heroes and heroines. Furthermore, although the individual parts of the world conflict with one another, the whole forms a harmony including all contradictions; also what seems to us men unnatural, belongs to the nature of the whole. Whoever finds fault with reality, usually thinks only of the world of the senses. But above this world thought discloses another of pure spirituality and ideality, which knows no evil, and even elevates and ennobles the sensuous world.

Thus the ancient Greek belief in the rationality and beauty of the universe is maintained to the end in full force. The last independent thinker produced by Hellenism holds to the conviction that what is needed is not the creation of a new world, but reconciliation to the present one by means of an enlightened intelligence. He, too, looks upon reality as the finished work of reason; here there is no room for great innovations, for a veritable history with free volition and progress due to individual initiative; in order to avoid all unreason, it is sufficient to penetrate to the foundation underlying the obscure appearance of things. Thus thought asserts itself to the end as the power which reassures man concerning his destiny, and lifts him up to the Deity.

The more, however, man lays aside his peculiar character and attains a life in the Infinite, the more human activity is transformed from striving to possession, from ceaseless progress to

perpetual repose. Rest in the Absolute, beyond all conflicts and contradictions, became, amid the confusion of the time and the sudden decline of civilisation, the highest aim. The immediately surrounding world now finds its principal significance in pointing the way to the higher world; it has its worth not in what it is, but in what it reveals as the sign and symbol of a higher being. It is owing to this symbolic character of the immediately actual world that allegorical interpretation possesses a profound justification. And the ascent from the sensuous to the spiritual, from the image to the truth, now becomes the chief movement of life.

Just as, in Plotinus's view, intellectual activity at its height passes altogether into religion, and religion rules over life, so it is principally religion that unites Plotinus himself to his surroundings, and also determines his position in the historical movements of his time. His attitude toward the Greek religion was entirely friendly, since his doctrine of the gradation of the Supreme Being through a series of realms was attractive to the popular polytheistic belief. And just as an exclusive monotheism had always conflicted with Greek feeling, so the strict unity of the deepest Ground of things did not forbid, even for a Plotinus, the assumption of intermediate powers, visible and invisible, in the realm of experience. Possessed of such a foundation, the ancestral religion appeared to be spiritually deepened and securely anchored; sympathetic minds could now hope for a revival of the ancient faith. Religious enthusiasm once again blazed up, only to die down quickly to a dull flame, and then go out altogether. Yet it was Neo-Platonism upon which the last attempt at a restoration (that of Julian), leaned for support; its conceptions formed the last weapons of dying Hellenism. Thus philosophy loyally bore Greek life company to the end.

The convictions which united Plotinus to Hellenism necessarily separated him from Christianity. His antagonism toward the latter centred upon points which are revealed in utterances directed against the Christian Gnostics. The chief criticisms of

their doctrines are the following: 1. The over-estimate of man.—Man is indeed united by means of his rational nature with the deepest foundation of things, but he is only a part of the world, and not only over him but over the whole world the divine sway is exercised. 2. The depreciation and materialisation of the world.—Whoever attacks the universe knows not what he does nor how far his impudence extends. It is, furthermore, radically perverse to ascribe an immortal soul to the least of men, and to deny one to the universe and to the eternal stars. 3. An inactive attitude.—What is needed is not prayer but effort. If we shun the conflict, the bad win the victory. Even in the inner life, the thing is to act, and not merely to implore salvation. Complete virtue, based upon insight, reveals God to us. Without true virtue, however, God is an empty word.

How far these reproaches are pertinent, and whether, in addition to the Gnostics, they apply to Christianity, cannot here be discussed. In any case they distinctly show that, in spite of all the changes, the old Greek ideal of life retains its chief characteristics; namely, the subordination of man to the universe, the personification, indeed the deification, of the powers of nature, the expectation of happiness from activity alone, the esteeming knowledge to be the divine power in man.

In reality, Plotinus is separated from Christianity even further than is implied in the above attack; yet, on the other hand, there exists a closer relationship than the antagonism between them allows us to perceive. In both there is a thoroughgoing spiritualising of existence, and a reference of all life to God, but less in a spirit of uplifting the world than of repelling it. But Plotinus finds the spiritualising of existence in an impersonal intellectual activity, Christianity in an unfolding of the personal life; in the one, all welfare comes from the power of thought, in the other, from purity of heart. This fundamental difference results in opposing answers to the most important questions of life. With Plotinus, there is an abandonment of the sense world, exaltation above temporal to eternal things, and repose in a world-embracing vision; in Christianity, eternity enters into

temporal things, there is an historical development, and a counteraction of the unreason of existence. In the former, man disappears before the infinitude of the universe; in the latter, he is made the centre of the whole; there, there is an isolation of the thinker upon a pinnacle of world-contemplation; here, a close union of individuals in a perfect fellowship of life and suffering. However highly we may esteem the content of truth in Plotinus's ideas, and the fervour of his religious feeling, we must still regard it as wholly comprehensible that the ever-increasing, mighty yearning for religion sought satisfaction, not in his direction, but in that of Christianity.

Plotinus makes us feel with peculiar force the profound contradiction which thwarted the efforts of post-classical antiquity, the contradiction, namely, that the development of a transcendent spirituality remained conjoined with what in reality was an inanimate, impersonal world; step by step the movement was obstructed by this impediment. It was Christianity that first solved the contradiction, by revealing a world corresponding to the religious aspiration of the time, and thereby guiding life's problem into new channels. How much Christianity itself owed to Plotinus, we shall consider below.

(ζ) RETROSPECT

We must again insist that it is impossible to do justice to Plotinus without penetrating beneath the work to the soul of the man. Unless we look beyond the first impression, nearly all his doctrines provoke contradiction, and only a world-worn, exhausted, and ascetic civilisation would seem in some measure to excuse them. A shirking of the world's work, an isolation from human society, a formless intellectual life, a magical interpretation of nature—all these can make appeal to Plotinus. True, there also spring from his mode of thought more fruitful movements: the emotional life of mediæval mysticism, and the attempts at a construction of philosophy from pure concepts, extending on into the nineteenth century, both point back to him. But his real

historical achievement is something apart from any of his particular doctrines, indeed is opposed to some of them: it is, namely, the destruction of the ancient ideal of life with its definiteness of form, and the creation of a new ideal of spiritual exaltation and soaring aspiration; the bursting asunder of all the fetters imposed by surroundings, and the substituting of the emancipation born of a pure spirituality; the subjection of all forms of activity to the control of a primordial, all-comprehensive Being. Although this is all merely tentative, it none the less prepared the way for a new view of the world and a new conduct of life; the individual had become too clearly conscious of his supreme autonomy as a spiritual being to make it possible that he should ever again submit himself to a given order in the capacity of a mere member. Beneath these beginnings, hidden by the rubbish of a world fallen into decay, there lay an abundance of vigorous germs which were destined to develop under more favourable circumstances into mighty forces.

Plotinus not only terminated, and inwardly disintegrated, the ancient world, not only supplied Christianity with liberating forces, and preserved throughout the Middle Ages, in opposition to the externalising influence of the prevailing organisation, an undercurrent of pure emotional life, but his ideas were an indispensable aid to the Renaissance in the struggle for independence of thought, and even modern speculation and modern æsthetics manifest his influence. Thus Plotinus has been an effective force in all ages; as a truly original thinker, he remains even to-day a source of large views and of stimulating suggestiveness.

The immediate effects of Plotinus's thought upon dying Hellenism need not detain us. The fusion of an all-comprehensive speculation with a deep emotional life, the interaction of religion and philosophy, were not bequeathed from master to disciples. After Plotinus's death the religious movement ran off into visions and superstition, the philosophical movement into abstract formalism and empty scholasticism. With the last burst of light in Plotinus, the creative power of Greece was finally extinguished.

(c) *The Greatness and the Limitations of Antiquity*

A résumé of the ancient views of life should fix attention, not upon particular phenomena, but upon the development as a whole. In this development we distinguished three periods: those of intellectual creation, worldly wisdom, and religious meditation and speculation. The post-classical period immeasurably increased the importance of the individual, and strove toward a life of pure inwardness. It was the first age to grasp the essential nature of both morals and religion, and to acknowledge their independent existence. In these important particulars, preparation was made not only for Christianity, but for the modern world as well. The valuation and treatment of the above-mentioned periods has vacillated considerably in modern times. When Humanistic enthusiasm brought into strong relief the difference between antiquity and the modern world, and sought to derive from the former a fresh impetus toward creative work, it was the classical epoch that fixed the attention and called forth admiration; but when men turned to antiquity for the instruction and culture of the individual soul, then it was the later epochs which had a powerful influence. In the period of the Enlightenment, the writings of a Lucretius and a Seneca, a Plutarch and a Marcus Aurelius, were in the hands of all cultivated persons. Since the rise of modern Humanism, however, that is no longer the case. But do not the more vigorous development of the individual and the intensifying of life which we are experiencing to-day bring us again nearer to later antiquity? So much is certain: the historical view must estimate antiquity as a whole; and its appreciation will only be enhanced, if, instead of staring fixedly at a single zenith of glory, as if this zenith were a miraculous gift of destiny, it looks with discrimination and discerns great movements and changes within the whole, and discovers everywhere eager effort and severe labour and struggle.

But all the differences of epochs do not rob antiquity of an

inner relationship and a permanent basis: the divergences are all within a common content of life.

For all the Greek views unite in regarding activity as the soul of life. The activity, indeed, takes various forms, and finds its centre of gravity in different spheres; in the course of centuries it retreats further and further behind immediate existence, yet ever remains the chief thing; it is always the criterion of the success of life. It is by activity that, for the most part, man knows that he lives amid great relationships and under the protection of Deity. But the origin and essence of activity lie with the man himself; his own force must awaken the divinity of his nature and guide it to victory over his lower self. Even in the perversions of asceticism and mysticism, the issue remained with man; his own exertion was to win happiness. Such convictions imply a firm faith in the power and nearness of goodness, and they clearly testify to a strong vitality, a joy in being, a delight in the unfolding of power. Here the multiplication of obstacles has not broken the will to live; certain kinds of life, indeed, are rejected, but in the rejection life itself is affirmed; complete extinction, in the sense of the Hindoo, is not what is sought. Even the ever-increasing desire for the assurance of immortality attests the power of the vital impulse and shows a tenacious clinging to life. Indeed, in the Greek hopes of immortality, there is far more a desire of prolonging the present than there is a conception of a wholly new kind of being. The philosophical doctrines reflect that focussing upon this life of the belief in immortality which is seen in the ancient sarcophagi, themselves already belonging to a period when life was overspread with gloom. For they clothe death with the varied wealth of life; they hold fast to existence, by ennobling it and elevating it into an ideal sphere.

From such a delight in life and in activity there springs a triumphant youthfulness; it is the fountain-head of that astonishing elasticity of mind which ever rebounds from tne hardest obstacles ready for fresh achievements. Whatever life offers that is great and good, is seized and developed. True, such a vigorous

affirmation of life has as its reverse side a harsh insensibility toward the suffering and darkness of life. Impediments indeed are not underestimated, and the consciousness of them steadily increases. But life's wisdom is always found in the keeping of what is hostile at a distance, and in the raising oneself above the sphere of its power. On the other hand, what is hostile is not taken up into the soul of the life-process, and utilised for further development; no transformation, no inner exaltation, spring from suffering. This inner growth is wanting principally for the reason that Greek conceptions, while indeed conversant with the great problems of mind in its relation to the surrounding world, know nothing of serious inner conflicts; the dominant interest is in that relation, not in the mind's relation to itself and to its own ideality. Here there reigns a secure and joyful faith in the power and glory of the human mind. The intellectual faculties, just as we have them, are recognised to be good; all that is needed in order to ward off everything hostile and to subordinate man's sensuous nature, is their vigorous development and a clear consciousness. The view that the mind by the unfolding of its powers subjugates nature, and moulds it into an expression of itself, here forms the essence of life's work; hence it is possible for the idea of the beautiful to become the central conception of creative effort. No inner transformation is necessary with such a conception; there is no basis for a growth through agitation and suffering, a passing through negation, a resurrection through self-abnegation.

The intimate union of truth and beauty, of penetrating knowledge and artistic creation, which distinguishes all Greek work, characterises also the Greek views of life. Its profoundest aspect is the searching out of the essential and the eternal; this lends to life a secure foundation and an enduring repose, and also transforms the chaotic appearance of things into a glorious cosmos. The contemplation of the order of the universe with its perfected harmony, the joy in the "eternal grace," becomes the highest reach of life.

Such a view of life may satisfy man where he is either sur-

rounded by an imposing present, or his thought creates out of the change and flow of existence an eternal present. The visible, rational present had ceased to exist for Greek life; hence philosophy sought with only the greater energy to hold fast to an invisible one. But it had to make ever more powerful efforts in order to do so; the world of essence and of beauty ever receded further into the distance; ideas steadily lost perceptible content; human existence grew continually more empty. Thus it came to be a grievous defect in the Greek conduct of life that it possessed no power of building up a new world; that with its lack of the idea of progress, it possessed no possibility of a thoroughgoing reconstruction, possessed no future and no hope. The narrow confines of the world must have weighed upon man as an unendurable burden, so soon as the needs and wrongs, so soon, above all, as the inner emptiness of existence were distinctly felt.

We saw that the Greek thinkers fought against such dangers like stalwart heroes, and unflinchingly upheld the old ideals amid all the changes. But even they could not burst the bonds imposed by the common national character; the foundations of the Greek view of life were much too firm and unyielding to adjust themselves to the new demands; hence the time inevitably came when mankind turned from them, and seized upon new ideals. The possibilities of life within the sphere of Greek civilisation were exhausted; the decline could not be prevented.

Still, the realisation that decadence was inevitable cannot restrain a feeling of profound sadness at the extinction of so much intellectuality and beauty. It may, however, serve to lessen our melancholy, if we consider that the inevitable dissolution freed the several elements of Greek civilisation from the peculiar union which had thus far bound them together, and so enabled them to enter into new relations and to produce their natural fruits. Wholly typical is the heroic energy with which the Greek mind explored the height and depth of human experience, clearly and steadfastly pursued to the end all the directions which it took, and sketched in outlines full of genius repre-

sentative views of life, which exhaust the chief possibilities of human existence, and hence form permanent elements of the further work of humanity. Typical also is the spirit of beauty which pervades those views and irradiates from them. We have here in mind not only the lucidity and charm of delineation which distinguishes most of them, but also their imperishable realisation of the universal power of form, and the fact that by means of the beautiful a peculiar illumination of the whole of life is achieved. The perception of beauty becomes the type of all genuine intellectual life; as, in the sphere of beauty, a secure repose unites with ceaseless movement, indeed, is repose in the midst of movement, so the same harmony is set before all the aspects of life as an ideal. Just as beauty pleases in itself, and not on account of anything it does, so intellectual labour is undertaken for itself, not on account of any use to which it may be put. And the good is desired for the sake of its inner beauty, without any thought of reward, and evil rejected as being in its nature ugly. Thus there gradually detaches itself from the ancient views we have considered the picture of a thoroughly refined life, at once strong and temperate and upborne by the deep seriousness of a joyful faith.

We saw that it was necessary for the whole ancient scheme of life to dissolve, in order to prepare for new forms. But that does not mean that it may not forever attract and stimulate us. For the ancient conduct of life possesses an incomparable and imperishable character in the fact that it develops with youthful freshness the simple, healthy, natural view of things; and that in it the first impression of the human state, its experiences and conditions, are reflected in perfect purity. Even though the experiences of adversity and the revelation of hitherto unknown depths have carried us beyond that first impression, we are always being forced to come to terms with it anew, indeed, we must appropriate it as a part of our own life, if the further development is to retain its plasticity and truth. Thus antiquity can the more readily render us an invaluable service, because, with the working out of a natural view of things, it at the same

time transcends that view. For its own movement inevitably brings on a crisis and catastrophe: the inner spirit, which it develops in ever-increasing strength, at length necessitates the severance of the ties binding it to the old body, and destroys all the old presuppositions. Antiquity is thus comparable to a tragic hero who, by his very downfall, upholds and gives fresh strength to the cause for which he wrought. So, here, out of all the confusion of the historical situation there shines forth with ever-increasing distinctness a world of pure inwardness; in it the truth of the old world also may find an imperishable resurrection. Hence, although something temporal is lost, the eternal abides, and even upon the stage of history a new life rises out of the ruins of the old.

PART SECOND

CHRISTIANITY

CHRISTIANITY

A. THE FOUNDATION

I. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF CHRISTIANITY

(a) *Introductory Considerations*

SOME sort of consideration of the general character of Christianity is indispensable as an introduction to the views of life which have grown up on Christian soil. First of all, however, we must examine the question whether these views of life actually spring from the Christian religion, or merely accompany it as the product of other factors. Without doubt, a religion is not primarily a view of the world and of life, a doctrine of divine and human things. Rather, it is the creation of a distinctive world of reality, the development of a new life under the dominant conception of a higher sphere. The life that here grows up is conscious of being raised far above mere doctrine, and it will at all times stoutly defend its independence of the latter. But it could not be of an enlightened sort without possessing in itself and developing from itself convictions respecting the sum-total of human existence. Every higher religion brings about an inversion of the immediate world, and changes the standpoint of life. It does not rest upon metaphysic, it is itself a sort of metaphysic, the revelation of a new, a supernatural world. Such a complete change is impossible without an effort of the whole man, without a decision affecting the whole of his being, and the change cannot justify itself, either to the man himself or to others, unless this decision is translated into thoughts, unless the type of life is developed into a view of life.

This necessity is not to be evaded by confining religion to a

particular sphere, by treating it as something which offers the individual a refuge from trials, but which leaves untouched the whole of the intellectual life and the work of shaping civilisation. Not even as an individual could man find support and contentment in a detached religion. For in virtue of his intellectual nature, in virtue of his implication in the destiny of the world, both his experience and his activity have reference to the universe; hence he can find no rest for himself without being at peace with the world. Every attempt on the part of religion to intrench itself within a separate sphere exposes it sooner or later to the suspicion of not possessing the full truth, of not being worthy of the allegiance of our souls. As a matter of fact, every religion proclaims its teaching, not as co-ordinate with other truths, but as the very core and centre of all truth, as that which far transcends all else. But even this estimate necessarily implies a view of the universe. Furthermore, religion could not assume the position of the chief concern of life without expanding its own content into a world. Thus, for example, if it finds that content altogether in morals, then moral conduct not only develops simultaneously with it into a harmonious whole superior to all distraction, but also into the expression of a new world transcending all the activity of the world of experience; it becomes of itself a metaphysic. Accordingly, since religion is always an affirmation respecting the last things, it cannot do without the formation of corresponding views of life.

But do we find so much affinity between the various forms and aspects of Christian belief that we can speak of a view of life common to Christianity? Manifestly, no other religion has departed so far from its beginnings, nor become in itself so deeply disrupted, as Christianity. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to defend the uniformity of its character, particularly by two opposite lines of argument. One makes a touchstone of the earliest form of Christianity, and in the later developments admits the genuineness only of what agrees with that form; the other finds the bond of union in the historical continuity; it holds by the immediate sequence of one form from another, and

accordingly must accept as Christian everything which belongs to the succession. Each of these methods doubtless possesses a certain justification; but, taken alone, neither will suffice. The first criterion is too narrow, the second wholly unreliable. Like each of the phases of the development, the beginnings contain much that belongs to the general conditions of the age and to the state of intellectual progress at the time; and it would be impossible to confine all movement within these early limits, and prevent every effort to rise above them. Still less will it do simply to go to an extreme with the history; for Christian history was by no means determined solely by the proper exigencies of religion; it may very well be that other factors outweighed those of religion, and that in the accommodation to human affairs the best part of its content was sacrificed. The dilemma vanishes only upon our realising that, in spite of all the distortion on the part of man, historical phenomena and movements have an eternal truth, a central fact of spiritual life, underlying and working through them with indestructible power. Only such a super-historical truth can hold history together; only to such a truth can we perpetually recur without sacrificing the living present to the past. Hence it is necessary to separate the intellectual substance of religion from the human modifications of its form, if we would possess a common groundwork of truth with which to confront every kind of disunion and hostility.

Such a groundwork is clearly enough recognisable in Christianity, particularly when it is compared with other religions. Thus, it is not a religion of law but of salvation; and as such it is not content merely with organising and stimulating existing forces, but demands a wholly new world and completely regenerated men. Furthermore, this religion of salvation is not of an ontological but an ethical sort; that is, its aim is not, like the religions of India, to penetrate beyond a world of illusion to one of eternal verities; rather it views the whole of reality under the contrast of good and evil, and demands a new world of love and mercy. Accordingly, all the facts and problems of life assume a distinctive form. Finite existence is not degraded by it to an

unreal appearance, but rather immeasurably exalted in significance, inasmuch as it teaches that the eternal enters into the temporal and there reveals its innermost depths, inasmuch as it holds that a union of the divine and the human begins even in this world. Such ends cannot be set forth by Christianity without an abrupt and irreconcilable breach with the existing state of the world, indeed with the whole natural order; nor without its reiterating the imperative demand for a new world. It thereby directs men's thoughts above everything visible and present to an invisible and future order. But this breach with the world is not equivalent to asceticism, nor does the demand for a better future mean an estrangement from the present. For the fundamentally ethical character of Christianity causes its spiritual superiority to the world to become at the same time constructive of a higher world. What the future alone can bring to full fruition is already present in disposition and in faith—more intimately present than the present of the senses; as such, it impels men with an elemental force toward the upbuilding of a new world, toward work on a kingdom of God in the very midst of the temporal misery of human life. Thus, in addition to inwardness and tenderness life now possesses activity and gladness.

These various features are closely interdependent, and taken together produce a thoroughly characteristic type of life. To be sure, the historical conditions force now this, now that side more into prominence; they may even cause the entire movement to deviate widely from the ideal view of the whole. But that throughout all change and distortion, throughout all complication and disruption, such an ideal is present and exerts a controlling influence, we must now attempt to show more in detail.

(b) *The Fundamental Facts*

The Christian life finds its chief task, not in its relation to the world, but in its relation to God, the perfect Spirit; fellowship with God becomes the centre of all activity and the source of

all happiness. That God is, and that man stands in relation to Him, are here at least as obvious and certain as the existence of a world around them was to the Greeks. The process of life itself so immediately manifests the working of the highest Spirit that any special proofs of the existence of God appear both superfluous and inadequate; only the wish for an exoteric justification could invest them with a certain value.

In his relation to God man is completely subordinated; and in this respect he cannot lay claim to any kind of egoistic being. But such absorption in the fellowship with God, such surrender of all separate existence, is after all something radically different from the complete extinction of all individual being in the absolute essence, which is the result in mystic speculation. The Christian plan of life does not rob the individual of substantial being; rather, notwithstanding his subordination, it preserves, and indeed immeasurably enhances, his independent worth. For the infinite distance between the perfect Spirit and wholly imperfect man does not prevent an intimate relation and a communication of the fulness of the divine life. Such a communication from being to being gives rise to a new kind of life, a kingdom of love and faith, a transformation of existence into pure inwardness, a new world of spiritual goods. In contrast with the previous state, this new life becomes a serious undertaking; in its interests, there are endless things to do, to set in motion, and to alter. Moreover, it requires ceaseless exertion to maintain the height which has been reached. At the same time, fellowship with the perfect Spirit brings a joy and blessedness which far surpass all other happiness. Further, this life, in its inner superiority to all other experiences, carries with it the certainty that the Power whence it springs rules all the world, indeed is the origin of all reality. The spirit of infinite love and goodness, the ideal of free personal being, is also the all-powerful Spirit, the world-creating Power. As the work of omnipotent goodness, the world cannot be other than perfect, perfect not only in the sense that under given conditions the highest possible has been reached, out of given materials the best possible pro-

duced, but perfect in the strict sense of realising all the demands of reason. So, too, as regards man, we may have faith that the winning of that inner life includes, or brings as a consequence, all other life; that the omnipotent love is forming the whole world into a kingdom of God.

But the more completely reality is transformed from within and exalted, the harsher, the more unendurable, become the contradictions of experience; intimately connected with the all-important fact of the new life is the perception that this world is the source of serious hindrance and even of danger for it. Misery and unreason not only surround us without, they assail even the inner life, and evil appears not only as a mere limitation and diminution of the good, but as a directly antagonistic force and a complete perversion of it. A deep chasm divides the world; the triumph, indeed the very continuance, of reason seems to be threatened. The principal question is not, as with the Greeks, the relation of the mind to its environment, but its relation to itself, its attitude toward its own ideality, as determined by the fellowship with God. The ultimate ground of all evil is the rending asunder of that fellowship, the revolt and the disobedience of man. Here evil has its deepest root, not, as with the Greeks, in matter and a degrading sensuousness, but in free guilt; hence it is enormously intensified. The question how such estrangement and disobedience are possible, and whether in the end evil itself may not be adjusted to the divine plan of the world, has caused Christendom endless pondering and study. At the same time, there existed the strongest distrust of any protracted discussion of such questions, and an anxiety lest an explanation of evil might weaken the seriousness with which it was regarded, and hence also the vigour of the conflict against it. The result was that the ascription of evil to a free act was adhered to, while the question of the compatibility of a world devastated by guilt with the sway of omnipotent goodness remained unanswered. Thus the enigma of the origin of evil is left unsolved also by Christianity.

But the Christian life could the more readily allow this problem

to fall into the background, since it brought all its energy to bear upon the actual combating of evil, and since in its own inwardness it was lifted securely above the domain of the conflict and above all unreason. This exaltation it could not attain by itself; the world is too completely pervaded with unreason and too much broken in its spiritual capacities for that. Accordingly, there was no hope of reaching the goal by a slow ascent, a gradual accumulation of forces. Rather, the reinstatement of the right relation to God—upon which everything here depends—must proceed solely from the Deity; and even He cannot effect the restoration by an interference from without, but must descend into the world of conflict, and there break the power of evil, there reveal Himself more completely than heretofore. This takes place, according to the Christian view, in such a manner that God lays hold of the world, not by means of special powers and manifestations, but by the full plenitude of personal life, and rescues humanity from the power of evil by entering into the most intimate union with human nature, freeing it from all suffering and darkness by transplanting an innermost core of human essence into the divine life. But this inner victory over suffering and darkness cannot, according to the ecclesiastical view, be accomplished by the divine Spirit without taking the burden in all its weight upon Himself. Thus the idea of a divine suffering becomes for that view the profoundest mystery of Christianity. In the supreme crisis the divine Spirit seems to bow before the dominant power of evil. But the darkness endures not; the apparent defeat is soon followed by exaltation, the Spirit manifests its superiority by a complete triumph, and leads the good to final victory. At the same time it appears that only through such painful and extreme suffering could the whole depths of the new world be revealed, and the full security of the new life be won. Thus, the transformation is at first only inward; it appears barely to touch the visible world. Evil by no means disappears even now; it persists and opposes the new order. But its roots have been severed; it no longer has the power to prevent the upbuilding of a kingdom of God also in

this world. Such upbuilding is visibly aided by the new community of the church, which is exclusively determined by the relation to God; in the midst of an indifferent or hostile world, this community preserves the connection with the invisible kingdom of God, and unites men to one another in the closest manner through love, faith and hope. Yet, even after the establishment of the good in human society has been achieved by such means, life still retains the character of a ceaseless conflict; only the outlook into the future, only the invincible hope of a new world, bears us triumphantly beyond into a realm of peace and undimmed blessedness.

Thus we see the Christian world ascend through a series of mighty events, and at the same time win an ever-increasing wealth of inner life. The creative act of God, the Fall, the entrance of the divine Spirit into the historical order, the victorious exaltation of the good and the founding of the kingdom of God upon earth, the prospect of a better future held out to men until the Day of Judgment—it is the close connection and interdependence of all these facts and events that first brings into strong relief the unique character of the Christian world. The events are not a necessary consequence of a given world, rather all the decisive changes result from a free act; the act here anticipates the historical process, freedom becomes the deepest essence of the spirit. Reality does not now mean something plastic, a work of art fascinating the perception by its restful symmetry; it has transformed itself into a drama of mighty forces and upheavals; and this drama agitates men with a mighty emotion. For man is not to look upon these conflicts and vicissitudes as if he were a spectator at a play; he is himself to experience them in his deepest soul, to live them anew as his own destiny. It is of the very essence of the Christian life that what has been objectively and irrevocably decided by historic events becomes for the individual, in all its seriousness, an ever-recurring personal problem; that all the commotions of the conflict in the world extend with undiminished strength into the circle of his experience and form the soul of his life. Indeed, only the individual appro-

priation and confirmation of those historic events give them fulness of life and an irresistible power of conviction; as mere events, they could neither sufficiently substantiate their truth nor attain a triumphant power of conquest. Thus the historical and the subjective, the macrocosmic and the microcosmic, are here mutually dependent; they reciprocally imply and set in motion and sustain one another. Even this cursory synopsis shows that Christianity presents us with no definitive result; that, notwithstanding its existence as a realised fact, it not only creates unending movements, but remains in itself a perpetual problem, a task that is ever renewed.

(c) *The Christian Life*

(*a*) REGENERATION OF THE INNER LIFE

The inner transformation which life undergoes owing to the new relations is rendered more clear by comparison with Greek conceptions. So long as the problem mainly consisted in bringing man into relation with a fully developed environment, and in filling his life with this relation, knowledge necessarily formed the substance of spiritual existence. Where, however, the question is one of co-operating in the upbuilding of a new world and of elevating one's own nature, the main thing becomes a new direction of life, a comprehensive act affecting the whole being. This act cannot be directed toward the achievement of anything in the existing world, for the aim is the creation of a new world opposed to the present one; nor will it suffice merely to shift the centre of gravity in the given state of the soul to some other faculty than knowledge, such as feeling or volition; what is required is to penetrate to the farthest depths of one's being, and by summoning and concentrating all one's power give a new soul to the inner life. The struggle to gain such a soul converts the previous activities into something merely external, and produces a gradation within one's own being; it creates difficult problems for the spiritual life itself. and at the same time gives

it a positive character; while in the Greek world the conception of spirit was chiefly determined by contrast with sensuousness, and therefore appeared the more negative in proportion as it was strictly taken.

But the Christian scheme of life is not determined by abstract conceptions; it is determined rather by the special circumstance that man has rebelled against God, and thereby become estranged from his own nature; his true self, his moral existence, is thus in most imminent peril; the one concern is to rescue his immortal soul from death and the devil. In view of the seriousness of the obstacles, life assumes the character of an intense struggle, a decision concerning existence itself, a decision between eternal bliss and eternal ruin. The question of reconciliation with God acquires an intense urgency, indeed it becomes the only question; all other problems now seem secondary; they can in fact become an object of hatred, if they stand in the way of the aim that is alone imperative.

Such passionate fervour and irresistible force in the one desire of life makes all previous seeking for happiness appear insipid and unsubstantial. To be sure, this strong affirmation of life may easily coincide with a much lower impulse, a tenacious clinging to some form of self-seeking. But such by no means corresponds to the deeper sense of Christianity. Rather, the Christian conviction is that the way to a proper self-affirmation is through rigorous self-denial; that what is needed is not merely an intensified natural being, but the birth, through fellowship with God, of a new supernatural being. Such a belief regards religion, not, as did most of the Greek thinkers, merely as an agreeable ornament of existence, but as the source of a new life, as the fundamental condition of spiritual self-preservation. In this view, the individual derives an abiding personal worth, not from his own nature, but alone from God; it is only through heavy sacrifices, only by the destruction of the old character, that a new man is born.

At the same time, the union with God lifts spiritual effort above the caprice of the individual. The soul, whose immortal

welfare is at stake, is no private affair of the man, its saving not a benefit that may be renounced; much rather it is an incomparable treasure, a good held in trust, which under no circumstances may be abandoned. The invisible relations of an eternal order here touch the feelings with their mystery, and give to life the deepest seriousness. Yet life is not oppressed by the earnestness it assumes, since the divine act of exaltation ceaselessly creates a world of love and freedom, and uplifts the individual to become a partaker in it. Through infinite power and goodness the impossible becomes possible. Thus perishes in the life-currents of a new world all the rigidity of a separate existence; with liberation from the narrowness of a self-willed ego man gains a broader and purer self. And from sharing in the inexhaustible wealth of a new world there flows boundless joy and blessedness, experiences which lie beyond all selfish indulgence or vulgar happiness.

By means of such a purification, man's oft repressed but never extinguished longing for happiness becomes ennobled and justified; the dilemma of adopting either an egoistic self-assertion or a meaningless renunciation disappears. Those emotions, so often aroused and repressed, pain and joy, care and hope, are now severed from merely human things, and taken up into the spiritual life itself. They thus gain an inner elevation and an unassailable position; and the process of life is not weakened but strengthened.

Considered also as to its historical effects, Christianity infused into an exhausted state of society a new impulse, and offered to a venerable civilisation a world full of fresh problems. This is specially evident when we compare the philosophers of the declining period of antiquity with the earlier Church Fathers. The philosophers far surpass the latter in the perfection of form, in the analysis of conceptions, indeed in the whole matter of theoretical demonstration. But upon all their work there weighs the fatal consciousness of the emptiness and worthlessness of human existence; it prevented them from putting forth their strength, and forbade all dedication to high aims. It is therefore

perfectly intelligible that the victory fell to the Church Fathers, who had a new life, a great future, to offer, and who could summon men to triumphant, joyous activity, and to positive happiness.

(β) THE CLOSER UNION OF MANKIND

The new life effects a profound change in the reciprocal relations of men, but not so much through doctrines and ideas as through the influence of actual results. Just as the elevation of one's being to freedom and unity reveals the man to himself, brings him nearer to himself, so the mutual understanding between men may increase, they may become more intelligible to one another, and live more in and with another. Moreover, the imperishable worth which the life with God confers upon the individual makes man of greater worth also to his fellowmen; amid the evils of actual life one may here fall back upon an inner being founded in God, and so hold firmly to an ideal of man without at the same time falsely idealising him. Only through such an emphasis of human worth is Christianity enabled to make love the fundamental feeling, and set high aims for action. It exhibits in this respect the greatest unlikeness to all systems of mere sympathy, the languid resignation of which eventually weighs men down, and paralyses all vital feeling. These can never produce the joy in human life and in human nature, nor the expansion and blessings of fellowship, which Christianity knows.

The life in common is upheld and strengthened by the consciousness of a similarity of destiny and of inner character. However different the stations and callings which life may assign to individuals, the one supreme task of forming a new nature is common to all. Even moral differences pale and vanish so soon as man ceases to compare himself with other men, as did the Greeks, and looks instead to an ideal of divine perfection, thus applying an absolute and not a relative standard.

But those general characteristics of the kingdom of God which produce greater solidarity and intimacy among human relations

are further strengthened by the unifying power of all great historical movements. The divine revelations on which life depends are not vouchsafed merely to individuals, but to humanity as a whole, in the sense that they require for their expression social organisation and social forces. Thus humanity becomes united in an inner community of life and in the upbuilding of a new kingdom; in such a community the individual can both receive from and contribute to the whole; the doing and suffering of each acquires a significance for all. Indeed, each event in the life of the individual is experienced in and through the destiny of the whole, and rests upon the latter as upon its abiding foundation.

To be sure, such changes bring to light great problems and produce mighty conflicts. The growth of the life in common must not suppress the independence of the individual. It was, in fact, Christianity that so immeasurably exalted the individual and, particularly during the first centuries, made all advancement dependent upon his freedom. How easily, on the contrary, the antagonistic forces which the Christian scheme of life should aim to harmonise fall asunder and oppose one another, is shown by the incessant conflicts running through the whole course of Christian history.

(γ) THE ACQUISITION OF A HISTORY

The ancient views of life bore throughout an unhistorical character. The numerous philosophical doctrines of the procession of endless similar cycles, which continually return to the starting point, were only the expression of the conviction that all movement at bottom brings nothing new, and that life offers no prospect of further improvement. When the days were good, this feeling occasioned no depression, since life was fully occupied with the present; but when they were bad, the sense of emptiness was inevitable. The profoundest Greek thinkers, indeed, viewed the temporal life as a reproduction of eternity; but they knew nothing of an entrance of the eternal into time,

a meeting of time and eternity. Christianity radically changed all this. For in the Christian view, the Eternal reveals the whole depths of His nature within time, thereby sets infinite tasks, and produces in the world of man the most stupendous movements. For here the battle rages over salvation or destruction, here the liberation from the mere state of nature is attained, here the upbuilding of a kingdom of God is accomplished. The presence of the eternal in time is what first produces a world-history, and gives a true history also to individual life. With such a liberation from an inherited nature, individuals, peoples, and even the whole of humanity are no longer confined within prescribed limits; by means of revolutions and reforms they can make new beginnings and create new powers; they can battle with themselves, and overcome themselves. A mighty desire, a divine discontent, is implanted in life.

But again, these fruitful changes are offset by serious complications. How the eternal can enter into history without ceasing to be eternal; how, without loss, the divine can share in the growth and change inseparable from time, remain an unexplained mystery. Thus a direct contradiction and a stubborn conflict mark the whole history of Christianity. One party sets the eternal before history, the other history before the eternal. In the latter case, there is the tendency to concentrate attention upon fixed and limited facts, and to let these work exclusively and directly upon mankind, but also the attendant danger of confining the present to a single point in the past, and of unduly restricting the range of Christian thought; in the former, we have the effort to comprehend Christianity in its essence and effect as a universal and continuous fact, to transform all that has been achieved in history into the immediate present, and at the same time to illuminate it with knowledge, but also the corresponding danger of dissipating the historical element and of dissolving the whole too much into a mere view of the world. This entails tremendous conflicts; but amid all the heat of strife there abide the acquisition of a history and the exaltation of action.

(δ) THE NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD SUFFERING

As in the actual fashioning of Christian life contrasts continually meet, so an appreciation of it must take into consideration conflicting influences; their joint effect is to produce a thoroughly individual type of feeling for life. It is in direct contradiction with the character of Christianity to begin by minimizing suffering and by assuring men that misery is immaterial: scarcely anything repels so much as the impertinence of representing the world as it is as a realm of reason; if it were such, indeed, the whole question of turning to a new world—the main thesis of Christianity—would be superfluous. The fact is, Christianity, with the new seriousness it lends to life, with its insistence upon absolute perfection, with its enhancement of the worth of man and of each individual, and its strong desire for love and happiness, must immeasurably increase man's sensitiveness to darkness and woe. Hence it does not forbid us the full recognition of suffering; rather, it characterises indifference toward suffering as a hardening of the heart. It was, in fact, just this, that Christianity permits the frank admission of all the evils and woes of existence, and allows the sense of suffering the fullest expression, that won the minds of men at the outset and has won them ever since; this feeling, which was elsewhere suppressed, found here a free expansion, and in consequence life as a whole increased in warmth and in sincerity.

But, on the other hand, Christianity is as far removed from a languid pessimism as it is from a shallow optimism. The immediate world, whose misery threatens to overwhelm us, is not the be-all and end-all; a belief, founded as upon a rock, here points beyond the present to a realm of divine life transcending all conflicts. That reason is the root of all reality is a thesis now defended with greater energy than ever before. Moreover, there is an inner exaltation of suffering. God has taken the burden of it upon Himself, and thereby sanctified it; from obstinate unreason, it is now converted into a means of the awak-

ening, purification, and regeneration of life; the descent serves as an ascent, destruction as an exaltation, the dark pathway of death as the portal of a new life. As the divine love shrank not from the deepest abyss, so also in the human sphere suffering enkindles a self-sacrificing devotion and an active love. It is in suffering that the most intimate relation to God originates; while the common fact of suffering proves to be the strongest bond between men. Accordingly, the practical attitude toward suffering changes. The misery of human existence is no longer pushed to one side and kept at a distance, it is sought out and energetically taken in hand, in order to manifest love in relieving it and to awaken love in response. The conflict with suffering, particularly its inner conquest, becomes the principal aim of effort. In this spirit, Christianity can exalt the despised cross into its symbol, and direct thought and meditation continually toward suffering, without falling under the latter's power. Whereas ancient art, even when representing death, aimed by an impressive portrayal of it to lead men's thought back to life, Christian art, with its pictures of saints and martyrs sets death in the midst of the labours and joys of life, not in order to cast a gloom over life, but to invest it with sublimer, invisible relations.

This attitude toward suffering has degenerated often enough into trivial sentimentality or morbid pleasure. Such a tendency, however, is in direct conflict with the spirit of Christianity, since not only is it opposed by the depth of Christian earnestness, but also suffering and unreason by no means disappear with the inner victory over them; on the contrary, evil remains a permanently insoluble mystery. The development of the Christian life itself involves far too many conflicts, cares, and doubts, to leave any room for comfortable self-indulgence. Not only do those cares and conflicts disturb the bliss of Christian faith, but the appearance of new joys increases the sense of pain. The inner aspect of the struggle is indeed changed, but the conflict itself has not ceased; for the strength of the Christian life does not lie in a simple destruction of evil, but in the power to oppose

to the principle of evil a new and a higher world. Hence, within a single life two opposite moods make themselves felt, a painful and a joyful one: the suffering cannot disturb the joy, the joy cannot extinguish the suffering. But, inasmuch as each develops itself completely and without obstruction, existence acquires inner breadth and ceaseless movement. And that which thus fills life also finds expression in art; for nothing is more characteristic of Christian art than complete emancipation of mood and fluctuation between the opposite extremes of darkness and light, misery and bliss.

(d) *The Complications and the True Greatness of Christianity*

Thus Christianity abounds in contrasts; its conduct of life bears a thoroughly antithetical character,—just as its chief minds are fond of using antitheses, declaring the difficult to be easy, the distant to be near, the miracle to be a commonplace. The collision of these opposing tendencies produces ceaseless movement; for, as a whole, the Christian life remains an ever-renewed quest and conflict; it retains to the end an unfinished, unreconciled, unrationalised character, ever calls forth new problems, becomes itself a problem, and must ever reascend to its own true height. Dangers and hindrances threaten it step by step; its history cannot be a peaceful progress, it becomes an alternation of advance and retreat, of ascent and descent, of decline and recovery.

One thing in particular results in incessant perplexity, the fact, namely, that Christianity erects within the domain of nature a supernatural world, that it continually seeks to rise above the conditions which are the essential means of its own life. An immediate consequence is the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of an appropriate representation in thoughts and conceptions; every exposition remains a mere approximation, retains a symbolic character. But the demand of man for tangible truth and definite results allows this imperfection to be readily misunderstood or forgotten; there results crystallisation,

coarsening, falling back upon nature, and the most serious confusions become inevitable.

No less are the higher motives of conduct continually overborne by those upon a lower level. The new affirmation of life, with its bliss, is often degraded to the service of the natural greed of life, the selfish demand for happiness; what ought to lift the man, by decisive volition, above himself, becomes instead a confirmation of his natural state. When, further, parties arise, and the powers of the world seek to press Christianity into their service, to exploit it for their own ends; when, in particular, all the inwardness, self-denial, and humility before God which characterise it, are perversely interpreted as a command of slavish obedience to men and to human institutions, of an uncomplaining endurance of all manner of unreason, then the vision becomes more and more clouded. Can we deny that, seen from without, the history of Christianity presents, on the whole, an unedifying spectacle, and that it is only when we consider the innermost soul of its development that an appreciative estimate becomes possible? Christianity, in fact, has experienced in a peculiar degree the truth of the Kantian saying, "Even the sublimest of things is belittled at the hands of man, so soon as he appropriates it to his own uses."

Added to these inner difficulties is the incessant hostility from without, the conflict with doubt, which necessarily increases with the progress of civilisation. The immediate impression of the world is against Christianity; and their ways lead ever further apart. Consequently, in order to assert itself, it is compelled to insist more and more energetically upon a reversal of the entire view of the world, to oppose to the visible world an invisible one, and to defend the latter as the soul of all reality. This requires not only a summoning of the whole personality, but a passage through experiences and changes; also a heroic elevation of mind and being. For, notwithstanding its inwardness and tenderness, the Christian life has a heroic character. But its heroism is radically different from the ancient heroism;

it is a heroism of the inner nature, and of simple humanity; a heroism in little things, a greatness arising from joyous faith and ungrudging self-sacrifice.

So far as human and historical relations are concerned, these characteristics lead us to expect endless complications; more definitely than in other religions does the history of Christianity become an arduous effort to realise its own being, a struggle to attain the highest development of its own nature. Yet no mere struggle; for it has been also a victory and a regeneration; we only need to look from the single phases to the whole, and to penetrate beyond the outward appearance to the moving causes, in order to recognise that a mighty life-force has been implanted in the world, and to become aware of the profoundest effects upon the whole of human existence.

Christianity has revealed a new world, and, through the possibility of sharing in it, conferred upon human nature an incomparable greatness and dignity, and upon the work of life an intense earnestness and a real history. It could not simply abolish the misery of the world, but it could rise above it as a whole, and thus inwardly triumph over its hostility. It has not made life easier but more difficult; yet in an original innermost recess it has lifted all oppressive weight from man by basing his nature upon freedom, and by breaking all the bonds of fate and of unyielding Nature. It has brought no definitive solution, no comfortable repose; it has plunged man into grievous unrest and hard struggle; it has thrown his whole existence into ceaseless commotion. But his life has not only been made far more significant by these conflicts and trials, there is held in continual readiness for him a region where the strife does not penetrate, and whence peace is diffused over the whole of existence. Withal, Christianity has not only called individuals to an ennobling change of life, but also opened to peoples and to humanity the possibility of a continual renewal—one might almost say, of an eternal youth. From all the errors of its relations to the world it could always withdraw into a realm of faith and contemplation as into its true home, in order there to recuperate its powers,

and even to restore its outward aspect. All the criticisms of advancing culture, all the opposition of scientific work, do not touch in the least its deepest essence, since from the first its aim was to be something other and higher than mere culture, since, in particular, it sought not to represent or even to further a present world, but to create a new one. Hence Christianity, notwithstanding its unsolved problems and its abuses, has become the moving force in the world's history, the spiritual home of humanity; and such it remains even where the mind is filled with opposition to its ecclesiastical interpretation.

II. JESUS'S VIEW OF LIFE

(a) *Preliminary Remarks*

That the spirit of Christianity gained so much power in the midst of an indifferent or hostile world, and that all the changes within Christianity itself could not destroy an abiding foundation, nor all the disruption extinguish an inner fellowship, was due, above all, to the supreme personality and the constructive life-work of Jesus. As the revelation of a new world, this life-work necessarily implies a coherent body of beliefs, a sort of view of life; and little as this view of life falls in with the philosophical movement of thought, it cannot be omitted from the present investigation, since all the views of life emanating from the Christian community point back to it, and since even beyond this community it has exerted the profoundest influence.

The unique difficulties of the problem are sufficiently obvious. In the first place, there is the difficulty with the sources, which for a long time were accepted without question, but which have given rise to innumerable doubts on the part of modern criticism. That we know Jesus only through tradition, although a very ancient one, and that with the tradition is mingled the subjective character and interpretation of the witness, no one can deny to-day who does not confound religion and historical

research, and thus surrender all pretensions to an unprejudiced judgment. But it is possible to exaggerate this difficulty, by mistaking what the matter of vital importance is. That which is characteristic in a truly great personality cannot be obliterated by any amount of subjective testimony; an incomparable spiritual individuality does not admit of being invented and factitiously perfected; if Jesus appears to be such, even when seen through the mists of tradition, then we may, indeed we must, rely upon the truth of the impression. But now, the sayings contained in the three first Gospels, with their wonderful similes and parables, present a thoroughly characteristic and harmonious picture of Jesus; the more we understand them in their simple literal sense, and exclude all extraneous interpretation, the more individual, the greater, the more unique, appear his personality and his world of thought. The life, at once transparent and unfathomable, that rises before us, enables us to look deep into the soul of the man, and brings his personality as a whole near to every heart, as near as only man can be to man. In the innermost traits of his being, Jesus is more transparent and familiar to us than any hero of the world's history.

The doubt and conflict which none the less existed and still exist as to the view to be taken of him are due less to the sources themselves than to extraneous convictions which obscure our vision. Very early, faith in Christ's work of reconciliation and redemption supplanted the interest in the life and teachings of the man Jesus; in particular, the ecclesiastical doctrine of the divinity of Christ was little favorable to a precise and accurate conception of Jesus's personality. The separation of two natures, whose union indeed might be decreed, but could not be brought to a living reality, led to the constant confusion, in the faith of the Christian church, of two views of Christ: on the one hand he was divine, existing in transcendent majesty, but possessing an abstract and featureless character; on the other, he was human, with a predominance of the traits of tenderness and suffering, yet there was here a failure to recognise the

joy in life and the heroic power of Jesus; often, too, there was a tendency toward the sentimental, particularly when the conception of vicarious suffering occupied the foreground of the picture.

When, however, the traditional view of the Church became unsettled, new dangers arose. Even in differing from the Church, men did not wish to surrender the relation to Jesus; hence each side sought to strengthen its position by an appeal to this relationship. The result was that each found in it what was favourable to his own view; and thus it was the varying requirements of the time which modified the historical picture first one way then another. But from early rationalism down to the present time such a procedure resulted in something too advanced, enlightened, and cultivated; not only the contemporary historical colouring, but even the distinguishing and overmastering elements of Jesus's character, became obscured. Whoever makes of Jesus a normal man finds it nearly impossible to do justice to his greatness. As opposed to such a levelling rationalism, there has sprung up of late a movement of historical research which insists upon a recognition of the simple facts. That is of course right: only it should not be forgotten that epoch-making personalities never reveal themselves in single utterances, but only as a whole, and hence from within; and that such an apprehension of the whole is only possible to a corresponding whole of personal conviction. Historical research does not so much decide the contest as transfer it to other ground. In general, the estimate and comprehension of great personalities resolves itself in the end into a conflict of principles; and the interpretation of the personality of Jesus will never be free from strife, but will always divide men into opposing parties. Every solution of the problem from the historical side, however, must undertake both to do full justice to the peculiarities belonging to the history of the time, and also to make it intelligible how a doctrine which belonged in the first place wholly to its own epoch, can have a message for all ages, can communicate eternal truth to all.

(b) *The Elements of Jesus's View of Life*

The essence of Jesus's teaching consists in the proclaiming of a new order of the world and of life, *i. e.*, the "Kingdom of Heaven," which should be far removed from, indeed in positive opposition to, existing conditions; in fact, opposed to all the natural doing and contriving of men, to the "world." In Jesus's conception, this new order is by no means merely an inner transformation, affecting only the heart and mind, and leaving the outer world in the same condition. Rather, historical research puts it beyond question that the new kingdom means a visible order as well, that it aims at a complete change of the state of things, and hence cannot tolerate any rival order. Never in history has mankind been summoned to a greater revolution than here, where not this and that among the conditions but the totality of human existence is to be regenerated. If, none the less, Jesus stands so far above all mere enthusiasts and revolutionaries, the difference is in the content of the newly proclaimed kingdom. For this content consists in the most intimate fellowship with God, the blessedness arising from such fellowship, and the inseparable union of trust in God with love for men. Seen from the point of view of this content, the kingdom of heaven is already present in the souls of men; its glory appears not as something distant, something to be awaited, an object merely of promise and of hope, but as something very near, something obviously present in our midst and at every moment tangible—in short, as something fully real even in the sphere of human life. Here a new life wells up with new aims and powers, a life that represents impressively to humanity a lofty and imperishable ideal, a life that unites with a great expectation and hope a veritable transfiguration of the present.

Accordingly, the new kingdom appears above all as a kingdom of spiritual life; it lies beyond all outward achievements and manifestations. Moreover it does not require a variety of activities and sets no complicated problems; it focuses the

whole life upon a single act—entrance into the new kingdom, full and unreserved dedication to God, the merging of the whole being in the fellowship with God. In this fellowship there develops a pure harmony of innermost life, a complete communication of being, a kingdom of all-embracing love and of unconditional trust, a secure protection of man in the goodness and mercy of the omnipotent God, and, added to all, the highest bliss. Here an infinite love allows nothing to be lost, and confers worth even upon the lowliest. All cares and afflictions disappear in the immediate presence of the divine love, in the "vision" of God; man is lifted above all perplexities and conflicts into a realm of peace, and filled with an overflowing joy in the treasures of the new life.

In this new order, external conditions also are transformed. Man is nowhere left at the mercy of hostile powers; even his material existence falls under the loving care of the omnipotent God. What is needful to man will be supplied to him, and nothing can befall him which does not contribute to his good. A characteristic conception of faith develops, which primarily affects spiritual goods, then the total welfare. Unquestioning confidence prevails that everything asked for in sincere trust will be granted; for, if men, "being evil," know how to give good gifts to their children, how much more shall God give good things to them that ask him? The right faith can "remove mountains." Accordingly, nothing is wanting to the perfection of the new world, the "Kingdom of Heaven;" nothing hostile remains to disturb its blessedness.

Thought of this new world is constantly accompanied and permeated by the analogy with family life, the reciprocal relation of parents and children, by which it acquires greater nearness and distinctness. Just as in the family there is on the one hand a loving, self-sacrificing care, lavished without thought of reward or gratitude, and on the other, an unreserved devotion, and an unquestioning expectation of help; just as not any special service, but the whole being, the mere presence of the other, gives joy; just as the one offers himself, and the other

receives him, as a whole; so it is in a far more intensified and perfect form in the kingdom of God. The human may thus grow into a likeness to the divine, since it is viewed from the beginning in the purest and noblest way, in the light of the divine. That the new life finds its appropriate expression in the feelings and relations of the family, marks its complete antithesis to ancient idealism. For, in the latter, domestic and social life were modelled after the civic life of the state, and the leading idea of conduct was justice, the justice that demands performance, and assigns to the individual his deserts in accordance therewith. In the new kingdom of adoption, on the contrary, all differences of performance, as also of ability, disappear; from the outset all men are equally near to God, and objects of an equal love. What is here required is the dedication of the whole being, strength of desire and sincerity of trust. That is something which is possible for everyone; and it needs no outward token.

The more exclusively everything is made to depend upon this one conversion of the being, upon the acceptance of the glad tidings, so much the more decisive becomes the demand that this acceptance be given without any reservation or any countervailing, and that all one's doing, without exception, shall promote this single aim. As, even in everyday life, a man spends all to recover a treasure hidden in his field, or to find the pearl of great price of which he has heard, so much the more must the incomparably greater spiritual good fill our whole thought. The compromises of expediency are strictly forbidden; nothing foreign to his purpose is permitted to occupy a man. For, whatever a man seeks penetrates into his mind, and lessens his devotion to the one object: "where your treasure is, there shall your heart be also." Thus arises an uncompromising antagonism between the life with God and that with the world; with the utmost possible emphasis the command is issued not to serve two masters; also to put away all vacillating and dallying. "No man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Even useful, indeed highly valuable, things become injurious, so soon as they come into conflict with

the one purpose; the eye is to be plucked out, the hand cut off, when they endanger the whole man. All deliberating and wavering must give way before the one thought. "For what doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his soul?" From this elevation of mind and of view follows an emphatic rejection of the desire for riches and earthly possessions, of the devotion to the sordid cares of everyday, of calculating and troubling over the distant future: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

Likewise, a characteristic estimate of the value of different conditions of life and of feeling develops; whatever arouses a strong desire, a hunger and thirst for fellowship with God, is lauded; on the contrary, whatever strengthens the earthly ties, and gives them worth, is condemned. But since all outward success and material comfort do this, there results a complete reversal of the customary estimate of men and things. The poor and afflicted, the humble and oppressed, are near to the kingdom of heaven, the rich and powerful, far; for the former are much easier led to a change of heart and to a longing for eternal life. No less have the ignorant and the incompetent the advantage over the clever and the wise, who are self-satisfied and self-absorbed. In fact, just as in everyday experience we value the more what we have lost, so he who has gone astray, the sinner, is an object of special solicitude; not only is the prodigal son impelled by a stronger desire to return to his home, but also a greater warmth of fatherly love goes forth to meet him.

Similarly, those seem especially near to the new kingdom who are of a peaceable and gentle disposition, those whose transparent nature and purity of heart remain untouched by worldly lapses, men of homely and simple dispositions, in whom the perplexities of life have not destroyed the sense for that which is most of all needful. Thus, opposed to the everyday occupations of trade, to the rigidity and narrowness of humdrum life, there here opens, through the fundamental relation of man to God, a rich, continuous, ever-flowing life; out of it rises the sanctuary of a new world, destined to sway the whole of reality.

The estimate placed upon the life of the child finds herein its confirmation. The child—obviously it is the period of tender, helpless infancy that is chiefly in mind—in the simplicity of its nature and the innocence of its dependence, in its clinging to others, becomes the perfect pattern of those who seek after God: they who would enter the kingdom of God are required to turn and become as little children. The child's nature is thus for the first time adequately revealed to the spiritual eye of mankind. Children appear as something sacred and inviolable, as protected by the divine love and as specially near to the divine nature; "for I say unto you that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven." In these simple words is contained a complete reversal of human feeling. Later antiquity, too, had concerned itself not a little with the child and his life; statues of children formed a favourite subject of its art. But it did not at all behold in the child the germ and the prophecy of a new and purer world, rather merely full and fresh nature; its works of art "represent throughout the drollery, the roguishness, the playfulness, even the quarrelsomeness and stealth, but above all that lusty health and vigour which should be one of the chief attributes of the child" (Burckhardt). Thus it is the outward approximation that so pointedly shows the inner divergence between the two worlds.

In the new life earnestness and gentleness hold an even balance. Since the work of salvation is directed mainly toward the weak and erring, toward them that labour and are heavy laden; since guilt is blotted out through love and mercy; and since all the relations of life are governed, not by rigid standards, but by the law of love and by the inward disposition, the yoke proves to be easy and the burden light. The Son of man came not to destroy but to fulfil, to seek and to save them that are lost. But the seriousness of life suffers no detriment by clemency. A divine order extends its sway over our existence, and the demands of a holy will give to human decision a momentous significance. The salvation of the immortal soul is at stake. It has been entrusted, like a priceless treasure, to man's keeping; he must,

and he will, one day give an account of his stewardship. The moment is irrecoverable, and its consequences reach to all eternity.

(c) *The Religion and the Ethics of Jesus*

Such a profound change in the demands and in the hopes of life naturally addresses itself to the whole man, with the result that the organisation of the work of life and the progress of civilisation lose all interest for him. The sum of duty is comprised in the twofold injunction, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind," and "thy neighbour as thyself." Stress is thus laid solely on religion and morals. Yet these are not treated as separate spheres, but as related aspects of one and the same life. Love of God and love of man form an indivisible whole.

The relations of men to one another rest throughout upon the community of nature between man and God, revealed by the kingdom of heaven: it is only from God that men gain a relationship to one another, only in religion that morals have a foundation. On the other hand, morality or humane conduct forms an indispensable confirmation of religion; religion manifests its genuineness by leading men to helpful, self-denying conduct. Simple as this seems, and little new as it is in teaching, the most momentous changes are none the less due to it.

Religion is here a complete absorption in the life with God, a ceaseless turning of the whole nature toward Him; it is that ennobling harmony of mind which is full of blessing, and which we designate by the term "love." As the core of all life, religion is not a mere supplement to other forms of activity, but operates in and through all activity as its soul. If religion in this sense is an attitude toward the whole of experience, it is a mistake to identify it with any special acts. Consequently, there is here the most emphatic repudiation of all alleged religious activity which is set apart from life in general, and which lays claim to a special sanctity, indeed an exclusive holiness. More especially does the latter presumption become a source of danger to the simple,

fundamental command of love and mercy; for these are easily repressed, even destroyed, by it. Yet the universal injunction to show love and mercy is an inviolable command of God, while the above peculiar claim is merely of human devising. It amounts, therefore, to a fatal perversion when such dogmas are allowed to weaken the eternal commands and blunt our sense for the weal or woe of our fellowmen. Hence the most decisive rejection of all claims to exclusive sanctity: of more value than all offerings in the temple is the simple command, "Honour thy father and thy mother."

Furthermore, the basing of religion in this manner upon the whole nature results in a rejection of everything external, of all formulas and all elaborate ritual, together with all those subtle distinctions of what is allowed and what not allowed. So, too, the most astounding works of religion (prophecies, miracles, etc.), are surpassed by the simplest self-denying act, the token of true piety. By their fruits we shall know them; not everyone that sayeth Lord, Lord, but whoso doeth the will of our heavenly Father, is pleasing to God.

Indignation at the perversion of religion reaches its height in the denunciation of all vain and ostentatious religious acts, all display before men, all hierarchical pretensions. Since, in fact, all men are equally thrown upon the divine love and mercy, pretense and self-righteousness only disclose a lack of inner veracity. Hence the emphatic, incisive warning against hypocrisy, the "leaven of the Pharisees;" this designates not so much the crude sort of hypocrisy which consists in pretending to the direct opposite of what is actually believed, as it does to the more subtle inner untruthfulness in which the outward act leaves the basis of the nature indifferent, and occupation with divine things is united with cunning, with the lust of power, and with selfishness. In contrast with such a dark picture, true piety shines but the more brightly; it accepts the divine favour in joyful humility, and manifests its gratitude in silent, untiring love.

The characteristic peculiarity of the ethics of Jesus lies a step further back than it is usual to seek it. It does not consist in

striking individual sayings: whoever is familiar with the Greek and Judaic writers of the time can point to most of the doctrines, similarly expressed, in earlier documents. But the spirit that fills all the teachings with a living power is new; even the old it makes new, and the simple great. For, while aside from Christianity there were only the aspirations and efforts of individuals, —the refined reflections of thinkers and the tender moods of sensitive souls—the kingdom of heaven presents a world embracing the whole being; the sayings of Jesus become an expression, a witness, of an original, ceaselessly flowing life. Even the most difficult requirements now possess the certainty of fulfilment. What in its isolation might appear paradoxical, becomes in its new relations self-evident; all the lifelessness and indefiniteness of earlier plans is overcome. Hence a great advance is unmistakable. What existed merely in thought has become deed; what was an aim and an ideal has become living reality.

Accordingly, all the principal directions of the new movement manifest, in addition to their connection with the past, a very fruitful further development. It is in accordance with the general character of the age that the moral problem is not connected with external works, but with the inner disposition. Yet this general desire lacked for its complete satisfaction an independent and comprehensive inner world; hence the spiritual life of the individual remained isolated, and all his laborious striving might appear as lost, so far as the community, and even the vital basis of his own being, were concerned. But all that now undergoes a complete transformation, since the union with God transfers man to a self-sufficing inner world, in which he is wholly absorbed. Whatever takes place in such an inner world has, *ipso facto*, a reality and a worth. The complete subordination of performance to disposition is no longer a pretentious assertion, but a simple fact, a matter of course, since action is directed from the outset, not toward the outward circumstances, but toward the kingdom of God present within. If the action is consummated in this inner world, the external act has only to

make known what there took place; it receives all its worth from that life-giving basis. The disposition itself grows thereby from a passive mood to a vigorous act. At the same time, the distinctions of greater and lesser achievement lose all meaning; the lesser attainment becomes superior to the greater, whenever it represents a higher value in the disposition. The change that has taken place is manifest in the parable of the talents: the question here is not how much natural capacity is involved, nor how much outward result is attained, but solely whether the man's whole power, be it ever so little, has been put forth in singleness of purpose; it is this inner achievement that alone determines the worth of the act. The result is a complete liberation from the destiny imposed by natural endowment and by the accidents of outward success; and the worth of the man is based solely upon what pertains to his own act, the act of his whole being. The power of external destiny had indeed already been broken by Plato; for he placed the greatness of man and the worth of life in the strength and harmony of the inner nature. But in the inner nature itself there remained another, still more powerful, destiny,—the natural traits, and the limits of mental capacity: the liberation from these was first accomplished by Jesus.

The new inwardness of the moral life represents at the same time an elevation above all external formulas and precepts; in the new kingdom man cannot be bound by any dogma imposed from without. Instead, there springs from within the sternest subjection of the whole nature to a spiritual law. Where it is a question of transforming human existence to its deepest roots and throughout its whole extent, even the least apparent expressions of life, the lightest thoughts, become subject to moral judgment. Hence every form of enmity, every form of unchastity, every form of untruthfulness, is forbidden, and not merely such as are manifest in overt acts, and prohibited among men. Neither are any expedient compromises with the alien world ever tolerated; on the contrary, the perfect ideal in all its fulness must be realised, the high requirement strictly fulfilled.

Thus there is developed the ideal of a perfection of the whole being, of a moral likeness to God: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

A second chief trait of the ethical advance here inaugurated is the mild character exhibited in its gentleness, humility, and love of enemies. In this instance also, careful discrimination is necessary, in order accurately to estimate the progress made. There is a gentleness which arises from the experience of extreme suffering, from a consciousness of the vanity of all human things and the implication of all men in a common misery—the gentleness of weakness; there is another gentleness which springs from a joyful gratitude for the great blessings allotted to man, for the wealth of unmerited goodwill and love vouchsafed to him—the gentleness of strength. The former gentleness exhibits sympathetic feeling, and will indeed alleviate suffering in a given instance with a kind of languid helpfulness; but it will not undertake to create new conditions. The active spirit of gentleness, on the other hand, seeks out suffering wherever it may be found, takes it vigorously in hand, and, if it cannot completely relieve it, will at least provide the means of an essential victory over it by the upbuilding from within of a kingdom of love. In the former case, we have a refinement of the natural feelings; in the latter, a regeneration of the innermost being. The one is seen in later antiquity, the other in the morality taught by Jesus. In the latter, the dominant note is the conviction that it is through the divine lŏve and mercy, and without merit of his own, that man is freed from all suffering and called to infinite blessedness. This becomes a source of overflowing joy and gratitude, and creates a gentle and peaceable disposition. The new exhortation is, not to repel violence and hatred however much evil men may do, but to triumph over it inwardly by submissiveness and love. Every wrong without exception is to be forgiven, in view of the boundless forgiveness which man expects and receives from God.

In this new kingdom man cannot be intent upon having precedence of others, or upon reserving anything for himself.

Rather, the conviction of his complete dependence upon the merciful love of God produces a deep humility and a cheerful readiness to subordinate self to others, and to serve them: "Just as the Son of man is come, not that he may be served, but that he may serve." Likewise, all dispute with others, all dwelling upon their faults, is prohibited. This spirit of genuine leniency is manifest in Jesus's saying regarding the attitude of men toward his mission: "For he that is not against us is for us."

But even above the requirement that man should live peaceably, show clemency, and be eager to serve his fellowmen, is the command to love one's enemies, and gladly to do good to them. In this instance also the teaching is not entirely new; but the revolution in life which makes the impossible possible, that not only gives an injunction but creates the power to obey it, is new. For, unquestionably, the injunction conflicts with natural feeling; it would be impossible of fulfilment without the establishment of a fundamentally new relation among men. But such a relation is established by the common Fatherhood of God; this bond unites men from within in the closest relationship, and kindles a love that stirs the innermost being, destroys all unfeeling emotions, and transforms enmity into brotherly love.

Closely connected with the features already discussed is the disappearance of all social distinctions, in view of the one great purpose in life. This also corresponds to a general movement of the time; but the new requirement, ineffectual as mere theory, attains in Christianity the power of complete fulfilment, since here the essence of life is really sought in an inner core of pure humanity which differences of station, education, etc., do not reach. The humanity in men becomes paramount, wherever feeling and effort are governed by the sense of the common Fatherhood of God.

The ready sympathy for all sorts and conditions of men, and the helpful and self-sacrificing character of the morality here unfolded, make the care of the poor and unfortunate an object of special commendation; in fact, to give all one has to the poor appears as the perfection of conduct; indeed, it becomes the

peculiar token of the genuineness of conversion to the kingdom of God. In contrast with entrance into the new kingdom, all worldly concerns are necessarily regarded with indifference; to cling to them becomes an unallowable departure from that upon which salvation alone depends. Accordingly, there is here no room for an interest in civilisation, in art and science, in the shaping of social conditions, etc. True, the parables of the leaven and of the grain of mustard seed presuppose a vigorous further development, and require a tireless activity; they who are the light of the world should let their light shine before men, should preach from the housetops; the salt of the earth must not lose its savour. But all this concerned the extension of the kingdom of heaven; it did not mean that general conditions were to be permeated with the new life. These were matters of indifference to Jesus, and necessarily so; nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ascribe asceticism to him, for how could one be called ascetic who inaugurates a new world, and with mighty power summons the whole man to joyous labour for it? Whoever is repelled by this indifference of Jesus to all merely worldly culture can only forthwith let the whole of Christianity go, since the revelation of a new world, opposed to the temporal sphere, is inseparable from it.

Thus, in the proclaiming of the kingdom of heaven, there emerges a real world which is thoroughly original, genuine, and, in its simplicity, revolutionary. Here everything is youthful and fresh; the whole is animated by a mighty impulse to gain the entire world for the new life. But just because the new kingdom cannot brook a rival, but aims at dominating the whole world, so its realisation is not deferred to some indefinite future time; rather its purpose is to establish itself at once, and forthwith to subdue all. Hence existence is thrown into the deepest commotion, although not into headlong haste and turbid passion. For the aspiration which Christianity arouses involves the full certainty of personal possession; and above all outward activity there hovers the majesty of a life filled with blessed peace.

(d) *The Collision with the World*

After developing the distinctive characteristics of the new life, we must next consider its encounter with the existing world. The relation to the age is peculiarly significant, owing to the unique position which, in his own view and soon also in the belief of his followers, Jesus occupied. For he proclaims the fact of a kingdom of God not merely as a general truth, but declares that even now, and through him, it is to become actual and rule over all the earth. Everyone is summoned to a change of heart and to entrance into the kingdom of heaven. "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand."

But the answer of his contemporaries did not long remain uncertain. It soon appeared that the multitude was momentarily attracted and even carried away, but not permanently won; while the attitude of those in authority was decidedly hostile. The official religion, as has often been the case within Christendom itself, became the bitterest enemy of a less artificial and truer life. Thus those who are bidden come not to the feast prepared for them; the one matter of supreme concern meets with cold indifference, or with unfriendly rejection. Indeed, the rejection even goes the length of a relentless enmity. Yet upon the other hand, even the best among the small band of followers, notwithstanding the loyalty of their devotion and the warmth of their love, are far enough from meeting the requirements of the upbuilding of a new world: the only truly great Apostle was not won until after Jesus's death.

Thus the prospect of an immediate triumph of the new kingdom inevitably vanished. Without doubt Jesus himself felt this, and was thrown by it into profound agitation and conflict. But in these conflicts he won an inner victory which was complete and entire. Above all opposition, above all doubt and anxiety, rises the steadfast faith that the triumph of evil can be only momentary; for not only do all perplexities and doubts shatter themselves against the inner presence of the kingdom of

God, but the kingdom itself shall achieve also an outward triumph. The Messiah will return, to be the Judge of men and to establish a kingdom of God upon the earth; the stone which the builders rejected shall then become the head of the corner.

How far these experiences and feelings were unfolded in Jesus's own mind, and modified his world of thought, it is now hardly possible to decide; for here more than anywhere else it is presumable that a later age attributed its own moods and struggles to Jesus himself. In any case, the seriousness of his conviction must have been increased and an element of sadness added to it, when the opposition of the world became so overwhelming, and the upward path led through apparent destruction. Deeper must have become the shadows, more powerful and moving the summons. The chief aim now was to remain steadfast to the work begun, bravely to endure persecution, willingly to bear even the most grievous wrong, and to look upon the evil of the present as insignificant when compared with the future glory, which thenceforth far more dominated his thoughts. At the same time, the separation from the world, and the demand of an exclusive devotion to the one aim, became still more imperative; while, on the other hand, all indifference and hesitation were still more decidedly regarded as hostile. This accentuation of the opposition probably occasioned the saying: "He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth." Likewise that other saying, which illustrates in the most striking manner the stern exclusion of any middle course: "If any man cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."

Yet in the midst of all the disturbances and conflicts there is not only a complete confidence in final victory, but even affliction loses its obstinacy and irrationality in the presence of the thought that the divine decree has appointed everything to be what it is, and that even the malice of men is made to serve the will of God. And even if the thought of an atonement designed

to propitiate the wrath of God at the sins of the world was foreign to Jesus himself, it was certainly his conviction that the afflictions of the just serve for the salvation of others, and thus become an evidence of love. In any case, the various dangers failed to make him hesitate; the last decisive step was taken with vigorous courage; the assault upon the citadel of the enemy was boldly made.

The suffering and death of Jesus have attained a peculiar significance in the thought of Christendom; together with the doctrine of the resurrection, they have become the central point in the faith of the Church. A discussion of these questions cannot be undertaken in the present work; the author's personal views upon them have been fully expressed in his book entitled, "The Truth Contained in Religion." Here it must suffice to point out that even a purely historical view of the death of Jesus would be forced to ascribe to it a far greater importance than the end of life is wont to have with other heroes. In the first place, the manliness and strength inherent in the personality of Jesus are thrown into relief and visibly emphasised by his courageous attack upon a foe so superior in power, and by his steadfast endurance to the end. Then his death, with its deeply moving and agitating impressions, appeared to reveal for the first time to the inner eye of his followers the meaning of what was taking place around them; not till then did the figure of the Master grow in their minds to superhuman dimensions; not till then did such powers of reverence and zealous love as were latent within them burst forth into flames. The accounts of Christian tradition respecting a bodily resurrection are subject to historical criticism, and must encounter grave doubts. But beyond all question are the facts that out of the sudden ruin of their hopes there arose in the minds of the disciples an immovable conviction of the inner nearness of their Lord and of his speedy second coming to judge the world; and that the overwhelming catastrophe did not overawe and weaken them, but raised them above themselves, and endowed them with the capacity for a heroism and martyrdom of their own. The un-

yielding spirit which Jesus manifested toward a hostile and outwardly so superior world, and the dignity which he preserved in his conflict with it, gave to the disciples the certainty of another order of things, and kindled also in them the courage to take up the work apparently trampled under foot, and to carry it forward with unbounded energy. Moreover, throughout the further development of Christianity, Jesus's suffering and death have given a peculiar intimacy to the relation of men to his personality; particularly throughout all the struggles and misfortunes of early Christianity the keynote heard is, Let us show our gratitude to Jesus, who suffered and died for us; let us stand fast, even to laying down our lives in a witness of death, the "most perfect work of love." True, the feeling of individuals often enough degenerated into sentimental trifling; but, rising above individual feeling, the tragedy of Jesus's death brings vividly before the consciousness of Christendom the tragic character of our own world; it shows with a force not to be ignored the dark mystery and the deep seriousness of human destiny; it successfully prevents all superficial attempts to rationalise existence, and all expedient compromises with the world as it is. Other religions have become world powers through their victories, Christianity through its defeat. For there grew out of its outward ruin and apparent disappearance the triumphant certitude of a new world, the firm conviction that in this new world are to be found the foundation and the security of all good; hence all the problems of existence are, for Christianity, concentrated upon a single point, and the turning of life toward the heroic and the supersensible is achieved. Yet there ceaselessly arises thence for men a great question, a great doubt, a great summons, a great hope.

(e) *The Permanent Result*

In considering the permanent significance of Jesus, we should remind ourselves that nowhere does the leading personality mean more than in the sphere of religion—this is in accordance

with the chief aim of religion. Taken seriously, this aim may appear to be altogether unattainable. Or, does it *not* seem hopeless to lift man, in the midst of his human existence, to divinity; to ensure him, notwithstanding his dependence upon the course of the world, a self-dependent soul; to reveal to him, in the midst of temporal limitations, an eternity? Without an inversion of the natural view of the world and of life, without a miracle, it cannot be done. But this miracle is first accomplished in the life and being of creative personalities; then by means of the nearness and tangibility thus won it can be communicated also to others, and finally become a fact for the whole of mankind. Hence the spiritual depth of religions is measured, and their character determined, chiefly by the personal traits of their founders; it is they who infuse an inner life into the framework of doctrines and ordinances, who oppose to all doubts an indisputable body of facts, who continually bring religion back from stereotyped formulas to the fresh vigour of its source.

When so much depends upon the personality of the founder, it was an incalculable advantage for Christianity, giving it a great superiority over all other religions, to be based upon the life and being of a personality which was raised so high and so securely above the lower things of human nature, and above the antagonisms which ordinarily cleave life in twain. There appears here, united with homely simplicity, an unfathomable profundity; united with a youthful gladness, a great seriousness; and united with the most perfect sincerity of heart and tenderness of feeling, a mighty zeal for holy things, and an invincible courage for the battle with the hostile world. Trust in God and love of man are here bound together in an inseparable unity; the highest good is at once a secure possession and an endless task. All utterance has the fragrance of the most delicate poetry; it draws its figures from the simple occurrences in surrounding nature, which it thereby ennobles; nowhere is there extravagance or excess, such as at once attracts and repels us in oriental types; instead, an exalted height of pure humanity in the form of pro-

nounced individuality, affecting us with a marvellous sense of harmony. And this personality, by its tragic experiences, is at the same time a prototype of human destiny, whose impressive pathos must be felt even by the most hardened mind.

So far as the image of Jesus remained a present reality—and it could never wholly vanish for his followers—Christianity possessed a sure guardian spirit, protecting it from sinking into pettiness and the indolent routine of every day, from becoming crystallised and commonplace, and from falling into the rationalism of dogma and the Pharisaism of outward piety; it possessed a power of turning from all the complexity of historical development to the simplicity of the essentially human; a power also of adhesion, as against all the separations into sects and parties which threatened Christianity even from the first. Thus, within Christianity, the movement of development has ever and again reverted to Jesus, and has always drawn from him something new. Thenceforth, Christianity became a perpetual ideal to itself. The "Imitation of Christ," often falsely understood as a blind imitation, was the watchword of all striving after the purity of the original teaching, of every effort to Christianise Christianity; hence to trace its historical development means to reveal the inner history of Christianity.

This interpretation of Jesus retains its full force also for us moderns, who feel ourselves separated in many ways from his world of thought. The separation, in truth, extends only to a certain point, beyond which it tends instead to effect a reunion. But it ought to be perfectly clear that Jesus represents a definite and distinctive profession of faith concerning final questions and spiritual goods, that consequently the acceptance of him requires certain fundamental convictions, and that, as in the case of every creative mind, so above all in his, men are divided, and will be through all time.

The immediate expectation of the kingdom of God made Jesus indifferent to all questions of mere civilisation and of the social order; hence on these matters neither sanction nor counsel can be expected from him. This separates him definitely from

those to whom the development of civilisation is the chief substance and the sole aim of human existence; it tends only the more to attract to him those who perceive the inadequacy of all mere civilisation, and who see in the secure establishing of a new world upon the fundamental relation of man to the Infinite and Eternal the only possible salvation of the soul.

More important, because more pertinent to the proper sphere of religion, is another consideration. Modern research has shown, incontrovertibly, the close connection of all Jesus's doctrines with his belief in the speedy regeneration of the world, in the immediate coming of the kingdom of God; even the ethics, with its gentleness, peaceableness and joyfulness, derives its true significance from the expectation of the speedy coming of glory; apart from this, it may easily appear sentimental and overstrained. But the above belief has been shown by the course of history to be erroneous; what Jesus looked upon as something to be swiftly and once for all decided, has become an endlessly renewed question and problem. Not easily, and not without momentous transformation, has Christianity adjusted itself to the change. Has it not thereby also receded from Jesus, even placed itself in opposition to him? The change is unmistakable, and a rejection of Christianity unavoidable for any one who sees in the world of our immediate existence the only reality, the final unfolding of the spiritual life. Whoever, on the other hand, looks upon this world only as a special form of being; whoever is unable to see the possibility of spiritual self-preservation, or any meaning and reason in all the untold trouble and labour of life, apart from the living presence of a new world of independent and triumphant spirituality, will joyfully and gratefully acknowledge the fact that Jesus gave powerful and irresistible expression to the nearness and presence of such a world. Not only by his teachings, but still more by his life and suffering, he created a breach with the immediate world; he deprived it and all its goods of value; he compelled men to look beyond it, and implanted in them an imperishable longing for a new world. The form, which we now recognise as transitory, was

then an indispensable means of inducing his age to acknowledge the new kingdom, and put forth its strength in support of it. Let us not be robbed of the eternal substance, because of the temporal wrapping. So, even on this point, we should realise that we are far less separated from than at one with him, *i. e.*, we who recognise the great contrast, and at the same time seek to rise above it.

Accordingly, even the very necessary efforts for a renewal of Christianity, for a more active and more universal Christianity, such as are being made to-day with ever increasing effect, do not need to break with Jesus; rather, even they place themselves in the service of the truth revealed by him, and with full conviction appropriate the saying of Peter: "Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life."

B. EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Before we turn to consider the history of the Christian views of life, we must glance briefly at the difficulties which the concept of history encounters in this sphere. Religion and history are in their nature contradictory. For, just as religion must proclaim its truth to be divine, so it must treat this truth as immutable; and just as it reveals a new world, so it must produce indifference toward the old. Christianity accentuated this opposition in a peculiar degree. Neither Jesus himself, nor his disciples, nor the early Christians, believed that they stood at the beginning of a long development; rather, they looked for the end of the world, for the coming of eternal glory, in the immediate future. It took centuries before the hope of a speedy return of the Messiah faded; it was, in fact, the upbuilding of the Church into complete independence and into a world-dominating power which eventually forced that idea into the background, since the Church then asserted that the kingdom of God was actually present. The Church herself, however, as the bearer of an immutable truth, has never conceded that there was any inner development in essentials. It is also significant

that Luther, so soon as the traditional conception of the Church was shattered, at once fell under the power of the idea of a speedy end of the world; this fact alone makes his later activity in particular intelligible.

Nevertheless, Christianity has a history. It has one, in the first place, for the reason that it belonged to very different epochs, and the characteristics of these epochs mingled in its formation. For, little as religion is to be regarded merely as an element of civilisation, it cannot escape the influence of the life surrounding it. The age in which Christianity received its provisional founding, the age of the decline of antiquity, is in fact far too exceptional to form the normal type of all ages, and to sway the whole future of humanity; it was necessary for Christianity to transcend the age of its birth, and it did so; but therewith religion too was drawn into the movement of history.

So far, however, the movement might appear only as contingent and enforced. Yet, with all its initial indifference toward the world, Christianity, as a permanent power in human life, has an inner need both of drawing the world to itself, and of further realising itself in the world. It must not remain an affair of mere individuals. With such a limitation, it would not so much as satisfy the individual, since even in him will be found an element of world-nature; rather, it must build up a connected whole of life, a Christian world. But, to that end, it must enter into a positive relation with the life of civilisation, although indirectly rather than directly, by means of the transformation of the whole man. Whoever ridicules the idea of a Christian civilisation, of Christian sciences, etc., only shows that he thinks meanly, not only of religion, but also of science and of civilisation. Such a reciprocal relation, however, such give and take, necessarily involves the entrance of Christianity into the movements of general life, and consequently its possessing a history.

This history falls, however, into two main divisions, an early and a modern Christianity; the former characterised by the relation to antiquity, the latter by the relation to the modern

world. The connection with antiquity still powerfully affects contemporary forms of Christianity, and occasions a great many serious difficulties. But this fact ought not to make us unjust toward the earlier phase of Christianity. For the time, this phase was necessary, if indeed Christianity was to rise from a mere sect to a spiritual world-power, and leave its impress upon the general state of affairs. For it could not attach itself to any other civilisation than that which then ruled the world, and which, in the universal belief of men, represented the final result of human effort. Furthermore, the fruitfulness of the union of the two worlds is incontestable. True, antiquity has often exceeded the position assigned to it by the Christian view; particularly in the matter of concepts and doctrines, it often seems as though Christianity had been ingrafted upon antiquity rather than antiquity upon Christianity. But Christianity was, and remained, the moving, progressive force; in spite of the deluge of classical and late Greek systems of thought which swept over it, it never gave up the battle for self-preservation and self-development. And if the total result does not usually rise above the plane of a more or less skilful combination, it always presents important problems, and in one instance—that of Augustine—it reaches a height which places it on a level with the great achievements of all ages, and also gives it a worth which persists throughout all changing conditions. Since Augustine thus represents the highest point attained by the early Christian views of life, and accordingly forms the chief subject of our present consideration, he may also be taken as determining the sub-divisions of the period: all that was accomplished before him may be regarded as a preparation, all subsequent achievement as a further development of his thought.

I. THE PRE-AUGUSTINIAN PERIOD

The account of the Christian views of life before Augustine presents peculiar difficulties. Since no single achievement rises to classical proportions, we must content ourselves with a gen-

eral survey. But there are not only many differences among individuals, and the permanent contrast between the Greek and Roman mind; there is also a gradual change in the character of the whole. For, with the more rapid growth of Christianity which began at the close of the second century and further increased after the middle of the third century, organisation took precedence of the individual, and outward performance precedence of the inner spirit, while the magical gained ever-increasing prominence. We hope to do justice to these difficulties by presenting glimpses of the whole from different points of view, and by noting in passing the individual deviations.

(a) *A Sketch of the First Centuries*

The utterances of the early centuries respecting human life and destiny are more important as signs of a new life than as theoretical achievements. In an age when Christian communities had to struggle hard both outwardly and inwardly, when the expectation of an ecstatic bliss caused men to live more in faith and hope than in the sensible present, when, finally, the main body of believers consisted of the poor and the ignorant, there was little room, and small incentive, for a connected treatment and a theoretical discussion of convictions about life. It was less a personal need than the necessity of defence that called forth expositions of doctrine; and inasmuch as these were designed for the outside public, it was the single points of contact and of difference rather than the whole in and for itself which obtained consideration. Moreover, in order to influence unbelievers, it was necessary to speak from their standpoint, and to make allowances for their prejudices. Hence the documents of the period are mainly exoteric in character, and much that they contain is rationalistic and utilitarian. What at that time filled the hearts of men is revealed much more clearly by early Christian art, and a visit to the Catacombs transports one more directly into the real life of the age than all the philosophical works taken together. In one respect, however, the latter pos-

sess a value of their own; they permit us to see how far what was new and characteristic had come to distinct consciousness, and how much capacity there was to meet unbelievers with the grounds for the new faith. The various expositions, however, gain consistency only through reference to the life behind them.

The views of life, also, show that morality was the bone and marrow of early Christianity: strictness in morals and inner purity were the primary requirement. The resemblance to the Stoics and Cynics of the time is obvious; but there are also important differences. Side by side with the subjectivity of man, the Stoics posit what is essentially a logical and physical order of things; but such an order cannot give the individual universal spiritual relations, and so provide a support for his efforts. For the Christian teachers, on the other hand, God, the perfect moral spirit, is present throughout the world; for them, the good is the ruling power, even beyond the human sphere.

But this faith is accompanied by the conviction that immediate experience nowise harmonises with it, that, on the contrary, experience yields much suffering and is full of unreason. To turn these to good requires the help of God, for man's power is insufficient; hence a religious faith is here closely intertwined with moral conviction. However, morals are rather strengthened and supported by it than spiritualised and deepened; inward religious feeling, longing for a life inspired by infinite perfection, very rarely finds expression; religion appears rather as a means of human happiness than as an end in itself. Although a profounder sort of religion may have been active deep down in the soul, it failed to show itself in theoretical discussions.

A further contrast with ancient philosophy appears in the fact that attention is directed less to individuals than to the melioration of the whole of humanity. Thus many new problems are raised, and the style of exposition is changed. The theoretical view gives place to what lives in the common consciousness; the immediate impression, the simple human feeling, is developed with more freedom and expressed more openly; the whole gains in warmth and lucidity. But popularising beliefs not only

endangers the perfection of form and the precise determination of concepts; often the mind is also carried away by the anthropomorphism of the popular view, and the heightened mood is not sufficiently held in check by an objective consideration of things.

Hence, a sketch of the early Christian thinkers should not take theoretical knowledge as the foundation, as was done in the case of antiquity; rather, it is the rôle of faith, *i. e.*, here, the comprehension and acceptance of the divine message, to transmit the truths on which the salvation of man depends. A strong inclination develops to depreciate the faculty of knowledge in favour of faith; it is made to appear as a fault of pride to attempt to penetrate the last secrets and to comprehend the contents of faith. "About God we may learn only from God" (Athenagoras). The Greeks, in whom the old delight in knowledge was ineffaceable, were in this respect in general more moderate; with the Latins, the belittling of knowledge was often exaggerated to the point of positive distrust of all man's mental faculties. In two important respects, faith appeared to possess an advantage, viz., certainty and universal intelligibility. The philosophers had to seek the truth, while the Christians already possessed it; faith all could share, while theoretical knowledge was the privilege of the few, since the multitude lack the leisure necessary for investigation. "Every Christian workman knows God, and manifests Him, and signifies by his deed all that God requires of him, while Plato declares that the Architect of the Universe is not easy to find, and, when found, is difficult to impart to all" (Tertullian).

The focus of early Christian faith is the idea of God. On this point important deviations develop, deviations not only from the popular faith but also from the philosophical views of the ancients. Now for the first time there is a strict monotheism, which accepts the one invisible God, but no demi-gods; now for the first time polytheism disappears, although it must be admitted that it later crept in again in a modified form in the hagiolatry of Christianity itself. Now all reality is recognized as immediately constituted by the infinite Spirit; nature, in con-

sequence, loses the old pantheistic deification. To the sentiment of antiquity this loss necessarily appeared intolerable; the new world offered in its stead seemed cold and desolate; it was no paradox when their opponents reproached the Christians with atheism. The ancient conceptions of deity were, in fact, destroyed by the new faith; but the new idea of God, with its imageless reverence and its paucity of names, lacked the tangibility and the individuality upon which the old way of thinking rested. On their part, the Christians not only appealed to the inner presence of the Divine Being, but believed that there flowed thence into nature also new life. Invisible angels, so they thought, hold undisputed sway throughout the whole of nature; all creatures pray; and in innumerable instances, such, *e. g.*, as the flight of birds, devout observation may detect the sign of the Cross. Just as such divine life does not spring from the force of mere nature, but is transfused into things, so nature everywhere points beyond itself to a higher order.

By the surrender of all relationship with conceptions of nature, the idea of God approached nearer to man, the free moral being. Although the expression does not occur, we could speak here, with more justice than in the case of the Greeks, of the personality of God. But the merely human is not sufficiently eliminated, unpurified human emotions being often transferred to the Supreme Being. In fact, much commotion was occasioned among the Fathers by the question whether it would do to speak of the anger of God, and thus to ascribe an emotion to the Supreme Being. To do so would be in direct contradiction with the doctrines of the ancient philosophers; but the fear of the anger of God was the strongest motive of conduct in the Christian communities—a fact which is attested even by the thinkers who regard that passion as incompatible with pure conceptions of God. Still, to nearly all thinkers emotion seemed indispensable; without the anger of God there can be no fear of God, and without this no stability in civil society.

As the work of an omnipotent God, the world cannot be other than good. Hence the order and beauty of nature are ex-

tolled—not seldom in contrast with the confusion and suffering of human life—and held up to unbelievers as a striking proof of the existence of God; to every unprejudiced mind the glorious works of nature must clearly proclaim the invisible Overseer. The world, however, has a fixed boundary not only in space, as was believed even in antiquity, but also in time, as was now taught in opposition to the ancient philosophy of history. There is no endless series of cycles; but, just as it has a beginning, so the world has an end, in time; whatever takes place in it, above all, the great conflict of God with evil, happens once and never again, although the consequences extend through all eternity. The importance of human conduct is emphasised to the utmost by this new philosophy of history; and the old way of thinking is charged with implying the uselessness of all striving, since, according to it, whatever is achieved is again lost, and every undertaking must begin anew. The duration of the world is not only fixed, but is also short; six thousand years are often assigned as its limit, with the added explanation that while the world was created in six days, in the sight of God a day is as a thousand years. Even now the end of the world, and, with it, the Last Judgment, seem near. This belief arose in the first instance from the confident expectation of a speedy return of the Messiah; it still persisted later, however, because the fading of the Messianic hope was counterbalanced by the growing impression of the decline of civilisation, the aging of humanity. Even as late as the beginning of the fourth century, Lactantius believed that the world would not endure beyond a few centuries. Hence no vista of an extended history opened before the Christianity of this age. So much the more important became the present, and so much the more imperative the decisions of the present.

No less did a new attitude of man toward the world operate as an incitement to activity. In spite of all the teachings of the Stoics respecting the supremacy of man, antiquity persisted on the whole in subordinating him to the world. But now that his moral nature conferred upon man a supreme worth, he became

the centre and purpose of the universe: all is for his benefit; even the sun, moon, and stars make obeisance to him. But his responsibility increases with his importance; his conduct determines the destiny of the world; his Fall brought evil into the world, and caused all the suffering that the present state of things shows. For the origin of evil lies in the freedom of man, not in the dark forces of nature. Thus the ancient doctrine of the obstructing and degrading power of matter also disappears; for nothing is worthless which has been created by the divine omnipotence. Likewise, man dare not now despise his body as something foreign and common; nor may he heap upon his sensuous nature all the responsibility for evil; for the body, too, belongs to our being, and there is no complete immortality without the resurrection of the body. This doctrine was very repugnant to the Greeks; and it was only after compromises and evasive interpretations that their greatest teachers subscribed to the faith of the Church.

But the higher we exalt the position of man, the keener becomes the sense of his present misery. For the present state of the world must be regarded as altogether unsatisfactory. Innumerable dangers and afflictions beset us from without and from within: there the irrationality of things, here our own passions. In particular, as is natural at a time of serious conflict, thought dwells upon the helplessness of the good as compared with the hostile forces. Moreover, there is no hope that the state of things will improve with the lapse of time, or that through an order inherent in things the history of the world will come to be its own Judgment. Amid natural conditions the good ever remains powerless, the truth must always suffer. Hence the hope of the speedy coming of a new world alone sustains the spirit and makes work joyful; all desire is focussed upon that supernatural future; and at service a frequent form of prayer is, "May grace come, and the present world pass away!"

The opening up of this prospect is the main thing in the Christian Evangel. However, the nature of Christianity is little discussed, and such discussion as there is fails to bring out the

deeper feeling of the Christian community. The Apologists of the second century looked upon Christianity as a God-given doctrine of reason, supplementing such reason as exists in man and manifests itself in history. Especially characteristic of this doctrine are an exclusive reverence for the one invisible God, and an exaltation solely of morality—a morality wholly inward and based upon free conviction, as constituting the true worship of God. Even at a later time the greatness of Christianity was found less in the revelation of a new content, in a spiritual elevation of mankind, than in a more universal and more powerful realisation of the end and aim of all men. Now for the first time Christianity appeals to the whole man, and instead of remaining mere skill in words and doctrines becomes a thing manifest in deeds. The loftier estimate of the personality of Jesus and the more devout reverence for him seldom find expression in the writings of the time, although contemporary art gives unmistakable evidence of their presence in the community. Great importance is universally attributed to Jesus's death, but definite explanation and justification of it are wanting. Writers dwell for the most part upon the belief that Jesus had destroyed the power of evil spirits, and had begun a regeneration of mankind. Yet, profounder speculations also appear. Thus, Irenæus believed that in Christ the eternal became human, that what was mortal was absorbed by the immortal, and that thereby we, too, become sons of God. Only in this manner could the mutable be raised to the immutable. This process of reasoning was permanently adopted by the Greek Church.

How men thought regarding the essence of Christianity appears also from the manner of its defence. On this point a shifting from particular to universal took place with the lapse of centuries. At first, the strongest evidence of truth was found in the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies; what holy men foretold before it occurred must be from God. Then the miracles of healing performed in the name of Jesus were pointed to, particularly the driving out of devils, of which men believed that they had daily evidence. Even the broadest and freest mind

before Augustine, even Origen, held these two proofs in high esteem. But as Christianity gained in strength, its own power and effects became the chief evidence. The moral condition of the Christian communities, it was pointed out, is incomparably better than that of surrounding heathendom; only divine omnipotence could confer on Christianity the power to purify men and make them steadfast in the face of cruel persecutions; only divine help could enable it to grow in spite of untold misfortunes. "For the blood of Christ is a seed" (Tertullian); "The more it is repressed, the more the religion of God grows" (Lactantius). Likewise the spread of Christianity over all peoples serves as an evidence of its truth; such an astonishing advance in the face of the hostile and more powerful world could not have taken place without divine assistance. Moreover, that the Roman Empire, speaking roughly, began simultaneously with Christianity and inaugurated an era of peace, was believed to have favoured the spread of Christianity, and to have been brought about by the appearance of the peace-making Saviour. Furthermore, the Apologists did not hesitate to make the most of the utility of religion for civil life and social order: only the fear of the condemnation and punishments of God compels the multitude to obey the laws. And the ethical elevation of Christianity naturally was not overlooked. It devotes all its power to the improvement of men: in the opinion of Origen the miracles of Jesus are raised far above those of all heathen magicians by the fact that they are not conjurer's tricks, but always have a moral aim. The intrinsic advantage of Christian morality consists not so much in new doctrines as in the communication of a power to perform tasks which otherwise would exceed the capacities of men. The gentleness, peaceableness, fortitude, and patience of the Christian are lauded. Particularly is it the new attitude toward suffering which everywhere comes to the fore. "We are distinguished from those that know not God by the fact that in misfortune they complain and grumble, while we are not diverted by evils and pain from the truth of virtue and faith, but are made thereby only the stronger" (Cyprian). Likewise, the

more intimate relation to one's fellow-men is often extolled. "Whoever bears his neighbour's burden, whoever essays to help the less capable in that wherein he himself is superior, whoever by communicating the gifts of God to them that have need becomes a god to the recipients, that one is an imitator of God" (Epistle to Diognetus). By Eusebius (*c.* 270–340), the moral effects of Christianity are compressed into a single view: "It gives to all a share in divine truth; it teaches how to bear with a noble mind the malice of the enemy, and not to ward off evil by evil means; it elevates above passion and anger and all fierce desires; in particular, it impels us to share our own possessions with the poor and needy, to greet every man as kin, and to recognise even in the stranger—according to an inner law annulling the external rule—a neighbour and a brother."

Because, then, of its gentleness, patience, and humanity, Christianity feels itself superior to its opponents. Yet the powerful longing for happiness and the expectation of a new world do not permit this tenderness to degenerate into effeminacy, nor the self-denial of believers into indolent resignation. The early Christian suffers and denies himself, but he does so in the secure hope of a higher happiness; he thinks not less but more of man and his aims. Lactantius writes his chief work with the definite intention "of inducing men not to depreciate themselves, as certain philosophers do, and regard themselves as powerless and useless and worthless and as born altogether in vain: an opinion which drives the majority to vice."

It is further a powerful incitement to effort, that man must of his own initiative make the decision for or against God. For, although the early Christian was closely identified with an historical tradition and a social environment, the great choice on which his destiny hung was none the less his own act. The complete freedom of the will was asserted with more confidence, barring a possible exception, than ever before or since; its denial appeared to destroy all moral responsibility, indeed, all moral worth: "There would be nothing worthy of praise, if man had not the capacity to turn in either direction" (Justin). To accen-

tuate responsibility to the utmost was indeed a life-and-death matter with early Christianity. Hence, freedom was proclaimed, not as a doctrine advanced by individual thinkers, but as the common conviction of the Christian Church; and it was viewed as extending beyond conduct to matters of belief; even faith was thought to depend upon the free decision of man; to accept false doctrines concerning God appeared to imply moral guilt. No obligation was felt to give a psychological explanation of freedom; likewise, the relation of man's freedom to God's omnipotence as yet caused no anxiety. For reality is here viewed from the human and not from the divine stand-point.

From convictions such as these there results a life full of power, emotion, and spiritual activity. The one supreme aim is to remain true to God through the dedication of all one's faculties to Him. Man is confronted with a momentous alternative: Either success and enjoyment in life, with eternal ruin; or bliss beyond, with continual conflict and suffering here. In making such a choice prudence, if nothing more, would give the preference to boundless eternity instead of to the short span of time. For the present, evil rules and exercises grievous oppression; even if the enemy be inwardly condemned, outwardly he remains triumphant and can inflict cruel wrongs. Hence, the mind must elevate itself above the sensuous present by the power of faith, and in joyful hope lay hold of the invisible better world. With regard to immediate surroundings, it is chiefly courage that is needed, courage in the sense of fortitude. Thus patience is often extolled as the crowning virtue. In this respect, the early Christian was in part near to the Stoic, in part far removed from him and antagonistic. Even the Christian should be a hero and bid defiance to all the world. Especially the occidental Christians were fond of calling themselves "soldiers of God"; and of the thinkers Cyprian in particular delighted in metaphors drawn from military affairs and the lives of soldiers. On the other hand, the Christian thinkers are directly opposed to the Stoics in the treatment of the feelings and emotions. How could Christianity have summoned men to a

complete revolution in their lives, and at the same time have repressed all emotion and commended the "apathy" of the Stoics! The new life is not born until man has been profoundly stirred by penitence and contrition; and in its hovering between the visible and invisible worlds, it is ceaselessly swayed this way and that by fear and hope. Hence, the aim is not to suppress or even to moderate the emotions, but to guide them in their full strength in the right direction: let the fear of God liberate from all other fear. "Fear is neither to be uprooted, as the Stoics demand, nor to be tempered, as the Peripatetics say; rather it is to be directed in the right way, and special care is to be taken that only that form of fear remains which, as the true one, allows nothing else to become an object of fear" (Lactantius).

The absorption of the whole man in the one aim leaves him no opportunity to take part in the work of civilisation; concerned, as he is, with salvation and future blessedness, such work could attract him little, and certainly the less in proportion as the ancient world fell into a rapid decline after the failure of the attempts at restoration in the second century. Thus, early Christianity manifests no impulse to improve general conditions, or to engage in the investigation of the natural world; in both, aloofness, if not open disapproval, is shown, according to the differences among individuals and to the contrast of Greek and Latin types of mind. Art, also, which was by no means of slight importance to the spiritual life of the early Christians, nowhere finds recognition among the thinkers. In this disregard of art there is also operative a reaction against the antique delight in form, which appeared to the early Christians to be an over-valuation of the unmeaning exterior after the fading and gradual disappearance of its living content. Inasmuch as form contributed nothing toward gratifying their longing for happiness, it was condemned as being indifferent, worthless, even seductive; while all effort was directed toward the content, the disposition, the moral constitution. Even a Clement could say, "The beauty of every creature resides in its

excellence." The Latins, however, carried the contempt for form to the point of indifference to grammatical accuracy. "What harm is done," asks Arnobius, "if an error in case and number, in preposition, particle, or conjunction, is made?" Such views are close to a barbaric disdain for all culture, and already breathe the mediæval spirit. But they are intelligible in connection with their age, and they indicate a turning-point in human endeavour whose consequences endured for more than a thousand years. It was the Renaissance which first brought about a change, and restored form again to honour.

But, although the early Christian thinkers show their strength in the exclusive exaltation of the state of the soul, even here the picture is not without its shadows. The vehemence of their clamouring for happiness places them far behind the ancient Greek thinkers in the matter of the motives of conduct. While the latter with one accord attribute an intrinsic beauty to goodness, and elevate the joy felt in this beauty into the chief impulse of worthy conduct, the majority of the Church Fathers, particularly the Latin Fathers, insist strenuously upon an ample reward of virtue. Virtue is regarded as a mere means to blessedness, a blessedness painted with a glowing fancy, and expected with perfect confidence in the Beyond. In this contemplation of future ecstasy, the actual moral life appears to become indifferent, at least there is no evidence of joy in it. In fact, the early Christians do not shrink from calling it folly for any one to suffer the pains which the life of virtue in this world involves, viz., labour and privation, grief and shame, without a sure promise of a great reward, or, conversely, for any one to shun evil without the expectation of severe punishment. "If there were no immortality, it would be wise to do evil, foolish to do good" (Lactantius). The sharp contrast with their surroundings, and the tremendous tension of the general state of things, may explain, and to some extent excuse, such crass utterances; also, it should be noted that the Christian Fathers, with their popular attitude, reflect the feeling of the multitude, and seek to work upon it, while the ancient thinkers addressed

themselves chiefly to the few eminent individuals. None the less, it remains true that in the purity of the moral motive the majority of the Church Fathers fall far behind the philosophers of Greece.

The greatness of early Christian thought lies in the development of an independent sphere of life, in the upbuilding of an all-inclusive organisation. Into this were gathered what there was of intimacy of feeling and of capacity for conduct; here arose, amid all the asceticism, a new world, a realm of joyful and fruitful activity. It was in itself something great that here, despite all the disruption and friction of the times, the firm foothold for the individual, which had so long been vainly sought, was found; that here a community of thought and feeling arose, which provided every one with a secure intellectual existence and with important aims. Here each felt the closest ties with others; those who believed in Christ formed one soul and one community. Here was realised with greater fulness and truth that ancient simile which likened society to an organism; the believers lived with one another and for one another like the members of one body; what each experienced immediately affected the others also. As a consequence of the fact that the Christian communities were composed chiefly of the poor, and also in consequence of the constant danger, if not actual persecution, to which they were exposed, the inevitable battle with privation and suffering became the principal concern of life. In addition to the private charities, there was formed an organisation of the Church for works of benevolence which spread itself over the several communities. The widows and the orphans, the sick and the infirm, the poor and the incapable, the imprisoned and the persecuted, ought to be helped and were helped. Yet, with all the strain put upon men's powers, the movement did not fall into extravagance; all the concentration of thought upon the future did not prevent an honest appreciation of labour, an earnest devotion to it, and a thoughtful and clear-headed employment of the existing means. In particular, duty was never enforced by outward compulsion;

help was never exacted in the form of a demand, but awaited as a freely offered service. That in practice many difficulties arose is shown by the repeated complaints of the Church Fathers at the lukewarmness and the scantiness of alms; but this fact was not permitted to affect the general view respecting free-will offerings. Although outwardly divided, property was to be regarded as essentially held in common; its possessor should consider himself as its steward, never as its proprietor. Thus, each should use only what is necessary for life, and offer the remainder to the brethren. For it is unjust that one person should revel in abundance while many are in want. This in itself makes luxury in all its forms objectionable. Similarly, any attempt at the selfish accumulation of material goods, in particular the exploiting of commercial advantages, is prohibited. In order to counteract desires of this sort, Lactantius transplanted to Christian soil the Aristotelian interdiction of every form of interest charges, a prohibition which thereafter became a permanent part of the ecclesiastical rule of life.

Coupled with the struggle against poverty was that against immorality. The Christians were surrounded by a polished and luxurious civilisation; dazzling and exciting pleasures allured and enticed; the lax conscience of the age knew how to dispose of moral scruples in a facile manner. The conflict was with a powerful, almost irresistible, current; no wonder that, at least in theory, every compromise was rejected, and that their opposition took the harshest form. All mere pleasure was forbidden, all ornaments prohibited: one could easily become lax through their use, and thus fall under the power of external things. These sentiments crystallised into fixed rules and regulations; many pagan amusements, *e. g.*, the gladiatorial combats, were condemned on principle; and, in general, abstention and caution were recommended. Most determined of all was the attack upon sexual impurity, a matter upon which heathen sentiment was very lax. A new spirit also showed itself in the fact that the same strictness in morals was demanded of the men as

of the women; and further, in the greatly increased difficulty of divorce, which contemporary Judaism as well as heathenism made decidedly easy.

If we consider that the early Christians believed that all these things were achieved in God's service, and also that they were themselves animated by a lively expectation of a new world, we cannot wonder that there developed within the Christian Church a lofty self-consciousness, and that all inner relationship with heathenism was decisively broken off. They regarded themselves as a world-people, who would spread themselves over the face of the whole earth; as the militant people of God: their commonwealth appeared to have been directly inaugurated by God, and to surpass every human alliance. This commonwealth, as is explained by Origen, alone possessed the character of permanence. For here ruled the natural law given of God, while civil laws originate with men, and by men are arbitrarily changed. This Christian commonwealth alone has the character of universality; as the divine fatherland, it seeks to include and to rescue all men, while political states are necessarily divided according to peoples. Herewith the Christian commonwealth appears as the heart of the total life of humanity, as the original people, which had existed since the beginning of history, and from whom was borrowed everything of truth to be found among other peoples.

Hence, the Christian could be in no doubt as to his decision in the conflict with the civil order which became inevitable at the time of the worship of the deified emperors: in danger and in extremity, in ignominy and in death, God must protect the faithful. The unbelievers naturally rejected this aloofness (*ἀμιξία*) as politically and morally inadmissible; and they saw to it that, in addition to compulsory measures, philosophical arguments also were not wanting. But these did not produce the desired impression; the Christians, on their part, persisted in identifying the contrast between the religious and civil communities with that between the divine and human orders. Even at that time all those claims were raised on behalf of the

Church which have endured throughout the Middle Ages and down to the present time.

Thus there were not wanting the seeds of serious complications, which later gave Christianity trouble enough. Moreover, let it be borne in mind that the thought of the time was dominated by a decided anthropomorphism; that there mingled with the moral aims not a little selfish clamouring for happiness; that not seldom passion and fanaticism broke forth with gruesome violence. Still other dark shadows will later occupy us. Particularly after the third century, the multitude were, on the whole, rather disciplined than moralised. But even the disciplining should not be undervalued; for an extended domain of life was thus won for nobler aims. A new beginning was made, fresh life awakened, the seeds of great developments sown. In particular, the power, joyfulness, and truth of the movement as a whole must appeal to us, so long as the stern battle with an over-mastering environment prevented life from falling into idle routine and preserved it from all sham and hypocrisy. Thus, at the time of the decline of a venerable and opulent civilisation, and amid an upheaval of all the relations of life, Christianity offered a firm support and revealed a lofty ideal to humanity; and its adherents might suitably and with full justice describe themselves as the soul of the world.

(b) *Early Christian Speculation*

(*a*) CLEMENT AND ORIGEN

The attempts to convert Christianity into a speculative knowledge, first made in the Orient, also belong to a consideration of the problem of life. For knowledge in this case does not mean mere thinking about life, it means the innermost soul of life, the elevation of life to the plane of perfect truthfulness. In this sense, it draws to itself all the living warmth of the emotions, and, hand in hand with its own growth, it increases the intimacy and delicacy of feeling.

The beginning is made by two Alexandrians, Clement (after 189 active as a teacher) and Origen (185–254). Both seek to press forward from faith to knowledge; but Clement does not go beyond the general outlines, and turns his thought principally in the direction of morals, while Origen erects a great speculative system, the first upon Christian soil.

Clement is a most zealous advocate of knowledge as opposed to faith. The problem is not very difficult, however, since for him faith means only a lower stage of knowledge, an acceptance of a doctrine on the ground of mere authority. It is understanding, so he shows, that first makes knowledge the full property of man; only with understanding does thought penetrate beyond the metaphor to the thing, beyond the blind datum to the luminous reason. Genuine understanding is capable of so engrossing the man, that he does not so much possess knowledge and insight, as himself becomes knowledge and insight. It is with knowledge alone that we attain a pure, unselfish joy, and no longer need a reward. Whoever demands a reward for the labour, sells his conviction, and becomes a child; the true "Gnostic," on the contrary (Clement is fond of this expression, while Origen avoids it), has been ripened into manhood by the love of God, and wants nothing but the truth itself. If we had to choose between knowledge and eternal bliss, we should be forced to relinquish the latter. But the crown of all knowledge is the knowledge of God. In such knowledge man is lifted above time and space into immutable being, and wholly absorbed in God, "deified" (*θεούμενος*). Herewith all emotion is laid aside, the Stoic ideal of "apathy" realised. In view of the inwardness of such a life, the mind needs no special proofs; all tenets and ordinances of an external sort lie in a plane far beneath. The true Gnostic praises God at all times, not merely on certain days and at stated hours; his whole life is an act of worship.

There was danger that this lofty attitude might separate the immediate followers from the congregations, and thus disrupt Christendom. But Clement fought against the danger with all

his power. There let knowledge rule, here faith; both aim at the same truth, and allegorical interpretation points out the way to bring the two forms into accord: there let the love of the good, here the fear of punishment, actuate men's conduct; for in both cases the same deeds are required, and the common work of the community unites both in a single aim. In fact, knowledge, which at first threatens to separate men, rather unites them through the active love which springs from it. For, just as the act of knowing is an unselfish surrender to the truth, so it also kindles an ardent impulse toward the manifesting of love. "Works follow knowledge as shadows follow a body." Love is to be manifested first toward Christ, by unflinching witness even to the point of the willing surrender of life, the "most perfect work of love"; then by a ceaseless activity for the Christian community. That all worth here resides in the disposition, results in another, freer, and more joyful attitude toward the world and its goods; the true victory over the world means, not outward aloofness, but an inner triumph. To be saved, the rich man must renounce his wealth, not outwardly but inwardly; he does so by placing it all at the service of the community, and by not using for himself more than is required for the maintenance of life. In this spirit, marriage is not shunned, as a worldly entanglement, but its significance deepened; it is then heartily commended, "for the sake of the fatherland, and in order to co-operate according to our powers in the perfecting of the world." Nowhere else in the early Church does the life of the family receive such loving treatment as is accorded to it by this thinker. "The most beautiful of all things is a domestic woman, who adorns herself and her husband with her own handiwork, so that all rejoice, the children in the mother, the husband in the wife, the wife in the husband, and all in God."

This more friendly attitude toward life is accompanied by a higher estimate of the world and of history. The antagonism between Christianity and its environment, which was so keenly felt by Clement, did not prevent his extolling the order

fixed by God as the best and the most suitable. He looks upon life as a common school, and upon history as a progressive education of mankind. As a part of this education, as a preparation (*προπαιδεια*) for Christianity, the culture of the ancients, particularly their philosophy, receives full recognition. In fact, the Christian doctrine is characterised as a selection and fusion of what is true in the various systems.

Surely such convictions do not express the average view of the Christian communities; Clement himself often enough mentions the dread of philosophy exhibited by the multitude, together with the opinion that it comes from the devil. But that amid all the commotion of the time such a free, inward conviction was at all possible, is a circumstance which should not be omitted from a survey of early Christianity.

Origen was the first to work out a comprehensive system of Christian doctrine. Yet the inner core of the system is not Christian but Platonic. The Platonic union of the true and the good, and its upward striving from the inconstant flux of time to an immutable being, from the obscure confusion of the world of sense to a pure spirituality, dominate the thought of Origen. As a strong outer covering we then have the Christian element, not only in the greater emphasis and the more personal form of the moral idea, but in the closer connection of eternity with time, and in the higher estimate of the historical process and of the human race as a whole. From the interaction of both lines of thought and ways of feeling there results a highly fruitful movement, a wide realm of thought, in fact, a characteristic, typical view of the world and of life. But a complete unification and a homogeneous development of the whole sphere of life is not achieved; despite his many brilliant qualities, Origen lacks the greatness of creative originality.

The conception of God at once shows a fusion of various tendencies. Origen is above all animated by the determination to eradicate the anthropomorphism of his age, and to exalt the

conception of the Supreme Being to a sublime height far above everything human and temporal, and inaccessible even to our loftiest thoughts. Accordingly we have only negative utterances, which could not lead to any sort of community of life with the Deity. In the midst of negation, however, there appears in Origen a striving after affirmation. For when he rejects certain ideas with special emphasis, the opposite is virtually accepted. In distinction from the multiplicity of things, God constitutes a strict unity; in distinction from the finite intermingling of the sensuous and the spiritual, pure spirituality; in distinction from the flux and change of our world, immutable being. To these results of speculation there is added as a new feature Origen's treatment of the manifestation within the world of God's all-pervading love and goodness; it is this which first brings him into closer relation with the faith of the community. Out of His goodness God created the world, and because of His goodness He permits not the slightest thing to be lost. His love embraces all peoples and all ages, and nothing good takes place among men without Him, "the God over all" (ὁ ἐπι πᾶσι δεος), as Origen prefers to call Him. The highest proof of this goodness is found in Christianity, which involves the entrance of the Divine into the world and the union of time and eternity. Here for the first time is raised to full distinctness and power that with which the world can never dispense.

But, in order that the world may manifest the eternal essence and perfect goodness of God, it must be larger than the customary Christian conception represents it to be. Although Origen rejects unlimited extension in space, using the characteristic Greek argument that without a limit it could not possess order and system, he is none the less more concerned with the world's extent than with its limit. In the case of time, however, dread of undue restriction forces him to break with the common conception and approach closely to the old Greek view of history. Origen denies, as decisively as any of the ancient philosophers, that the world had a beginning in time. True, this present world had a beginning, just as it will have an end; but before it lay

innumerable other worlds, and others will follow it. Our present existence is only a link in an endless chain; the world, including historical Christianity, only one world among many. To the Christian thinker, this succession of worlds appears, indeed, not as a mere rhythm of the course of nature, but as a work of divine creation; creation itself becomes a progressive, ever-renewed act, instead of an event occurring once for all. Likewise, the Stoic doctrine of the complete likeness in character of all the world-periods finds no acceptance; for it destroys the freedom of decision, something that forms a chief element in Origen's belief. Free decision, however, is sure to result variously and give to the several worlds individual character. Hence our world, distinguished by the appearance of Christ, may very well assume a peculiar position.

But the Greek and Christian elements here tend toward an adjustment also as regards the content of the world. The Greek view looks at the world principally under the contrast of the spiritual and the material, the Christian view under that of moral good and evil; in the former, evil has its root in matter, in the latter, in voluntary guilt. Origen makes every effort to reserve a finer sort of matter for the good without in any way weakening his rejection of common matter. The essence of reality consists of the invisible world of ideas—a doctrine which, thenceforth, becomes a constituent element in Christian speculation; material being originates subsequent to this invisible world, and continually requires its constituting and animating power. But as the work of God, material being was at the outset far purer and finer than the coarse sensuousness which now surrounds us; its lower nature came as the result of the voluntary degradation of spirits which were unable to maintain the effort necessary to the preservation of goodness. Hence, the opposition of Christian and Greek beliefs appears to be reconciled; the final decision rests with the moral act, but immediate feeling continues to be swayed by aversion to common matter, and thus the way is open for an ascetic ideal of life. But asceticism finds also within Christianity a theoretical justification; in contrast

with the view of Clement, a stricter, most abstemious conduct of life is sharply distinguished from that of the average; not only the disposition, even the kind of conduct, separates the Christian from the crowd.

From such convictions there develops a characteristic view of the destiny and problems of human life. Men's souls, as a chief part of the divine creation, belong to the permanent state of the world, and accordingly must have lived before this present existence; they are found here below in consequence of their own guilt; their goal is a return to the divine height. For this is the abode of degradation and temptation; the body with its weight draws the spirit downward to lower spheres and obstructs all pure joys. But the power of the mind, with its faculty of knowledge, victoriously opposes matter, and amid all the misery of immediate existence there persists the firm trust that in the end nothing can be lost of all that the eternal God has created and protected with His love. Thus the speculative and the ethical tendencies of Origen's thought unite to produce the belief in a complete restoration of all things, in a return to the divine home even of him who has gone farthest astray. While thus the course of the world returns quite to the point of beginning, and in the total movement nothing is either lost or won, the whole of history may seem to be merely a temporal glimpse of eternity, and all the work of the world threatens to sink into a dreamy unreality.

With this return to pure spirituality and complete eternity, knowledge, as the only means of passing from appearance to reality, from the temporal to the eternal, becomes the chief concern of life. Infinitely higher than the daily religious worship is the desire for the pure knowledge of God; in such knowledge everything temporal, everything sensuous and mutable, is transcended, and man is wholly absorbed in God, transformed into God.

Such an ideal gives to Christianity, which embodies it, a peculiar form. Above all, Christianity must mean something more than a single, although pre-eminent, point in history; it must encompass the whole of reality, and elevate it in nature

and worth. Its essence is the complete presence of the immutable in the mutable; it is the super-temporal activity of the Logos, which frees all its disciples from time and transports them to eternity. Thus Christianity for the first time reveals a complete knowledge of divine being, a deification of man. But a distinct transition from such a world-idea to historical Christianity is wanting. None the less its treatment everywhere displays an effort after universality, a broad and free intelligence. Christianity extends its activity over the whole of history; the advent of Christ forms the climax of a world-historical movement. That which had previously existed only in a dispersed and isolated way was thereby raised to dominating power. For from the very beginning God has taken the world under His protection, and at all times there have been just men and those pleasing to Him. But in Jesus began the complete union, the "interweaving" (*συνυφαινεσδαι*), of divine and human; and by this fellowship with the divine human nature becomes divine, not only in Jesus, but in all who accept and manifest the life revealed in him. The true follower ought not to remain merely a believer in Christ (*χριστιανός*), but himself become a Christ. His own life and suffering can serve for the salvation of his brethren. Thus, even in the field of experience, Christianity appears as a progressive work, ever beginning anew, and extending throughout the whole of history.

As regards human things, Christianity manifests its peculiar greatness and universality chiefly in the sphere of morals. In Origen's opinion, it laid upon men no new commands; but it achieved a greater thing, in that it gave them the power to fulfil even the severest injunctions, penetrated to the innermost recesses of the moral nature, and filled their hearts with tenderness and charity. So, likewise, it is ethical greatness and ethical influence which lift the personality of Jesus far above that of the heroes of antiquity. No other Church Father of the Orient has dealt so intimately, so lovingly, with this personality as Origen. He dwells upon the goodness and humanity of Jesus, his gentleness and sweetness; and these noble feelings, together with

a tranquillity of the whole being, can be communicated from him to us, and transform us into Sons of Peace. He dwells also upon Jesus's sufferings, and glorifies martyrdom accepted from pure love as the only adequate gratitude.

Thus the transformation of Christianity into speculation did not involve in this instance a loss in warmth of feeling. Moreover, we see Origen zealously concerned to preserve a close relationship with the Christian community both in the matter of faith and in that of life in general. As to doctrine, allegorical interpretation offered a convenient expedient, and Origen not only freely applied this method, but developed it in technical resource. But as to life and conduct, the estimate he placed upon morals identifies him closely with his environment, while his striving for an eternal and universal content in Christianity leads him to exalt the Christian community above the state.

Accordingly we find that the broad rich mind of the man embraces the several spheres of thought and, to the best of his ability, unifies them. But complete unity is not attained. Even if morality supplies a common bond between the Christianity of the cultivated and that of the multitude, even if the exalted estimate of the sacraments unites all believers, there still remains at bottom a wide divergence. For when Origen expresses the view that Christianity cannot possibly uplift the whole human race without appealing to each one according to his individual capacity and without accommodating itself to the powers of comprehension even of the less intelligent, the contention itself shows how sharp the contrast was between the cultivated and the masses, and how far removed the thinker was from his surroundings. Thus there remain side by side an esoteric and an exoteric Christianity. The former by its increasing independence achieves an extraordinary breadth, freedom, and inwardness. But it soars too far above the general conditions to have any marked effect upon them. Its content, too, consists rather of Platonism coloured by Christianity, of Hellenism inwardly intensified, than of the constructive elements of a new world and a new order of life.

However that may be, the type of Christianity which herewith received its stamp permanently triumphed in the Orient and also exerted a profound influence upon the Occident. True, the increasingly systematic and self-conscious "orthodoxy" which arose naturally took exception to several of Origen's doctrines; and, in consequence, his followers, who felt the opposition keenly, were forced to concede modifications of the fundamental ideas without, however, being able to prevent the eventual rejection of the system. Yet in its innermost substance the above orthodoxy rests upon Origen's intellectual work: "the history of dogma and of the Church during the following centuries is, in the Orient, the history of Origen's philosophy" (Harnack). Down to the present time, the conception of Christianity as an entrance of eternal being into our temporal world, and as a consequent elevation of humanity above all the limits and misery of this world, has remained dominant in the Orient. Questions of the precise content of history, and of the uniqueness of the life of Jesus, pale before the fundamental fact of the Incarnation; correspondingly, Christian dogma formed under Greek influence has not the slightest word to say either of a characteristic content of the life of Jesus, or of a spiritual peculiarity of Christianity. Dogma, in fact, although it appears to mark the complete triumph of Christianity, in reality testifies to a surrender to the power of Greek speculation. The speculative movement, however, attained its full strength only with the aid of Neo-Platonism, which soon began to pour into Christianity in torrents.

(β) THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM. GREGORY OF NYSSA

Even the Christian thinkers were unable to avoid the intel lectual transformation effected by Plotinus; his view of the world presented far too much of what they themselves demanded for them not to be irresistibly attracted by it. Here for the first time the whole of reality, from its innermost ground to its remotest articulation, was made spiritually living, every-

thing fixed and rigid was dissolved and merged into a single life stream; at the same time human effort was lifted securely above immediate existence, and the sensuous transmuted into a semblance of an invisible order. This movement irresistibly swallowed up whatever in Christianity tended toward speculation; it also lent to Christian thinking a flexibility and versatility without which the harmonising of faith and knowledge necessary to the construction of an ecclesiastical system of thought would hardly have succeeded so soon. Meanwhile, the speculative minds by no means forgot the uniqueness of Christianity; only the appreciation of it was left to the individual life of the soul, and not carried forth into the battle going on in the realm of thought. But even if the Christian element as a rule followed rather than led, it introduced into the whole a new tone, the tone of a softer, more intimate feeling; the whole remained a mixture, yet this assumed decidedly different forms with different individuals. With the intrusion of Neo-Platonism there begins for Christian philosophy a new epoch, as distinguished from the previous predominance of Platonism and Stoicism: not until the culminating point of the Middle Ages was reached was this new mode of thought forced to yield to Aristotelianism, yet to an Aristotelianism which it itself had considerably altered. It will be sufficient for our purpose to recall as a representative of this earlier time a man who nevertheless presents an individual type of life, namely Gregory of Nyssa.

Gregory of Nyssa belongs to the fathers of orthodoxy, and at a later time was celebrated as "the father of the Fathers," owing to his services on behalf of the dogma of the trinity. But sincere as his orthodoxy is, it is upborne and pervaded by a mystical speculative tendency, and appears less as the animating spirit than as the framework of his religious life. In his doctrine of God the perfect personality retreats behind the absolute being, and the desire for fellowship with difficulty overmasters the striving for complete absorption in the eternal unity. At times the different lines of thought are fused in the same conception;

then the Neo-Platonic element easily predominates over the Christian. In the expression "seeing" God, Gregory is thinking not so much in the early Christian fashion of the nearness of person to person as he is of the mystical union with underived being; and the name Father, applied to God, indicates in his mind not only the affection of loving care, but still more the derivation of our being from Him as well as our dependence upon His nature; accordingly, rather the metaphysical than the ethical relationship. The connection of Gregory's theology with philosophical speculation is conspicuously shown in his favourite conception of the infinitude of the Supreme Being. Such infinitude transcends not only all limits, but also all intellectual comprehension; any particular attributes here become inapplicable; true, the thinker seeks earnestly for names by which to designate the transcendent Being, but he quickly convinces himself of the inappropriateness of all human expressions. Hence, he longs impatiently for wings with which to rise above the visible and the changeable to abiding nature, to unchangeable, self-dependent power. In this he would fain lose himself and by absorption in the true light become himself like the light.

With this negation of all attributes, the divine threatens to disappear for us into complete darkness, while our world sinks to the level of unessential appearance. Yet with Gregory this danger is counteracted by an opposing tendency: a union of Christian conviction and the Greek sense for beauty causes him to recognise in the world an important content, and at the same time to make more living the picture of the divine nature, whose glory the world reflects.

The idea of the beautiful was wrought out in Gregory's mind not only through the mediation of Plotinus, but also direct from Plato, and hence possesses much warmth and fresh vividness. He finds beauty poured forth throughout the whole world; order and harmony unite all its diversity; everywhere there is fixed proportion; even human conduct ought to aim at the right mean. The essence of the beautiful, however, is the good, and

the supreme beauty is purity of heart. In our rational nature we bear an image of the Divine Being; although sin has obscured it, by the putting aside of all evil it can be restored, and then it will shine forth in perfect purity and beauty, and lead man to the divine prototype. To this extent, all knowledge of God depends upon the moral attitude. "He who purifies his heart from all wickedness and all violence, sees in its own beauty the image of the divine nature." "Hence, blest is he who is pure of heart, since, contemplating his own purity, he looks upon a likeness of the original." The transcendent majesty of God we cannot fathom, but the measure of the knowledge of God is in us: "Purity and repose of soul (ἀπάδεια) and the putting away of all evil—that is divinity. If it be in thee, then God dwells in thee wholly."

But although such an indwelling of the Divine lends to our being a higher worth and to our life a more vivid content, the tendency is always above and beyond immediate existence; with all its resources the world stirs in us only a longing for higher forms of life; it ought never itself to absorb us. Thus life assumes the character of a yearning that soars above everything the world has to offer. "We ought not to wonder at the beauty of the vaulted sky, nor at the rays of light, nor at any other form of visible beauty, but let ourselves be led by the beauty discerned in all these to a longing for the beauty whose glory the heavens declare."

Thus the deepest propensity of the man is to depreciate the actual world we live in, and to destroy our pleasure in it. A pessimism develops whose intensity of feeling frequently recalls modern tendencies. Gregory vividly portrays the manifold suffering and evils of life, the prevalence of hatred and arrogance, of grief and unrest, the power of the passions, whose whole chain is set in motion through a single link. The capacities of the soul are not here trained to distinguish genuine from spurious beauty. However, all particular evils and wrongs pale before the thought of the nothingness and perishableness of the whole earthly existence. Everything here is inconstant and fleeting. The flowers

blossom afresh each spring, but man is vouchsafed but one youth, and then declines toward the winter of old age. The outward fortunes of life are various, and the throng calls many a one happy; but for a profounder vision all such differences disappear; measured by the highest standard no one career has the advantage over another. For, at bottom, all things earthly are vain: who can be happy where everything swiftly vanishes, and we have the graves of our fathers ever before our eyes? There may be men who do not feel such sorrow, and find their satisfaction in sensuous pleasures; but with their animal obtuseness they are really more miserable than the others; not to feel evils is the greatest of all evils. Jesus said, "Blessed are they that mourn." But it was not his intention to glorify sorrow as such, but rather the knowledge of goodness which suffering always brings with it, since the good itself ever escapes us.

Still, all the tenderness and delicacy of feeling here manifest cannot disguise the fact that the thinker is dominated by an ontological rather than an ethical aim. It is not the longing for more love or more justice, but for more of the essential and the eternal, that impels Gregory to rise above the sensuous world to God. That results in a peculiarly harsh rupture. For, if the invisible order alone possesses genuine being, all else is mere appearance; thus condemned, everything sensuous must be put away, and everything that entangles us in this worthless life given up. Among the things which the truly pious man must put behind him belongs also "busying oneself with the sciences and arts, and with whatever in customs and laws can suitably be dispensed with." Following this train of thought—elsewhere Gregory is more lenient—marriage is regarded as the beginning and the root of the zeal for useless things. He who, like the good helmsman, means to steer his course by the stars, which never set, should so shape his existence that it is ever poised in the middle between life and death, and should never give himself with his whole strength to life.

Corresponding to this detachment from the world, there is an absorption in the inner life of the heart and mind. Here

Gregory feels himself immediately sure of union with God, and from this point the soul pours itself out even into the surrounding world and into nature. He enters into an interchange of soul life with nature, such as was scarcely known to earlier times; he ignores the relation of nature to man as manifested in the ancient feeling for nature, and perceives her power particularly in the quiet murmur of the forest and in the profound solitude of the desert. Accordingly, along with his brother Basil, he assumes an important place in the historical development of the feeling for nature, as has recently been pointed out in particular by A. Biese.

Hence, even as a whole, Gregory's view of life merits more consideration than it customarily receives. It is the purest philosophical expression we have of that withdrawal of the Christian life from the world which spread still more widely after the outward triumph of Christianity.

Christianity was less and less able to adhere to the original idea of providing a refuge for pious feeling and moral life in the midst of a wicked world; the influx of ever larger and more unregenerate masses had made necessary continual concessions. Finally, the outward triumph, with the consequent inundation by those masses, decided the inner downfall. If serious minds, really concerned for the eternal life, were not wholly to despair, it was necessary to find special means of relief. The Orient and the Occident went in different directions: the latter sought compensation in an exaltation of the Church, as an objective order, above the losses sustained by individuals; the former sought it in the withdrawing of individuals to a solitary life devoted in singleness of purpose and with intense fervour to the service of God. The irresistible force with which such a life attracted his contemporaries was portrayed by Gregory with keen satisfaction, while the tenderness and delicacy of feeling produced by self-communion practised under the combined influence of Greek and Christian tendencies is nowhere more strikingly exhibited than in himself, the philosopher of mystic yearning.

(c) *The Formation of an Ecclesiastical Rule of Life*

From an early time Christianity manifested a strong tendency toward the formation of a visible, organised church, a church which the individual should respect as a sacred authority, which should set apart holy men and holy things from secular life, which should develop an impressive form of worship, and, in particular, should rule over the minds of believers through the mystery of the sacraments. Gradually this tendency, which at the outset was still undeveloped and but an aspect of a larger movement, became the chief concern. Such a change might well appear to later generations as a mere decline from the fundamental idea of the religion of spirit and of truth. But whoever considers the permanent needs of the human heart, the peculiar conditions of that age, and the peculiar character and requirements of Christianity, will not only understand the historical necessity of the change, but will no longer look upon it as a mere decline. The conception of the Church, of a peculiar sphere of life dominated by religion, springs from the innermost nature of Christianity. It was a proclamation to mankind that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand; it was the Evangel of the kingdom. The hopes for the near future had not been fulfilled; Christianity must reconcile itself to this world of unreason for a longer period; in consequence, it must reckon with an inevitable decline of the first enthusiasm. But unless it wished to accommodate itself wholly to the world, and so surrender its peculiar character, it was forced to mark out and develop an individual sphere of life, opposed to the world, where its ideals and hopes might take refuge. The conviction, so essential to Christianity, of the birth of a new world, of the creation of a new life and being out of the new relation to God, was represented in the field of history by the Church. True, the precise shape which matters assumed did not fully coincide with this general ideal; a community with more freedom, more independence, more inner life, would have better harmonised with

it. But it was the peculiar conditions of the time which determined a development in the opposite direction. A small handful of men struggling against the disproportionate power of the world demands something more than mere toleration; it proclaims itself as the nucleus of a new world, as the people divinely called to rule. And will not this small company be compelled at first to hold firmly together, and to oppose to all incipient divisions the authority of the body as a whole? Will not the tangible and visible elements of the organisation make stronger and stronger appeal in proportion as the enthusiastic uplift of the first beginnings dies down? Above all, it was in the overcoming of threatened schisms that the Church found its unity, and at the same time saved Christianity from being divided into sects. Moreover, the growing influence of the Latins led to the further development of organisation and to the strengthening of the sensuous elements of the religious life. The later Greek tendency to refine the sensuous is foreign to the Latin character; the latter, on the contrary, sees in the sensuous an essential constituent of reality. Hand in hand with this view goes a pre-eminent capacity for organisation, and great shrewdness and skill in the treatment of practical questions. On the other hand, the speculative sense of the Latins is little developed; and, in particular, there is lacking the idea of an inner compulsion of truth, such as the ancient Greek world contributed to the Christian, an idea which increases the inner independence of individuals, and prevents any rigid restraint of their powers.

Finally, a critical review of the above development should also consider the general state of things outside of Christianity. The religious longing which, since the close of the second century, swept all intellectual life before it, bears throughout, despite all the subjective eagerness for happiness, the stamp of an enfeebled and languid age. The desire of the time is not for activity, but rest; not for responsibility, but for release from care; not for the dangers of freedom, but for the security of subjection; not for rational comprehension, but for the magical fascination of the mysterious and the incomprehensible; not for

the elevation to a purely spiritual reverence for God, but for an actual presence of the higher world, as impressive as possible, and dominating the mind by its sensuous magnificence. In an age characterised by such a mood, only the development which actually took place could have made Christianity victorious. But the recognition of this historical necessity is tantamount to a most decisive rejection of the claim that Christianity must permanently keep to this form: "the characteristics which, at that time, gave Christianity the victory, do not vouch for the permanence of the victory in history" (Harnack).

Thus the visible Church steadily gained in power and authority; thus it steadily transformed moral duty into the fulfilment of certain requirements, and brought up its members to complete subordination and to willing obedience. The less sufficient the individuals were in themselves, the more the Church grew in unapproachable majesty, the more fixed became the idea of its sanctity, the more it had to minister to human imperfection by peculiar means of grace. In fact, even those writers who combat the ecclesiastical idea with special energy, make loud complaint of the insufficiency of the individual, of the weakness of his faith, and of the indifference of his love. With the increase of this tendency the Church appears more and more as a divine institution, not as a human organisation; the honour shown it is manifested toward God, and any injury done it is done to Him. Only through the Church, the mother of Christians, is there a way to the Divine Father: "No one can have God as his Father, except he have the Church as his mother" (Cyprian). The individual owes the Church obedience and pious reverence; holding aloof from it is looked upon as malevolent contempt or as presumptuous obstinacy. That stamps schism and heresy as the worst of wanton crimes, from whose consequences not even martyrdom can afford relief. For all other offences affect individuals, while this affects the whole community.

Simple and, particularly for the Latins, convincing as this line of thought was, very serious perplexities arose from the fact

that some—precisely on account of the esteem in which the Church was held—insisted upon a certain moral excellence in the incumbents of ecclesiastical benefices, and connected the validity of their official acts with the possession of those qualities, while others rejected this demand as dangerous to the prestige of the Church: in the former case the moral side retained its independence, in the latter it was subordinated to ecclesiastical and religious needs. The latter tendency triumphed; the demand for a strong organisation and for the certainty of aid overcame all moral scruples. At the same time, the Church was gradually transformed from a fellowship of holy men into a legal institution resting upon mystic and even magical foundations.

The exaltation of the Church was accompanied by the establishment of a priesthood. The priests, particularly the bishops, became the accredited intermediaries between God and the congregation; they became the dispensers of the divine grace. Above all, the increasing power of the idea of sacrifice operated to exalt their position. From an early time Christianity had been unable to do without the idea of sacrifice; but at first the opposition to heathen sacrifices predominated. An ethical religion saw the true sacrifice in the offering up of the heart. "To foster innocence and justice, to keep free from all deceit, to rescue men from danger—these are our sacrifices, these are holy in the sight of God. With us the more just one is, the more pious is he." So thought Minucius Felix, who glorified the reliance upon simple morality, the relinquishing of all peculiar religious acts, as the distinguishing merit of Christianity. Even Lactantius believes, "That is the true worship in which the spirit of the worshipper offers itself to God as a spotless sacrifice." Still, in the meantime, the idea of sacrifice had assumed a magical character. The more oppressive became the fear of a God who judged and punished, and the more acutely conscious of his own unworthiness the individual became, the more vehement was the longing for extraordinary means of help and expiation. Here appears "in the foreground the atoning work of Christ.

It is not so much the incarnation—that is a presupposition—as it is the death of Christ which is viewed as the *punctum saliens;* and even thus early it is treated from every conceivable standpoint, as propitiatory sacrifice, as reconciliation, as purchase price, as vicarious suffering of death upon the cross" (Harnack). This change operated to exalt the priesthood particularly after the idea established itself through Cyprian that the priests, in offering sacrifice, repeat the sacrifice of Christ. Hence, the need for authority and the need for magic coincided; the "priest of God" was exalted far above the congregation, and invested with superhuman sanctity.

In the same direction tended the development of a double morality; originating at the very beginning of Christianity, this gradually embodied itself in a fixed order of things. It offered the opportunity of incorporating into Christianity the ideal of asceticism—something which possessed an irresistible attraction for the age—without implying that the ordinary conditions of life must be given up. If, in other words, there is the possibility of exceeding the imposed obligations, we have surplus merit; and this excess can be applied to the shortage of others. So it was argued respecting the martyrs who witnessed to the faith with their blood, and, in fact, all the more because the majority of the congregation did not follow them upon the path of thorns; so people thought also of those who, by painful abstention from worldly goods and pleasures, such as fasting, poverty, and celibacy, made sacrifices to God. To such meritorious works is ascribed the power of blotting out sins, at least venial sins, which, following the Stoic example, were clearly distinguished as pardonable offences (*peccata venialia*) from deadly sins. In all this we see a valuation of performance as such, and a gradation of worth in proportion to the magnitude of the work; at the same time, an attempt to counterpoise guilt and merit. Thus there springs up a system of compensations; morals assume more and more the character of a legal order. The administrators of this order are the priests. While the conception of a universal priesthood is not completely nullified by such a

development, so far as practical life and immediate feeling are concerned its influence is much restricted.

The result was that, along with the visible strengthening of organisation and increase of pomp, there was a marked externalisation and coarsening of life, an enormous influx of alien elements, and the danger of a sudden decline of Christianity. To be sure, counteracting influences were not wanting. The power and inwardness of Christian morality were not extinguished; the thought of the speedy coming of the Day of Judgment kept men's minds on the alert; the conflict with the heathen world, a world which, after the middle of the third century, began to exert its full power against Christianity, preserved them from falling into indolent routine. Moreover, the restriction of individual freedom was not oppressively felt, so long as resistance to the superior might of the world made united action necessary, and so long as it was only their personal choice which bound individuals to the Church. But a change inevitably came with the elevation of Christianity to the official religion of the state; for whatever was questionable in the transformation of Christianity into a visible organisation depending mainly upon magical rites now irresistibly produced its full effects. With all the perfection of system, the splendour of ritual, the zeal for works, there was lacking a substantial inner life, a spiritual depth. Simple morality was neglected in favour of religion, while religion itself was deeply impregnated with the passions and interests and even the sensuous conceptions of mere humanity; it possessed little inspiration, little inwardly transforming power. Christianity was in imminent danger of suffering inner destruction while outwardly triumphant; if ever in its history it needed a great and original mind, it needed such now—a mind in touch with the age and sharing its needs, but also one which would raise the age above itself and guide it to eternal truth, so far as this was anywise attainable. Such a mind appeared in Augustine. Passing through the profoundest personal struggles, and dedicating to the Church the unremitting toil of a lifetime, he gave depth and power to the religious longing of his time, and

infused into the ecclesiastical system a spiritual content. So, too, he brought to its highest philosophical expression the early Christian view of life.

II. AUGUSTINE

(a) *General Characteristics*

Augustine (354–430) is the one great philosopher sprung from the soil of Christianity proper. He unites within himself all the influences of the past and all the fresh impulses of his own age, and out of them he creates something which is new and greater. Rooted in a Latin environment, he is still subject to powerful Hellenic and Oriental influences; he combines early Christian and Neo-Platonic elements in a new way, with the result that the peculiarity of the former is more carefully preserved, and, although the form of union is open to attack, it has dominated all the later history of Christianity. The development of Augustine's thought is in a pre-eminent degree an expression of personality, in fact, of direct personal life. All his work, indeed, serves the one purpose of the unfolding and enjoyment of his own being; in all the varied forms of activity the ultimate goal remains the same, the well-being of the entire nature. Happiness, blessedness, this it is upon which the whole thought and passionate longing of the man are concentrated—happiness, not in the restricted sense of the earlier Latin Fathers, but as the complete satisfaction of the inner nature, as the vivifying of all the powers, as blessedness extending to the deepest foundations of being. Accordingly, aspiration and effort here absorb all else; they not only accompany but permeate and transform intellectual activity. Such happiness as this ought not to hover before one as a distant hope; it should become a living presence and complete possession. For, "he who is happy merely in hope, is not yet happy; in fact, he still patiently awaits the happiness which he does not yet possess." But that we can and must attain happiness Augustine regards as perfectly certain; in his mind this conviction needs no proof

and admits of no doubt, rather, it affords the mightiest weapon for combating doubt. The longing for happiness overcomes all opposition and fuses into one even the most hostile elements; it is the source of life, love, and passion in all work, and gives to labour the strongest incentives. Hence, all that Augustine undertakes is marked by passionate fervour and vehement emotion. The religious longing of mankind, often the expression of a languid and ascetic mood, is here pervaded by the most powerful vitality; even cognition rises to a form of self-assertion and exaltation of being. This invasion of the whole range of his intellectual work by a colossal subjectivity actuated by a devouring thirst for happiness, constitutes at once the greatness and the source of danger in Augustine.

While, therefore, Augustine's view of the world and of life is necessarily influenced by this peculiarity of his nature, it is more particularly characterised by the fact that it includes within itself the sharpest contrasts, and thus keeps thought in ceaseless movement.

On the one hand, there is the impulse to grasp all the fulness of being in one mighty effort, to concentrate life upon itself, to seize upon blessedness directly with the whole nature; in other words, a soaring above all forms and definite ideas, a total absorption in pure feeling. On the other, there is the desire to compass and illuminate with thought the whole length and breadth of the universe, to set forth likewise the inner world, and to give an account of all activity; in other words, a removal from the immediate impression, a vast intellectual structure, a theoretical intermediation of fundamental conceptions. From the union of both these tendencies springs a powerful movement of religious speculation, in which feeling and thought, immediate and mediated life, are inseparably intertwined. But this antithesis is variously intersected by another. On one side there is a ceaseless striving for pure spirituality, a transmutation of things into thoughts, the underived independence of a transcendental inner life; on the other, a glowing sensuousness, an insistence upon tangible data, upon the sure contact and grasp,

the pleasurable tasting and enjoyment, of things; and both are fused through the medium of a grandiose fantasy capable of wresting forms even from the obscure depths of the inner world. Consequently, in the same personality we have not only an untiring creative impulse and a turbulent energy of life, but restraint due to moral disunion; for there is also the consciousness of helplessness in the presence of his own problematic nature, a passionate longing for deliverance through supernatural power, and for translation to a state of rest and peace. The general problem of morals is here intensified by the fact that Augustine's sensuousness is not of the naïve but of the subtle sort, and threatens to poison and debase all effort. Finally, Augustine exhibits a twofold nature in that he deeply and truly feels and lives his experiences, and yet is able to reflect upon them with clearness and composure, as if they were wholly objective.

These various tendencies are not brought together in a comprehensive system and there harmonised, nor are they, so to say, adjusted to one another from the outset, as with Aristotle; rather, each develops in isolation, and only in the end is there contact and union with the others. Hence, we have sharp contrasts, halting procedure, working at cross purposes, and manifold conflict of opposing tendencies. There result harsh contradictions, not only in small matters but in great; continued unrest, crossed and recrossed by opposing currents; but there results also a ceaseless tension and vibration of life, an ever-recurring inception of creative work, the most active flux of all things. Although such a medley of contradictory elements often seriously complicates the structural development of the thought, it does not in the least interfere with a full expression of spontaneous and intimate emotion, the utterance of pure natural tones of the simple human sort. In other words, the inner religious life here attains a childlike simplicity and a fervent emotional expression such as literature affords only at altitudes seldom reached.

This interaction of conflicting tendencies not only increases the difficulty of understanding Augustine's teachings, but also

interferes with a just appreciation of the nature of the man. Possessed of an unusual sensitiveness, he is so far carried away by the impression of the moment that he lives in it exclusively and is oblivious of all else. He is thus led to extreme, fanatical assertions, which represent his convictions, indeed, but not his entire faith; for here he condemns and rejects what yonder he honours and loves. The churchly Christian in him at times speaks of culture like a narrow-minded sectarian; yet as a comprehensive and profound thinker he also treats the ecclesiastical order, with its authority and its faith, as a thing of expediency, an institution established in the interest of the masses and of human weakness. Hence, it is possible to set one Augustine over against the other, and so to cast doubt upon the sincerity of both. Part of the contradictions disappear, if we take into account the inner development which gradually forced him from a universal and philosophical to a positive and ecclesiastical treatment of things; but the most serious contradictions survive all the changes of development, and it would be a decided mistake to attempt to force his thought, as a whole, into a system. On the other hand, it is only necessary to press forward to the living whole of his personality in order to find a bond of union underlying the manifold elements, and rendering their contradictions intelligible. But this personality cannot be brought within the limits of formal logic; and the conflicting elements in the man's nature necessarily find their way into his work. Still, Augustine could never have exerted the influence which he did, had there not been an essential personal veracity back of his rhetorical utterance. Quite enough that is unedifying remains, indeed, to be overcome. In the remarkable mixture of traits which are combined in Augustine's nature, nobility and justice are not so strongly represented that they are not at times completely submerged by the waves of passion. In particular, his is not a pure, exalted nature, like that of Plato, for example; even in his loftiest soaring, he cannot wholly free himself from lower elements; and he seems unable to touch the profoundest depths without also stirring up a great deal of

muddy slime. This must set a definite limit to our appreciation of the man. Yet, however much we may find to criticise, if we follow Augustine's self-revelations to their source, they always disclose a genuinely human and wholly intelligible aspiration; they reveal a man of integrity, a powerful man, and one to whom nothing human is foreign. And if, among the saints of the Church, there was scarcely another so little saintly, so passionate, so full of weaknesses and errors, there also lies in his kinship with common human nature something of an atonement, and surely the secret of his power over the minds of men.

(b) *The Soul of Life*

Both the starting-point and an abiding characteristic of the Augustinian view of life are to be found in a radical dissatisfaction with the natural world, particularly with the condition of man. Scarcely any one has painted the miseries of human existence in harsher colours and with more intensity of feeling than Augustine. The helplessness of the individual and the abuses of social life, the dissensions and wars between peoples, the miscarriages of justice, the unavoidable entanglement in all the cares of our friends, the multitude of temptations, the constant hovering between fear and hope, the painful uncertainty of the human lot—all these speak here with eloquent voices; and the distressing decadence of the age adds an individual poignancy to the sense of common human misery. The recourse of the philosopher, to blunt his sensibility and master the feelings of pain, appears to Augustine as morally inadmissible, even if at all likely to be effectual; it would result, he thinks, in a harsh apathy, a hardening of the nature, an extinction of love. Moreover, evil besets us not merely from without; it dwells in our own nature; in the form of sensuality and pride it is the motive power of conduct; we may form good resolutions, but the ability to execute them is lacking. Then, too, there is the intellectual incapacity of man, who is overwhelmed with doubt and unable to penetrate to the truth. Amid such extremities and ob-

stacles he is threatened with complete despair; casting off the burden of life might seem to be the only refuge.

As a fact, man behaves quite differently. Amid all his suffering he displays a tenacious clinging to life, a powerful impulse toward self-preservation, an unconditional will to live (*esse se velle*). Even the most miserable existence is preferred to destruction: the criminal, condemned to death, clutches eagerly, as if it were a priceless blessing, the pitiful life which a reprieve confers upon him. A similar desire for life pervades the whole of nature; from the monstrous dragon to the smallest worm, every creature defends his life and exerts all his powers to avoid destruction. Would such a universal fact be intelligible, if the world of suffering and of evil were the whole of reality, and the being which in its first aspect is so pitiful were not in its essential nature good and capable of happiness?

These observations serve only to confirm Augustine in his own attitude. He himself is not oppressed by the suffering and misery; rather, the more the latter are intensified, the more he feels and knows that in his innermost nature he is superior to them; in fact, it was precisely the misery of immediate experience that awakened in him the firm conviction that this world could not be the whole world. Thus, behind the repressed physical life-impulses appears a vital metaphysical impulse, which emphatically forbids a renunciation of blessedness and the desire to live.

But such a change, such a new justification of life, requires another foundation and other relations than those of the natural world; only in a transcendental, perfect Being, only in God, can the new life find its foothold. The reality of this Divine Being is accepted by Augustine as the axiom which is the principal assurance of the nature of our own being; so surely as man is something more than nature, so certainly is he established in God and surrounded by a divine life.

But besides this assertion of an axiomatic truth, there are not wanting theoretical analysis and demonstration; these progress from merely colourless outlines to a perceptible content by pass-

ing through the stages of being, spirit, and personality. In the first place, immediate being, characterised by hindrance and suffering, a realm of ceaseless change and unstable becoming, cannot possibly be true being; a true, genuine, real being—the cumulation is Augustine's own—can only be an absolutely unchangeable nature, an essence which, untouched by the stream of time, ever remains what it is. True life can only be eternal life. Real being, however, is naught else but God; all genuine life springs from Him, and refers back to Him.

Thus all reality has as its deepest ground a spiritual Being. Simple reflection shows us that the most certain point, to which no doubt attaches, is the existence of the soul. For, although we may doubt everything, doubt itself proves the fact of thought, and hence, of the soul. Our inner life is immediately present to us; it cannot be imaginary. That we exist, and at the same time know that we exist, and cherish our being and our knowledge, is an incontestable fact; the existence of a material world, on the other hand, does not admit of strict proof. Thus, the inwardness of the psychical life leads Augustine to the idea of a pure spirituality; the source of this, once again, is God, the prototype of the nature of man.

In spite of the individuality of his argument, Augustine's demand for pure spirituality and real eternity is, after all, Platonic in character. At the same time, in other respects he breaks away from Platonism and opens up new lines of thought, inasmuch as the demand for more power and individual life leads him to seek for the essence of the soul in volition rather than in knowledge. Just as, in his view, the life of the soul is fundamentally and chiefly the striving for well-being and self-realisation, so its completest expression is the will, as that in which life attains unity and is raised to full activity. In fact, it is even affirmed that all beings are nothing but will (*nihil aliud quam voluntates*); "the will is the comprehensive principle of all activities of mind" (Heinzelmann). This conviction became steadily more pronounced throughout Augustine's life, and separated him further and further from the intellectualism of antiquity.

Since, however, Augustine retains the Greek method of proceeding from the macrocosm to the microcosm, or rather, of interpreting the microcosm as a miniature macrocosm, the primacy of the will applies, in his view, also to the Divine Being. The trinity—according to his conception properly the inner life of the Deity and not merely the order of His revelation—appears as a circle of being (power), knowledge (wisdom), and will (love). Life, divided in knowledge, returns to itself in volition and strengthens by deeds the unity of its nature. This prototypal essence, according to Augustine, is reproduced in every being, but particularly in the human soul.

Thus, Augustine's idea of God brings about a union, indeed a fusion, of speculative and religious, of Platonic and Christian, elements. Pure real being becomes at the same time the ideal of personal life, "the good acting upon the will as all-powerful love" (Harnack). On the one hand, God is not a particular somewhat, existing along with other things, but the inclusive whole of true being, beyond which there is no reality; to separate oneself from Him means to fall into nothingness; to unite oneself to Him means to rise from appearance to reality. On the other hand, God is the ideal of holiness, justice, and goodness—the perfect personality raised incomparably above the human estate. By contact and reciprocal influence both these conceptions are modified; that of pure being receives life and warmth, while the conception of personality outgrows the human type, as appears, indeed, in Augustine's relentless attacks upon the "anthropomorphites," who represent God as having human form and human passions.

If, accordingly, true being and the highest good are merged into one in the idea of God, and if real and eternal life is only to be found in God, then everything depends upon the relation to the Supreme Being, and only from this relation as a starting-point is there salvation, happiness, and self-preservation. It is, therefore, with the profoundest conviction that Augustine says, "If I seek thee, O God, it is the blessed life I seek. I will seek thee, that my soul may live."

Corresponding to the twofold root of the idea of God is a twofold way of seeking God. In the one case Augustine follows the Neo-platonic speculation: it is pure intuition which is to lift the whole man into the world of transcendent essence, and "ecstasy" is to extinguish all self-seeking. Man here desires of God nothing but God Himself; the Supreme Being is an end in Himself, not a means to happiness. But, even in embracing mysticism, Augustine preserves his individuality. With intuition he unites in the most intimate manner, love; feeling is not repressed but ennobled; a warm, emotional life pours into the mysticism and gives an unwonted intensity even to its expression. No one has done more than Augustine to confer a distinctive character upon Christian mysticism.

More characteristic and important, however, is the other kind of relation to God which Augustine develops; it is the living relation of the human to the absolute personality, an ethico-religious fellowship with God. Here, also, the world, with its bright diversity, lies without, and the whole soul yearns for a share in eternal love; but in this instance, there results a far richer content than in the case of mysticism, and it is not renunciation, but a strengthening of the purified, indeed regenerated, life of man that is required. The state of the individual soul, the moral condition of the inner man, becomes the chief problem of life and the centre of all activity; through intimate personal fellowship with God, the activity of a human being becomes immeasurably exalted; there arises a history of the soul, and the absorbing interest of this history forces everything else, even the most remarkable and disturbing experiences, into the periphery of existence. Religion here exerts the most fruitful influence in the direction of raising inner experience to complete independence and inherent worth, and of establishing the life of the soul firmly within itself. The special reason why religion is here capable of originating and effecting so much is that it embraces within itself a complete and permanent antithesis. For now there is definitely developed the inner dialectic of the basic principle of Christianity, namely, the reciprocal action of the

farthest possible separation from God and the nearest possible approach to God. Between God and man, or the perfect and the most unworthy being, the holy and the sinful, there yawns an immeasurable chasm, the consequence of guilt; but, at the same time, by a free act of God, the separation is annulled, and, in their innermost natures, a complete union of the divine and the human is established. Grave inner conflicts, indeed, are not all past, but there now rises above them a blessed peace, and we may hear resounding through the *Confessions*, like a fundamental tone, the single thought, "Thou hast created us for Thyself, and our heart rests not until it rests in Thee."

The movement thus begun propagated itself in a copious literature—suffice it to recall Thomas à Kempis; it found newness of life in the Reformation; and, beyond the religious sphere, it possessed the significance of a turning point for the independent development of an emotional life, and was an important step toward the introduction of a new world.

(c) *The Religious Form of the Spiritual World*

Augustine's incomparable and incontestible greatness lies in his disclosure of the mighty contrast within man himself. By removing the source of all truth and love immeasurably above human unworthiness, and, at the same time, bringing man into the closest intimacy and ceaseless communion with it; by at once deeply humiliating man and exalting him to a supreme height, he fashioned a type of religious emotional life independent of all particular confessions, indeed, a type valid for all humanity. But, certain as it is that Augustine attains truly classical greatness in his grasp of the deep things of life, when it comes to the determination of particulars he falls under the influence of a languid and declining age, and is diverted into uncertain paths. Augustine is stronger in accentuating an antithesis than in solving it; hence he leaves the religious life too much in the transcendent Beyond, instead of reuniting it with the life of every day, and so utilising it for the latter's elevation. The tre-

mendous force with which this man throws himself into the thought of the moment results in his opposing so sharply the divine and the human, grace and works, that the gain of one side involves the loss of the other. God seems only the more highly exalted, the deeper man is debased. To think meanly of man, to deny him all independence, all power for good, and every sort of freedom, thus becomes the accepted token of piety. The sublimity of the divine is measured by the remoteness from it of the human. Can we marvel that, with such a point of view, Augustine is unable to paint the depravity, the worthlessness, of man in vivid enough colours? But let us accord full recognition to his service in grasping so profoundly and in portraying so powerfully the contradictions in human nature, the incapacity of man in the presence of life's inevitable problems, the limits of mere nature, and the indispensableness of free grace. By this service, he rescued the best part of Paulinism, at least for the Occident. But since, under the influences of that restless time, he failed to carry through the new conception, failed to raise the new man to fulness of power, and to find in freedom itself the highest manifestation of grace, his religion and piety retain a one-sidedly passive character, they do not rise to manliness and joyousness, and are much exposed to the danger of morbid self-torment, of an uncritical, inactive piety, even of a sensualistic development of life.

Such dangers extend beyond the immediate condition of the soul and influence the life of the community; hence the power of the man gives also in this instance a fatal force to his errors. It is, further, a peculiar element of Augustine's greatness that he seeks to imbue every form of activity with religion, and will not permit anything to enter into the spiritual life which has not been elevated and consecrated by religion. He is, therefore, the first to erect upon Christian soil a comprehensive system of religious culture. By it he accomplished a great quickening and deepening of the whole of existence. At the same time, the persistent transcendence of the divine made this effort one-sided and problematic; the length and breadth of the work of civili-

sation is not touched; in fact, the least dwelling upon secular matters is thought to endanger the cause of religion. Life consequently becomes seriously dwarfed and narrowed; there is wanting any adequate counterpoise to the surging and seething of vehement subjectivity. With such detachment and overstraining, there is danger that religion will be reduced to a utilitarianism which ascribes values only to what is useful for "the soul's salvation," and therewith, in spite of Augustine's resolute effort to rise above human littleness, again makes man the central point. These various dangers, no less than the unmistakable greatness of Augustine's achievement, will come out still more distinctly when we pass in review his treatment of the good, the true, and the beautiful.

With the good, *i. e.*, the morally good, the separation from mere nature is insisted upon with peculiar force. Morality consists in nothing but the full and free surrender to God; all good acts, especially works of mercy—here the chief part of practical morality—appear as sacrifices offered to God; that only which is done out of fellowship with God is truly good, or constitutes a "true" sacrifice. He who loves himself, his kin, and fatherland on their own account has not the right love, but only he who loves them on God's account, and from God—only he who loves God in them; for he alone loves in them what is real and good. "We love God and our neighbour with the same love, but God on His own account, ourselves and our neighbour on God's account."

But just as God is the sole end, so He alone is the source of the power for good; only He can inspire us with genuine love; from Him we have derived whatever right feeling we possess; and whatever is regarded as our merit is His gift (*merita nostra dona ejus*). The attempt to found the moral life wholly upon the eternal love leads Augustine to stigmatise all self-confidence on man's part, all self-reliant conduct, even when there is no evil intention, as mistaken, bad, and vicious. "Whatever does not spring from faith is sin." To attempt to achieve by one's own capacities what springs only from the power and grace of God

seems to Augustine nothing but over-weening self-conceit; indeed, this self-confidence of God's creatures, this presumption of trying to accomplish something by means of merely natural faculties, Augustine regards as the chief source of evil. Hence, he makes the sharpest distinction between an action springing from natural impulses and inclinations, and conduct based upon higher power and developed through self-denial; and here we have an elimination of the naturalistic morality which antiquity never wholly laid aside. One of the principal conceptions of Christianity thus receives a distant formulation and a sure foundation.

But, although the giving of a religious character to morals resulted in a liberation from nature, serious dangers arose from the direct and complete subordination to a religion which leaves the divine and the human rigidly opposed to each other. Conduct, in relation to the world and to other men, loses all independent value. If in all our relations we are to love God only; if in our fellow-men we are to love, not the human beings as such, not the father and mother, not the friend and fellow-countryman, but only the divine that is in them, then it is only natural to break off all connection with the lower spheres, and, instead of seeking the divine through such a mediation, seek it directly in itself. Complete indifference toward our surroundings, the blunting of our feelings for our kin and for humanity, would therefore seem to be the proper worship and the highest form of sacrifice. Augustine himself did not so intend, nor did he so conduct himself—that sufficiently appears from his relation to his mother; but an abandonment of good works, a divorce of the worship of the eternal from the love of man, is none the less a consequence of his view. Phenomena of this sort had already been displayed by Augustine's own age; and they were again displayed by monasticism in that tendency which extolled an uninterrupted contemplation of God as the highest life.

Likewise, the propensity to deprive man of all moral desert is, in Augustine's treatment, fraught with serious dangers; it threatens, namely, to suppress human initiative, to transfer

moral decision to a point above us, to cause good to be done not by us but to us. But if the moral life of man is reduced to a miracle and to grace; if, without any co-operation on his part, it is instilled into him from above, a marked materialising of life is almost inevitable. Such a result, in fact, appears with Augustine himself in his doctrine of the sacraments; and it increased in mediæval Christianity.

Similar convictions are brought to light in Augustine's handling of the problem of truth. His passionate longing for the full possession and enjoyment of truth is not satisfied with its mere approximation, such, *e. g.*, as the attainment of probabilities. For is it possible to recognise something as probable without a knowledge of the truth? If any one finds a resemblance between thy brother and thy father, and yet does not know thy father, he surely will appear to thee foolish. Particularly where the fundamental conditions of one's own life are in question, there can be no peace and contentment without a full possession, a secure having and holding, of the truth. But such a degree of certainty is indispensable only in those matters which are necessary to salvation, not for everything which falls within the sphere of man's contemplation; here doubt may enjoy so much the freer scope. Nowhere else does Augustine display so strong a leaning toward religious utilitarianism. He is interested not so much in the world as in the action of God in the world, and particularly upon ourselves; God and the soul, these are the only objects of which knowledge is needful; all knowledge becomes ethico-religious knowledge, or rather ethico-religious conviction, an eager faith of the whole man. Instead of musing upon the secrets of the heavens and the earth, the courses of the stars and the structure of animals, the Christian should be satisfied devoutly to glorify the goodness of God as the cause of all heavenly and earthly, all visible and invisible, things. Any further consideration of the diversity of the world, especially of nature, arouses a multitude of misgivings. It is superfluous, since it does not increase our happiness; inadmissible, since it consumes time required for more important things; dangerous to

the convictions, since the direction of thought toward the world easily leads us to look upon the corporeal as alone real; injurious to the moral attitude, since it produces overweening self-conceit. Hence, we should patiently bear our ignorance, and suppress all desire for the investigation of superfluous things—the vain thirst for knowledge! "Man's wisdom is piety."

The beautiful, too, assumed a peculiar cast as incorporated into a religious system of life. Here the aim is the comprehension of the greatness and glory of God as revealed in His works, in the total structure of the universe. The sensuous charm of things accordingly retreats into the background, likewise the absorption in a concrete object. The main thing now is the ascent from the diversity of the world to its all-dominating unity, from the visible phenomenon to its invisible ground, from the transitory individual things to their immutable essence. The joy of the ancient Greek in the beauty of the world once more flashes forth: proportion, type, order (*modus*, *species*, *ordo*) dominate and pervade all being, spiritual no less than material; the more anything shares in these, the better it is; and there is nothing well-ordered which is not beautiful. One of the chief points in the Augustinian view is that all the diversity of being and of life unites to form the harmony of the universe; even the moral world we shall find falls under the sway of this æsthetic conception, and is described as a work of art. For Augustine, also, the idea of the beautiful is something intermediate between the pure inward thought and the visible existence; the influence of this conception is displayed especially by his first philosophical treatises after his conversion. But he is always compelled to pass from the contemplation of beauty to the thought of its final ground, to the vivid realisation of eternal power and goodness. Even here the thought of religious utility, of the salvation of the soul, is dominant; only as a means to that end does Augustine's sterner mood permit any occupation with the beautiful. Thus, we should not "uselessly and in vain," not with "idle and passing curiosity," view "the beauty of the canopy of heaven, the order of the stars, the splendour of the light, the

alternation of day and night, the monthly revolutions of the moon, the seasons corresponding to the four elements, the power of the seed to bring forth form and fixed relations"—but in order to ascend from such transitory phenomena to immutable and eternal truth, to God.

Accordingly, all relations of form have value for Augustine only in so far as they conduct us to the regulating thought of God. Moreover, in its preoccupation with nature, the work of God, his estimate of beauty overlooks, indeed rejects, art, the work of man. With a meaning similar to Plato's, but in still more vehement language, he shows how art, particularly dramatic art, arouses in man conflicting emotions, and allows him in some marvellous manner to extract pleasure from a painful excitement of the feelings. Furthermore, an æsthetic cast of life is precluded by Augustine's violent dislike of the formal culture which dominated the closing period of antiquity. He ridiculed stirring up the emotions over distant and alien things, such as the fate of Dido, as the customary literary training required; he flew into a passion over scholars who, in the bitterness of their strife over the pronunciation of the word "man" (*homo*), forgot what man owes to his fellow-men. But with all his professed hostility to formal culture, Augustine remains a master of exposition, a supreme artist in the use of words; above all, his diction possesses in the power and delicacy of its pervading emotional tone an enchanting musical sonorousness; in the hands of no one else has the Latin tongue become so completely the receptacle of purely inward life.

Thus arises a thoroughly distinctive system of life, entirely dominated, even in its several parts, by religion, and supplying the basis of the culture of the Middle Ages. The elements of its greatness no less than its peculiar dangers are plainly visible. Life can here withdraw to a point where it is protected from any entanglement in the work of the world, and is sure of relationship with the eternal verities; on the contrary, civilisation loses all independent value. Practical, scientific, and artistic activity is here unable to keep man within its sphere; he is impelled be-

yond it to religion; he longs to reach with all possible speed the point where arduous labour is exchanged for an adoration of eternal love and omnipotence. To find in this a secure repose, beyond the world, and not to be drawn back by anything into the sphere of doubt and suffering, is the prayer which swallows up every other desire. Such a longing for rest and peace is fully intelligible in view of the miserable condition of the age; and we saw, also, how Augustine's personality remained bound by strong fetters to the civilisation of his time. But the course of history necessarily brought whatever was doubtful to full fruition; and it has cost untold trouble to restore the equilibrium of values.

(d) *The History of the World and Christianity*

Up to this point it has been the universal idea of religion, the inner relation of man to the perfect Spirit, which we have seen occupying Augustine's thoughts; the peculiar characteristics of historical Christianity remained in the background. But these emerge with distinctness so soon as attention is directed to the actual state of the world and to the facts of history. Even here Augustine is interested at bottom only in the relation to God; but whoever takes such a large view of religion will also have revealed to him a characteristic view of the world. In the first place, there is here a union of Christian and Neo-Platonic features. The world is apprehended, with perfect decisiveness, not as a necessary emanation of primordial being, but as a product of a free act: God created it, not from His own need, but out of the abundance of His own goodness (*ex plenitudine bonitatis*). He created everything Himself, not, as the Neo-Platonists believed, through the aid of subordinate gods; accordingly, to Him alone adoration and gratitude are due. But the world which He created is not something indifferent in character, as might be supposed from the views of the earlier Church Fathers; rather, in it are revealed God's entire fulness and glory; it constitutes a communication and a presentation of His whole

being. Moreover, the world is no mere succession of detached things, but a single order, a closely united whole. Furthermore, this sensuous existence does not constitute the whole world; rather, it rests upon an invisible order which preceded it, and which continues to be its life-giving cause. What takes place in the human sphere is not to be explained by the external coexistence of things, but only by the action of inner forces; everything is miraculous; miraculous, in particular, are the everyday occurrences, *e. g.*, the issuing of a new being from the seed; habit has simply blunted our perception. A miracle is not something arbitrary and contrary to nature, but takes place according to a deeper nature and law; there is no such thing as chance; we merely call a thing accidental when its causes are concealed from us. Likewise, the succession of events is inwardly concatenated; the earlier event contains the later, the "seeds of seeds" lay in the beginnings of the world's creation; to be sure, particular places and times brought about their development, but these were only the occasions, not the efficient causes. Thus the world may be likened to a gigantic tree, whose roots contain in invisible capacities (*vi potentiaque causali*) all the later growth; the progress of the world-process is just as marvellous as all growth from the seed. A further reason why all diversity has a fixed order is the fact that God, the perfect Being, has bestowed on created things a graduated being, so that their totality forms an unbroken chain.

Thus the world, as a representation of the Divine Being, becomes vaster, more coherent, more inward. So much the more painful is the fact of all-pervading evil. From the outset this fact weighed with terrible force upon the mind of our thinker; but religious speculation, which found a basis for all things in God, only increased the burden. Moreover, with his perplexed reflection upon the problem, the subtility of Augustine's sensuousness displays itself in a very offensive manner. In his presentation, evil appears to rule in the physical world, and to resist the good, as if it had an independent nature, as the Manichæans taught. Following this assumption, Augustine finds sin

chiefly in the sexual sphere, and defends the opinion "that sexual pleasure is sin, and that original sin is to be explained from procreation as the propagation of a *natura vitiata*" (Harnack). By spinning out this view in an unedifying manner, the thoughts of the Christian community were directed to unclean things, and their imaginations poisoned. At the same time, the grasp of the nature of evil is very superficial. No one is more to blame than Augustine for the fact that an element of Manichæism was grafted upon Christianity, and continues to this day to cling to it.

But this is only one trait in a nature full of contrasts, and even here valuable thoughts are interspersed with what is doubtful in sentiment. In evil Augustine sees not merely scattered events in so many individuals, but an all-pervading phenomenon, a great stream of life; through Adam all peoples were involved in sin, the whole of humanity fell away from God, and came under the power of the devil. Encompassed by such a total state of corruption, the individual is wholly powerless; he cannot avoid sin, since his capacity for good is extinguished, and all progress by his own initiative excluded. It is further of no avail to appeal to free-will; for, in order to will the good, we must be good, and good we are not.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to surrender the conviction that the world as the work of the perfect Spirit is good; in the end evil must serve the good. "If it were not good that there should be evil, evil would in no wise have been permitted by omnipotent Goodness." But how to solve the direct contradiction of religious conviction and immediate experience, and to solve it not only for faith but also for the scientific consciousness? Augustine is compelled to summon all his power; he has, in fact, united all the resources of his mind in a supreme effort.

The first step in the solution is found in the ancient Greek conviction, so energetically defended by the Neo-Platonists, that evil has no independent nature, no reality of its own, but merely adheres to another being; that it is nothing but an obstruction and privation of the good; "whatever injures, robs the thing it

injures of a good; for if it abstracts no good, it does no injury at all." One can lose only what one possesses; only he who has sight, *e. g.*, can become blind; the higher in rank anything is, the more it possesses, the greater is the loss which it can sustain. According to this point of view, misery itself is a witness to the greatness of the original good; since this good springs from God, it cannot in the end be lost. By such a course of thought, Augustine finds in every sort of effort, even in the worst misconduct, the expression of a desire for the true and the good; we commonly seek happiness and bliss by the wrong paths, but happiness and bliss are what we seek.

But how is the existence of any sort of diminished good, or of any diminution of excellencies, compatible with the activity of omnipotent Goodness? In order to make that evident, the above metaphysical argument is supplemented by an æsthetic consideration. The world is to be comprehended, not by its several parts, but as a whole; whoever looks upon its multiplicity piecemeal will perceive defects everywhere. In particular, let not the judgment of the world be influenced by the weal or woe of man; "considered, not according to human advantage or disadvantage, but in itself, nature reflects honour upon its Creator." What in itself seems unreasonable will become clear when seen from the stand-point of the whole, just as the unity of a painting makes even the black in it beautiful, or, as in a musical composition, the discords serve the harmony of the whole. Indeed, the highest beauty may reveal itself in the very compassing and reconciling of contrasts. Hence, the harsh discord of a first impression is compatible with faith in the perfect harmony of a deeper view.

The point, however, in which the world shows itself to be a whole, is not found in the world but above it, in the Divine Being. It is particularly the moral aspect of the idea of God which contributes the reconciling conclusion: thus a Christian superstructure is added to the Greek foundation. The evil of the world loses its irrationality when viewed as an indispensable means to the manifestation of the moral perfection of God. Such a mani-

festation must accomplish two things: on the one hand, the stern reality of the moral order and its judicial character must be shown; on the other, the merciful goodness of God. The former object is attained, if a part of mankind, *i. e.*, the great majority (for all by their sins have fallen under condemnation), are abandoned to their merited punishment; while the second aim is fulfilled, if the other part, without any desert of its own, finds salvation through grace alone. For the principle of the sole activity of God requires that the election to blessedness or perdition be not determined by any distinction in performance, but exclusively by the divine pleasure, by the not otherwise conditioned will of divine omnipotence. To assign any co-operation to human freedom would be to diminish the divine work. Thus freedom, so greatly prized by early Christianity, is sacrificed to the unconditional dependence of man upon God (although, as will appear later, only in this one line of thought). The good, it is here maintained, is not the work of man but of God: "what is done by thee, is done by God working in thee."

Hence, in the order of the world as a whole, there are united mercy and justice, gentleness and severity; and these form a complete harmony when seen from the divine point of view. If this harmony cannot be depicted without a defect, there is good ground to admit one; "God deemed it better to do good with evil, rather than not to permit evil at all." Accordingly, the world is "beautiful even with its sinners"; even the eternal damnation of the lost belongs to the perfection of the whole.

Here we have a heroic effort to find a theocentric solution of the problem of evil. The attempt is made under the ostensible leadership of morals, but actually under the dominance of artistic conceptions, or, as it may also be expressed, under an artistic construction of the moral idea. For the above view of the world-process as a manifestation of the Divine Being, the separation of the qualities "goodness" and 'justice," and the effort for symmetry and order are all artistic. In truth, in this attempt, Augustine is continuing the speculation of Plato much more than he is developing a Christian belief.

The chief difficulty with this treatment of the world and of evil is one which is common to the whole supernatural tendency of the age. It assigns reality to God alone, and at the same time struggles against the consequent resolution of the world into mere appearance; it affirms a world apart from God, and finds all the reality of this world in God. Hence, two parallel lines of thought persist, unreconciled; or rather, a divine and a human, an eternal and a temporal, view of things dovetail into each other. In its rigid austerity, Augustine's doctrine has an element of supreme greatness, so long as it is concerned solely with God, and incorporates the human estate into the divine life as an unsubstantial element. But it is impossible for those who bear the heat and burden of the day thus completely to eliminate the human point of view and human feeling; and so soon as these gain ground, they draw the eternal into the temporal sphere. As a consequence, the harshness of the picture becomes unendurable. God could save all men; but, in order to develop all sides of His being equally, He has not done it; on the contrary, He has hopelessly damned the great majority for all eternity, without these lost souls having sinned one whit more than those elected to eternal blessedness. Augustine continually talks, indeed, of free grace, but in reality he closely approximates an arbitrary despotism; he extols mystery, and with difficulty avoids degenerating into sheer irrationality. Finally, nothing remains but to point to the Beyond, where all enigmas will be solved.

Furthermore, salvation or damnation is here in every respect definitely "predetermined" by the eternal divine decree, and the whole course of the world completely settled; whatever he does or leaves undone, man can alter nothing, his rôle in life is minutely prescribed for him. The inevitable result was the destruction of all incentive and all interest in life. For the utmost exertions of the damned can avail nothing, nor can the shortcomings of the elect do them any injury; nothing remains but the torment of uncertainty as to where one belongs.

But, however great the power which this line of thought exerted over Augustine, and however indomitable the energy with

which he pursued it to the end, again we have before us but one side of the man; in his own immediate feeling, and so far as his position in the life of the Church was concerned, quite another estimate triumphed. Augustine, in fact, now forces the above line of thought into abeyance, and, without more ado, adopts the temporal view of things, making the eternal order merely the background of historical development. Here it appears as though things were still plastic, as if grace could and must still be shown to man, as if it were possible, even now, and of one's own accord, to make the great decision. Freedom, too, is once more admitted. In order to solve the problem, the individual seems to require only assistance and relationship with the whole; it is expressly declared that the mercy of God is not of itself sufficient, that the will of man is also necessary. Hence a wide chasm separates Augustine's speculative and practical treatment of life.

These antitheses extend also to his treatment of Christianity. For pure speculation, Christianity means the supra-historical triumph of the eternal God over the revolt of evil, it means a manifestation of the divine capacities in their higher power. But the further treatment does full justice to historical Christianity, including the work of salvation and the personality of Jesus. Here, too, Augustine's sense for what is great and universal discerns in Christianity more than a single phenomenon in the course of history; "what we now call the Christian religion existed also among the ancients, and was not wanting from the beginning of the human race to the time when Christ came in the flesh. But since His coming, the already existing true religion began to be called the Christian religion." At the same time Augustine declared that the entrance of the Divine into history, as a visible Presence, constitutes the peculiar greatness of Christianity; by that fact it can help the whole human race to obtain salvation, whereas the influence of philosophy, which can avail itself only of the non-temporal action of universal reason, is restricted to a few. Christ was sent to free the world from the world. By His suffering and triumph the power of evil over us,

established through the Fall, is broken, the solemn compact destroyed which testified against us, and man once more enabled to draw near to God.

Convictions such as these Augustine can express broadly without entering upon the peculiar characteristics of the personality and life of Jesus. But wherever his innermost feeling finds full and free utterance, it testifies to the deepest impression of this personality. Great above all is the humility in the majesty as well as the complete inversion of the natural estimate of things; "none of his conceptions in relation to Christ is more pronounced than that Christ has ennobled the things before which we shuddered (shame, suffering, pain, and death), and robbed of their worth the things we desired (namely, to obtain justice, to be esteemed, and to enjoy)" (Harnack).

At the same time, Augustine developed a philosophy of history with Christianity as its central point. Humanity has the same periods of life as the individual; the acme of manly vigour corresponds to the advent of Christ; after that, old age began. For while it is indeed true that Christ established a kingdom of imperishable youth, such youth belongs to another order of things than the earthly. Hence the earthly sphere is not the chief arena of effort; nor is there any longing to accomplish the utmost possible here, to give a rational form to the whole extent of mundane things; on the contrary, all external conditions are indifferent as compared with the inner state and with spiritual goods. This ascetic tendency paralyses all effort for social reform; *e. g.*, slavery is allowed to remain undisturbed, although it originated in the Fall, and slave and master are equal before God. For "the good man is free even when he serves another, while the evil man is a slave even when he rules."

Just as Augustine will not devote his powers to earthly things, so his affections refuse to be fixed upon this life, to find here their home. It is true that here and there appear rudiments of an attempt to uplift this finite existence by the immediate presence of the Divine, and to triumph over this world, not by withdrawing from it, but by inwardly transforming it. Augustine

regards it as wrong to take the expression "world" always in a bad sense; to him it seems nobler to possess earthly things without depending upon them than altogether to renounce them. At times, prohibitions appear to be given only because men as we actually find them are incapable of self-control. The pious man is not miserable even in this life of trial; for he can always withdraw from the sphere of suffering to a life with God, to a fellowship with divine love, which bestows peace and joy upon his innermost soul.

Nevertheless, the deep consciousness of the burden of suffering, waywardness, and guilt, the strong sense of the uncertainty and imperfection of human existence, do not permit of any complete satisfaction here below; true and perfect happiness still belong to the Beyond. There alone can we find peace and blessed vision, while here we merely work and hope; this life is a mere preparation, a pilgrimage in a foreign land, an abode of temptation; indeed, in comparison with the next life it is death. Hence, the earthly life has worth only in view of the life to come. For it serves as an education for the latter; and, amid all trials and griefs, it holds the certainty of a better future. In truth, when our thoughts ascend to it in anticipation, all the obscurity which now surrounds us seems to be but a thin veil that will soon fall; as compared with the glory of the perfect life, all the suffering of the present fades into a mere dream. We are only seemingly sad, for our sadness shall pass away even as a sleep, and in the morning the good shall reign. But as to immortality, there is here not the slightest doubt, for the essence of life is decisively transferred from the visible to the invisible, from time to eternity, from man to God; whoever loves God with the whole heart is perfectly secure, in that love, of personal indestructibility. For "such a one knows that nothing will perish for him that does not perish for God. God, however, is the Lord of the living and the dead."

The thought, however, of future destiny, and not personal destiny alone, but the destiny of kindred, becomes a powerful incentive to ceaseless toil in the present. Especially effective in

this regard is the doctrine of purgatory, a middle state between bliss and damnation, particularly in conjunction with the belief that the petitions and deeds of the living can moderate the sufferings of those in purgatory. The elaboration of such a doctrine reveals Augustine's minute knowledge of the motives and weaknesses of the human heart.

Such a concentration of attention upon the Beyond stamps all joy in the goods of this life as wrong. The possession of worldly goods is, therefore, regarded as a hindrance to the moral life and to consecration to God. Here the ideal of asceticism appears in full strength; private property is looked upon as a chief source of the world's misery; whoever altogether relinquishes its possession surpasses him who only surrenders the love of it. Celibacy becomes a higher state than matrimony; even the extinction of the human race as a consequence of universal celibacy would be greeted by Augustine with joy. Hence affection, like hope, in the end attaches itself wholly to the Beyond.

(e) *The Church*

So far, two spheres of thought have been introduced by Augustine, the universal religious sphere and the Christian; besides these, however, there is a third realm which calls forth his efforts and often appears to monopolise them, namely, the life of the Church, the visible religious community fully equipped with fixed ordinances. Two chief motives impelled Augustine to take up and vigorously to perfect all that the Latins had accomplished by way of strengthening ecclesiastical power and authority: its utility for the masses, and its necessity for his own inconstant mind. His early writings in particular give very frank expression to considerations of expediency. In common with the other Church Fathers, Augustine sees the chief superiority of Christianity in the fact that it offers salvation, not to some few, but to the whole of mankind. If, at the same time, there exists a deep distrust of the capacity of individuals, and the ancient idea of a permanent separation of humanity into an

intelligent minority and an unintelligent majority prevails, then authority and faith become indispensable; the cultivated man does not need these for himself, but even he must submit to them in order not to shake the faith of the masses by availing himself of his freedom; "even if such do themselves no harm, they will harm others by their example." Here the Church appears as an institution for the education and disciplining of the masses; faith, *i. e.*, submission to the teaching of the Church, is recommended on the ground of certainty, indeed, of convenience! Far more forcibly, however, than by such reasons of utility, Augustine is impelled by his own restless nature, which is torn by contradictions, to seek a firm support inaccessible to doubt. Plainly, all the soaring of speculation did not insure him against harassing doubts; in spite of his intellectual power he possessed the nature of a Thomas, who must touch and grasp whatever he is to recognise as true, and who does not accept the reality of spiritual entities, unless some material embodiment brings them directly before the eyes. Hence, he clings with his whole soul to the Church as an indispensable support, and confesses for himself, "I would not believe in the Gospel were I not constrained by the authority of the Catholic Church."

For such a line of thought, the central conception of the intellectual and religious life becomes the Church, the fellowship of the new life, the institution dispensing pardon, through which alone the divine love, and with it a new life, is imparted to man, particularly by means of the sacraments. Here alone is salvation accessible, here alone are sins forgiven, here alone is there the possibility of a moral life. For the individual, accordingly, there is no salvation without submission to the doctrine and the life of the Church. "Without a strong rule of authority (*sine quodam gravi auctoritatis imperio*) the true religion cannot subsist."

It is the Church as a visible order, as an established institution, that first wins Augustine's veneration. But he could not justify such an estimate, even to himself, did not the visible organisation assume spiritual powers, were it not, also, in spite

of its independence, a member of wider relationships. Such, however, it becomes in fact; without surrendering its own nature, the temporal and visible acquires the qualities of a higher order and derives therefrom a deeper content, a greater power, an unspeakable sanctity; whatever is drawn from this source enriches and elevates the visible, so that visible and invisible merge into a single whole of life. The sphere of the Church here appears wholly to absorb that of religion and that of the Christian life; and since everything rational in life is here connected with religion, there is absolutely nothing good outside the Church: without the Catholic Church no Christianity; without Christianity no religion; without religion no rational life. Accordingly, the attitude toward the Church determines in the end the worth and blessedness of man.

This blending of the sensible and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, was not accomplished abruptly with Augustine; he was brought to it by the whole development of the earlier Church. Yet the movement now assumes large dimensions and unfolds its full strength; with this expansion, Augustine becomes the founder of mediæval catholicism.

The importance of the above fusion, no less than its historical necessity, is obvious. Through it, life secures a firm basis and conduct a tangible aim; all forces are united in the accomplishment of a single task. Inasmuch as the visible acquires invisible powers, the temporal directly communicates the eternal, not as its mere symbol, but as inseparably united with it in growth, as inseparably confluent with it; the interest in what takes place among us and through us infinitely increases; man here knows that he is securely sheltered in divine relationships, and that no part of his conduct is lost. The fundamental conception of Christianity, that of the union of the Divine and the human (which are usually separated), of the entrance of the Eternal into time, is here carried out in a highly effective, although assailable, form, and one which was peculiarly suitable to the historical conditions. For how could Christianity, at the time of the migrations and the formation of new nations, have

wrought and ruled in any other form than this? Nothing, however, distinguishes Augustine more widely from Plotinus, and also from the fathers of the Greek Church, than this prominence of the religious community and its history, this acquired independence of a temporal conception and order of things.

But the importance and real power of this development involve at the same time serious complications. The uniting of the eternal and invisible with a particular historical institution results in the danger of circumscribing and crystallising, as well as externalising, the spiritual content; the danger of limiting eternal truths to transitory forms, and inner aims to outward performances. It is possible, indeed unavoidable, that a harsh exclusivism and a passionate fanaticism should arise when those who have no share in this visible community and do not meet its requirements lose all connection with the kingdom of God, in fact with the rational life. Moreover, the question suggests itself whether Augustine did not merely decree instead of prove the unity of these two spheres, whether the conceptions are not rather externally conjoined than really united. As a matter of fact, all the chief concepts have here a double sense. Christianity is now the eternal revelation of God, pervading all time, now a particular, limited, historical order; the Church now the invisible communion of the elect of God, now a visible organisation with a human head; faith now the humble dedication of the whole being to divine truth, now the mere acceptance of the teaching of the Church without personal examination; the miraculous now the evidence of supernatural powers in all events, now an occasional interruption of the course of nature, *i. e.*, of the habit of divine action. To bring this equivocal use of terms distinctly into view would mean to shatter one of the pillars of the Augustinian system and of the mediæval order.

But while Augustine confines all the spiritual life of the community to the Church, he at the same time does his utmost to give life within the Church a rich content. A mystic fundamental conception, an intimate feeling, a sober practical activity, here reciprocally aid and support one another. It was inevitable that

Augustine, who thought so meanly of man, and felt so keenly the moral defects of his age, should make the substance of this life independent of the characteristics of individual persons. Thus he developed the doctrine of the sanctity of the priestly office (*sacramentum ordinis*), and contended that the priest as priest possessed a peculiar "character," independent of the qualities of the individual.

Just as the Church provides its members with all the goods of the Christian life, so in particular it strengthens love, which in Augustine's view forms the essence of the Christian life. If we ask whether any one is a good man, we do not ask what he believes and what he hopes, but what he loves; the soul is present rather where it loves than where it lives; it becomes what it loves; not faith and hope, but love, reaches above life to the Beyond. Love, which is imparted to us by God, especially by means of the sacraments, enhances and ennobles all the virtues. Love, however, ought not to remain a mere matter of disposition, but should assume definite forms of expression and incorporate itself in visible works. Virtue becomes in this way the "order of love"; works, even in the sense of a tangible achievement, are indispensable, since man as a member of the community must also give practical proof of his disposition. The requisite works are: in the case of religion, participating in the ordinances of the Church, especially the sacraments; in the case of moral conduct, the showing of mercy, and the care of the poor and the unfortunate. Augustine does not restrict himself here to the welfare of individuals, but magnifies the beneficent effect of Christianity and of the Church upon the total condition of society; to wit, the improvement of the relations of master and slave; the promotion of the brotherhood of classes, of nations, and of all mankind, and the establishment of inner bonds of union between rulers and peoples.

In this education of the race, the ultimate thought of the Church is always the Beyond; an other-worldly sentiment fills the minds of her servants. But the Church cannot in this world prepare for the next, without also exercising authority over

the world, without subjecting to itself all other powers; not from the love of temporal power—for her own inclination would lead the Church to withdraw wholly from the world—but from solicitude for the salvation of the whole of humanity. But, notwithstanding all the effort to maintain such a height, the danger is almost unavoidable that the earthly will confine the spiritual to its own limits, and by involving it in temporal affairs, draw it down to their level. Not only may the individual easily fall a prey to the lust of power, but the conduct of the Church also may closely approximate to the character of secular politics. In an evil world, the state of which, according to Augustine, can never be materially improved, the Church could accomplish nothing without taking account of actual conditions. Hence, whether good or bad, she must come to terms with those conditions; she must and may tolerate (*tolerare*) many things which of herself she would wish otherwise. Thus the Church also becomes more and more an empire of this world; and amid the cares of her temporal power her religious character is in danger of becoming weakened and her ideals of being lowered.

Such a church cannot possibly regard the state as possessing equal rights and privileges. The peculiar circumstances of an age in which the state had already become Christian, while the idea of the ancient state continued to exert a potent influence, were reflected in Augustine's mind by a qualified judgment; the state, namely, must be sternly repulsed when it opposes the Church, or seeks to usurp her place; but within its limited sphere it is to be prized, if it acknowledges and furthers the higher aims of the Church. Under the former circumstances, a passionate hatred of the state develops which is almost without a parallel in history. The earthly and the heavenly kingdoms are diametrically opposed, and the development of their opposition runs throughout the whole course of history; the former springs from self-love carried to the extreme of contempt for God, the latter from love of God carried to the point of contempt for self. Cain and Abel appear as their respective founders. Of Cain we are told, "he founded the state" (*condidit civitatem*); the secular state

traces its origin, therefore, to a fratricide! The Christianised state meets with more approbation; it has a task of its own assigned to it, one which is aside from that of the Church, since the requirements of life demand an organisation common to believers and unbelievers. In particular, the state has to maintain order and peace; the Church herself offers no objection to obeying civil laws in temporal matters. Augustine concedes to the state so much independence in this direction, that in the mediæval conflicts the friends of the state were able to appeal to his authority. But this recognition of the state is confined to secular things; eternal salvation and spiritual goods are in the sole charge of the Church, on which rests the responsibility for the education and culture of mankind. To the latter alone, therefore, belongs the devotion of the inner man.

It is much the same with the nation and the fatherland. The Church pursues upon earth her heavenly aims undisturbed by the discrepancies in customs, laws, and methods of organisation; whatever among different nations serves in various ways the ends of earthly peace she does not disturb, rather she upholds it and conforms herself to it, so long as it forms no obstacle to true religion. But the spiritual task remains untouched by the life of the nation; only in the lower sphere of mundane existence is the nation tolerated as something of natural origin. Personally, moreover, Augustine possessed no patriotism; his fatherland was Christianity. Hence, here, all life outside the Church touches the Christian only from without, and as something alien.

Associated with the complications arising from the conflict with the world are dangers in the inner life of a church which knows nothing divine beyond its own ordinances. It possesses no freedom for individuals, no inner constraint by a truth present in the depths of a man's soul. All dissent and separation are regarded as the result of a depraved will, of an arrogant presumption; the unbeliever (*infidelis*)—no one has done more than Augustine to bring this name into contempt and dishonour—is one who will not believe the divine Word; a heretic, one "who, for the sake of a temporal advantage and particularly his

own fame and distinction, either proposes or accepts false new opinions." When, in addition, such wilful dissent, being a menace to constituted authority, does injury to the community, then violent hatred darts forth, and there is a burning desire for the extermination of the evil, root and branch. Scarcely anywhere else does Augustine's passion break forth with such wild impetuosity as here where the whole fervour of religious desire is concentrated upon the ecclesiastical system; to be sure, Christian love also is to remain intact, inasmuch as the constraint operates for the salvation of those affected; yet this love and solicitude after all possess the character of compulsion: one should compel those who nominally belong to Christianity to accept it (*compelle intrare*), and force goodness upon such as are enemies of themselves. "Destroy false doctrines, but love men," is the phrase; and God is besought "Mayest Thou put to death the enemies of the Holy Scriptures with a two-edged sword, and make them to cease their hostility to Thee. For so I wish them destroyed, that they may live in Thee." Thus, with evident self-deception, Augustine's feelings become marvellously confounded; transplanted to the soil of the Church, all the lower emotions threaten to spring into life again, and even the most fanatical hatred to put on the cloak of Christian love. It is, indeed, a rank soil for the production of religious persecutions, inquisitions, and heresy trials—those saddest outgrowths of Christianity.

In a similar way the substance of morality was injured by the omnipotence of the Church and of ecclesiastical interests. Morality, in consequence, appears not as an independent realm possessing intrinsic worth, but as a sum of religious ordinances, or, since religion is here identical with the Church, of ecclesiastical rules. Hence, there is morally good conduct in the strict sense only within the Catholic Church; even the sublimest works of self-sacrificing love and renunciation are not of the slightest avail for those who are not Catholics; in fact, such deeds, being without the pale of the Church, are not good deeds at all.

Moreover, this dependence of morality upon the ecclesiastical

organisation unavoidably subjected it to all the flux and change of time. That alterations in the rules of life take place in the course of history was evident to Augustine's age above all from the difference between the Old and the New Testament; the change is most marked in the progress from polygamy, which was originally permitted, through monogamy to chastity, which, although not required, was yet desired. In such changes, Augustine thought that it is not the opinions of men but the moral law itself that alters; what was earlier allowed later comes to be forbidden.

Owing to the relativity of morals, it is possible for acts to become obligatory which are in direct contradiction with universal moral laws, provided it is indisputable that a divine command requires them to be performed. Like the laws of nature, moral laws also become mere rules, which can be broken at any time in the interests of religion. The danger of this development is felt by Augustine himself; hence, he demands the most rigorous proofs that any exceptional command really comes from God; he is, therefore, cautious in his application of the rule to individual instances, more cautious than other Church Fathers of his time. Still, his elevation of it into a principle contributed largely toward the destruction of the independence of morals and the subordination of moral to ecclesiastical interests.

In all this we see the ecclesiastical system expand without limit; we see it enslave religion, shape intellectual life in accordance with its own ends, and crush its opponents. In the case of Augustine himself, however, authority and ecclesiastical power are merged in the most powerful personal forces; personality, with its immediate relation to God, remains the animating soul of the whole. From the life with God, as this not only strives toward mystical absorption in the deepest ground of all being, but also develops through personal intercourse an ethical community, there flow unceasingly into the ecclesiastical organisation strength, warmth, and inwardness, which prevent it from sinking into a soulless mechanism of ceremonial observances and legalism. Authority itself is not operative here as an in-

flexible fact and by the mere weight of its existence; rather, an inner need, a compelling personal demand for happiness and for a firm support, force men to seek it and maintain it. From these life-giving depths the ecclesiastical system derives in great part that vast power over the minds of men which it has exercised even down to the present time. But can all the magnitude of the achievement conceal the contradiction involved in the fact that man is raised to such a spontaneous, independent, and transforming personal life, and also required to submit himself unconditionally to the ecclesiastical system? For the time being, the contradiction was obscured; but in the end men inevitably became aware of it, and were led into new paths.

(f) *Retrospect*

It is not necessary to encumber our lengthy review of Augustine with comprehensive reflections. It will suffice briefly to remind ourselves how much the whole has exhibited at once the riches and the immaturity of Augustine's activity and nature. We saw three spheres of life, that of universal religion, that of Christianity, and that of the Church, unfold themselves into great realms, appropriate the whole of reality, and give to human existence a peculiar form. Partly combining and interpenetrating, partly intersecting and inwardly conflicting, these three spheres of reality produce an unlimited breadth and fulness of life, and at the same time the most stubborn contradictions. The same thinker who, in shaking off ancient traditions, made the individual life of the soul the all-dominating central point of reality, has done more than any other to found a system of absolute authority; the man, to whom love became the soul of life, indeed the power by which God moves the world, kindled indescribable hatred by the exaggerated fanaticism he displayed toward those of other faiths; he who, by a regenerating revolution accomplished a radical liberation of the spiritual and the moral from all natural conditions, fell a prey, in another direction, to a confusion of natural events and free human acts,

indeed, even to a crude materialising of the moral life. In particular, moreover, his whole effort is pervaded by a contradictory treatment of the individual subject; at one time the latter is summoned to the boldest activity, and, confident of victory, feels itself superior to all existence; at another, overcome with distressing doubts as to its own capacities, and passionately longing for some secure support, it obediently submits itself to an external authority.

The most serious thing about Augustine's nature, which is as transparent in certain directions as it is unintelligible as a whole, is the difference of its spiritual, and particularly moral, levels; there is no other great thinker in whom the heights and depths lie so far apart. On the one hand, there is a marvellous warmth of affection, the deepest sympathy for every sort of human destiny, a power to vitalise the best and noblest in man, a capacity to act as the vehicle of divine power; on the other, the impetuous clamouring for happiness, so defenceless against intrusions of the lower impulses, consumes all aspiration and, particularly where the eminent logical abilities of the man are pressed into its service, and the sensibility is blunted against every contradiction of immediate feeling, brings forth the most ghastly products. That repulsive fusion of glowing passion with cold, relentless consistency, which often characterises later religious conflicts, begins with Augustine.

But that which was a defect in the thing itself became a source of strength to the result. The most diverse tendencies of the age found in Augustine not only a point of contact but an adequate, indeed a classical, interpretation; he is the most eloquent spokesman of its inmost intention. At the same time, each can here supplement itself by the others; and all disagreeable consequences may be averted by the ever-present possibility of new developments. Augustine, in fact, possesses a unique value for the comprehension of every kind of tendency, inasmuch as in him all kinds show in the most distinct manner how they originate from the totality of human nature, and also reveal with the most transparent clearness their ultimate motives. In

particular, it is here evident how deeply rooted in the spiritual needs of man the system of mediæval Catholicism is, and how securely it is fortified by that fact against every assault either of rude force or of petty ridicule.

To define Augustine's historical position is by no means easy. Obviously he forms the intellectual culmination of early Christianity and dominates the Middle Ages. But later Christianity has constantly drawn from him, and the Reformation in its main theses appealed to his authority; indeed, it is scarcely a paradox to say that if the present generation means again to take up the fundamental problems of religion, and to take them up independently, it must go back for its historical orientation, not to Schleiermacher or Kant, not to Luther or Thomas, but to Augustine, as the point where all later developments were in the formative stage, and where, accordingly, their justification or non-justification will be evident to critical examination. Moreover, aside from religion, the modern thinker will find many points of contact with Augustine, if only he penetrates beneath the often curious expression of the thought to the essence of the matter. In some respects Augustine, with his all-dominating subjectivity, stands nearer to us than Hegel and Schopenhauer.

Nevertheless, we hesitate to follow the example of prominent scholars of our own day and call him outright a modern man. Undoubtedly, Augustine has much that is modern, above all in that ardent, penetrating subjectivity, and in that marvellous nature which embraced the harshest contradictions. But does that of itself make him a modern? In truth, there is wanting much that seems indispensable to the modern character. He knows nothing of a clear analysis of subject and object, nothing of a desire for a world of pure objectivity, of passionless truth, of disinterested work, such as pervades the modern world and counteracts all mere subjectivity; on the contrary, he swiftly universalises the subjective and gives it objectivity. Moreover, the direct and exclusive concentration of his thought and effort upon religion does not permit him to concern himself in the

affairs of the actual world, leaves no room for the ideal of the universal man in the sense of modern times. Finally, strongly marked traits of antiquity live on in him: from the classical age, namely, the cosmic speculation, the plastic moulding of reality, the distinction of an esoteric and an exoteric life; and from the closing period, the longing for a haven of rest secluded from all storms, for a finally settled decision to be enjoyed in secure peace, also the exaggeration of the opposition of the sensuous and the spiritual. In other respects—and the best—he merely followed his own genius, and in so doing develops an imperishable greatness. Hence, it is surely better not to place Augustine in any particular group or epoch, but to recognise in him one of the few personalities from whom later ages draw inspiration, and who serve as a lodestar in the solution of those eternal problems which transcend all ages.

III. THE MIDDLE AGES

(a) *The Early Middle Ages*

Were it our task to speak of the general mediæval view of life, instead of the views of life of mediæval thinkers, a characteristic and attractive theme would await us; we might then look forward to a number of interesting distinctions and to much that would be valuable. So far as our special problem is concerned, however, a full thousand years offer nothing new. The views of life of the mediæval thinkers borrow their material from earlier ages; such characteristic combinations as are presented rather serve to express the historical conditions than to contribute anything of permanent value. It is, accordingly, our privilege, indeed our duty, to epitomise.

The first centuries of the Middle Ages chiefly follow Neo-Platonism in philosophy. In addition to the sources already mentioned, there are, by way of conclusion, two others: the treatise of Boethius (*d.* 525), on the consolation of philosophy (*de consolatione philosophiæ*), a philosophical devotional book

for the cultivated, and the works of the Pseudo Dionysius (undoubtedly of the fifth century). Boethius's *De consolatione* possesses more refinement and distinction than strength and warmth. The thinker is filled with the worthlessness of everything earthly and sensuous; he rises to the supersensuous essence and at the same time to the universal point of view; he finds solace in the thought that with such a change everything becomes rational and evil dissolves in mere appearance.

Dionysius concerned himself more with the whole social order; his essentially Neo-Platonic wisdom was accepted by the Middle Ages as a revelation of the profoundest Christian truth, sanctioned by Apostolic authority. As the essence of Christianity, there appears here the Neo-Platonic idea of a going out and return of God to Himself; the world is nothing but an eternal cycle of divine love. The historical becomes a symbol of the eternal, the human a symbol of the cosmic and divine. The tone of life becomes dreamy and wistful; the Christianity of the Church is influenced in two important points. By transplanting to ecclesiastical Christianity the Neo-Platonic conception of an unbroken gradation of beings, a procession of life from higher to lower, the thought of an hierarchy surpassing that of Augustine is developed and established, first the heavenly, and then its likeness, the earthly, hierarchy. Further, by a philosophical development of a tendency of the age, this system fused sensuous and supersensuous in such a way that the sensuous appears now as a mere reflection of the spiritual, now as inseparably united with it; this had the result of conferring upon acts of worship, particularly the sacraments, the character of mysteries, and consequently of greatly increasing their importance. The two chief pillars of the mediæval ecclesiastical system—the hierarchy and the sacraments—here plainly exhibit their ancient basis.

As the means of introducing Dionysius in the Occident, we may mention particularly Scotus Erigena (ninth century). He manifests a fresher sense of life than is seen at the close of antiquity; and the grounding of all existence in God had the effect

of again making the world and nature more important, in fact, of preparing the way for a radical pantheism. The last consequences of this view, however, were not apparent until centuries later, and then its rejection by the Church was inevitable.

Nowhere upon the soil of the Middle Ages proper is an intention manifest to lay violent hands upon the legacy of the past. Nevertheless, certain changes take place, owing to the fact that some elements of the inherited stock unfold more vigorously than the others, and thus alter slightly the aspect of the whole. These developments, however, are twofold, and take opposite directions: on the one hand, more intelligent insight is demanded; on the other, more sympathetic appropriation. The former movement begins, in particular, with Anselm, of Canterbury (1033–1109). He endeavours to find a theoretical basis for the truths of faith, not in order to make them more acceptable by demonstration, but only to analyse more clearly the acknowledged truth. But when fundamental questions, such as the existence of God and the Incarnation, once become matters of theoretical discussion, the inevitable result is an inner change, a rationalising of the traditional doctrine. Moreover, the theoretical interest, once aroused, cannot always be so easily satisfied as it is with Anselm.

In fact, it was intensified to the point of open conflict in the case of Abelard, the brilliant dialectician (1079–1142). In him the subjective tendency breaks forth with striking freedom and vigour; already there appears that freshness of feeling and flexibility of thought by which the French mind has done so much to clear away the rubbish of the past and to win for the present a life of its own.

Abelard does not bow in awe and reverence before the traditional doctrines of religion; he makes them an object of ceaseless reflection and discussion; he displays his dialectical power even upon the most difficult of the dogmas. In a highly noteworthy treatise he has a philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian engage in an argument concerning ultimate questions, and find that they are much nearer to one another than at first ap-

peared: he makes investigation, indeed doubt, honourable, in accordance with the view that "through doubt we come to investigation, and through investigation to the truth"; he looks upon authority only as a provisional substitute for reason, and sharply criticises the many for calling that one firm in the faith who does not rise above the average opinion, and for condemning and denouncing things of which they are ignorant, and for declaring that to be folly and nonsense which they do not comprehend.

The content of his doctrines corresponds to this rationalistic turn of mind. With Abelard, morality forms the essence of religion; Christianity has not offered something new and antithetical, it merely represents the culmination of a general movement. Besides this, it has united what was dispersed, cleared up what was obscure, and communicated to all what was previously accessible only to a few. Jesus is reverenced as the founder of a pure moral law. In Christianity, too, let no languid inaction reign. Abelard finds it "remarkable that while throughout the periods of life and the succession of the ages human insight into all created things increases, in faith, where error is particularly dangerous, no progress takes place. The cause of this must surely be the fact that it is not free to any one openly to investigate the question what ought to be believed, nor with impunity to express doubt concerning what is affirmed by all." In morals, however, Abelard brings about a transition from the mediæval to the modern point of view, inasmuch as he gives full recognition to the individual subject, and makes the agent's own conviction and conscience the thing of chief importance in conduct.

Thus we see a new spirit arise, which must necessarily be in sharp conflict with the environment. But Abelard's vitalising of the inherited substance, his demand for a theoretical illumination and more skilful adjustment of the articles of faith, was certain also to affect his opponents. As a pupil of Abelard we should name Peter the Lombard; but Thomas Aquinas, the head and front of scholasticism, also stood in close relation

to Peter. As has often happened in the history of religions, so here orthodoxy appropriates and uses for its own ends the weapons which rationalism has prepared.

Still more dangerous was the tendency toward a merely emotional assimilation of doctrine, which found its expression in mysticism. Here likewise the tendency first appeared on ecclesiastical ground and was wholly in sympathy with the Church (Bernhard of Clairvaux and the Victorines). But very soon arose a radical pantheism (Amalrich of Bena), the spread of which the Church was enabled to prevent only by the most rigorous means. Life as a whole was obviously in need of a new synthesis; to have achieved this, according to the genius of the age and with the means it afforded, constitutes the chief service rendered by scholasticism at its zenith.

(b) *The Culmination of the Middle Ages*

The needed synthesis, the chief work of scholasticism, is no mere product of formal learning and subtle ingenuity; called forth by the urgent demands of universal historical conditions, it is itself an achievement of universal historical significance. Serious dangers to the traditional faith of the Christian Church arose from two sources; on the one hand, mysticism, in view of the emphasis it laid on the immediacy of feeling, threatened to dissipate the content of faith and to destroy the organisation of the Church; on the other, the conflict between knowledge and faith grew to alarming proportions when, subsequent to the twelfth century, all of the Aristotelian writings gradually became known in the Occident. The early Middle Ages possessed only the logical treatises; and it must have had the effect of a momentous discovery, and must have profoundly stirred the minds of all scholars, when by the remarkably devious path of the Mahometan world and Spain Aristotle's immeasurably rich and carefully elaborated system finally reached the Christian Occident. The shock was accentuated by the circumstance that Averroës, the chief of Mahometan Aristotelians, formu-

lated the relation of knowledge and faith in a manner which Christianity as well as Mahometanism was unable to accept. Knowledge he developed without regard to religion; and at the same time, under the influence of Neo-Platonism, he interpreted Aristotle variously as pantheistic. Wholly without mediation there follows the introduction of faith; its truths are to be blindly accepted on authority as a command of God, however flatly they may contradict the results of investigation. Thus we have the well-known doctrine of a twofold truth, in accordance with which that may be false in theology which is true in philosophy, and *vice versa*; thus there is an inner cleavage in men's minds, and the danger that to outsiders the world of faith may seem to be accepted on external grounds and to lack internal truth. None the less, this definite separation of the two spheres, which must have been particularly welcome to acute minds, penetrated also into Christianity. Its chief representative in the thirteenth century was Siger of Brabant, whose history has been but recently cleared up. His writings possess a lucid style and show precision of thought. Dante's honourable mention of him, which was inspired by deep feeling, of itself insures him a lasting fame. The representatives of the Church were thrown by this intrusion of Aristotelianism into an awkward position. Its intellectual power, the wealth of its material, but especially the perfection of its scientific technique, could not be ignored; "as in the case of the discovery of new weapons, no one thereafter could fight without making use of them" (Seeberg). At the same time, those of the older way of thinking, the minds particularly dominated by Augustine and Plato, felt that in Aristotle and his elaboration of concepts a foreign element was intruding itself into Christianity and endangering its distinctive character; a rationalising dissolution of the traditional content of faith seemed to lie near at hand. The solution of the conflict came through the development of a Christian Aristotelianism, particularly by Albert the Great and still more by Thomas Aquinas—an Aristotelianism which undertook at once to preserve the superiority of Christianity and to

utilise the proffered wealth of Aristotle. The concept of gradation became the means whereby knowledge and faith, the world of nature and the kingdom of grace, were brought into a close union. This new Aristotelianism could not make any headway without coming into conflict with that of Averroës. The two, in fact, came into violent collision shortly after the middle of the thirteenth century at the University of Paris, then the focus of the intellectual interests of Christendom. That the conciliatory movement won the victory created no little danger for both science and religion; but it was in harmony with the urgent demands of the general situation. For only such a movement could satisfy the characteristic mediæval demand for order and organisation, and prevent inner decay. However inadequate, owing to the profound changes which have taken place, that solution has become for us to-day, for the age in question it was indisputably of great importance. The capacity here manifested by the Church to annex movements which threatened to become dangerous showed itself also in the case of mysticism, which was not rejected, but placed where it appeared it could do no harm and only be of service. Out of it all arose a comprehensive synthesis of life which has exerted, and, in spite of the changed conditions and the contradictions, still exerts to-day, a profound influence upon mankind.

The historical appreciation of Thomas (1227–1274) has been repeatedly prejudiced by the conflicts of the present age. The quite just rejection, namely, of an unhistorical Neo-Thomism has often caused the original and genuine Thomas to be likewise depreciated. While Thomas was not a thinker of the first rank, he was no insignificant mind and no fanatic; he did not rise far above his age, but he brought together and elaborated whatever it produced, and he did this with great skill and in a moderate spirit. That he stood at the summit of the intellectual development of his time is convincingly shown by Dante's recognition of him. That of itself should silence all petty censoriousness.

Thomas's greatness consists in the upbuilding and systematic completion of an all-comprehensive Christian view of the world

he brought Christianity into closer relation to civilisation and to science, and while fully protecting the ascendency of religion, he also awarded to the other departments of life their respective rights. For him, however, the fruits of civilisation are represented by Aristotle, who, in the totality of his doctrine, appears as newly arisen, and hence as an entirely fresh influence. Here there was offered a view of the world of astonishing richness and symmetrical execution; here was a system which presented a definitive conclusion, and nowhere disturbed men with unsettled questions. No wonder that it subdued the minds of the Middle Ages with a wholly irresistible force; it offered them, in fact, everything they could wish.

At the same time, a serious problem here presents itself. To adapt the Hellenes to Christianity, full as they were of the joy of life and wholly concerned with this world, was no easy task; to us moderns, it will appear, in fact, impossible. But the mediæval thinker found the Greek at one with him in an ideal estimate of things; further, following the precedent of most of the Arabic philosophers, he saw Aristotle through the medium of Neo-Platonic ideas, and understood him in a more inward and religious sense than the facts really allow; in particular, Aristotle's dominant interest in the sense-world, and his reserve respecting ultimate questions, facilitated a *rapprochement* with Christianity, so soon as a graduated relation between the two worlds had been admitted. Such a gradation, however, is the leading thought of Thomas. With him, every sphere receives its proper due, even the lower unfolds its peculiar character undisturbed by the higher. Thomas recognises both a distinct realm of nature and an independent task for natural knowledge; and he condemns all direct reference to God in the details of scientific questions as a refuge of ignorance (*asylum ignorantiæ*). But the lower sphere must keep within its bounds, and avoid all encroachment upon the higher. The realm of nature sketches only in outline what in the realm of grace, the world of historical Christianity, is further carried out and finally established. Thus, *e. g.*, according to Thomas, the existence of God, the founda-

tion of the world in Him, the immortality of the soul, are demonstrable by mere reason; on the other hand, the doctrines of the Trinity, the temporal creation of the world, and the resurrection of the body, derive their authority from the Christian revelation. Hence, subordination is coupled with the above independence, and the distinction of spheres with a comprehensive relationship. We are here told, "The divine right does not infract the human"; "Grace does not destroy nature, but completes it (*gratia naturam non tollit, sed perficit*)"; "reason is the precursor of faith."

Above the realm of historical revelation, however, lies a still higher stage: the immediate union with God which mystic vision inaugurates, the realm of glory (*gloria*). But this realm is rather a hope than a possession of the earthly life; moreover, the way to it necessarily leads through the ecclesiastical order; of himself the individual could not attain it. Finally, the whole forms a single great temple: nature is the vestibule, grace leads into the sanctuary, a holy of holies fulfils every yearning and discloses itself to the faithful in occasional solemn moments of ecstasy.

But things which fit together smoothly in a general scheme often cause untold trouble and labour in the details of execution. Now there were conflicts to be mitigated, now lacunæ to be filled. This required an energetic and skilful employment of logical tools. Herein Thomas did, in fact, achieve important results; he proved himself a master both in the uniting of apparently distinct things by a chain of syllogisms, and in settling contradictions by acute distinctions, by pointing out the different meanings of concepts.

This logical capacity also rendered a valuable service to the permanence of the Christian tradition. The dogmas, it is true, do not spring from mere reason; but, once they have been communicated by God, they also may become an object of logical treatment. Thus arises the first system of Christian moral theology; in particular, the ecclesiastical order is carefully articulated and firmly welded together. All the minutiæ are brought

into relation and subordinated to a superior rule; the Church accordingly assumes an out and out hierarchical form, more hierarchical even than was foreshadowed in Augustine. Different lines of thought here tend toward the same goal: viz., the demand that the Church form a compact unity or single body (*unum corpus*), the belief in the progressive transmission of divine powers from higher to lower; finally, the assumption, self-evident for the mediæval thinker, that for us there can be no full reality without a visible embodiment, and hence, likewise, no solid organisation without the headship of a single person. Accordingly, Thomas of necessity defended the concentration of ecclesiastical power in a single hand; and he condemned as lost and as meriting severe punishment those who withdraw from the Church and perhaps even oppose her. All the independence of the individual is surrendered; the Church becomes the conscience of mankind; moreover, the full development of the doctrine of purgatory increases the ecclesiastical power. At the same time, the secular pretensions of the Church are extended; it now dominates all intellectual life, and enjoys unconditional supremacy over the state. Just as, throughout Christendom, kings are inferior to priests, so all the kings of Christian peoples must be subject to the Pope, "as to Our Lord Jesus Christ Himself."

In spite of its harsh formulation, this principle does not merit the reproach of representing a lust for power; it is not desire for her own prosperity, but for the welfare of the divine order, and solicitude for the salvation of mankind, which give rise to the secular dominion of the Church. Thomas himself is deeply imbued with an ascetic spirit; in agreement with his age, he unhesitatingly calls the Beyond his fatherland (*patria*), and plainly longs for the peace of a life dedicated solely to the contemplation of God. But that which more than all else prevents the Church from being completely transformed into an ecclesiastical state is the belief in the communication of divine life and divine love in the sacraments. In them the efficacy of the passion of Christ (*efficacia passionis*) is kept alive; the sacraments of the new Covenant "not only denote but produce grace" (*non*

solum significant, sed causant gratiam). Hence they become an important feature in a biographical sketch of Thomas; in particular, the system of ecclesiastical order receives through the sacraments a mystical background and a religious spirit.

Accordingly, it is wholly intelligible that Thomas became the chief philosopher of the Middle Ages, and that he was promptly honoured—as the paintings of the time show—as the classical interpreter of Christian truth. The conception of order, which dominated the Middle Ages, attained in him its appropriate philosophical expression; a great system of life is unfolded, one which recognises and holds firmly together all the manifold problems; the horizon becomes considerably enlarged, and by the introduction of bodies of ancient thought a sort of renaissance takes place. But of course this approbation holds good only from the standpoint of the Middle Ages, not from that of the present.

That Thomas was the most eminent mind of his age is shown by the fact that Dante takes him as his starting point. Although we cannot here do the great poet justice, we must not wholly pass him by. Dante furnishes us with a striking instance of the truth that man is not necessarily a mere product of the time, that, rather, he is capable of making the whole scope and content of his age the expression of a personality which transcends it, the instrument of a search for universal truth. For while his world of thought, so far as its content is concerned, is wholly that of the mediæval Church, in particular that of Thomas, and he has the appearance merely of accepting and giving an artistic form to a traditional substance, the old substance, here freshly fashioned, really presents new aspects; in fact, through the closer relation to personality into which it is now brought, it becomes something essentially other and higher. That is to say, since the poet and thinker here transforms all that he appropriates into an intimate experience of his own great soul, since he gathers upon a single thread all the endless variety of the world, fashioning it into one total vision seen by mighty power, the infinite and varied fulness of the world is

irresistibly fused into a closer unity, and instead of constituting a bare skeleton becomes instinct with spiritual life. Henceforth the principal outlines of the vast mediæval structure stand forth with distinctness; its important truths acquire a marvellous directness and simplicity without losing their theoretical justification; indeed, we may say that the mediæval world, which in other instances occupied only the detached thoughts of men, here for the first and only time is completely encompassed by an entire intellectual life, inwardly mastered, and so transformed into an experience of the whole man. In particular, the harsh contrasts and the motive forces of that world here first attain a complete development and produce their full effects; especially is this true of the ascent through stern negation to blissful affirmation, and of the mighty conflict between justice and love, which pervades and agitates that world. To transpose in such wise an entire world into a personal medium was possible only for a personality which combined great unifying power with the widest range of sensibility, the capacity, namely, to experience within itself the whole gamut of human emotion, from sober earnestness and stern severity to inner tenderness and passionate love; a personality which, securely rooted in itself, yet possessed the warmest sympathy for all the activity and fortunes of men. And the realm which the poet created would not have become the permanent possession of mankind, and have continued to exert its untold influence, had he not been endowed with the power to give such bodily semblance, such force and truth to the creatures of his imagination that they stand before our eyes, and stir our love and hate, as if they were real. Thus Dante not only became a support for his people, who also owed him much for his enrichment of the language; but we, too, honour him as one who added to the intellectual possessions of mankind. In his own day and generation, moreover, he penetrated beyond all that was merely temporal to the eternal immanent in it; and for the things that are eternal he secured a worthy recognition. No one will think meanly of the Middle Ages who justly appreciates Dante.

The Middle Ages did not come to a standstill with Thomas, nor did they simply follow the middle course mapped out by him. Mysticism was not to be so easily appropriated, little as the personal disposition of its leading minds inclined them to a conflict with the Church. And soon the attempt was made to formulate the relation of knowledge and faith in a different way from that of Thomas; and from this attempt arose another type of life. In general, the Middle Ages show far more variety and far more movement than it is customary, even at present, to ascribe to them.

The head of mysticism, and its supreme speculative mind, was Meister Eckhart (*d.* 1327), a magician in the use of words, and the creator of the philosophical terminology of the German tongue. In his views as a whole, it is not his aim to separate himself from scholasticism and Thomas Aquinas; and even his mysticism offers little as to its concepts that is new to any one familiar with the historical connections; it contains the same interweaving of logical abstraction and religious emotion which fascinated so many minds subsequent to Plotinus; and it is exposed to the same danger, namely, that of sacrificing all content and of losing itself in formlessness the moment that it relinquishes its hold upon the definite and the particular. But this mediæval thinker, sprung from a new racial type, possesses more freshness and immediacy of feeling, more joyfulness of mood, and more simplicity of expression, than was to be found in declining antiquity; moreover, he possesses a marvellous ability to give form and fashion and palpable reality to the incomprehensible. We will linger with him a little longer, since no other thinker of that time is capable to-day of so direct an influence.

Eckhart's mysticism has a simple intellectual framework. God does not emerge from the mere essence, the "abyss," of His nature into living reality without expressing Himself; by expressing Himself, He creates things; hence, He alone is the reality in all things. All error and depravity come from God's creatures seeking to be something on their own account; all

salvation lies in complete absorption in God. To man, as the thinking soul, is assigned the task of leading the world back to God; hence God Himself cannot do without man.

Accordingly, the return of the soul to God, to whom its whole being belongs, and the elimination of all egoistic demands for happiness, become the essence of life; there is engendered an energetic struggle against an obstinate clinging to the individuality of the ego, and for a large and free growth of man's nature out of the infinitude of the Divine life. Whoever demands a recompense for his labour is like the money-changers whom Jesus drove from the temple; the truth, however, "covets no trade." Whoever seeks anything for himself possesses no true love toward God. For, "if I had a friend, and loved him in order that he might bring good to me and do my will, then I should not love my friend but myself." Likewise, selfishness and vanity in religion are illuminated with unsparing brightness. "The true life does not consist in our being all sweet words and holy demeanour, in our having a great appearance of sanctity, in our name being borne far and wide, in our being greatly loved by God's friends, in our being so pampered and coddled by God that it seems to us that God has forgotten all his creatures save ourselves alone, and that we imagine that whatever we ask of Him will forthwith be granted. No, not that; what God requires of us is something quite different."

In truth, the thing is to destroy every appearance of individual being, and thus to eradicate all selfishness. The principal means is suffering, not merely outward but above all inward suffering. Outward suffering, namely, "does not make man patient, rather it merely shows whether he is patient, just as fire shows whether the coin is silver or copper." True suffering, on the contrary, "is the mother of all virtue, for it so weighs down man's heart that he cannot stand erect in the presence of arrogance, and therefore must be humble. But the highest pinnacle of exaltation lies in the deepest abyss of humility; the deeper the abyss, the higher the altitude; the height and depth are one." Man must be brought to a spiritual destitution, such that he

wants nothing for himself, knows nothing and has nothing; everything must be destroyed "which lives for its own will and own use, or for any will."

But to such a depreciation of the merely human in man, there corresponds an exaltation through absorption in the Divine nature. "The spirit dies being wholly absorbed in the miracle of the Deity. For in the unity, it possesses no distinctness; the personal loses its name in the unity; God takes the soul into Himself, as the sun draws into itself the morning glow." Then is the word fulfilled: "Blessed are they that die in the Lord." For, in the re-birth from God, the spirit receives a share in the whole plenitude of the Divine life: "If I am blessed, all things are in me; and where I am, there God is: so I am in God; and where God is, there am I." All egoistic enjoyment is now so far repressed that it can be said: "Whoever has once been touched by the truth, and by justice, and by goodness, that man could never for a moment turn aside from them, even though all the pains of hell followed in their train."

Such a life can unfold itself only in the deepest inwardness, in a coherent unity of being transcending all the diversity of powers and achievements. If the soul would find "peace and freedom of heart in a silent repose," it must "call all its powers home again and withdraw them from scattered things into an inner activity." Thus there develops, apart from all contact with the outward world, a profoundly inward life of the heart; even the word *Gemüt* (the heart, as the seat of the affections and will) received from Eckhart its peculiar shade of meaning.

Then there arises a struggle for the full immediacy of the religious life, a rejection, or at least diminution, of all outward mediation. God is not far from us; "Thou mayest not seek Him here or there; He is not farther from thee than the door of thy heart; there He stands and waits; whomsoever He finds ready, will open to Him and let Him in." Likewise, the work of Christ means no outward vicarious agency, which relieves us of responsibility; we should all become what he was. "It avails me not to have a perfect Brother; I must become perfect myself."

But, Jesus "has been a messenger from God to us, and has brought us our salvation; and the salvation which he brought us was ours." His example should make our pains light; for "the good knight complains not of his wounds, when he looks upon his king, who is wounded with him."

With such a belief, the fear of God as a just judge yields to the nobler feelings of love and trust. Man ought not to fear God; this alone is the right fear, that one fears to lose God. We ought not to be vassals but friends of God. True, man is full of sins; but, "what a drop is to the sea, that the sins of all men are to the boundless goodness of God."

Finally, there is here an eager impulse to declare to the world the riches of the new life by active doing: "when a man exercises himself in the contemplative life, he cannot bear the sheer wealth of it, he must pour it forth and exercise himself in the active life." But since the whole world is now a reflection of the Divine nature, there is no room for a harsh opposition between sacred and profane, spiritual and worldly; the right disposition can possess God in everyday life and in intercourse with men, quite as securely as in a desert waste or in a cell. The unassuming, thoughtful work of man for man takes precedence of all else; the simplest acts of helpful love are better than all pious enthusiasm. Martha, who manifested toward Jesus self-sacrificing care, is thought to be more worthy than Mary, who listened to His words; a master of living (*Lebemeister*) is worth a thousand reading masters (*Lesemeister*). Indeed, "were one caught up into the third heaven, like Paul, and should see a poor man who begged a broth of him, it were better that he leave his ecstasy and serve the needy man." Accordingly, specifically religious works here lose their distinctive value. Of prayer we are told: "The heart is not made pure by outward prayer, but prayer becomes pure from a pure heart." Worshippers of relics are accosted with: "What seek ye, people, with the dead bones? Why seek ye not the living shrine, that it may give you eternal life? For the dead hath neither to give nor to take." Particularly objectionable is the confining all men to a single order; for

all have not the same way pointed out to them: "what is life to one man is death to another." The one essential point is that everything be done from love; it is "the strongest of all bonds, and yet a sweet burden." "He who has found this way, let him seek no other." "But where more love dwells, no one knows; that lies hidden in the soul."

In the intention of Eckhart, all this should fall within the ecclesiastical order, and not work against it; it possesses no repellant and excluding force, as was later the case with Luther; the accentuation to the point of an Either—Or was still wanting. Yet there is here developed in its fullest strength a force tending to intensify life and make it more sincere, to free it from the egoistic demand for happiness, as well as from all outward forms and merely outward acts: there is here much, in fact, which is broader and freer than in the case of Luther.

From the outset the system of Thomas encountered the opposition of those who, in accordance with the distinguishing trait of the older movement, attached themselves to Augustine and Plato, who regarded the development of Christian thought under the influence of Aristotle as too rationalistic and too dependent upon the dialectical elaboration of concepts, and in opposition thereto emphasised the importance of facts, and the primacy of the will, as practical religious interests. This movement had its principal seat in England, particularly at Oxford; here also was found the man who brought the movement to its culmination, and first opposed to Thomism a fully mature system, viz., Duns Scotus, the acutest mind of the Middle Ages (*d.* 1308). His relation to Thomas is often compared with that of Kant to Leibniz; while laying increased demands upon rational proof, he greatly restricted the domain of rational knowledge, and stoutly resisted the transformation of theology into philosophy. Like Kant, he directed his attack not so much against the content of truths as against their customary proofs and formulæ. In theology, he upheld the primacy of the will and of practice as opposed to theory; theology therefore he calls practical knowl-

edge, just as faith is a practical attitude. He appeals to the revelations made by the absolutely free will of God; he is not concerned with necessity, but with the "contingent." Throughout, the will has attributed to it a decided pre-eminence over the intellect, and at the same time a freedom of decision amounting to unmotived choice. Just as religion here becomes wholly positive, so in general, individuality is viewed as something positive, which cannot be deduced from a general notion. And this undeducible individuality does not appear, as it easily might to the Aristotelians, as something incidental or even obstructive, but as the highest perfection of being. The shifting from a rational to a positive mode of thought is clearly manifest in the following antithesis: according to Thomas, God commands the good because it is good, while according to Scotus, the good is good because God commands it. It is significant of the scientific character of the latter's work that the trend toward positivism was not the result of opposition to dialectic, but that, on the contrary, it accompanied an improvement in its technique and a great display of acumen and dialectical skill. In particular, the power of conceptual analysis here reached its zenith; no heed was paid to the charm of linguistic forms. Distinctions of permanent importance were drawn, and philosophical terminology was enriched and made more precise in manifold ways. Every cultivated man daily uses expressions which go back to Duns Scotus. At the same time, however, the danger of subtle hairsplitting and empty quibbling about words lies near at hand. So it happened that to later thinkers, *e. g.*, to Erasmus, Scotus could appear as the typical representative of an unfruitful scholasticism. This was possible, indeed, only because the sense for the problems which dominated the thought and productive activity of this most singular man was extinguished.

(c) *The Later Middle Ages*

In the further course of the Middle Ages there was a dissolution of those intellectual relations whose production had constituted the work of its period of culmination. So-called Nom-

inalism, whose principal representative was William of Occam (*c.* 1280–toward 1350), pursued still further the direction taken by Duns Scotus, by denying the existence of universals, restricting man solely to subjective notions, and refusing him any access to things. But all possibility of a scientific basis for faith disappears at the same time: faith is rather to be accepted simply as a fact, just as the Church transmits it; and the latter here appeals directly to the Bible. In the end, everything depends upon the omnipotence and arbitrary will of God. The irony of fate, however, shows us this devotee of the principle of authority engaged in a bitter conflict with actually constituted authority. The ideal of absolute poverty, not only of the individual members of the order but of the order itself—an ideal which he had embraced with the utmost fervour, he sees rejected by the Pope; and he is led by this conflict into an increasingly severe censure, not only of the Pope individually, but of the Papacy and of its pretensions to temporal power; at the same time he becomes a champion of the independence of the state and of the empire. "The sacredness of poverty converted him into an opponent of the Papacy and a champion of the independence of the state" (Seeberg). But, notwithstanding an unswerving devotion to these ideals throughout his life, as to immediate results he attained practically nothing. Yet his scientific turn of mind dominated the thinking of more than a century, and, in certain essential respects, prepared the way for the Reformation; in fact, Luther calls himself an Occamist, and venerates Occam as his "dear master."

For our purposes, those works of the later Middle Ages which reflect a more moderate and practical mysticism, are of more immediate importance. Above all, the famous devotional book of Thomas a Kempis (*d.* 1471), the "Imitation of Christ," exerted a kind of influence which makes it necessary for us to dwell upon it a moment, and consider the grounds of its effect.

Little as this work presents a connected view of life, as a whole it is pervaded by fundamental moods at once simple and powerful. We perceive a soul overwhelmed by the misery of the

human lot and striving with inner yearning to rise above it. All longing is directed away from the world toward God, from the Here to the Beyond; these are diametrically opposed, so that accepting the one involves rejecting the other; "the highest wisdom is to rise to heaven through contempt for the world." All the content and worth of life comes from the relation to God; but the relation is not to be established by knowledge, by profound speculation, of which there is a strong distrust; rather it is to be established by a personal relation of heart to heart, by self-sacrificing devotion and love. The whole scale of values is determined by the conviction that whatever frees us from the world is good, whatever entangles us in it is bad. Again there arises a religious utilitarianism, a restriction to what is necessary to salvation, a process fatal among other things to secular knowledge. The chief approach to God is suffering, with its power to destroy all worldly pleasure; moreover, a solitary and silent life (*solitudo et silentium*) is enjoined, likewise a willing obedience, a cheerful deferring to others, a mastery of self to the point of complete self-renunciation, a continual remembrance of death. "Man rises above earthly things by two wings, simplicity and purity." This picture is completed by the requirement of love, of a constant helpful disposition, and a mutual bearing of burdens.

But these sentiments do not apply to man in the concrete, to the living personality; detached from any solid basis, they float in the free air, and lead off into the indefinite and the abstract. For, all intimacy with men is discouraged; we should have as little intercourse with others as possible; we should neither wish that any one take us to his heart, nor concern ourselves deeply with love for individual men. Here we get a glimpse into an ascetic, deeply passionate mood of a monkish sort. That, however, the heart cannot really love in this abstract fashion but requires for its affection a living object, is evident even here; for the more feeling is detached from concrete human relations, the more exclusively it concentrates itself upon the personality of Jesus. He alone is to be loved pre-eminently and on his

own account; all others only for his sake. One should keep the image of Jesus's life ever before him, and make it the pattern of all his own conduct: the "Imitation of Christ," in love and in suffering, in self-denial and in conquest, becomes the well-spring of human life.

But in all this one is concerned simply with personal salvation; there is no solicitude for mankind at large; social conditions are accepted as if man had no power to alter them. Even within the Christian life, all the emphasis is laid upon individual initiative; Divine grace and the ecclesiastical organisation are presupposed, yet the individual must depend upon himself for their appropriation and use; the final decision rests with him. This decision is not an outward but an inward act; "he who loves much, accomplishes much"; but, none the less, it is something to be produced by us; even the state of the inner life is an achievement of the man himself. The insufficiency of human conduct is not questioned; only the insufficiency means shortcoming instead of complete failure; what is needed, then, is the supplementing of our capacities, not the regeneration of our nature. Thus this view of life presents various cross currents; and all its spiritual inwardness cannot preserve it from an unedifying justification by works.

So, too, in the treatment of the *summum bonum*, conflicting tendencies appear. On the one hand, there is a selfish desire for happiness; instead of complete and entire renunciation, there is deferred enjoyment; the present is sacrificed, but only for the sake of the future; service is accepted, but in order later to rule; temporal drudgery is endured, but on account of eternal bliss. Amid all the apparent devotion and sacrifice, it is the personal advantage which is kept in view; God and Christ are merely means to human blessedness. But this is only one side of Thomas. A no less strong tendency is a disinterested devotion to God; here a pure love for the good and the eternal manifests itself, and finds expression in language at once simple and noble. "I would rather be poor for Thy sake, than rich without Thee. I prefer to be Thy pilgrim upon earth, to possessing

heaven without Thee. For where Thou art, it is heaven; but where Thou art not, it is death and hell." "I do not trouble myself about what Thou givest apart from Thyself, for I seek Thine own self, not Thy gifts."

Accordingly, the noble and the selfish, the sublime and the petty, lie here side by side; quite likely, precisely this combination contributed much to the unparalleled extent of the book's acceptance; for the author who possesses much in common with the average of mankind, and also the power of elevating his readers, has the best chance of attaining a wide influence. Moreover, in the development of his doctrines, Thomas often frees himself entirely from the monkish point of view; hence deep and noble emotions find an expression which is raised above the strife of parties, and this expression is so simple, so felicitous, so convincing, that every religious mind can find reflected therein its own meditations and experiences.

Hence, persons of the most diverse persuasions, quite beyond the pale of the Christian Church, have found delight in the "Imitation of Christ," and have drawn from it refreshment and inspiration for their own lives. It is the last work in which Christianity in its older form made a universal appeal.

C. MODERN CHRISTIANITY

I. THE REFORMATION

Christianity had hitherto experienced inner transformations in abundance without these changes leading to an abrupt break or interrupting the continuity of the development. That matters now took a different course, and that a new form of Christianity arose, can hardly be explained by religion alone; the cause was a general change in intellectual and spiritual conditions, in the processes and tone of life. Early Christianity received the impress of its distinguishing features in the fourth century, when the peculiar conditions of that epoch deeply influenced it. Mankind was surfeited and weary with culture; there were no great

ideals to guide and uplift work; in the individual, the feeling of moral weakness predominated; owing to the enormous influx of crude elements, Christian life rapidly declined. Moreover, the age was oppressed by a harsh contrast between the spiritual and the sensuous—a reaction consequent upon the refined sensuousness in which every decaying civilisation issues. In such a state of things, the first demand was to provide man with a firm foothold outside of himself, to free him from doubt, lift him above all final shortcomings, protect him from the storms of life, and bring him into the sure haven of eternal rest. The longing of the time was for authority and for definitely settled conclusions; men sought to lighten their own burdens to the utmost possible, and turned eagerly to the mysterious, the magical, the incomprehensible. When, accordingly, the dogmas were welded into an unassailable system, and the objective order of the Church claimed the exclusive privilege of providing salvation for all men, this inflexible system and this claim precisely met the condition and the needs of the age; and therein lay their irresistible power.

This movement was continued by the Middle Ages, and, at their culminating point, a system was created in the Roman Catholic Church which stands as a unique phenomenon, not only within Christianity and the sphere of religion, but within the whole intellectual history of man. Not merely the individual adherents, but the work of civilisation in all its branches was annexed and assimilated by religion; on the other hand, religion was expected, in the formation of the Church, to rise above all the inadequacy and contingency of human conditions, and consolidate itself into a thoroughly independent empire of divine powers and activities. This empire opposed to the instability of the rest of human life the contrast of eternal truth held as a secure possession, and presented itself as the sole mediator between man and spiritual and divine things; within itself, however, it contained a wonderful reconciliation of the contradictions between which human life moves, and by which it is continually threatened with inner disruption. This world and the

next, the sensuous and the spiritual, were here closely connected and intertwined; the accepted view of the world was represented by a living community, and this community was elevated and ennobled by the divine powers which were imparted to it, and which made of it the central point in a great world-wide relationship. Intellectual work and the development of power went hand in hand; a great deal of reasoning was carried on with rigid logical consistency, but it rested upon a super-rational, mystical basis; the rigour of the moral ideal was tempered by an element of the beautiful borrowed from Hellenism, while the danger of falling into effeminate indulgence was prevented by the austerity of the moral order. Whatever inequalities and contradictions remained were prudently reconciled or skilfully concealed, with the aid of the conception of hierarchical gradation.

Such an organisation of the world and of life no unprejudiced observer can deny possesses the character of greatness. But, just as this system sprang from particular historical conditions, so it rests upon peculiar presuppositions; and whether these are valid for all ages and forever bind mankind, may very well become a matter of doubt. Definitive conclusions of the sort are admissible only where there is a faith not merely in an eternal truth but in a complete temporal revelation of that truth, and where the course of history promises no kind of real advancement or innovation, where, accordingly, life possesses in its very foundations the character of perfect stability; they are further possible only when the form of religion they present constitutes the normal type of all religion, and nowhere comes into conflict with the necessary requirements of the human soul. But such a conflict is inevitable, owing to the fact that man, the living individual, will not in the long run accept the passive rôle here assigned to him. For, in the above mediæval system, man does not find his intellectual centre of gravity in himself, in his convictions and conscience, but in the Church which embraces and dominates his life; the system of life is less a consequence of his activity than something which is imposed upon him;

throughout, unconditional submission and willing devotion are required of him. Notwithstanding all the warmth of feeling and all the diligence in pious works, the character of freedom, joyfulness, and independence, is wanting; it is the religion of impotence, and of conscious impotence. But could such impotence last? Must there not a renewal of strength follow, and more and more resist the above tendency?

Such a renewal of strength did take place: it was not an audacious presumption on the part of individuals, rather there were great changes in the actual conditions of life, which once more brought fresh power and courage to mankind, and altered the attitude toward ultimate questions. The gloomy and oppressive influence of declining antiquity began to fade; new peoples arose, exulting in a youthful vigour which, at first directed chiefly to outward things, was finally turned inward and necessarily brought about a new intellectual epoch. The Church, with its tangible organisation and its strict discipline, had performed an excellent service in educating the nations; but, like every phase of education, this also came to an end; so soon as the state of nonage was distinctly felt, it became unendurable; thenceforward, an institution which had been a source of blessing through long centuries threatened to become an unyielding obstruction.

Even in the Middle Ages, sentiments and movements of the kind were already manifest; but the new impulse did not attain self-consciousness until the rise of the Renaissance. Then minds awoke as if from a long sleep; life became more spontaneous, freer thoughts of God and the world, and a belief in a spiritual and divine life even beyond the pale of ecclesiastical forms, arose and created the joyful mood of a fresh dawn. Simultaneously, the eye was opened to the beauty of the surrounding world, while thought and reflection were captivated by the wealth of natural objects. Moreover, radical social changes were inaugurated, leading to new developments. The feudal system was inwardly broken; a powerful middle class arose, and with it the influence and honour of the burgher's toil in-

creased; still other social strata sought to rise, and demanded a better standard of living. All this finally led to a change also in ultimate beliefs.

But this fresh impulse, with all its fulness of life, would of itself never have produced a renovation of religion; in view of its increase of man's power and of his feeling of self-importance, it was calculated, rather, to divert him from religion. Religion could triumph only if the movement were transferred to its own sphere, only in case the progressive forces themselves felt a strong sense of the need of guidance, only if a sovereign personality appeared for whose soul the forms of the Church offered no peace, a personality powerful enough to penetrate to the very foundations of our spiritual existence in order to win that peace, and courageous enough to carry out irresistible inner convictions in the face of a supreme existing order made inviolable by the faith of mankind.

Such a personality appeared in Luther: all the spiritual currents that swept through the Reformation became flesh and blood in him; his masterful and concrete grasp of things filled the whole movement with glowing life and irresistible attraction.

"Between ourselves," Goethe wrote to Knebel, "there is nothing interesting in the whole Reformation except the character of Luther; and he, moreover, is the only thing which made an actual impression upon the multitude."

Our characterisation of the man refers particularly to the period of struggle, which finds its literary expression chiefly in the treatise on Christian freedom (*de libertate Christiana*). Here and there we shall draw also upon Melanchthon, where he has formulated the leading ideas with special clearness.

(a) *Luther*

Luther's principal change in the mediæval system consisted in transferring the religious problem in all essentials to the immediate personal life of the individual, and there working it

out in its full scope. That does not mean merely bringing a given content somewhat nearer to subjective feeling; for the Middle Ages were surely not wanting in subjective feeling, and a change therein would never have brought about a revolution in intellectual life. The innovation consisted rather in bringing the whole of transmitted religion more vigorously to bear upon man in his total being, upon a living unity of human personality, and in measuring it by that standard; that religion thus became more an affair of the whole man inevitably made it far more real and true in itself. From this change there resulted a greater concentration, a diversion of effort from the widely extended ramifications of the ecclesiastical structure to a single all-dominating central point, and a corresponding elimination, or at least, subordination, of everything which appeared, in contrast with the main issue, as of merely subsidiary importance. Inasmuch as this concentration forced into closer proximity, as it were, the whole substance of the religious world, the latent unrest and all the conflicting interests of Christendom made themselves far more acutely felt; the struggle of the whole man with the whole of the problem grew into a burden too heavy to bear; at the same time the total inadequacy of the assistance offered by the mediæval system became clearly evident. Public and personal religion could no longer peacefully tolerate and unite with each other, as they had done in the Middle Ages; rather, the stronger new life-process transformed the toleration of both into an alternative. And the choice between the alternatives could not remain doubtful. For, amid the diversity of aims, the one task of saving the soul, the moral personality, now rose supreme. Since the exaltation of the task meant demanding the perfect holiness of the entire inner man, his salvation appeared to be removed to an infinite distance, indeed, to have been made absolutely impossible: nothing else could avail in such an extremity but the highest Power. Yet God was, as it were, alienated from the immediate life of man by the mediæval system; His place had been taken by the Church with its means of grace and good works. But has not the human thereby usurped the place

of the Divine? And can we extort salvation by utmost human means, and be sure of it, when God is believed to be angered, and Christ appears first and foremost as Judge of the world? This was the state of things which confronted Luther.

Hence, a passionate longing arose for immediate access to God, a burning thirst for a saving miracle of infinite love and grace. If any such prospect of help presents itself, no regard for men or for human ordinances should be allowed to prevent the soul bent upon its eternal salvation from embracing it. On the contrary, we are told: "I care not for offences; necessity breaks iron and knows nothing of offences. I ought to spare the weak conscience, when it can be done without danger to my soul. When not, I ought to take counsel of my soul, let it give offence to the whole or to half the world."

This desired deliverance through the mediation of superhuman power has in truth, according to Luther, already taken place; it was brought about through the offer of Divine grace in Jesus Christ. Only one thing is needful for life, for justice, and for Christian freedom. That is the most holy Word of God, the Gospel of Christ. The content of the glad tidings is the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins, as brought about "by the incarnation, the suffering, the resurrection, and the transfiguration of the Son of God." "We believe that Christ suffered for us, and that it is for His sake that our sins are forgiven and that justice and eternal love are bestowed upon us. For, this faith God will accept as a justification before Him" (Augsburg Conf.). Hence, the belief that it is for Christ's sake that man has a merciful and gracious God, and that a miracle of love has spanned the otherwise impassable gulf and restored man to the state of a child of God.

The result is an energetic concentration of Christianity, an elevation of life above all visible ties to an immediate relation to God. Conformably to such concentration, the whole of life becomes subject to a great contrast, that of the law and the Gospel. The law is the expression of the Divine command, of the moral order, and is for man as man unrealisable, so soon as the

whole, the inner, the perfect, are taken as the standard; the Gospel is the proclamation of grace and salvation, and is thenceforth the proper object of faith. It is impossible that such forgiveness and reconciliation can affect man magically and without an inner impulse; it requires personal appropriation; and it is faith in which this is accomplished. But this single process which is all that must take place upon man's part is itself more than anything else a matter of Divine grace. "The rest God effects with us and through us; this He effects in us and without us." Here we must refrain from ascribing any merit to man, and give honour to God alone. "If justification is attributed to faith, it is attributed to the mercy of God, and not to human efforts, or human works, or human worthiness" (Melanchthon).

But if the establishing of a new relation between God and man is really altogether God's doing, and man is only a recipient, there springs from the change introduced by Luther a new life full of fresh and glad activity. For after grace and love have removed the contradiction, and destroyed the barrier between God and the world, the glory revealed in Christ may be shared by all believers, and it is capable of making them, as true children of God, the freest of kings. The heavier the burden of evil was formerly felt to be, the greater is the present jubilation over the new-found freedom; the more painful the doubt of salvation was, the more joyful is the absolute certainty of it. As "the Word of God comes to change and to renew the world, as often as it comes," so man is now summoned to untiring effort and achievement. In particular, the disposition to be helpful and self-sacrificing abounds. "From faith there flows love and joy in the Lord, and from love flows a glad and free spirit, anxious to do service to others without thought of gratitude, of praise or blame, of gain or loss." In this sense we are told that we ought to be a Christ to one another (*alter alterius Christus*), and in this entirely ethical reference something else is meant than with the Greek Church Fathers. "As Christ has offered Himself to me, so will I give myself to my neighbour as a sort of Christ (*quendam Christum*), in order not to do anything in this life except

what I see is necessary, useful, and salutary to my neighbour, since I myself through faith have a superabounding share in all good things in Christ." Such service to one's neighbour is the surest witness of one's own salvation through Divine grace. "To forgive one's neighbour makes us sure and certain that God has forgiven us."

However, the chief characteristic of the new life is freedom, so that Melanchthon could say in so many words, "In the end freedom is Christianity"; freedom not as a natural property, but as a favour and gift of God; freedom not of the man in himself, but of the "Christian man." But this freedom means primarily freedom from the law; that the law shall no longer terrify us with its oppression and compulsion, but that we shall do the good of our own accord. Freedom, also, from all works; not as though they could be dispensed with, but in the sense that they do not bring salvation. By faith we are not free from works, but from the ascription of value to works (*de opinionibus operum*). Herewith is consummated a change in the ideal of Christian perfection. Where works lose all independent value, no specifically holy office can be set apart from everyday life, and its incumbent clothed with peculiar majesty; there is no mark of distinction, no superabounding merit; no sphere of activity stands above others in the service of God. In accordance with the conviction that "God's Word is our sanctuary, and makes all things holy," the work of everyday and the calling of the burgher have full honour and sanctity ascribed to them. Hence, much that the older belief accounted of the first importance falls to the ground; namely, contempt of the world, double morality, the distinction between priests and laymen, the store of works of supererogation, and the doctrine of purgatory. Herewith, the privileged status and the superior power of the Church were shaken in their foundations.

A development of the greatest importance now takes place, in that the old conception of an invisible church is enormously strengthened, and at the same time the human and temporal

elements in the visible church are far more distinctly felt. That is no mere theoretical distinction; it is a liberation of the religious from the merely ecclesiastical; it is an elevation of moral and religious personality above all human authority and tradition. The Christian is indeed bound to the Divine order, and all his strength springs from Divine grace; but just for that reason subjection to human dogmas seems something shameful and slavish (*turpe et iniquiter servile*); just for that reason we are told that one "ought not to seek justification in prayers and divine exercises, such as have been invented by men." "Neither the Pope, nor a bishop, nor any man, has a right to impose a single syllable upon a Christian without the latter's consent; whatever is done otherwise, is done tyrannically." The ceremonies are now regarded as appointments having a transitory form; to confine salvation to them would mean to diminish the Divine grace; they are subject to the changes of time, and are like a scaffolding which is removed on the completion of the building. The invocation of the saints is condemned with particular emphasis, as obscuring the work of Christ and as weakening the trust in the Divine grace. This change to greater inwardness and to an insistence upon the essential is sustained and enforced by the demand that each individual fully appropriate the Divine grace, and that we attain to an unreserved faith in regeneration; it is not enough that Christ should be generally acknowledged, He must be Christ for thee and me (*ut tibi et mihi sit Christus*). The Divine life should not merely somehow touch man, and adhere to him from without; it should strike its roots into his very nature, operate in him, and pervade his whole life.

In the presence of this striving for greater sincerity, all caprice on the part of the mere individual, and all derivation of divine truth from human reason, are denounced with the utmost energy. The Divine grace comes to man as a fact, and it cannot be further deduced or translated into general concepts; it is a fact, therefore, before which reason must unconditionally bow; the speculations of reason have no place in divine things,

nor may the Scriptures be interpreted in accordance with her subjective findings, but must be taken and accepted in the plain sense of the words. To that extent, the salvation of man is here made to depend essentially upon an historical fact, which must be not merely of an invisible and spiritual, but also of a visible and material sort. There can be no surer prevention of caprice, unless the letter itself has authority, and unless the sacraments, in addition to the compulsion of faith, contain the real presence of Christ.

From these conditions there springs a life full of movement and intense interest. A securer inward peace is won through love and grace; a childlike relation to God develops, and with it an inner gladness, which illuminates also the life with the world, and even throws a glamour over external nature. But all the inner growth of life by no means converts the earthly existence into an abode of pure bliss. For the opposition of a dark and hostile world persists; we are surrounded by a world of profound unreason. "God has cast us into the world under the devil's sway, so that we possess no paradise here, but must expect all manner of misfortune every hour, misfortunes to our person, to wife, to property, to honour." Suffering and the sense of it are at first increased by the entrance upon the new life: "the more of a Christian one is, the more exposed is he to evil, to suffering, and to death." The hardest to bear, however, is the temptation to doubt. For doubt, and the opposition of the reason, are continually being aroused; inner assaults and conflicts which, being spiritual, are far more serious and dangerous than all bodily ones, are constantly being renewed. But finally, the consciousness of salvation through Divine grace and love rises free and triumphant above all opposition; while a steadfastness which is at once humble and defiant proves itself superior to the greatest obstacles. The childlike disposition merges with manly courage, with a heroic spirit, which does not shun the world but bravely takes up the battle against it. Thus, even that which is hostile must ultimately serve to promote inner growth. "It is spiritual power which reigns in the pres-

ence of the enemy and is mighty amid all sorts of oppression. This means nothing but that virtue is perfected in weakness, and that in all things I can increase in salvation, so that even the cross and death are compelled to serve me and to co-operate toward my salvation." Yet, even with such an inner victory, this life is not the end and completion, but a mere preliminary (*præcursus*), or rather, a beginning (*initium*) of the future life. "It is not yet done and finished, but it is in progress; it is not the goal but the way. Everything does not glow and shine, but everything is being swept."

The power of initiative at work in this development of life is re-enforced by the distinct consciousness of opposition to the traditional forms in which the divine truth of Christianity seems to be distorted and obscured by human additions. There are two foes to combat: Romish arrogance and justification by works, and Greek speculation and subjectivity. The contest with the Romish influence is consciously the more important, yet the opposition to Hellenism is in reality not much less prominent. In Luther's opinion, Hellenism had flooded Christianity with foreign systems of thought, chiefly the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic, and, in consequence, not only distorted it in detail, but transformed it as a whole too much into a mere theory or view of the world. Speculation, he thought, had here taken the place of religion; human reason had settled the principal facts to suit itself, now one way, now another: and the matter of chief concern is in danger of becoming a mere subject of sport, when allegorical interpretation is allowed to make anything of anything. This interpreting, with its various meanings, roused to bitter antagonism the simple sense for truth of Luther's German nature; with irresistible force, he opposed to it the simple facts, the plain literal sense. It is the recourse to history which would here fain exclude all philosophical speculation; and it is the acceptance of the fundamentally ethical character of Christianity which would exclude all intellectualism. Accordingly, the characteristic peculiarity of Christianity appears

to be worked out in its purity, and at the same time a resumption of early, genuine Christianity to be consummated.

That the Reformation was no simple restoration but a development and a revolution scarcely admits of dispute. In its search for an immediate relation of the soul to God, and for a pure inwardness of the moral and religious life, it might well make appeal to early Christianity; for early Christianity really possessed those elements. But it possessed them along with others; it had not yet given them the exclusiveness, the repellent power, which they received from Luther. Mediæval Christianity, too, by no means rejected immediacy and inwardness, although the place which these occupied had been still further restricted, and they were forced to adapt themselves even more to tendencies of another sort. The innovation accomplished by the Reformation lay, therefore, neither in its introduction of something entirely new, nor in its resuscitation of something wholly discarded and buried, but rather in the fact that between the two elements which had hitherto peacefully existed side by side, between, namely, a religion of pure inwardness and the religion of the ecclesiastical system, there had sprung up an irreconcilable opposition; and this opposition was due to the fact that that inwardness had become far more an affair of the whole man, indeed, an all-dominating force. That is the way in which great changes in the religious world are wont to take place: there is a desire to restore to present consciousness something original; but by fixing attention upon it alone, it becomes intensified, everything opposed to it is eliminated, an inner transformation results, life's centre of gravity is shifted, and thus the sense of the original also is radically altered. Hence the Reformation does not restore the old, but inaugurates a new, Christianity.

The new character of the Reformation is attested by changes of a very decisive sort. The more prominent position accorded to the inner life elevates the spiritual above the sensuous and gives it greater freedom; the confusion of the two, transmitted to Christianity by declining antiquity, and still further con-

founded by the Middle Ages, now disappears. The sensuous was thus absorbed into the more fundamental spiritual process as an essential constituent belonging to its full reality. Such a fusion placed the religious life in danger of becoming seriously materialised; much resulted which, with a freer detachment of the spiritual from the sensuous, would certainly have appeared as magic, as crass superstition and insufferable idolatry. The Reformation consummated such an emancipation of the spiritual, and at the same time degraded the sensuous into a mere image and symbol. The liberation thus brought about appeared both as the true fulfilment of a religion which required that God should be worshipped in spirit and in truth, and as an elevation of life to manly independence and majesty, as compared with the state of nonage. This sharper demarcation of the sensuous and the spiritual had a profound effect also upon the ethical and the practical. For the removal of the confusion between them led directly to the rejection of the ascetic ideal of life, which sees something evil in the sensuous as such. That view was right, so far as the refined and corrupt sensuousness of the latest period of antiquity is concerned; but it lost its justification when applied to the more natural and spontaneous, although robust and even crude, sensuousness of modern peoples. Without such a new environment, the Reformation would hardly have won emancipation from the monastic ideal of life.

Evident, also, is a general trend, not only of religion but of the whole of life, toward greater activity. That this activity is essentially unlike the restlessness of mere natural vigour, and that no mere insolent lust of antagonism or wanton mania for innovation enticed Luther into this momentous struggle, are facts which only the crassest misunderstanding of his nature and purpose could mistake. In reality, the whole development of life here bore within itself the consciousness of unconditional dependence upon infinite power; all strength admittedly came from God; and nothing but solicitude for the salvation of the immortal soul and for the rescue of Christian truth could have forced the breach with an ecclesiastical system which had been

hitherto so passionately venerated. That which is new and all-important, however, is the fact that the creation of a new life peculiarly one's own was looked upon as the chief result of the Divine activity; the direct relation to a transcendent power enables man himself to transcend the world and frees him from all human dependence. Henceforth he does not need to look for the support of life without, having found the surest support of all in the inner presence of infinite love and grace. Piety, too, assumes a more active character, and outgrows that blind devotion which earlier Christianity esteemed so highly. At the same time, the hierarchical system, which found the essence of religion in a vast structure outside the soul, is shaken to its foundations. Luther and the other reformers did this system much injustice, by imputing to its human representatives as a personal fault what in fact was only a necessary consequence of historical conditions, and by treating particular defects of the age as permanent characteristics of the system. But that the above historical conditions had passed away, or at least were beginning to disappear, the Reformation showed in a convincing manner; whatever impossibilities and errors lay concealed in the imposing hierarchical organisation were certain to be distinctly felt the moment that the inner world of the spirit was recognised as the true abode of God's kingdom, and the immediate presence of this kingdom was found in the soul of each individual. It now became evident that the separation of the substance of religion from the life of the soul endangered the spirit of religion; that it tended toward the substitution of the Church for God and ecclesiasticism for religion. If the individual spontaneity of man is excluded as far as possible from the religious life, goodness and the divine influences can be imparted to him only from without and in a miraculous manner; there is danger both of coarse materialism and of inner decadence; the bounds between religion and magic become obliterated. Moreover, all the efforts to disconnect the Church from the standpoint of individuals cannot prevent human ideas and interests from entering into its structure; in particular, the idea

of power takes a dangerous hold upon activity, so that the ostensibly divine becomes strongly humanised. In contrast with the above, the Reformation upholds the view that man can never be raised above the merely human except by a divine miracle wrought within his inner nature, and that only upon this inner foundation can the kingdom of God among men be built.

That means a life and death struggle with the older way of thinking; a new epoch accordingly dawns for humanity. To acknowledge the higher character of this new movement is by no means equivalent to the declaration that it is superior in all respects. Much that was valuable in the old was sacrificed, since the rejection of all usages is an undeniable abuse; *e. g.*, is it necessary that the monastic life, a life withdrawn from the world and devoted solely to the aims of the spirit, be discarded along with double morality and justification by works? Moreover, in certain vital points, the old conserved the necessary requirements of religion much better than the new. *E. g.*, the former more vigorously defended the indispensable independence of the religious, as against the political, community; it more energetically resisted a merely secular development of civilisation, a decline into mere expediency and utility. But the immaturity, and even the errors, of the new movement, cannot preclude the admission that in it a higher principle has come into existence, a principle which, at first intended only as a religious one, must eventually transform the whole of life.

The immaturity of the Reformation is indeed the more in need of emphasis, the higher the estimate placed upon the significance of the change. Least surprising is the fact that the new could not wholly free itself from the old, but perpetuated much that did not accord with its own nature. Thus, the shifting of the centre of life to the sphere of moral conduct would necessarily have led to an examination and transformation of that world of thought, so largely based on Greek speculation, which is preserved in the dogmas of the early Church. So, too, confirming the spiritual character of Christianity would have necessitated the eradicating of anthropomorphism from religious

ideas and emotions; but anthropomorphism is rather strengthened than otherwise in the doctrine of an angry God demanding satisfaction, and in the doctrines of the atonement and of vicarious suffering.

Likewise, in its inner character, the new often has not attained the perfect elaboration which would accord with its own fundamental aim. The great innovation demands that the spiritual life of man should form a new unity above all special activities; and the whole of life can be transformed only in case the moral task results in an elevation of the whole of man's world, and is not confined to a special domain. Such an aim is operative and exerts a certain force in the movement, but it is not worked out cleanly and symmetrically. It often appears as if the intention were merely to transfer the focus of life from the intellect to the feelings and the will; as *e. g.*, Melanchthon calls the "Heart with its emotions the most important and the principal part of man." There is danger that the movement may veer too much into the merely psychological and subjective, that the deepening of the moral life may remain too much confined to individuals, and not extend its influence beyond the inner nature to the whole work of civilisation. The result is a dualism in life: on the one side, a religion consisting merely of a certain subjective disposition and mood; on the other, a cultivated life possessing no relation to ultimate questions. With Luther himself, the belief that the end of the world is near at hand surely also tended to the same result; for whoever believes that, cannot well undertake the upbuilding of a new order of life. Consequently, the activity which here appears in the deepest things of life is not disseminated through life's whole extent; on the contrary, passive endurance of this evil world, a submission to existing powers, an acceptance of the maxim, "Be silent, suffer, refrain, and endure!" are often made to appear as the right attitude. Thus acquiescing in the irrational world, Lutheranism exhibited far less power and efficiency in dealing with general conditions than did the other branch of the Reformation.

But not only was the new life immature, it contained within

itself an unyielding and, in the end, unendurable contradiction. The religious life was to be based upon a direct relation to God, and found, accordingly, in pure inwardness. But, at the same time, it was necessary to guard at any cost against its falling under the power of subjective caprice and so of losing its truth; with good right, therefore, Luther demands an immovable certitude founded upon fact, corroborating the inner certitude and giving strength for the conflict with a hostile world. This superior and indubitable certitude can be sought to-day only within the life of the spirit itself, in a new stage which directly evinces a divine reality. But Luther, under the conditions of his time, could not well find such certainty, such a firm foothold, elsewhere than in an historical fact, *i. e.*, a fact lying within history and historically transmitted. He accepted as such fact the Incarnation of God in Christ and the Atonement of love; in view of its unintelligibility by the powers of reason, this fact must not only be certain in itself, but it must be handed down to us by sure guarantees and in a manner excluding all doubt. Hence, the craving for unimpeachable witnesses and sanctions. Such a secure support Luther found above all in the Bible, as the "Word of God"; he found it also in the common teaching of the early Church; he found it, lastly, in the sacraments. All subjective interpretation of these evidences, all dissipation of them into mere notions, must be prevented. Thus a principal part of belief is the unconditional authority of the Scriptures, coupled with a return to the literal sense of the text, which is assumed to be something simple and intelligible to all. "This above all must be incontestable for a Christian, that the Holy Scriptures are a spiritual light, far clearer than the sun itself, especially in all that concerns salvation and what is necessary." The dread of deviation from the letter, and the constant demand for something tangible, and something exempt from interpretation and discussion, furnish an explanation also of the degeneration into magic of the doctrine of the sacraments, something which Luther elsewhere so energetically combated. He is here in danger of ascribing full reality only to a mixture of the

sensuous and the spiritual, and thus of relapsing into the mediæval way of confounding them.

There is a contradiction in all this, which the arbitrary *fiat* of the powerful man might indeed suppress, but could not solve. Where the religious life is found in a wholly direct relation to God, the historical element may indeed be an indispensable means of the awakening and education of man, but, as incapable of being immediately experienced, it ought not to be made a part of faith itself. And where, as with Luther, salvation is essentially connected with an historical fact, there results a fatal discord, which must involve all the fundamental concepts. Thus, faith is now not merely the unconditional trust of the whole soul in the infinite love and grace, but also a compliant acceptance of a number of authoritatively transmitted doctrines which are in direct conflict with reason. So, too, the Word is not merely God's own saving act, but also the documentary definition of it in the biblical books. From the fact that a purely inward religious life was thus made to depend upon something which could not become an object of immediate experience, there have resulted a great deal of spiritual oppression and many heavy burdens of conscience. Moreover, Luther's historical position assumed a contradictory aspect through the fact that he outwardly attacked in the severest manner the same views which, in a somewhat modified form, he was obliged to include in his own system of thought. He aimed at emancipation from ecclesiastical authority, yet was forced to introduce authority of another kind; he sought to dispense with all intellectualism, yet ended with intellectualism of another sort, since instead of speculation and mysticism he required a knowledge of historical data; in fact, the Church, with Luther, was upon the point of becoming pre-eminently a doctrinal association, a mere school of the pure Word. Luther had assailed Rome in the name of freedom and pure spirituality, yet he was soon forced to champion authority and the letter, in opposition to the "Zealots," the "Anabaptists," the "enthusiasts," and the "fanatics"; and he did so with harsh severity and not without

injustice. The appeal to the spirit, which was what first made his own position possible, he turned into a bitter reproach of others. "But, my good friend, what does the spirit amount to? I have also been in the spirit, and have also seen the spirit." Consequently, ecclesiastical Protestantism contains this contradiction: in the inner uplift which it gave, it began a work calculated to revolutionise the world; but in the execution of its task, it again fell under the influence of the body of thought whose dominion it had sought to break.

Luther himself, however, arrived at a middle position, which was not free from caprice, and which he imposed upon his age with rude severity: a particularly grievous oppression resulted here from the fact that, on the one hand, the personal conviction of each individual was appealed to, and, upon the other, the decision was strictly prescribed, and any deviation therefrom stigmatised as an offence.

Yet this contradiction, which not only appears such to-day, but was one from the outset, was, under the prevailing conditions, an unavoidable necessity; the unparalleled confusion of the times would have created the danger of a general disintegration, had not an iron hand drawn a middle course, and defended it right and left regardless of consequences, thus at once preserving historical continuity and making progress. There lay something deeply tragic in the fact that the new movement could establish itself historically only through a contradiction with its own inmost nature; and Luther himself was the principal sufferer. He imposed upon others nothing which he did not first impose upon himself; if he assumed a high-handed and domineering attitude toward others, he did it chiefly because he had the severest trials of his own to overcome, which often "wrung from him the cold sweat"; because his conflict with others was at the same time a conflict with himself. And precisely in these conflicts, the transparent veracity, the perfect loyalty and genuineness of the man, are revealed with special distinctness. He devoted the highest conceivable earnestness to eternal things, and by such an earnestness of his whole personality he

afforded a secure support to mankind for centuries; possessed at once of great power and childlike simplicity, and of a rugged and rough manner, he stands ever memorable before the eyes of the German people, an impressive admonisher exhorting to constant watchfulness for the soul. And, just as he personally fought his way triumphantly through all the confusions, doubts, and dangers to a position of absolute security and deep peace, so his work, aside from all that is doubtful and ephemeral, represents a type of life which is of permanent significance. An inexhaustible well-spring of life is here disclosed in the inner movements and even the conflicting emotions of the soul; humble trust and a courageous, vigorous spirit here merge into one; man is brought into the immediate presence of the Infinite and Eternal, and so exalted to incomparable dignity and worth. Above all, spiritual life now becomes a strife for and against worlds. Inasmuch as independence, the sense of freedom, and courageous living are here ennobled, indeed sanctified, by being grounded in infinite love and grace, an altogether new view of the world is revealed, and a fundamentally new relation to reality established. In this sense, the Reformation became the animating soul of the modern world, the principal motive force of its progress. In this larger sense, the greatest thinkers and poets of the last century, men like Kant and Goethe, have gratefully felt and acknowledged themselves to be its followers; in truth, every phase of modern life which is not directly or indirectly connected with the Reformation has something insipid and paltry about it.

But even in its narrower, ecclesiastical form, the problems and conflicts largely spring from the fact that a higher aim pervades the whole, that the task is increased, that a closer relation of man's nature to the source of truth and love is sought. Whoever concedes that this deepening has taken place will honour the spirit of the whole, notwithstanding its immaturity, and will welcome the dawning of a new and more genuine life. The mediæval system embraced the most diverse interests, and cleverly adjusted them to one another and combined their

results. This marvellous system of inner and outer accommodation, this incomparable masterpiece of organisation, with its accumulated knowledge of mankind and its vast historical experience, possessed an undoubted advantage in its effects upon social life and upon the visible conditions of existence; it had a broader historical foundation, greater rationality, and a riper culture. The new movement can claim superiority only where the belief prevails that, as Luther expresses it, "not for the price of the whole world can a single soul be bought"; where man accepts the momentous tasks of life in joyful trust; where, besides, in the face of the severest conflicts and the clash of the deepest human interests, there is a recognition both of the immeasurable worth of personality and of the establishment of a kingdom of independent spirituality.

Hence, the uncompromising alternative which characterises the view of life developed by the Reformation, particularly in Luther's conception of it, may serve also for its own criticism. Whoever rejects the above deepening in spirituality as superfluous or impossible, cannot look upon the Reformation otherwise than as a leap in the dark, a stirring up of wild passion and fatal schism; whoever, on the contrary, admits the possibility, the inevitableness, of the change, must accept it, with all its unsolved problems, as a mighty deed of liberation and as the dawn of a new day.

(b) *Zwingli and Calvin*

Although Luther unquestionably forms the spiritual head of the Reformation, and the development which took place in his personality must be accepted as the culmination of the whole movement, the leading men of the Reformed Church possessed far too much independence in the influence they exerted upon life to be passed over here in silence. Our brief account, which in the main follows Dilthey, has also made use, in the part on Zwingli, of the excellent work by Stähelin.

As compared with Luther, Zwingli was much more closely related to Humanism and to the general culture of his time; he

was also more strongly impelled toward an active co-operation in contemporary affairs; he did not break with the world in the radical manner of Luther, nor impart to the religious life such a defiant self-sufficiency, nor ascribe to it such a superior majesty. But, although there is less depth in the whole, many contradictions and much asperity disappear, the religious side is more closely interwoven with practical life, and the world of thought becomes far more rational, than with the founder and hero of the Reformation.

"What distinguished Zwingli from Luther in the treatment of faith is the closer union in which for him the religious and the moral aspects of faith stood, and which, accordingly, led him to look upon the relation of law and Gospel rather on the side of their affinity than on that of their opposition"; he did not want to recognise any other reformation of the Church "than one through which both the moral and social life of the people should be permeated and transformed by the renewing and sanctifying power of the Gospel" (Stähelin). In harmony with this is the fact that, as regards Christ, he emphasised the ethical and the ideal human side, and did not dwell merely upon the Passion. A more rational and freer mode of thought appeared not only in his doctrine of the sacraments, but also in a sharper demarcation between original sin and actual sin, in the receding of the conceptions of the devil and of the end of the world, and in the extension of the idea of revelation so as to include not Christendom only, but the whole of mankind.

But, although Zwingli takes pains everywhere to point out a relation of man to God, he sees in this relationship no mere natural endowment of man but a revelation of God; with a decisiveness equal to that of Luther and Melanchthon, he rejects the scholastic doctrine of a natural knowledge of God antecedent to faith. Likewise, Christianity retains a central position and a unique character. For in the appearance of Christ lay the last and the profoundest revelation of perfect goodness. Henceforth the entire dependence of man upon God is clear, as is also the fact that this relation affords him complete blessed-

ness. The true religion, accordingly, is this: that man finds himself dependent solely upon God and trusts solely in His goodness. "This is the well-spring of our religion, that we recognise in God, Himself uncreated, the creator of all things, who possesses all and freely gives all."

Consequently, everything must vanish that comes between us and God; to set one's hope upon anything else than upon God Himself is a superstition; "Such an unassailable and infallible power as faith ought to be can never be based upon anything created. For how could that which at one time did not exist be a foundation for our trust?" The activity of the invisible, of that which is superior to every form of nature, is perfectly evident to inner consciousness; "God's greatest miracle is that He places Himself in relation with the human heart, so that we recognise Him as our Father." To such a view, the old doctrine of the means of grace, a good deal of which is preserved in Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper, must appear as mere magic, and hence be rejected.

But dependence upon God by no means destroys man's own activity; rather, man should devote himself with his whole strength to becoming a vessel for the Divine life and action, in order thus to bear a likeness to the tireless activity of God, through whom and in whom all things live, and move, and have their being. "To act, in universal relationship with the all-comprehensive highest active force, is the soul of this system." "Since God is a force," Zwingli says in one instance, "He will not suffer that one whose heart He has drawn to Himself should be idle." "Only the faithful know how Christ allows his followers no leisure, and how serene and happy they are in their work." "It is not the duty of a Christian to talk in a grand way about doctrines, but steadily to co-operate with God in the accomplishment of great and difficult things" (after Dilthey). Even the doctrine of election by grace, which at the first view appears completely to annul the independence of the agent, in these relations rather enhances his importance and activity. For where God Himself directly decides upon the salvation or

damnation of the individual, the immediate relation to Him is everything, the inestimable worth of the religious process within the individual is obvious, the believer can feel himself wholly secure in God and know that he is the instrument of His perfectly good and omnipotent will. Moreover, with Zwingli, "the thought of rejection noticeably recedes behind that of election to blessedness" (Stähelin).

Thus the idea of an active and manly Christianity, made prominent by the Reformation, was developed here in a particularly effective form; that is, religion is continually being transformed into moral conduct and thereby sanctioned, all the other aspects of life unite themselves harmoniously with it, and the individual has his independent task in the life of the community: it is a fresh and glad spirit which emanates from Zwingli in every direction. Even if it be in good part true that the reason why everything here fits together so smoothly and assumes such clear outlines is that Zwingli does not feel the dark side of life and the contradictions of our spiritual existence with anything like the force, nor fight his way through them with such deep emotions, as did Luther; and even though his practical tendency might easily result in a confusion of religion and politics, indeed, of religion and the constabulary, still, the peculiar significance of this simple and healthy, fresh and buoyant Christianity should have permanent recognition.

It is in another guise that the fundamental idea of reformed Christianity appears in the case of Calvin. Born to organise and to rule, his mind is severely methodical and unswerving in its logical consistency; every detail is fitted into a single structure of thought. Yet not only the form but also the fundamental feeling is a different one. The type of thought is theocentric, in the manner of Augustine; the honour of God is the central idea; all creatures subserve His glory; it is the absolute will of God which determines every thing, and in a manner unintelligible to man. All doubt, and even all natural self-confidence, are an offence against the majesty of God; the whole of man's life should be dedicated to God, to whom it has belonged from the

outset; God works everywhere without mediation, hence all secondary causes and human instrumentalities drop out; everything should be eliminated from worship which degrades the purely spiritual essence into what is visible and merely representative.

Yet, even here, the activity of the individual person is fully preserved, indeed, if that be possible, still further increased; just as God Himself is looked upon as the highest, unceasingly operative activity, so, too, the service of God must be that of an active life. But activity loses the character of radiant gladness which it possessed with Zwingli; it assumes a stern and austere, indeed a mournful and gloomy, aspect; life becomes a hard and unrelenting struggle to realise the purposes of God. Whatever is apart from that struggle, all delight in natural things, is forbidden and condemned as a robbery of the Highest. "This religiosity is distinguished from that of Luther by the rough duties of a warrior of God under strict discipline which fills every moment of life. It is distinguished from Catholic devoutness by the power of independent action which it produces. But its character is determined by the way in which the religious observance of the whole life results from the principle of theocracy and election by grace, by the way in which every direct and indirect relation to other men finds its motive in that theocracy, and, finally, by the way in which a proud severity toward the enemies of God is here justified on religious grounds" (Dilthey).

Closely connected with this affirmation of the omnipotent will of God and of the unconditional obedience of man is the resumption of Old Testament ideas which became evident in the life of the reformed communities. This life is full of deep earnestness and is apparently joyless, but it possesses an indomitable energy; there is not only the strength of patience, but also the impulse to act; it confers an immeasurable power both upon the individual and upon the self-sacrificing congregation, the chosen instrument of God. Nowhere else was there so much effected toward elevating the Reformation into a world power; and although here, too, the Church eventually took

refuge in an orthodox creed, it was from this branch of the Reformation that the mightiest impulses toward civic freedom and freedom of thought arose; and it was here that, out of the bosom of the Reformation, modern life won its way to independence.

II. CHRISTIANITY AND THE LAST CENTURIES

However unreservedly we may accept the necessity of the Reformation, and however high an estimate we may place upon its importance, the fact remains that it profoundly altered the general conditions of life, and also that serious evils resulted from the rupture. The antagonism between the two confessions roused the passions peculiar to religion to the highest pitch, and precluded for the time being any general interest in the work of civilisation. Occupied in refuting an opponent, men often forgot, as indeed they still do to-day, the content of their own lives. Moreover, the separation brought with it, for both sides, the danger of narrowness. On the part of Catholicism, the increased authority, concentration, and stability might easily result in a narrowing of the characters of men and in a dread of freedom of any sort. On the Protestant side, on the contrary, the supreme solicitude for the individual soul might readily cause indifference toward all intellectual interests, split religion up into a number of sectarian doctrines, and produce much cantankerous obstinacy on the part of individuals. Moreover, the great historical connections which the Church had thus far preserved, connections reaching far back into the early history of the Orient, were here lost. In their stead, Protestantism possessed the advantage of greater freedom, and of a history richer in content; above all, the enhanced worth of personality and the increase of personal responsibility gave it great power and the capacity continually to stir new spiritual depths.

Catholicism likewise was not left unchanged by the flight of time; a close inspection reveals far greater modification, and far more variety, than is superficially visible. In particular, it is

traversed by the opposition between a system which aimed mainly at power and dominion and was little concerned with the inner state of the soul, between Ultramontanism, in short, and a purely religious belief which regarded religion as an end in itself. The two tendencies indeed are often inseparably united in the same individual; yet in themselves there is a wide divergence between them, and Catholicism owes its inner life wholly to the second tendency. In spite, however, of the inwardness, tenderness, and delicacy which the latter gave to the spiritual life of the individual—suffice it to recall Pascal—it was at a decided disadvantage in its effect upon society as a whole, when compared with the rigid organisation of Ultramontanism. The future alone can tell whether from this stand-point a progress of life as a whole is possible.

The antitheses in the case of Protestantism are more obvious; they spring from its innermost nature. Protestantism originated through the fact that a personality of overwhelming native force arose with mighty power and opposed to the ecclesiastical order the compelling demands of its own inner nature as a higher divine right. It cannot renounce this personal origin, nor the commanding place which personality has held in it, without surrendering its own *raison d'être*. But at the same time a special content, a peculiar form of Christianity, was developed and set up as a norm for all. This form clearly disclosed the contrasts latent in Christianity, opposed to the earlier form, as being too rationalistic, a tendency toward the ethical and historical, and, by establishing an immediate relation of the soul to God, gave to life a profound depth. Still, it was a particular form that was here developed; it required a particular condition of the soul; it was also modified in various ways by the individuality, the natural disposition, even the temperament, of the founders. Would it not necessarily become an oppressive bondage, if this form were to be binding upon all? would not succeeding generations lay claim to the same right to satisfy their religious needs which the Reformers exercised, and without which there would have been no Reformation?

Protestantism would hardly have attained the position in the modern world which it has attained, had it not formed an alliance with modern civilisation, and were it not, in so far, a religion of civilisation. It is presented to us as such a religion by German literature at the period of its highest development. The specifically ecclesiastical element is here as far as possible eliminated; the sharpness of the contrasts is softened under the influence of a more joyful life; more cheerfulness and trust in human nature arise, and man gains both greatness and worth in himself and an inner relation to others. At the same time religion in its widest sense, as Panentheism, continues to exert an influence, and adds to the earnestness and deeper meaning of life. A wide divergence from early Protestantism is here unmistakable; the whole character of life is essentially altered. Since the earlier form persists, and even puts forth new life, the Protestantism of modern days embraces two different religions, the difficulty of keeping which tolerably united increases in proportion as the historical sense of the nineteenth century brings the peculiarity and the antagonism of both forms more distinctly before our eyes. But this duality is a source of strength in Protestantism as well as a source of weakness; it is only where there is breadth like this that it is capable of keeping the two poles of modern life in a fruitful relation; and even if Protestantism shows itself quite unprepared to grapple with the above inner antagonism, the honesty and the sincerity with which it takes up the problems, and the whole-souled energy which it devotes to their solution, remain in themselves something great.

Their importance, indeed, can be fully appreciated only by one who recognises the severity of the conflict with modern civilisation into which Christianity has fallen. In its rich unfolding of life the modern world has brought an untold wealth of things new and great, whose influence no one can escape and whose fruits we all enjoy. But with this incontestable gain there is closely interwoven a characteristic tendency which is deeply involved in doubt and conflict. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century the modern world has wrought out a new type

of life which departs widely from the Christian. A powerful life-impulse forces the thinking and the activity of man more and more into the world which Christianity regarded as a lower one; in this world reason reigns or, wherever it is not yet present, the labour of man seeks to create it; forces spring up *ad infinitum*, and the increase of power becomes the highest and all-sufficient goal of life. The greater the strength and self-consciousness which this new type acquires, the more evident it becomes that it is incompatible with Christianity, in fact, that the fundamental tendencies of the two run directly counter to each other. Their peaceable and friendly co-operation, such as existed in earlier times, becomes impossible; a clear understanding is increasingly necessary; continually harsher is the rejection of Christianity by those who follow the specifically modern tendency. But just as the danger to Christianity seems to be greatest, a turn of affairs completely changes the situation and again starts a movement in its direction. Faith in the infallibility and self-sufficiency of modern civilisation begins to waver; modern life itself presents so much that is dark and evil, and the increase of power at the same time yields such a strong sense of inner emptiness, that the whole conduct of human life becomes again a problem, and we are forced once more to fight for a significant content of our existence. And in the search for new aims Christianity, with its spiritual depths and its power of reconciling the great antitheses, may very well assume a new importance; it may appear that it has by no means exhausted itself, but that in a new form it can still call forth fresh forces which are indispensable to the aims and struggles of mankind.

Further evidence of this may be seen in the attitude of the modern thinkers toward Christianity, in so far as they are of a constructive and substantial sort, and do not stop with merely clever reflections and destructive criticism. Their attitude toward the ecclesiastical form of Christianity is certainly unsympathetic, if not hostile; yet no one of them wishes to give up Christianity entirely; rather each seeks to bring it somehow

into relation with his own belief, and so through such a connection to strengthen the latter; and it is precisely with the best in his own thought that he strives to connect Christianity. In this way, each one fashions his own Christianity—Spinoza and Leibniz, Locke and Rousseau, Kant and Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer—and these several views taken together give a true picture of the intellectual movement of modern times. If, then, in spite of the differences, modern thinkers all adhere to Christianity in some form, they must, indeed, find or feel in it something which modern civilisation of itself cannot create. In truth, it would be easy to show that in the work of them all there is a spiritual depth and inwardness and an ideal estimate of things which is less a product of their own thought than it is a result of the traditional associations of the Christian life.

This borrowed element was earlier taken for granted, and it merged, undistinguished, with elements of another kind; now, its separation and the crisis which has come upon civilisation as a whole, compel it to show itself more distinctly and within more clearly defined boundaries; now, moreover, Christianity must subject itself to self-examination, and distinguish more clearly between the part which belongs to a particular age, and the part which is able to encompass all ages and continually to bring forth new results.

Christianity has not spent itself in the forms which have thus far appeared. In the first centuries, it powerfully and consistently promoted ethical concentration and the regeneration of life; but the circles to which its influence extended stood at first outside the civilised world, and its efforts showed more subjective warmth than intellectual depth. With the further decline of antiquity came the period of Christian triumph; but Christianity developed into a universal system only under the resistless sway of the Greco-Roman world, which also brought with it all the evils of a weary and languid age. The Middle Ages presented the more positive task of educating the new peoples, but the conditions of the time gave to this work an external and compulsory character; the inward life languished beneath the

sway of organisation; spirituality wasted away under the pronounced materialism of the religious life. In opposition to these tendencies the Reformation arose, and by simplifying Christianity succeeded also in rejuvenating it; but we have just been engaged in showing how little the Reformation meant a definitive conclusion. Christianity next had to protect the deeper content of life from the secular and self-conscious civilisation of the modern world; latterly, this civilisation has itself reached a crisis, from which only a radical deepening of life and an inner renovation of man can rescue it: ever more irresistibly are we driven back from the ceaseless activities of civilisation to the problems of the soul, to the struggle to make life significant and to preserve a spiritual existence. These questions can hardly be taken up and profitably discussed without the problem of religion coming to the fore; and in the new century this problem will presumably more and more dominate men's minds. In the result—which may not be reached without serious catastrophes—it will indeed appear that Christianity not only has a great past but also a great future.

PART THIRD

THE MODERN WORLD

A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN WORLD

A GENERAL characterisation of the modern world seems more difficult to-day than ever before. For the very development of the modern idea has originated an ever-growing number of new problems, and it has become more and more difficult to define, in set terms, what we mean by that idea. Postponing, then, any attempt at the formulation of general principles, let us take as our starting point the historical conditions which prevailed at the outset of the modern period. The dawn of a new life was rendered inevitable by the fact that the traditional order had been shaped by a set of circumstances and feelings which were the product of their time and could not possibly remain in force forever. The peculiarity of that older outlook was the way in which it connected Christianity—a Christianity condensed into an ecclesiastical organisation—with the ancient culture. This culture again was the work of special nations, and at the same time the expression of a particular stage of spiritual development. With the appearance of new nations it might easily seem strange and unsatisfying. As the spiritual life deepened in essential respects, it could not but drive out the old dogmatism. Now new nations had in fact stepped into the world-arena—chief among them the Germanic races—and they were beginning to make their spiritual individuality increasingly felt. Again, Christianity itself had become more inward, a change which, when fully realised, could not fail to destroy the old easy, happy relations with antiquity which had seemed so natural to the Middle Ages. In these facts there lay already the germs of important reforms. But the change which did most to bring about the final rupture was the revolution in men's disposition

and feeling toward life. The old dogmatism with its claim to finality and its submission to ecclesiastical control corresponded to the desires of men who were weary and self-distrustful, and therefore credulous toward authority and eager after signs. Now, however, new life and fresh courage had awakened; men willed to stand on their feet and look their problems in the face; they must seek new ways for themselves. The break with the past and the realisation of a new life had become a pressing necessity.

And in the break itself there were already indications of the direction which the new movement would take: it bade fair to be the direct opposite of the position hitherto maintained. In the first place it could start only from individuals, which meant for the individual a position of independence and ascendency instead of his being, as in the Middle Ages, merely a member of certain given corporations, obliged to live according to their ordinances. Secondly, the individual who had rejected the traditional culture as unsatisfactory was bound to believe in the possibility of progress. Lastly, it was impossible to withstand an established order sanctioned by history, without an active faith in a reason unfettered by time and place and not limited, as in the Middle Ages, to the work of annotating and expounding historical tradition. Thus, from the very beginning the modern period was inoculated with a germ of individualism, of belief in progress and in reason. Taken as a whole, it stands over against the mediæval system of Authority as a system of Freedom.

But the chief characteristic of modern endeavour is its interest in the world and its vigorous appropriation of the world's resources. This is in obvious contrast to the closing period of antiquity and the time in which Christianity took shape. Then tired humanity found a support and meaning for life only in an escape from the visible world into a kingdom of faith and mystical emotion: in its effort to reach an ultimate unity it had lost all joy in variety. Now, on the other hand, the new life-impulse urges us with all its force out into the world; we want a larger

life: we want to come to close quarters with things and wrestle with their contradictions. The sentimental life of faith and emotion yields place to diligent work and manly activity: the whole aspect of existence is transformed. But this new life which at first might seem so simple soon proves to be terribly complicated. Its aim is to bring the soul and the world into closest intimacy, to make life world-embracing, to draw the world into the very being of man; surely no easy task, now that profound spiritual upheavals have so widely estranged life from the world, and sunk it so deeply within itself. Moreover, modern scientific thought begins to perceive that the soul is not immediately akin to the world about us, and that the one cannot therefore directly influence the other, as the older view maintained. If, however, a deep chasm makes itself felt between the two and a mutual adjustment is necessary to bridge the gulf, then the old simple view of reality becomes impossible; the world which was man's without effort, he must now build up with unutterable labour and toil. We already see that modern life is no peaceful possessing and unfolding, but rather a ceaseless conflict, a struggle for the very foundations of its existence.

A sharp opposition has indeed arisen, an implacable strife. The desired union of soul and world may be understood in two radically different ways. It may be held, on the one hand, that the soul absorbs and assimilates the world; on the other, that the world absorbs and assimilates the soul. Hence arise two fundamentally different systems of reality: the idealistic and the realistic. Each is profoundly influential, and modifies essentially the whole aspect of existence. The soul cannot seek to subdue the world to itself without experiencing a widening of its own nature. Spiritual endeavour frees itself from a merely personal standpoint, and so far as possible abstracts from the specific limitations of this or that nationality or religion. The spiritual life is now concentrated upon what is most universal in its nature and upon its own untrammelled energies; it is impelled only by its own inward necessities. This change is more particularly noticeable in the greatly increased influence which thought

exercises in modern life. More than ever before is thought the impelling and guiding force of our civilisation. Ends and means are all discussed beforehand, possibilities all considered, life mapped out in advance and lived in anticipation. Mental constructions, ideas, principles—these form the nucleus of our modern life; the whole realm of existence is steeped in them; on all sides we see theories paving the way for actual movements, increasing their power, inspiring them with passion. More than ever before is human life moulded and swayed by thought.

But hardly less important is the transformation effected from the other side, arising out of the development of a world which stands independently over against man and, so far as possible, brings him under its control. All that human imagination and desire has projected into the things about us is now regarded as a distortion of their real nature and is therefore ruthlessly expelled. Only through such rigorous elimination of the subjective does nature for the first time become in herself a great connected whole. For the first time man's dependence on her,—nay, more, the fact that he is a part of her,—receives complete recognition. But it is ever the influence of the outer upon the inner which is increasingly emphasised: the soul appears to be sustained entirely from without, its whole happiness seems to depend on its relation to the environment. Movements of this kind open up an inexhaustible mine of fact, and are a stimulus to incessant work. Now for the first time man's life and effort seem placed on a secure footing. Deceptive illusion is replaced by the full light of truth, subjective arrogance by a humble recognition of limits. Thus we have the development of a realistic culture, which first wins its way to full independence, and then proceeds to claim exclusive rights. It even undertakes to satisfy completely the ideal needs of man, interpreting them, it is true, in a sense very different from that of the old tradition. So in modern life we have a two-sided development, two systems of reality with opposite tendencies and totally different content waging incessantly a more or less open strife. It is only a shallow, smooth-faced optimism that can hope to reconcile easily and

quickly such diametrically opposite positions. A genuine transcendence of the opposition, necessitating a thorough-going transformation of the whole aspect of the world, has been the goal aimed at on all the highest levels of modern life. But that no final conclusion has been obtained, nor even so much as a firm foothold, can scarcely be denied by any who have thrown themselves whole-heartedly into the confused and conflicting movements of the present time.

Such an inner contradiction together with the constantly renewed effort to overcome it, stamps the modern period with a character of incessant movement and stormy unrest. It is a period which not only contains individual problems without number; its whole being is a problem; it is continually absorbed in the struggle to understand its own nature, its own meaning. As a consequence, the life of the modern individual is incomparably more unfinished, unstable and prone to disturbance than was the case in earlier epochs. Amid such agitations it is easy to understand the longing that arises for the greater rest and fixity of earlier times. It is the unrest of the New which, to the partisans of the Old, is its bitterest reproach, and the reason why they so emphatically reject it.

But however comprehensible such a train of thought may be, it is none the less perverse. The upheavals of the age have brought into view a whole new realm of fact, and the entire character of life has fundamentally changed. Our early crudities have been clearly exposed and we can never return to them. We all, without distinction of party, accept and profit by the great results of the new way of thinking; and this we cannot do without honouring the will and the effort which inspire it. The great perplexities in which we find ourselves are not due to the arbitrariness and self-assertiveness of man. They are rather imposed upon him by the historical evolution of the spiritual life. And if there has been a loss in certainty, peace and comfort, there has been a corresponding gain in freedom, breadth and largeness. In the courageous facing of problems there is more truth than in that older attitude which bore the semblance

of attainment without the reality, that temper which uncritically placed man in a class apart, that mood which attained repose not by vanquishing but by ignoring the contradictions of our existence.

So, in spite of its uncertainty and contradictions, in spite even of its mistakes, we will rejoice in the new age as embodying a higher form of life, and in this spirit trace its strivings upward step by step, not in slavish obeisance to everything "modern," but in eager search for the vein of truth which runs through all human error.

B. THE RISE OF THE NEW WORLD

I. THE RENAISSANCE

(a) *The Fundamental Characteristics of the Renaissance*

The brilliant researches of distinguished scholars have made it quite clear that the Renaissance is by no means to be understood as a mere return upon classical antiquity, but first and foremost as a development of the modern spirit. Italy is the soil in which, owing to favourable circumstances, the new life first breaks through, so that its more general features are closely blent with the typical Italian peculiarities. Still it would have been impossible for men to feel themselves so near to classical antiquity and to link it so closely to their own creations, had there not been a real kinship in important features which allowed the present and the past to join hands over the gulf of the Middle Ages. We will first examine these common features.

The Renaissance resembles antiquity in the value it sets upon the world and secular labour. The withdrawal of life into a cloistered seclusion remote from the world,—the final result of the old Christianity,—can no longer attract the eager upward striving of the youthful spirit. Ever more and more irresistibly does it feel itself drawn toward the world till its centre of gravity is altogether transferred thither, and the image of that other world grows more and more dim. This change comes about

less through a sharp break than by a gradual transition. Religion is not overtly attacked and disavowed, but it is stripped of the stern inflexible majesty with which it swayed the men of the Middle Ages. It acquires something akin to the immediacy that belongs to the intuitions and impressions of sense. Its divinities take on a purely human shape, and move as friends in our midst. In intercourse with the divine, human nature is exalted; the distance between the two worlds lessens; the human is no longer in sharp contrast with the divine, but is rather its expression and its mirror. It is mainly art which thus transfigures the world and makes it a spiritual as well as a temporal home for man. But its exaltation of the Here in no wise interferes with its belief in a Beyond, and this, too, it invests with the most human and attractive features. Both worlds are so steeped in the joy of being that no contradiction between them can yet be realised. So, for example, in the chapel of the Medici, side by side with the artistic idealisation of the Here, we have the most living portrayal of a glorious Beyond. Such a mood sees nothing incongruous in a simultaneous enthusiasm for antiquity and for Christian piety. The new Academy, the highest philosophical creation of the Renaissance, feels no hesitation in the attempt to establish complete harmony between antiquity and Christendom.

But the change, hidden though it be from consciousness, is yet there and its leaven is at work. The world in itself, the "Here," is depicted as a more coherent and self-subsistent whole: its outer and inner aspects, so long at strife, seek a fresh reconciliation. Nature becomes again instinct with spirit, the conception which antiquity had defended to its latest breath. Still more important for the conduct of life is the development of a spiritual medium other than the Church, a lay-circle absorbed in its own fresh interests and problems, and forming itself into a close inner fellowship, first in Italy, and then in the whole of Western Europe.

The spirit of antiquity seems again to emerge in a renewed respect for form. We saw that the old Christianity, repelled by

the polished emptiness of form characteristic of the post-classical period, and bent only upon the salvation of the immortal soul, gave all its attention to subjective feeling and discarded form as something of little or even of doubtful worth. The danger of barbarism was already impending, a danger which waxed greater as the old culture declined, till in the Middle Ages all spirit was like to be stifled beneath a shapeless incubus of matter. Now again comes the reaction: form wins back its old importance: with the fresh energy of youth men gird themselves to the task of overcoming all non-spiritual, formless confusion, making clear distinctions and fearless selections, and blending the chosen material anew into a thoroughly systematic shape. It is in this process that the transition is first made from a crude nature-conception to spirituality, that the world becomes subject to man and the whole of existence filled with an exalted joy. A development in this sense now becomes the all-comprehensive ideal of life, and from this point onward its influence extends in every direction through the whole of the modern period.

But however closely the Renaissance may touch antiquity, there remains an essential difference. What to the ancients had been a primitive natural outlook, adopted by each and all as a matter of course, had now to be expressly striven for, and could only be won at the cost of a bold violation of immediate tradition. The whole process becomes more conscious and aggressive, and defines itself through the very oppositions it encounters: the movement toward the objective world of form is like a return after long wandering to an abiding truth, like the joy of recovery after serious illness. Here the more pronounced development of the subject, which is the most important characteristic of the Renaissance, is already apparent. We see it separating itself more confidently from the environment, meeting it more freely, asserting its own power more fully. It even becomes the central point of life, viewing everything in relation to itself, and transforming all that is presented to it in accordance with its own nature.

It is by no means easy to give an account of the way in which the modern spirit has contrived to realise along the lines of the Renaissance its own distinctive character. Two influences are here at work: one, the outcome of a long historical process; the other, born of the peculiarities of the responsive and susceptible Italian temperament. In the first place, the old culture was not so dead in Italy but that it could, by dint of a little energy, be again stirred into life. Moreover, the Middle Ages had not left such a strong, deep impress here as in the north. Then, too, there were the peculiar political relations, in themselves so extremely unfortunate; the splitting-up of states into factions, the weakening and overthrow of lawful powers, whereby the individual was thrown back upon his own strength and judgment. In Italy for the first time, we see the position of an individual determined not by his membership of a certain class, or corporation or guild, but by his own character, free from all fetters of external authority. No longer does his social position make him merely a sample of a particular type, stamping upon him certain distinctive features, and directing his activity along lines which leave him no choice. He can move freely, and throw his own individuality into his creations. There is greater vigour and distinctness of individual development than ever before. How very much more forceful and vivid are the characters of the early Renaissance than those of the Middle Ages with their conventionality and uniformity!

Dante here marks a real transition. As far as material goes, he belongs completely to the Middle Ages: his masterpiece proclaims him as the truest disciple of that most mediæval of thinkers, Thomas of Aquino. But at the same time he feels and creates with such independence and mastery, he puts so much passion into his thinking, and pours over the universe such a seething tide of love and hate, that with him we feel ourselves entirely upon modern ground.

But we cannot hope to understand the force which has enabled the modern individual to re-create his world, and the extraordinary success of his emancipating work among the na-

tions, unless we take into due consideration the forces at work in the larger arena of the world's history. The reality of the inward life was no fresh discovery. It was a truth which the closing period of antiquity had already grasped, albeit with pain and effort. As a subordinate or side issue it had been faithfully preserved by the Middle Ages, and nowhere more so than in the life and speculation of the mystic. But now it feels itself strong enough to transcend its chrysalis-state and wing its flight through the world. The individual has promise of an infinity within his own being and is given an infinite universe wherein to unfold it. So the movement toward a more inward life, that legacy of a dying world, now becomes the germ of a great future, full of unlimited possibilities and problems.

It is chiefly, however, in the more definite understanding with the world, in the clearer distinction of the boundaries between the world and self, that the greater independence of the modern subject is apparent. The growth is two-sided: as the spiritual life becomes more inward, we have a richer and more forceful development of the object-world. The interaction of the world and self makes life incomparably fresher, more alive and more substantial. "In the Middle Ages both aspects of consciousness—that which faces the world, and that which looks toward man's own inner life—lay dreaming or but half-awake beneath a veil which shrouded them each alike. The veil was woven of belief, childish prejudice, and illusion: the world and history as seen through its meshes were indeed wonderfully coloured, but himself man could see only as race, nation, faction, corporation, family, or in some other universal shape. In Italy first this veil is lifted; the state and the things of this world generally begin to be viewed and treated objectively; but at the same time the subjective asserts its rights, the man becomes a spiritual individuality and knows that he is such" (Burckhardt).

This clearer distinction of man from his environment results in a bolder and freer exercise of all his spiritual powers. Reflection becomes a pioneer, opening up new paths, everywhere deliberating and calculating, believing itself able to make things

from out its own content—for example, to build up out of mere theory the constitution of a state. But this self-confidence presupposes a close alliance with imagination, a soaring imagination, which ventures on bold syntheses and finds new links of union in apparently disconnected phenomena. Things may no longer stay as they are; man subjects them to his criticism, proves his powers upon them, and forces them to his use or enjoyment. Moreover, the life of feeling with its demand for happiness is radically different from the mediæval temper. It refuses to be comforted by faith and hope in a Beyond; it demands immediate satisfaction and with heart aflame presses on to possess its happiness in full.

But through all this strengthening of his inward life, man's mind still remains constantly in touch with reality, since only so can his powers unfold and his life be rich in content. Every effort is made to dispel the mist of traditional prejudices and to grasp things in their true nature. It is on the sure ground of a reality soberly and clearly apprehended that man's own activity finds footing. Accordingly, it is everywhere most important to begin by discovering the real nature of things, defining them more precisely and depicting them more clearly. In this way the world gains a firm objective character, and for the first time it becomes possible to speak of an objective world-consciousness. But this in no wise detracts from the importance of the subject: it is, after all, from the basis provided by the subject that the objectifying process goes forward.

So subject and object point to each other for completion. Opposite poles of thought, they are ever prone to hostility. But life will attain its highest perfection where both work together, bound to each other in a fruitful mutual relation. And this is what happens in art, primarily from the point of view of the artist, but to some extent from that of the spectator also. For as in the domain of art all inner impulse seeks embodiment, so, too, the outward form cannot be appropriated until it has been animated with a soul. Thus, in beauty, life reaches a unity and, at the same time, its own completion. The alliance of strength

and beauty, or better still, a beauty instinct with life, becomes the all-controlling ideal.

In this revival of beauty we cannot fail to see how far we have travelled from the old conception. The beautiful is no longer an affair of peaceful contemplation and a sinking of self in the object. The subjective impulse is far too active to refrain from appropriating to itself its several experiences and transforming such influences as exalt its life into terms of personal enjoyment. Moreover, in the old days—at least among the greatest thinkers—the beautiful was so closely akin to the good that they could both be united in one single conception (*καλὸν κἀγαθόν*). If a choice were made, it was usually in favour of the good. In the Renaissance, on the other hand, the relation to morals becomes looser; the beautiful begins to occupy an independent position over against the good: a code of life arises which is specifically æsthetic. It is not that art becomes unmoral, but that such morals as it requires it itself produces, and measures in accordance with its own inner necessities. Here beauty fulfils its supreme function in ministering to life and in developing to the full man's spiritual capacity. The expression in form serves to excite all man's varied powers into pleasurable activity. All the riches of his inner life, gradually stored up through the ages, come now into full possession and enjoyment through their expression in art. What gives to the art of the Renaissance its abiding significance and power is precisely this, that the modern spirit seeks and finds itself therein. The picture is not just a copy of some definitely fixed object: life itself receives through it a fresh impetus. So art gives birth to a new ideal of life: the ideal of man is his universal nature, the varied manifestations of his activity blending together into one harmonious whole.

But it is only among the few that creative art can keep so high a level. Elsewhere subjective and objective, feeling and performance, lose their balance, and the one seeks the suppression and overthrow of the other. On the one hand, there arises the tendency toward pleasure and dazzling display, a life of

luxury and enjoyment, dignified and tempered, it is true, by artistic taste, but lacking in lofty purpose. On the other hand, there is a separation of outward performance from inward motive, an impulse to concentrate effort on the controlling of environment, a movement toward the merely useful and practical. This results in a fruitful cultivation of the technical arts, and the employment of mechanical contrivances which prove very serviceable, especially in the hands of gifted individuals; but at the same time, the ultimate aims of man and his inward state are entirely ignored. Accordingly, the main current of endeavour breaks up into different streams and runs at very different levels. But in the end it is one and the same movement, embracing all kinds of opposite tendencies, and penetrating every single domain of life, so that its influence is felt not only throughout the wide regions of vigorous, healthy growth, but often in the murky abodes of wizardry and superstition.

In the first place, the relation to the world and to nature undergoes great changes. The Renaissance is the age of travels and discoveries. It feels an imperative need to bring every possible sphere of real existence within its own horizon and to link it with its own life. Civilised man takes the earth for his property; as his clear glance sweeps its whole extent, he finds it no longer huge and overpowering; he can say proudly with Columbus: "The earth is small." In more specific ways, too, reality is compelled to open up its resources and minister to man's enjoyment. Botanical gardens are laid out, menageries exhibited; in every domain the outlook is enriched and new interest is awakened.

But the man of the Renaissance is not content merely to look at nature; he must also control her. Here, however, he is still confined within narrow limits, and when in the impetuosity of his desire he overrides them, he falls into grievous errors. We find, indeed, some valuable pioneer-work carried out in scientific research, and at the end of the fifteenth century Italy stands at the head of Europe in mathematics and the natural sciences; also the feeling for technical discovery has awakened. But on

the whole, the treatment of nature still remains speculative and subjective; research has as yet no sure point to work from. An animistic interpretation of nature prevails; the perception of her conformity to law is still wanting, and therefore no objection is taken to the miraculous. When, at the same time, the surging forces of life are claiming full sovereignty over the external world, it is easy to understand how man may be swept away by an unbridled imagination and carried into the gloomy regions of magic. Sorcery and superstition wax more luxuriant than in the Middle Ages. Nature, still a closed book to science, must be outwitted by secret arts and forced into the service of man. But worst of all was the belief in witchcraft, though, indeed, it was the northern lands far more than Italy which suffered under the weight of this dread nightmare with its terrible history of bloodshed. A weakness for superstition and magic must certainly be included in any portrayal of the man of the Renaissance period.

He is far more happily situated as regards the development of an artistic view of nature and the spiritual intercourse he can now enjoy with her. The result of these is a permanent enrichment of life. The man of the Middle Ages had been too dependent on his sense-environment and was far too limited in his perceptions to be capable of transcending his scattered impressions. Later antiquity was in more intimate spiritual contact with nature, but nature was still rather an agreeable kindly companion than a means for the inward expansion of man's being. In the Renaissance she plays a far more important rôle, for now man begins to delight in the beauty of scenery; he is conscious of an irresistible impulse to depict it, and the feeling for nature receives a thorough development through the medium of plastic art. The environment can at last be unified to form a complete picture; a soul breathes through it and pours out upon man its liberating, calming, ennobling influences.

The discovery of the world has its counterpart in man's discovery of himself. The individual is possessed before all else with a passionate desire to realise his powers in action and de-

velop them in every direction. In all that he does he must distinguish himself; his achievements must be brilliant, his skill proved beyond a doubt. This is congenial soil for the development of the private citizen, the man who separates himself from all public concerns and forms his own clique. But together with the growth of individualism goes a clearer knowledge of the individual character. Man observes himself and his fellows with greater exactness, and delights in clear, even trenchant description of what he has observed. He seeks to trace the characteristic features of persons and classes and social relationships. Nor does he forget the inner life in his concern with the outer. The delineation of the soul attains marvellous perfection. So man becomes an object to himself. With clearer, soberer reflection, unperturbed by moral considerations, he determines to search his nature through and through and measure its capacity. This self-knowledge makes his life more conscious and effective. Man's life and action become in a truer sense his very own.

Ordinary everyday life also suffers change and transformation. Everywhere there is a movement in the direction of grace, beauty and comfort; everywhere life feels the moulding hand of art. Manners become more refined; pleasure is taken in the beauty and purity of speech; social intercourse is ennobled; festivals link art and life in closest fellowship: in every department there is a call for the effective display of strength and skill. This is the beginning of cultivated society, in which the individual has free movement and is valued in accordance with his contributions to the general entertainment and pleasure. Distinctions of birth are ignored, inequalities of classes levelled: women co-operate with men. All the more exclusively does the cultured circle shut its doors against outsiders. Humanity recognises a new basis of division.

The aspect of the state is also completely transformed: we have the rise of the modern commonwealth, with its civilising aims, its interest in secular problems and its claim to regulate all social relations. The life of the State is founded wholly on experience, and is freed from the invisible net of relations in which

mediævalism had wrapped it. The State is no longer a fragment of a divine order which embraces the whole world; no longer is it an organism of which individuals are the members; here "there is no feudalism in the northern sense with artificially derived rights" (Burckhardt). Politics are an ingenious mechanical contrivance in the hands of great men or exclusive aristocracies and must, at all costs, be effective. An insatiable thirst for power, success, and fame in the visible sphere suppresses the moral judgment as a childish prejudice. A Macchiavelli in his rugged aphorisms is only formulating the guiding principles of his time. "Reasons of State" justify to the consciousness of this age even the most infamous actions. But at the same time there is a development on a large scale of the technique of political life. To control the outside world man must have an exact knowledge of his own powers: so in the Italy of the Renaissance the science of statistics springs up. And not only is the home government improved and systematised; the relations with other states demand more care and skill. Italy, more especially Venice, is the home of a "foreign" policy. This tendency to technical treatment pervades each and every department. War now becomes an art and presses every fresh discovery into its service. In fortress building the Italians are the teachers of all Europe. The science of finance is thoroughly developed; the State works enthusiastically to raise the general level of well-being, securing health and comfort in the things of daily life, the laying out of towns and so forth. And everywhere reflection goes hand in hand with pleasure in creative activity; production is accompanied by description, reasoning, criticism. It is especially Florence with its political movements that is at the same time the home of political doctrines.

Just as in this department the development of strength and technical skill pushes the moral judgment far into the background, so too, generally speaking, the soil of the Renaissance is unfavourable to morals. It is not that there is any lack of noble, humane feeling, or of most estimable personalities.

These are present in full measure. What is really wanting is an organised moral realm confronting the individual, exercising restraint upon his inclinations, driving him beyond his merely natural standpoint. Instead of this, we find everything depending on the uncertain nature of the individual character. A thoroughly noble disposition can utilise its freedom for the unfolding of the fairest blossoms, but there is also plenty of room for brute strength and violence of the most terrible kind, for beasts in the guise of men, practising crime as their profession. The average of society shows a remarkable mixture of higher and lower, noble and base, often united in one and the same person. As soon as morality runs counter to natural inclination, she is looked upon as a force imposed from without, hindering man from the full unfolding of his powers and from handling objects in a natural way.

The most potent counteracting influence to lower cravings is the desire of the individual for fame and immortality, or even for mere esteem in his own circle: self-respect, as we should call it. But this is an incentive which concerns appearance rather than reality, and readily ministers not to genuine morality, but to its counterfeit. In truth, the moral atmosphere of the Renaissance is unclean through and through, and not all the beauty and purity of its artistic productions can, in the end, conceal even from itself the moral abyss which threatens to engulf it. It is this lack of moral vigour, and not primarily the Reformation or the Anti-reformation which has utterly unfitted the Renaissance for maintaining the lead in modern thought.

To the Renaissance religion owes its close alliance with art and the consequent strengthening of its hold upon modern life. But the general temper of the Renaissance is by no means favourable to religion. The mass of the people remain sunk in superstition and are influenced almost exclusively by the magical elements of religion, by the heathenism still persisting upon Christian ground. The middle and higher classes combine a strong antipathy to the works and ways of the Church with a sleek subserviency toward ecclesiastical authorities. Nor can

they altogether escape the influence of the magical element. Especially would they seek to have the assurance of the sacraments against the event of death. At bottom, this feeling is thoroughly worldly, and it is in the main for worldly contingencies that religion is supposed to provide. But the passionate lust of life and the longing for fame and greatness in this present world make men keenly conscious of the obstacles which confront them and direct their thoughts to the mysterious ruling of Fate. If an undertaking is doomed to failure, it is at least desirable to know the result beforehand and direct plans accordingly. So through this radically faithless, sceptical period there runs a strongly marked vein of fatalism, astrology, and even magic. Such is the average tendency; but in opposition to this we find lofty natures and select groups of thinkers developing a nobler and deeper religion, a religion for religion's sake. Here endeavour soars above all visible and finite forms; the idea arises of a universal religion; the spontaneous joy in life which belonged to the Renaissance is glorified and transfigured into a religion which includes both Theism and Pantheism: Panentheism, exalting man to life unending by union with the Godhead. This is the starting-point of influences which have been most productive for modern thought. But however pleasing and attractive are the personalities of certain isolated individuals, yet even to them religion was not so much a matter of moral conversion as of metaphysical theory. Interest in the fundamental problems of early Christianity fades away before the speculative and æsthetic contemplation of the universe and the enlargement of existence which, it is hoped, will result therefrom. It was inevitable therefore that in Italy the adherents of the Reformation should be few. It is true that these few individuals were more than usually strong in their championship of a freer and more universal mode of thought, and they understood, too, how to sacrifice property and life in its cause. But they found their true sphere of labour far from their own home: the soil of the Renaissance was utterly unfit to produce a universal religious movement.

We must now turn our attention to the principal life-philosophies of the Renaissance. If it is true that they are not productions of the very highest rank, but halt wavering between the old order and the new, it is likewise true that they are rich in suggestive ideas. It is to be understood as a limitation when we select three main directions of thought and seek to represent, in the persons of their leaders, systems of cosmic speculation, of human conduct, and of the control of nature through science.

(b) *Cosmic Speculation. Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno*

The truest philosophical expression of the Renaissance is contained in the systems of cosmic speculation which originated with Nicholas of Cusa and reached their highest point of development with Giordano Bruno. The former was still, in many ways, closely linked with the Middle Ages, the latter imbued with the spirit of a new epoch. The one was an honoured Cardinal of the Church, the other persecuted and burnt as a heretic.

It is the peculiarity of these thinkers that they tend to turn away from the problems of inward experience to the universe at large, hoping thereby to win a wider and a truer life, and to exchange the narrow limits of man's personality for the infinity of the universe. And since it is only as an expression of the Divine Being that the universe possesses such high value, the surrender to it has a religious implication which invests it with a spiritual glow. The Neo-Platonist and the Mystic also believed that all things had their existence in God, the Absolute Being. But this belief now operates very differently. In the thought of the world's union with God, a world-weary epoch had found a motive for swiftly mounting to the ultimate Source of Being, and withdrawing from the gay panorama of phenomenal existence into the unity of the eternal. But from this same thought, a generation full of the joy of life draws inducement to mix more closely with the world and to rejoice whole-heartedly in its

riches, since God dwells in all and from the whole complex universe it is His face that looks out upon us. It is the presence of God which now gives to the world more unity, harmony, spirituality.

Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), of German origin, but intellectually a son of Italy, still belongs in great part to the Middle Ages, though the new tendencies are sufficiently strong in him, and sufficiently decided, to pave the way for important changes. The transcendence of God and the separation of the world from Him are still maintained. But it is the aim of speculation to find some inner ground of union between the two. That Being which in God is one, is in the world developed into a manifold. "What is the world other than the manifestation of the invisible God, and what is God other than the invisibility of the visible?" The created world did not arise suddenly at some point in time, but prior to its manifestation existed eternally in God as an invisible potentiality. God does not work through middle terms, such as Ideas, but is immediately active through all; He alone is "soul and spirit" of the whole world. As a manifestation of infinite being the world has no limits. But as an expression of the divine unity, it must, despite its limitlessness, possess some principle of connexion. It is a principle of this kind that Nicholas seeks, sometimes picturing the world as a harmonious artistic whole—thus closely combining mathematical and æsthetic conceptions—sometimes as a series of steps mounting from lowest to highest in an unbroken chain. In both conceptions alike the endeavour to see things as a whole is combined with respect for the individuality of the unit; everything has its settled place, and its own peculiar task. "Nothing is at bottom empty or useless in Nature. For everything has its own activity. Each manifold blends harmoniously into a unity, just as many notes form one harmony, and many limbs one body. The animating spirit unifies the whole body and through the whole the limbs and the parts." Here we already have the doctrine usually attributed to Leibniz, that two things can never be exactly like each other, else they would fall together into one.

But the growth of the individual existent is fostered more especially by the fact that it is not a mere part of the whole, but can experience immediately for itself after its own fashion the infinity of being and all the riches of the universe. "In all that is, God is omnipresent; and all that is, is in God." Especially is the human spirit—the microcosm—by virtue of its inner connexion with the divine ground of all reality, "a divine grain of seed which carries within it the original patterns of all things." From this point of view, life would seem to be the evolution of an inward germ which contains within itself the whole world; it is the creation of a world from within. The idea of development now begins to take on the sense of a progressive actualisation of the potential. It is of course not only in the world that Nicholas would seek God; to the religious consciousness the supremely important thing is the immediate apprehension of God Himself, the rising in mystic exaltation to the source of all being. This is in close adherence to the old mystical idea that evolution (*explicatio*), as being a differentiation of unity into multiplicity, is an inferior process to involution (*complicatio*), which comprehends all multiplicity in an undifferentiated unity. But Nicholas is able to allow more importance to the life of the world, inasmuch as he does not separate it from God by a fixed gulf, but represents it as drawing constantly nearer to Him and thereby realising more and more its own nature. It is the clash of the eternal and the temporal within us, of the infinite and the finite, that gives such restlessness to our endeavour and at the same time fills us with the certainty that we are ever mounting upward. It is the penetration of our existence by religious, even mystical, ideas, that has given birth to the conception of an infinite progress.

A yearning for the Infinite not only possesses the human spirit, but reaches beyond it to the world of nature and sets that also into restless movement. In nature nothing reposes; the earth, hitherto the firm-established centre of the universe, must now move like the other heavenly bodies. Even the celestial pole, seemingly the most fixed point of all, does not escape the law

of change. Movement can never cease. Death itself is but the minister of life, for it is nothing more than a "separation through which life is communicated and multiplied."

Such theories result in greatly altered conceptions of the nature and value of the phenomenal world. Change and movement had fallen into great disfavour ever since Plato's time and had sunk especially low in the esteem of the Middle Ages which set over against this fluctuating world-process the eternal rest that is in God. But now it is precisely such change and movement which, under the influence of a fresher vitality, win importance and value. The world gains at the same time an added significance. Since throughout its whole extent it rests upon God and aspires after Him, nothing in it can be an object of contempt, and certainly not our earth, the dwelling-place of the human spirit.

The more intimate nature of the activity of the Renaissance likewise reveals to us, despite its continuity with the past, an entirely new temper. Nicholas is at one with Neo-Platonism and Mysticism in considering knowledge as man's most important faculty. It is knowledge which, by penetrating to the very heart of being, is to effect its union with God. The human spirit is a living mirror of the universe, a ray from the divine light. But the mystical contemplation of the infinite in which all oppositions are reconciled does not altogether satisfy him; he is also dazzled and attracted by the infinite variety of life. And since the aspiration after knowledge is closely blent with that idea of an endless progress, the thirst for wider and yet wider knowledge becomes the very soul of life. "To be able to know more and more without any limit, that is to resemble the Eternal Wisdom. Man would fain increase continually his knowledge of that which he knows, intensify his love for that which he loves, and the whole world avails not to satisfy him, since it cannot still his craving after knowledge." This struggle for knowledge brings out and develops the true inner nature of spirit. "Like a fire which is kindled from a flint, so can the spirit, through the light that radiates from it, grow without limit." This new concep-

tion of spirit as a variable quantity capable of endless development supplies a powerful stimulus to the world's work. Earthly existence now has a future of its own, and not merely an expectation of a better world to come. These are clearly approximations to a new mode of thought.

It is at the same time true that Nicholas is still largely dependent on Scholasticism, and, side by side with most fruitful suggestions, his writings contain very fantastic speculations, a good deal of hazardous number-symbolism, and also some edifying meditations in the devout style of the mediæval legends. Moreover, what seems new in him often proves to be borrowed from Neo-Platonism and Mysticism, even to the very concepts and imagery. And yet, in spite of all, we find ourselves on the threshold of a new world. For what is really new and is also capable of renewing the old, is the altered temper of life, the pleasure in work and creation, the attraction toward a world full of movement and beauty, in a word, the characteristic mood of the Renaissance.

When we turn from Nicholas to Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), the near kinship of both thinkers is at once obvious. But at the same time, we cannot fail to notice a great change: life has gravitated still farther away from religion and in the direction of secular labour. God is seen from the stand-point of the world rather than the world from the stand-point of God. Moreover, the new thought is more self-conscious and has more resistent power; it feels its opposition to the old and it takes up the contest with a boldness that borders on effrontery. At the same time, the Copernican system, which has such a strong attraction for Bruno, powerfully supports and confirms the new tendencies and modes of feeling. Once again astronomy shows its power to influence man's general outlook on the world and even the very sentiment and tone of life. The belief that the universe was a closed system and that the stars moved in unchanging orbits had been, ever since Plato's time, the principal article and support of the creed which considered the universe as a self-poised artistic whole governed by eternal and immu-

table Ideas. The new astronomical doctrine of the endless space and incessant change of the universe paves the way for a completely new conception of the world.

Bruno, like Nicholas, finds the chief purport of life in the upward progress of the finite spirit to infinite being. He also shares Nicholas's idea that the world—the sphere of visible being—contains as a developed manifold what exists in God as undifferentiated unity; and he therewith assigns a twofold trend to man's endeavour: while it seeks to penetrate through appearance to reality, it should also participate joyously in the God-pervaded life of the world. But the centre of gravity has now been moved much nearer to the world; the reference to God often seems nothing more than a mere device for exalting the world in itself, and looking upon it as a whole. The divine essence and energy are at work inside things; it is as the artificer shaping from within that the divine reason is extolled. "God does not exist beyond and apart from the things of the world, but is throughout present in them; just as there is no such thing as being in the abstract apart from individual being, or nature apart from natural things, or goodness apart from the good." Thus the world becomes the central concern of science, the distinction between the credulous theologian and the true philosopher, according to Bruno, consisting precisely in this, that the former in his explanations passes beyond nature, whereas the latter remains within her boundaries.

As a result of the closer connexion between God and the universe, the qualities which Nicholas in his speculations about God held to be mainly characteristic of Him, are now transferred to the universe: infinity, namely, and the coincidence of all opposites. As in the case of Nicholas, it is speculative thought which urges Bruno to assert the infinity of the universe: a finite world, he argues, would be unworthy of God; it is in keeping with His nature that He should actualise everything potential. But this train of thought now receives immense additional support and vitality from the new astronomical view of the universe. It is with Bruno that this view first manifests its trans-

forming, widening power. Later on, custom has deadened and dulled it, but here it is at work in all its freshness. The old restricted view of the universe is repudiated as far too narrow; so, too, the idea of a spatial heaven beyond the stellar sphere. World upon world opens out into the infinite, all full of life and motion, all manifestations of the Divine Being. Men begin to feel a proud joy in their liberation from mediæval narrowness, an exalted bliss at sharing the life of the immeasurable, God-pervaded universe. Over against its expanse and fulness, man's particular sphere dwindles into insignificance. To rise from our lethargy into the pure ether of the universe, to embrace the universe with "heroic" love, this it is which constitutes the greatness, the soul of our being. It is here that true morality lies: in this heroism, this putting forth of our utmost energy, this tension of our whole being as it lays hold on the infinite; and not in self-renunciation, self-humiliation, self-disparagement.

The infinite nature of the universe has also an inward character of another and more exalted kind than belongs to human action. For men are ever seeking, and must weigh and ponder at every turn. The universe is far removed from all such unreadiness and vacillation; the Supreme Cause knows no seeking and choosing; it cannot do other than it does. So the opposition between freedom and necessity disappears. For real necessity denotes no outward compulsion, but the law of one's own nature. Therefore "there is no need to fear that if the Supreme Cause acts according to the necessity of nature, its action is not free: on the contrary, it would not be acting freely if it acted in any other way than that demanded by necessity and nature; or rather, by the necessity of nature." So over him and around him, man beholds a truer life than his, far removed from the complications of his own experience. But he can learn through thought to lay aside all littleness and grasp this universal life.

With Bruno, however, the surrender to the universe is closely connected—though not in equal measure at all stages of his literary activity—with his recognition of monads, that is, of units

differing from each other, indivisible, indestructible. These units are not mere points without content, but each of them has "within itself that which is all in all." Each has a share in the whole universe, but has it in a unique and peculiar way. Each through the development of its own life, contributes to the perfection of the universe. Finally, each possesses the certainty of imperishability. For so-called life and death are merely phases in its being, an evolution and involution, very much as Leibniz believed at a later period. "Birth is the expanding from the centre, life the period of the circle's fulness, death the contraction back into the centre." Such imperishability, however, does not assert the continuance of precisely this form of life; the indestructibility of the natural existence is no personal immortality in the Christian sense. But it is a true philosophical expression of that exalted vitality which permeated the Renaissance and gave to the individual also the consciousness of being imperishable.

As here, so everywhere, we have a manifest endeavour to overcome the oppositions of existence without overstepping the limits of this world. Things long sundered feel again the full force of mutual attraction. The universe, according to Bruno, knows no divorce of inner from outer, of bodily from spiritual. For not only do these oppositions spring in last resort from the same root, but even in the realm of experience, spirit is nowhere absent. The greatest and the smallest things alike possess a soul, just as all soul-life is bound up with bodily existence. Likewise form and matter are inextricably blent in the processes of nature; form is not added to matter from without, and matter is not a mere empty potentiality, that "next to nothing," as the Middle Ages termed it, following Augustine; but form is implicit in matter and matter is moulded by it from within. Herein lies the superiority of nature to art, that art employs a foreign material whereas nature works with her own; art works around (*circa*) its material, nature within it.

So nature reveals herself as full of life and energy. But at the same time, the older conception of the universe as an artistic

whole is preserved and rejuvenated. Life and beauty are closely united, not only in the whole spirit of the Renaissance, but also in the cosmic theory of its greatest philosopher. With all its movement, the world is yet a splendid work of art, whose harmony is undisturbed by the difference and discord of the parts. Indeed, the harmony itself demands a plurality of parts; for "there can be no order where there are no differences." We cannot understand connection without difference nor the One without the Many, nor the manifold save from the stand-point of the One. "It is a subtle magic which after finding the point of unity, is able to elicit the opposition."

In this converging of all things toward universal harmony we have a motive that can lift men clear above all the injustices and suffering of existence. Once again it is the realm of thought which is expected to effect a full conciliation with reality. In the universe viewed as a work of art, everything shows itself to be useful, beautiful and reasonable. "Nothing in the universe is so trifling as not to contribute to the completeness and perfection of the highest. So, too, there is nothing bad for certain people and in certain places which would not be for other people and in other places good, and even best. So to him who has regard to the whole universe nothing will appear base, evil, and inadequate; for, despite all plurality and contradiction, everything is best as it is arranged by Nature, which, after the manner of a choirmaster, guides the different voices into a harmony, and that the best possible harmony." It is as supplying the link between perfect beauty and boundless vitality that Nature is the true object of religious worship. "Not in the littleness and meanness of human things is God to be sought and revered, not in the base mysteries of our Roman decadents (*romanticorum vilia mysteria*), but in the inviolable law of nature, in the splendour of the sun, in the shape of the things that spring forth from our Mother Earth, in the true image of the Supreme as it reveals itself in the countless living things which, on the fringe of the one immeasurable heaven, have light and life and feeling and knowledge, and acclaim the One Best and Highest." This

worship of nature as the true kingdom of God had a very powerful attraction for Bruno personally, and he turned to it with all the force of his ardent disposition; whereas the inner problems of the religious life, as also the historical and ecclesiastical elements of religion, left him wholly untouched. It was his misfortune, however, to belong to an age entirely absorbed in dogmatic controversy.

By way of appreciation and criticism of this world of thought, we may subjoin the following remarks. Bruno's was a mind full of resource and suggestiveness, whence proceeded much that was liberating and inspiring: he gave philosophical expression to the main tendencies of the Renaissance; and finally, a martyrdom met with heroic endurance casts a splendour over his whole life. But, except by such as measure greatness by the intensity of a man's opposition to the Church, he cannot be considered a great thinker. For, with Bruno, thought is not in process of passing out of a tumultuous confusion into a state where all is sifted and clear. That universe which is to be the means of emancipation from the smallness of the merely human, fancy peoples once again with powers that are but faded reproductions of the human form. The world is resplendent as the reflection of divinity, but this divinity is soon again enslaved and absorbed by the world. We have here that nature-worship which reflects the æsthetic feelings of the Renaissance in regard to nature, but in itself is a strange and hybrid phenomenon.

And if there is a contradiction involved in the relationship of the world to God, there is likewise a contradiction in regard to the world itself: the contradiction between an æsthetic and a dynamic point of view. In the artistic conception of nature which we find in ancient Greece, there is no life without form, and everything has its clear delimitation. Now form loses its immutability and the tide of life flows limitless and free; but at the same time, the old æsthetic view still persists, nay, is preached with more than ordinary fervour. The contradictions are not really overcome; they are simply left side by side. It is unmistakably an age of transition.

At the same time we must not depreciate the liberating, quickening influences of the Renaissance, even on its intellectual side; only we must not forget that if much is won, much, too, is lost, and that what we are given is boldness of outline rather than well-elaborated construction.

(c) *The Art of Human Conduct. Montaigne*

The emancipation of the individual is one of the main issues of the Renaissance. The movement, however, develops differently in the different countries. In Italy it is attracted toward what is great, strong, superhuman, thereby precipitating fierce conflicts with the environment. In France the national genius gives it a tone which, if less high-pitched and heroic, is far more moderate and amiable. In Italy, again, the individual's teeming energies, spurning restraint, enter into conflict with the infinity of the universe; in France, the plea for independence and freedom of movement does not challenge the stability of the existing order. Once more, the Italian thinkers are interested in seeking a point of contact with Neo-Platonism, which appeals to them through its identification of God with the universe, and its exaltation of man as a world-embracing microcosm; whereas the French feel most natural kinship with the hedonism, epicureanism and scepticism of the post-classical epoch, with such tendencies as emancipate the individual from all enslaving fetters and redeem life from its drudgery by transforming it into an art. The most prominent representative of this movement is Michel Montaigne (1533–1592). He "has portrayed if not the typical man, at least the typical Frenchman, with all the doubts and misapprehensions under which he labours, the pleasures which delight him, the hopes and wishes that he fosters—portrayed him as he is in his whole nature, whether sensual or spiritual" (Ranke).

The modern individual, whose aim it is to develop his powers and enjoy his life, can bring more interest and freshness into his work than was possible for one who lived in the post-classical

period. At the same time he has much harder opposition to encounter from environment and tradition. Again, if all absolute values and rigid conventions are to give way, thought will have much more to do, far more rubbish to clear away, far more call for its acuteness, wit and sarcasm. And this expectation is fully borne out by the facts.

A rigidly orthodox culture, absolutely binding on the individual, Montaigne condemns as a danger and a misfortune. It diverts man from his own to alien interests, from the present to the future. "We are always out, never at home." We want to live everywhere, and so we live nowhere; we live without having any real consciousness of our life. At the same time, life has become artificial. "We have forsaken nature, and now want to instruct our mistress, under whose guidance we were once so safe and happy." Untruthfulness and hypocrisy pervade all our relations; we concern ourselves mainly with appearances; "the whole world masquerades," as Petronius says. By entangling ourselves with strange and alien interests, we make our lives restless and troubled; we lose our power of simple enjoyment, of easy and unfettered movement. The very refinement of our demands makes our passions more dangerous. So the civilised man is less happy and less good than the natural man with his simple and immediate outlook.

In the charges thus brought against our civilisation, Montaigne seems to be anticipating Rousseau; his description of its evils agrees with Rousseau's even to the actual terms used. But the remedy he proposes is very different, and far less wild and dangerous than that suggested by the famous radical. Whereas Rousseau wishes to destroy the whole of our previous civilisation that he may build up an entirely new life, Montaigne is content with merely lightening the pressure that civilisation exerts upon the mind of man. This he does by pointing out the relativity of all its arrangements, and by denying the fixity of social ordinances. But outwardly everything remains as it is, and to this extent the doctrine of relativity is thoroughly conservative in tendency.

To Montaigne the chief means of emancipation is critical reflection. It is this which reveals the fleeting, changeful nature of historical constructions, the accidental character of human institutions, the uncertainty of all so-called knowledge, the hollowness and barrenness of scholastic learning, and, above all, the subjectivity and individuality of all opinions and valuations.

If things and their values are constantly changing with the individual, as in some gay panorama, if the same thing presents one aspect to this man and another to his neighbour, then it becomes a folly, a piece of arch-stupidity (*quelle bestiale stupidité*) to make one's own opinion binding on another man. He who clearly perceives the subjectivity and relativity of all convictions and all institutions is won over to the cause of most broad-minded toleration.

Such a revolution of the inner life cannot fail to change our judgments of all that tradition has accustomed us to regard as great and good. The only criterion which an individual has is his own feeling. All claim to reality must be settled by appeal to his feeling: nothing can be good unless it prove itself agreeable. So the individual impression is to be the judge of truth; and that which is good-in-itself must yield place to the pleasant and the useful.

But such increased freedom of movement by no means implies that the individual loses touch with his fellows. For man's life is passed in contact with other men and under the influence of bygone generations. The result of such association is a stock of generally-received beliefs and regulations, the extent of whose influence is further increased by custom. Our wisest course is to adhere, of our own free choice, to the usages and opinions which happen to prevail in our environment and our particular social sphere. Religion is reckoned as one of our social arrangements, and even as regards its historical status, an attitude of conservatism is recommended. The best party in the State is that "which upholds the old religion and the old distribution of property." So there was good reason why Montaigne on his travels

should be received by the Pope, and why his work should meet with the approval of the Holy Office.

When all restraints have been thus removed, the new life is able to develop its own nature freely and fully. The development here is mainly in the direction of the art of living, the right use of all opportunities, the clever adjustment to the needs of the moment, the *vivre à propos*.

Obviously this life lacks depth, but it possesses notwithstanding some admirable traits. Although the Supreme Good is pleasure—in the sense of the self-pleasing (*plaisir*) of the individual—and though no one can feel it his duty to consider the welfare of any one else, yet it by no means follows that a man must be indifferent to the rest of the world. A friendly demeanour toward those by whom he is surrounded will naturally commend itself to a man of tender-hearted, kindly disposition. Efforts are made to humanise social relations, to abolish severe regulations such as cruel punishments, torture and the like. Animals and even trees are to be treated with indulgence. Moreover, the consciousness that everything human is relative and that all individuals have equal rights makes for a charitable judgment of other people's actions and a broad tolerance toward men and things. So Montaigne pursues his own way, undisturbed by the sharp oppositions and passionate conflicts of the age in which he lived.

The mainspring of a happy life is moderation: this it is which constitutes virtue. Virtue is no stern taskmistress, fettering life's freedom, but a minister to human happiness, teaching us the art of right enjoyment. She is a cheerful, happy presence, never demanding renunciation save in the interests of a greater pleasure. It is the golden mean that moderation finds commendable in all circumstances; no bold, empyrean flight, but contentment with a bare sufficiency, is the best guide to happiness. Goods which exceed the mean are only an incubus.

Happiness, moreover, demands a simple and natural mode of life. All real joy and real capacity are developed in close contact with nature. So, even in moral education, it is the simplest

impressions and feelings which should form the starting-point of our effort. "Pain and pleasure, love and hate, are the first things which a child feels; when it becomes capable of reason, then these elemental feelings combine with reason to form virtue." Here appears, seemingly for the first time, the maxim which later excited so much discussion, not to interfere too much with nature but to give her a chance of working in her own way (*laissons faire un peu la nature*). "She understands her business better than we do."

The less life concerns itself with trying to fathom the universe, the greater is the stress laid on social intercourse with men. Society is the chief source of pleasure; life develops best when men act and react on each other. But such interaction must still leave them their independence; even though their thoughts be constantly occupied with man, they do not require his physical proximity at every hour of the day. So, according to Montaigne, it is best to avoid all fixed obligations, and binding relationships. "Wisdom herself I would not have wedded, if she had asked me."

This regimen of life is specially distinguished by its light-heartedness, cheerfulness and gaiety. The easy acceptance of things as they are is particularly characteristic when we contrast it with the deep and solemn sense of responsibility which had marked the attitude of the Reformation. Life would now seem to be altogether freed from the oppressive nightmare of the past and the perplexing riddles of the universe. Through the shifting of its centre of intercourse to a sense-environment, it assumes the form of a gay, light-hearted dalliance with the surface of things, a dalliance in which there is a constant interplay of varied forces spreading cheer and joy over the whole of existence. All problems lose their harshness; an amiable temper softens the edge of even the sharpest thrusts.

Such are the tendencies which influence the development of one very important side of French character. No other nation is so ready to remove the waste and rubbish of worn-out traditions, to centre life in the immediate present, to live for the

moment, to vibrate to the swingings of time's pendulum with liveliest sensibility. So it is among the French that we find the clearest indication of the changes in the tendencies and moods of civilised life. They are the people who, not only in external things, set the fashion. It is the French, too, who have made life into a fine art, turning existence into a merry pastime, and giving full and free play to the individual. And of Montaigne it can be said in all these respects, that "the peculiar genius of the nation is reflected in him" (Ranke).

But that which suffices for a certain level of life is not therefore the ultimate and the whole. Common-sense is not the sum of wisdom. And yet Montaigne maintains that it is. But at once all those objections come up which the old Epicureanism called forth; the centuries have only added to their force. Obviously this way of life is unproductive; its optimism, too, has no security against misery and evil. Its strong point, the taking things lightly, becomes a weakness so soon as great and serious issues are at stake. We may go further and say that if its jesting temper makes the ultimate problems of our spiritual existence a matter of social taste, of mere fashion and caprice, then it is only a step in the direction of frivolous and destructive levity. Unhappy is the nation that adopts a mode of life which makes for this superficial enjoyment and allows a sceptical, epicurean way of thinking to decide not only on things temporal, but on things eternal.

(d) *The New Attitude toward Nature and the Control of Nature through Science. Bacon*

With Bacon (1561–1626), we are already on the very threshold of the Enlightenment. For with him the seething ferment of the Renaissance becomes clear and intelligible. But the new element is still working within the old rather than finding for itself an independent basis and creating its own form of expression. This thinker excels in boldness of conception, but has little gift for detail work. He, like his predecessors, is impelled by a soar-

ing imagination, which gives his ideas a powerful impetus and interweaves his presentation of them with brilliant imagery; he, too, has suggested more than he has worked out. So we count him as still belonging to that transitional period which ushers in the modern world.

He begins his work with a trenchant criticism of the prevalent philosophy, and a complete break with historical tradition. He finds the existing state of science utterly and wholly unsatisfactory, since it gives us neither the knowledge of things nor the power to control them. That which passes for science is mere pretence and wordiness; it is barren and dead, forlorn result of centuries of toil! With the facts before us, how can we continue to bow down before our much-belauded classics, especially Aristotle? And why such dependence on the old? Why call those early thinkers old, and not rather ourselves, who embody the experience of the centuries? Once we thought tradition the mouthpiece of transcendent reason, but now we begin to doubt whether she really does hand down only the best achievement of the past. For may not time be like a river, which bears onward the light, inflated things, leaving what is heavy and solid to sink to the bottom? We must, therefore, free ourselves from all traditional authority, and begin our work all over again. Here we have a complete change in the attitude toward history; from a blind reverence of the past, we swing round into a blind rejection of it, and to an exclusive appreciation of the present.

Such a sharp break with the past is often censured, and Bacon is accused of a wanton passion for innovation. But an unprejudiced estimate in the light of the circumstances of the time will give a different verdict. When men began seriously to doubt the correctness of the older method, the overweening force of tradition must have seemed to them a tremendous incubus, an intolerable restraint: at all costs, this burden must be shaken off and the path left clear. It is easy for a man to value history aright when she no longer threatens his freedom; he who has to fight for justice is seldom just.

But how are we to improve on these earlier thinkers? Obvi-

ously their mistakes were not due to any lack of intellectual power, for there was certainly no dearth of talent among them. It must have been their way of procedure, their method, which led them astray. Their work was vain, because it followed the wrong paths. From a more correct method we may hope for better success and an end to unproductive toil.

The seat of the error may be specified as follows. Man, instead of taking things as they were, and considering the truth about them to be more important than his own ideas, had made himself into a centre, and interpreted everything in accordance with his own feelings and purposes; the whole immeasurable wealth of the universe he imprisoned in a web of human conceptions and formulas; the phantoms of human prejudice tyrannised over work and hindered all progress. Such inquiry was anxious, above all, to have done with its problem and to rest from the labour of thinking; so it broke off when it had scarce begun; general propositions were recklessly hazarded and set up as incontestable truths which could give an answer to all questions. This subjective and deductive procedure gave no interpretation of nature (*interpretatio naturæ*), but a mere unverified anticipation (*anticipatio mentis*); nor did it win any control over nature, but with its formulas and abstractions remained quite unfruitful for the purposes of life.

The clear perception of the fault indicates the remedy. We must keep in close continuous touch with things, develop an objective, inductive method, free science from anthropomorphism. Preconceived notions and doctrines must be expunged, and the mind presented to the outside world like a clean slate. Only he can constrain nature who first obeys her. So through the whole course of the work all personal preference—nay, all that the mind of itself can contribute—must be set aside; the mind must never be allowed to work by itself, but the subject-matter must, as far as possible, be treated mechanically (*velut per machinas*), and just follow the movement of the objects themselves. This new kind of inquiry must begin with individual impressions, as it is these which faithfully transmit to us

the nature of things. The foundation thus laid must be broad and secure; we must *see* clearly and exactly, and, where possible, with the help of instruments, since these not only make our observations finer, but also eliminate the uncertainty caused by differences of subjective appreciation. Then slowly and cautiously, feeling our way carefully step by step, frequently altering the conditions of observation, and cleverly selecting crucial instances, we must mount upward to our universal propositions, even then not hurrying to attain the finality of a system,—thereby precluding further growth—but leaving questions open, and thought alive and progressive. At the same time, inference must always be abundantly supported by experiment, which binds nature and constrains her to an answer, whereas otherwise she slips from man's hold with Protean agility. If all this is done with unwearied patience and stern self-criticism, we shall gradually build up on a sure foundation a mighty pyramid of knowledge.

Many objections have been urged, and not without reason, against this Baconian method. The activity of the mind does not admit of being so entirely eliminated; work does not accumulate and arrange itself so easily. It needs to be guided along right lines, which only the pioneering work of thought can win from the chaos of the phenomenal world. Here, too, inquiry is still too much at the mercy of the immediate impression: there is a lack of penetrating analysis, that most important instrument of modern scientific inquiry. Moreover, Bacon is still straying in the paths of scholasticism in so far as he seeks not the simplest forces and laws, but rather the universal forms and essences of things. But none the less, his work, taken as a whole, marks a new departure. The perception of human littleness has awakened in full force, and at the same time a longing to come into living touch with things, nay, more, with the infinity of the universe. To this end, man must abandon his long-cherished illusions and war against himself—a war which cannot succeed save at great cost. Nor does the contact with things result only in an expansion of life: its main effect seems to be to bring life

out from the shadows in which it has lain into the full blaze of reality. And the result of such a triumph is that man, in spite of his consciousness of subordination to nature, feels an access of sure, proud confidence in his own powers.

And he does so the more, since with Bacon scientific inquiry does not stop short at mere knowing, but seeks to gain a technical control over nature; "the real and true goal of the sciences is nothing else than the enrichment of human life by the introduction of new inventions and resources." This is the origin of the characteristic saying which has passed into a proverb that knowledge is power. Man is willing to serve nature only that he may wrest her secret from her and subdue her to his sway. Inasmuch as such control means a continual expansion of our powers, turning the forces of nature into limbs of our body and instruments of our will, it raises indefinitely the level of our life and well-being. Life's success is thus made to depend on scientific knowledge and its technical development.

Such a course of thought leads to an enthusiastic eulogizing of inventions; they are "as it were new creations and imitations of the Divine works." The inventors, moreover, are men who increase the wealth of humanity and win for it new provinces; hence they are far superior to the conquerors in war who only enrich one nation, and that at the cost of others. How one single invention can alter the whole course of life is shown by the discovery of printing, gunpowder and the compass; for without these, literary development, war and world-wide commerce were all alike impossible. How much more may we expect when methodical, systematic attack replaces the dependence on mere happy accident, when a universally valid method of discovery is formulated and practised by many in common. For it is certain that nature still hides much treasure; many inventions yet await us. And by erecting into an art that which once belonged to the domain of chance, we can hope to raise appreciably the level of life. With the enthusiasm of a prophet Bacon foresees a new condition of civilisation, and presses forward to the realisation of it with burning ardour. Like a true

seer, also, he expects this better future to result from an immediate revolution rather than from a process of slow toil.

To conceive life's main problem in this way is to give birth to a new spirit which reveals its influence in many directions. The task of building up the pyramid of knowledge and revolutionising the whole of existence by means of inventions is far too great for the individual. It requires the united energies of many. Nay, more, however true it be that the present is the critical turning-point, yet the work of successive generations is required, a sum-total of all possible contributions. Science is no longer the affair of the individual, but of the race. Each man must willingly subordinate and adjust himself to the whole which calls for the services of all; "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased." Thus the new knowledge acquires a distinctively ethical character.

At the same time, the profound respect for method, which had been the original inspiration of Bacon's work, becomes more and more pronounced. Any mode of procedure which is to make sure of progress in its department and to fuse together the scattered energies of many minds must be quite independent of subjective accidents and be necessitated by the facts themselves. It will reduce differing capacities to the same level and increase the effectiveness of the less talented. For "gifts in themselves poor and unpromising become of importance when employed in the right way and order." A lame man who keeps to the path can overtake a runner who makes a circuit. Method seems here to have cut itself loose from persons, and to work with the unvarying accuracy of a machine. This is the beginning of that overvaluing of method and undervaluing of personality which has been the cause of much error in our modern life. But the exaggeration must not blind us to the perfectly justifiable and indispensable character of the main contention. The development of the spiritual life of to-day was not possible until work proceeded securely along its own lines in an undeviating course which the individual was bound to respect. And to win for it this right was the real motive of this whole insistence upon method.

This transformation of science is accompanied by a corresponding change of the position which it occupies in the domain of life. It now becomes the peak which dominates the whole landscape: it is the very soul of civilisation. The new order of things ranks as "the kingdom of philosophy and the sciences." The new intellectual epoch is proclaimed with no uncertain voice. But the parent stock of all science is natural science. This is the "great mother," the root of all knowledge, separation from which means death; in fact, with Bacon, it provides concepts and rules for all the sciences. So already at this early date, we have that fundamentally false identification of "nature" with "world," of natural science with science generally, which has set up so much error and confusion.

When science is so conceived, and associated with the impetus toward technical development, there results a certain characteristic view and temper of life. Even within the limits of time itself, man has now an important task to fulfil, an important future to look forward to; his energies are now fully occupied with this present world. From the exercise of his powers amid the press of work, there is now evolved a more vivid consciousness of self, a fundamentally optimistic frame of mind. The thinker has no desire to bewail the miseries of mankind; he would rather linger over great men and their works, "those marvels of human nature." He would like to frame a calendar which should celebrate the triumphs of humanity. And though science may suffer much from an overweening self-confidence, it is not this, but craven-heartedness and a premature despair, which we are especially warned to beware of. What a contrast, this, to the mediæval spirit!

The chief aim of work is to produce, and prove effective. Hence a growing tendency to disregard the purely inward aspect of things, a tendency pervading all departments alike. Bacon has, for instance, some striking epigrams on the subject of religion. It is he who says that in philosophy a sip off the surface may perhaps drive a man to atheism, but a deeper

draught will bring him back again to religion; yet he is insistent on the separation of human from divine, of faith from science, so that scientific inquiry may be undisturbed by religious fanaticism. Morality he wishes to base no longer on religion and theology, but on human nature; his treatment, however, does not go very deep, and his investigation concerns itself more with ways and methods of work than with ultimate ends. Bacon speaks of a culture of the mind (*cultura animi*), and he is so much under the influence of the metaphor that he can also talk of an "agriculture" (*georgica*) of the mind. Law is reckoned as a part of the work of civilisation: its chief function is to minister to the common use and happiness of the citizens. The laws must be clearly and definitely grasped; the application of them must be regulated by the mode of thought actually prevalent, to the strictest exclusion of all elements of caprice and uncertainty. Also in educational theory, technique takes precedence of morality. Bacon holds up as a pattern the school system of the Jesuits. Finally, a very noteworthy feature is the contempt for art and all beautiful form. He is not concerned with the beauty of things, but only with their content and their use. The art of presentation has for him no value; all adornment seems superfluous and even harmful. As a matter of fact, Bacon presents his own thoughts in the most carefully modelled and finely polished form; often he coins expressions so striking that they have been borrowed by succeeding centuries; his mode of presentation shows the greatest freshness of feeling, and an almost dramatic interest by reason of the sharp antitheses which everywhere abound in his work. Everything taken together, he is a master of scientific style, and more than any one else, has given to this style its distinctively modern colouring.

So, too, in other respects, Bacon often breaks through the limits imposed upon his thought by the technical character of his scientific work. Still it is the scientific temper which directs the main current of his thought; and only that which is tributary to it can join in the common movement.

Bacon has given classical expression to an urgent need of our modern life, and has championed its cause triumphantly. The movement which he develops is a movement of revulsion from abstract conception to immediate intuition, from the subtleties of words to the knowledge of things, from the narrowness of the schools to the broad culture of social life, from the airy freedom of subjectivism to the binding relationships of an objective world. He interweaves human existence more closely with its environment. In a word, he is the founder of Modern Realism. How truly his work met the need of his age for immediacy and reality, is shown more particularly in the seventeenth-century revolution of educational theory (Comenius) which takes up his line of endeavour and carries it still further.

That Bacon remains, notwithstanding, in a transitional position is sufficiently indicated by his outlook upon life. He is completely silent upon many problems, the expression and solution of which was the great achievement of the Enlightenment. In particular, there is no mention of a break with the primitive view of the earth's place in the universe. He allows contradictory tendencies to exist side by side without making an attempt to reconcile them. When it is a question of knowledge, the relation of the human mind to reality is totally different from that which it assumes when action is concerned. In the one case, it stands aloof from things, empty and powerless; in the other, it gains gigantic proportions and subdues the environment to its imperious sway. But, we may ask, what is going on in the man himself whose capacities are thus enormously extended? What is the inward gain which corresponds to this increase of power? To this question Bacon has no answer.

We see, then, that he has no more arrived at a final conclusion than have the other thinkers of the Renaissance. However much he has contributed by his youthful energy and optimistic faith to the inauguration of a new era, it is nevertheless true of him also that he ushers in not daylight, but dawn.

II. THE ENLIGHTENMENT

(a) *General Characteristics of the Enlightenment*

As the Enlightenment shared with the Renaissance the task of reconstructing the modern world, it is natural that both epochs should possess features in common. To both the universe makes an irresistible appeal: the gladness and joy of life, the impulse to produce and create, the inclination to make action the all-important centre of existence, the desire to rule and govern the outside world, the struggle for the free development of every power—these things are common to them both. And this overflowing vitality is accompanied by a firm belief in the sovereignty of reason within the world of reality. Even opposition is viewed rather as a welcome stimulus to our powers than as an incapacitating obstacle. The whole tone of life is optimistic through and through, and characterised by a prompt readiness to action.

But within this general likeness, there are dissimilarities which amount to a complete opposition, an opposition which must be kept clearly in view by such as wish to follow with understanding the development of our modern world. For the Renaissance represents its youth, the Enlightenment its early maturity. The Renaissance tends rather to present the whole realm of being as an undifferentiated unity; it inclines to the heroic; it allows imagination to rule unchecked. The Enlightenment makes more for clearness and distinctness, not only in the objective, but also in the subjective, world. Its energy is less impetuous; it is cautious and calculating; it desires to do work that strikes deep and bears fruit. In the Renaissance, we have the full freshness of the first impression, action based on impulse, often a mere chaotic confusion. The Enlightenment asks for thorough grounding, strict order, systematic connection. In the one case, man is on a familiar footing with his world, and is quite unembarrassed in his dealings with it: there is an easy give-and-take relationship; the prevalent mode of thought is

monistic. In the other case, man and the world are more sharply sundered; there is discovery of differences, setting forth of oppositions, a method which is essentially dualistic and dichotomic. The one aims at building up comprehensive systems; the other at reducing things to their ultimate elements. In the one, the synthetic method prevails; in the other, the analytic. To the Renaissance, nature is animate; the greatest things, as the smallest, are the abode of spirits, which appear sometimes as forms of ravishing beauty, but sometimes as black, tormenting fiends. To the Enlightenment, nature is *in*animate, resolved into smallest atoms, subjected to unchanging laws, and therewith transformed into a machine whose transparent wheel-work allows of no magic and no sorcery.

The distinction goes deep and affects all branches of human activity. Morality, to the Renaissance, is something imposed from outside; so it easily comes to be looked upon as a burdensome restraint on the boisterous vitality of the strong and the virile. The Enlightenment views morality as part of man's own nature, and an agency for lifting life to a higher level. Again, in politics, the Renaissance exalts the individual with his lust after rule and dominion; the Enlightenment makes all men free and equal, since it sees in all the manifestation of one and the same Reason. Philosophical belief, again, in the one case favours Neo-Platonism, in the other, Stoicism. Finally, there is a totally different attitude toward history. The Renaissance proclaims itself as a revival of older forms of life, and in its productions blends old and new inextricably together. The Enlightenment sets life in a timeless present of Reason and is, therefore, diametrically opposed to all historical tradition, and to all systems of life that are based upon authority.

In general temper, it is the Renaissance which, at first sight, is the more intensely alive. But the pulse-beat of the Enlightenment is really stronger, and the results of its activity more important. In both periods, life centres its interest on the world, and is eager to subdue all tracts of existence to the will of man: in both, the gulf between man and the world is wider than in the

Middle Ages. But in the Renaissance, man and the world are not so far asunder but that they can still unite again with ease: in artistic creation, the opposition seems altogether lost, and reality is entirely within man's grasp. The Enlightenment, on the other hand, has intensified the opposition, almost past hope of transcendence. Nature is emptied of everything spiritual, and becomes completely autonomous; the soul, at the same time, is loosened from all outside connection and firmly centred in itself. The two aspects of reality seem in irreconcilable antagonism; and when, notwithstanding, man cannot turn his back upon the world, and sees that if he hold aloof his work has no meaning and his life no gladness, he is face to face with a knotty problem: if world and soul are to reunite, the primitive conception of them must be radically changed, and the chief instrument in effecting this change is science. Such a process, however, involves far more thought and toil, more critical reflection and clear definition of limits, than was possible to the more primitive culture of the Renaissance. Taken all in all, the Renaissance gives us a fresher and more brilliant picture; the Enlightenment, one more full of thought and meaning.

If what we have said is sufficient to show that a first impression of the Enlightenment may easily incline to be unfavourable, it is natural that the nineteenth century should be particularly unjust to it, inasmuch as the assertion of its own spirit involved such a complete reaction. Moreover, it could not see the Enlightenment as it really was in the first flush of its youthful ideal, but knew it only when it had descended to the level of ordinary life. Hostile to history as the movement was, it can yet be appreciated rightly only in the light of its historical connections. Viewed in this light, it no longer presents itself as a logic-ridden process subject to the petty limitations of a formal understanding, but rather as an earnest endeavour of the whole man to realise the true meaning of his life. It contrasts with the Middle Ages by its claim to complete freedom, and with the Renaissance by its claim to complete clearness; through the fulfilment of

both these claims man takes possession of the world and feels himself its ruler.

The requisite condition for such control of nature is that man should live his own life and possess from the outset a trustworthy mental equipment. So it was one of the main concerns of the Enlightenment to secure him this requirement by proving that he was no mere empty receptacle, no *tabula rasa*, but rather the possessor of a self-sufficing nature, a repository of infallible truths, himself the measure of all things. To attain mastery of his world, all he needs is to search into this nature of his and develop it thoroughly. From his indwelling reason he can produce a "natural" law, a "natural" morality, a "natural" religion, independently of all tradition. It enables him to criticise the traditional order of things, call everything into question, weed out what contradicts reason, gather together and treasure up all that is in accord with it. Every power is called upon to do full work; the human spirit seems now for the first time to enter upon its majority; it engages in a vigorous conflict with the seeming irrationalism of the world around it; out of its indwelling reason, it evolves, in opposition to ecclesiastical organisation, a system of life that is universal, and it therewith revolutionises the whole order of things in every department. The system has been severely attacked and has been broken through at almost every single point. But as a whole it still survives, since all revolution and innovation have as yet failed to produce a new Order. And only a system can overthrow a system.

When we consider the Enlightenment in closer detail, we are struck by the spirit of serious labour, happy faith in the power of goodness and enthusiasm for humanity, which greet us on every hand. How much we owe to its untiring zeal for the humanising of social conditions, in ameliorating harsh laws, for instance, and raising the general standard of culture and education! How deeply we are indebted to the intellectual acuteness which freed us from the devastating superstition that lay like a blight on the genius of the Renaissance! In truth, we often

judge the Enlightenment unfavourably for the very reason that we have drawn from it the inspiration for our best work.

Such a recognition of its claims, however, need not blind us to its limitations and errors. Whether or not we approve of the attempt to isolate the reason, concentrate its forces, and then marshal them to do battle with the outside world, we must at least admit that the project was carried out in far too easy and hasty a fashion, and that consequently life became involved in restrictions and negations which reduced it eventually to a shallow conventionalism. To the Enlightenment with its consciousness of power and its optimistic turn of mind it seemed as though reason lay ready available in the soul of every man. The natural goodness immediately operative in each individual awaited only the emancipating touch to rise in majesty and bring the environing world into like harmony with reason. There was nowhere any aliveness to difficult spiritual problems. Much, therefore, became superfluous that had hitherto seemed indispensable. If reason were available at every moment in every individual, then why trouble about history, which really seemed rather a hindrance than a help? Again, there was a weakening of the spiritual tie which linked the individual to the community. And finally, the optimism of the period prevented any deeper understanding of the old religious view of life. In all these points, the Enlightenment was bound to become more and more narrow in proportion as it developed more and more self-consciously its own peculiar character.

This narrowness, moreover, penetrates even to the innermost structure of life. The Enlightenment seeks for the firm and ultimate ground, the fundamental constituent of reality, in that which is immediately given to consciousness. What consciousness first becomes aware of passes for the real essence of the thing. Thus the entire soul is summed up in thought and knowledge; the coexistence of atoms makes up the entire world. The realm of presentation together with spatial existence constitutes the whole of reality, though neither singly nor together can they give rise to what is spiritual or self-sufficient.

Such negations and restrictions were bound, as the movement spread and deepened, to increase in force and finally to produce a strong reaction. But despite all that is questionable and defective in detail, there is no contesting the great and abiding significance of the fundamental aim. The keenest-eyed criticism must not forget how greatly the movement has helped to bring light and freedom into human existence, and how profoundly it affects us all even to-day.

The transition from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment is neither sudden nor abrupt. In passing from the Old to the New we meet many striking and interesting figures who combine the tendencies of both periods and interweave work of the highest order with much fanciful speculation. Foremost among these figures stands Kepler (1571–1630). In him the youthful spirit of the Renaissance still lingers, and, with it, the hope to unriddle nature's secret by one bold effort and force an access into her inmost shrine (*penetralia naturæ*). His work is inspired by a lofty imagination which makes beauty the guiding motive of the world. But at the same time he displays an indefatigable zeal for clearness: immanental forces are driven further and further from the domain of nature; the differences of things assume a quantitative form: mathematics are not only to express nature symbolically, but to give an exact knowledge of her. And, despite his reverence for mind as the source of knowledge, there is a very clear appreciation of the value of experience and a painstaking observation of minute detail. It is the discoverer's proud boast that his respect for a difference of eight minutes of arc paved the way for the reform of all astronomical science. Imagination and science, the artistic and the mathematical turn of mind, unite in the conception of a harmonious universe; it was this idea that most effectually inspired Kepler to make the discoveries which have immortalised his name.

With Galileo (1564–1641), on the other hand, we at once breathe the air of the Enlightenment. Here the domain of exact science is freed from all fanciful speculation and Nature is

purified from all psychical admixture. On the whole, during the second and third decades of the seventeenth century, the new movement gains visibly in strength and independence. The year 1625 witnesses the appearance of Hugo Grotius's *magnum opus* which not only sets natural law upon a systematic basis, but, more generally, proclaims with no uncertain voice the advent of a new thought. The same disposition manifests itself contemporaneously in France, and also in England. A new spirit is awaking: all that is now needed is a great thinker to help it into full self-consciousness and bring life wholly under its control. Such a thinker we find in Descartes.

(b) *The Leaders of the Enlightenment*

(*a*) DESCARTES

Descartes touches only casually upon the problems and interests of human life. None the less, he has a right to be included among the thinkers whom we are seeking to portray. His philosophy is no mere erudite research, or work possessing a merely technical interest; for through its influence a new way of thinking is evolved which wholly transforms the spiritual outlook: in Descartes's work we have the victorious emergence, in full strength and clearness, of the spirit which was to dominate the future centuries and stamp an enduring impress upon man's spiritual life.

From his youth upward Descartes was dominated by an ardent passion for complete clearness. This it was which rendered him such an enthusiastic devotee of mathematics and at the same time made him conscious of the intolerably unsatisfactory condition of science as handed down by scholasticism: chaotic confusion, revolution in a perpetual circle, artificial distinctions rather than fruitful solutions—above all, a lamentable want of certainty and fixity. A profound scepticism is awakened which strikes at the very roots of knowledge, nor are the resources of the existing order in any way adequate to satisfy the demands

of an energetic thinker. There is no confidence in the authority of historical tradition; indeed, the authorities themselves are full of contradictions; as for the senses, apparently our most trustworthy source of information about reality, they may deceive us, and not only in this or that detail, but in the presentation as a whole: witness dreams, or better still, the fancies of fever-patients. We do indeed trust to logical chains of reasoning, but is this trust justified? Is it not possible that a mysterious Power should so have constructed us that our very obedience to the laws of our nature should lead us into error? In a word, there is nothing we can trust: no conviction so established but now shows signs of giving way. Doubt remains, apparently, in full possession of the field. From such a painful position there could be only one means of escape: the discovery of an absolutely fixed point, a point such as Archimedes sought to serve him as a fulcrum for moving the earth; only from such a point would it be possible to bring any certainty into knowledge. But turn where we will, where are we to find such a point? It cannot be outside us; we can look for it only in ourselves, and we find it here in thought, in mental activity. Any particular assertion, in fact all the content of our thinking, may be erroneous, but the fact remains that in thinking erroneously we are still thinking. Even when we doubt, we are thinking, and so even doubt itself confirms the fact of our thinking. In thinking, however, there is involved the thinking subject, the Ego—not derived from it by a wearisome process of inference, but immediately present in it. Thus the maxim, "I think, therefore I am" (*cogito, ergo sum*) has to bear the weight of the whole philosophical superstructure; the fulcrum we have sought is none other than the thinking subject itself. It is here that philosophy must take its stand, and find a starting-point for all further development.

This may seem a simple line to take, but in the energy and thoroughness with which it is followed up, it betokens nothing less than a complete revolution. For whereas formerly the world was the fixed point, and the problem was to justify the transi-

tion to man, now the starting-point is the Ego and we have to explain the transition to the world. This change not only affects the method of inquiry; it gives an entirely new content to reality. —Descartes cannot, however, use the Ego as the basis of his world-philosophy without further strengthening our ground for belief in its capacity; and his point is that if we are to have full confidence in our reason, there must be a God, an Absolute Reason, making our finite reason worthy of trust. He therefore seeks to prove the existence of a divine Being, an Infinite and Almighty Intelligence. Of such a Being, veracity is of the very essence. He cannot lead our reason astray, if it conscientiously obey the laws of its own nature. But this it can do only by refusing to admit as true anything that is not just as evident, just as clear and distinct, as is the implication of our own existence in the fact of thinking. Here we have a safe criterion, and at the same time an incentive to undertake a most thorough sifting of all that has been transmitted to us from the past as true. Error no longer seems to be a necessity of our nature, but rather to be explained by the fact that the impetuosity of our desire for knowledge urges us to a conclusion before we have attained the necessary degree of clearness and distinctness. But in that case, we can avoid error, if we will, by bridling our impetuosity and practising a stern self-discipline. Though we cannot reach the whole truth, yet the truth that we do reach may be unadulterated and trustworthy. So self-criticism does not originate with Kant, but appears at the very outset as a main requirement of modern science and modern culture.

The proofs by which Descartes supports these contentions are in many respects open to criticism; the grounds he gives for believing in the existence of God are almost wofully unsatisfactory. But when a great thinker produces proofs the inadequacy of which is obvious to any one of average intelligence, we may always surmise that at the back of the proofs he adduces there is something original, axiomatic, intuitively certain, and that he is impelled by an inward necessity for which he cannot find the right expression. Descartes, feeling human reason to be the

source of all knowledge and the criterion of reality, was naturally influenced by a strong desire to ground it securely in the Universal Reason. The inevitable result was a *circulus in demonstrando*, and this circle again points to a discrepancy in first principles; still, the immediate purpose was attained: the philosopher was now fortified in his own conviction and could enter upon his work in all confidence.

The task that presents itself is first and foremost a thoroughgoing revision of the problem of knowledge: nothing can be counted as knowledge that does not satisfy the demands of clearness and distinctness, but in bringing knowledge up to this standard, we immensely increase its lucidity, freshness and coherence. Mathematical procedure becomes the pattern for all scientific inquiry. As, in mathematics, we begin with what is self-evident and press forward step by step in a perfectly sure sequence, never straying into the vague regions of the undefined, but keeping all our manifold data within the bonds of systematic arrangement, so now we must bring the same ideals into philosophy and scientific work generally. In so far as we do this, we may expect knowledge to show a perpetual advance, whereas the scholastic procedure necessitated the same ground being covered over and over again.

But Descartes does not only succeed in achieving a reform or, shall we say, a revolution in science; he inaugurates a new era of general culture. In the Middle Ages, culture was first and foremost a historical product. Reason could do nothing without receiving the support and sanction of the supreme powers—tradition and authority. Now, however, there arises a culture the basis of which is man's own intuitive insight and the reason which dwells within him. If only that is to be good and true which is immediately evident to our reason, much that has hitherto been reckoned as a solid and valuable possession must indeed lose its importance, and we run the risk of hasty negations and an extreme radicalism. There is, however, a positive and constructive side to this criticism of the traditional

status, a discovery of new standards and values, a more searching and original treatment of the problems of human existence.

The main result of the desire for clearness is seen in man's changed conception of his own being and of the relation between nature and spirit. As the claims of thought become more imperative, they prove fatal to that conception of body and soul which had been hitherto prevalent—a conception which regarded them as mutually inseparable, but endowed the material factor with inward forces and impulses, whereas the spiritual was left vague and undefined, at the mercy of any material metaphor. In proportion as each began to be more clearly defined and referred back to a single principle, the impossibility of connecting them in any immediate way became apparent. The essence of soul is conscious activity—thinking in the wider sense of the term; the essence of body is extension in space. The soul's activity is reflective: it is always rounding back upon itself, or rather, it remains self-centred even when its endeavour appears to be outwardly directed. The action of bodies, on the other hand, consists in their mutual contact and interaction. The soul is essentially indivisible; matter, as spatially extended, is infinitely divisible. Thus dualism becomes a necessity; and, however true it is that man could not rest satisfied in it forever, it was yet an inevitable stage in his progress, and a stimulus to further effort. Especially has it rendered valuable service by its clear separation of mind from matter, thus necessitating a vigorous and clear development of the two departments, each along its own line. Now for the first time each can be explained from its own particular context, the psychical psychologically, and the physical by physics. It was this which first made possible the exact sciences and a self-interpreting psychology. Again, as regards the social life, this separation of mind from matter was the most important agency in restraining the barbarous crusade against witchcraft, a crusade supported by the adherents of all the religious confessions. Its chief opponent, Balthasar Bekker, was an enthusiastic Cartesian, and even in the criminal courts

themselves the influence of the enlightened Cartesian position can be directly traced.

This separation of the psychical from the physical necessitated an important understanding concerning the demarcation of boundaries. The sense-properties of things—the rich variety of colours, sounds, etc.—which had hitherto been looked on as inherent in the things themselves, prove on closer examination to be contributed by the soul, and to be the reactions with which she responds from the storehouse of her own inner nature to the stimulus from outside. The wonderful magic of nature which so delights and enchants us does not really belong to her, but is lent her by the soul, which clothes with this splendid garment the inanimate world of matter and motion. Nature thus loses all soul and psychic quality; she stands over against man as something strange and alien; before her immensity, the sphere of the soul threatens to shrivel into a contemptible smallness. But to Descartes himself this turn of things seems more suggestive of gain than of loss. Nature, freed from all psychic elements, can at last become quite transparent to thought. She now presents herself as a collection of tiniest atoms endowed from the outset with a power of movement; she becomes a system of simple powers and laws, a great piece of machinery, far superior in its exquisite delicacy of adjustment to any human contrivance, while yet its separation from such is only a question of degree. Even the most intricate organism is nothing more than a machine of the highest possible degree of perfection; if the old physicists made the organism their starting-point for a comprehension of nature generally, now the organic must find its place in a scheme that is purely mechanical. The actions of material bodies are not determined from within, but are dependent on a stimulus from without; nature is one vast, immeasurable network of reciprocal relations. This transformation of nature into an inanimate mechanism made upon later generations a general impression of artificiality and lifelessness, but, at the time, the prevalent feeling was one of pride and delight in the control of nature by means of our ideas, and—sec-

ondarily—in its subordination to our purposes. For it was not till nature had been reduced by analysis to its simplest elements, that it was at all possible to carry out Bacon's programme of controlling it through the insight and skill of man. Descartes did not neglect the technical aspect of the question; his correspondence shows convincingly to what an extent he busied himself with technical problems. But in the last resort, he made all utilitarian considerations yield place to the value of knowledge for its own sake, to the joy of illumining those regions of nature which would otherwise remain in darkness. He was the first to give a systematic and precise interpretation of nature in terms of natural law.

The autonomy thus obtained by nature is accorded equally to the soul. Though with Descartes the soul is deprived of all extension in the universe and is strictly limited to man, it becomes thereby, only the more certainly, underived and independent. No outside influence can reach it, save with its own co-operation; all outward expression in life must originate in the depths of its own being. But this would be impossible if it were empty to begin with. To be independent, it must have an original endowment of its own, a secure heritage of indubitable verities, of "innate ideas." Though we cannot become clearly conscious of them until we reach a certain level of development, yet they are there from the beginning, directing our effort. The doctrine of innate ideas is indispensable if we wish to maintain the self-sufficiency of the soul and the independence of thought.

We need go no further than this doctrine to see the supreme importance which attaches to intellect in the Cartesian conception of the soul. This predominance is due to a gradual and unnoticed change in the meaning of thought. From being at the outset the fundamental energy of the whole soul with the very general meaning of conscious activity, it narrows into the specialised meaning of conceptual thinking, the activity of knowledge. Intellect is more important than sense-perception, since the latter is not a purely self-conditioned form of consciousness, but is also conditioned from without. It also takes prece-

dence of will, since willing involves a thinking and knowing. So knowing presents itself as the nucleus for the development of the whole life of the soul, a development through which our entire existence is brought to the stage of self-determined activity. Our happiness, too, seems to be entirely bound up with our thinking. Scientific insight gives us power over our feelings, and a remedy for all pains and sorrows. For it shows us that the things outside us are not subject to our control, and what we know to be impossible cannot rouse our interest. Our *thoughts*, on the other hand, *are* within our own power; we can concentrate them on the infinite universe, and in the knowledge of its greatness our own being expands. "When we love God, and through Him feel our union in spirit (*voluntate*) with all created things, then the greater, nobler and more perfect our conception of these things, the more do we value ourselves as being parts of the perfect Whole." At first sight these seem only casual remarks, but they are faithful to the spirit of the system, and indicate clearly the line of advance which was to receive its classical expression in the life-scheme elaborated by Spinoza.

There is much in Descartes that is incomplete; but to urge this as a reproach against the genius who opened up new worlds of thought would be thankless and perverse. On points of supreme importance he has not only thrown out most valuable suggestions, but has determined movements of far-reaching import. The modern tendency to start from the thinking subject, the establishment of a rationalistic culture, the precise investigation of nature with its leaning toward mechanical conceptions. the self-centredness of the psychical life with its exaggerated appreciation of the intellect—these things all owe their philosophical foundation to Descartes. Much of it seems to us to-day less characteristic and less great precisely for the reason that it has become a component part of our being and we take it as a matter of course. Moreover, the smoothness and clearness of exposition often make us forget the profound and original character of the content. Whether at the same time certain essential problems have remained untouched, whether the triumph of

simplicity has been purchased at the cost of ignoring whole groups of facts, we will not here discuss. In any case, Descartes's genius for clearness and simplicity makes him the best guide to our study of the peculiarities of the Enlightenment. In Descartes we see both the motives which impelled the rise and growth of the movement, and the difficulties attaching to it from the very outset. There can be no better starting-point for estimating alike its greatness and its limitations.

We cannot pass from Descartes to Spinoza without at least mentioning certain typical thinkers among his contemporaries. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), one of the most consistent thinkers of any epoch, made it his special work to extend to the whole of our world the mechanical conception of nature which he had helped to establish. This is the real bearing of his attempt to rid the soul, no less than the State, of all inwardness of life and wholeness of conception, and to view it in an entirely new light as a mechanically-propelled contrivance. This view he has maintained with admirable vigour and clearness, though, it must be confessed too, in a decidedly narrow spirit. Thinkers who in this fashion stake everything on the development of one single fundamental conception usually find few unconditional supporters and found no school. But they stamp themselves with all the force and clearness of a distinct type upon the whole domain of man's activity. They are ever ready with question and answer wherever their problems are seriously discussed. Thus Hobbes influenced Spinoza and Leibniz; in the eighteenth century he was held in high esteem especially by the French Enlightenment, and he has commanded the attention of our own century right up to the present day. He always finds friends; he has always something to give, even to his opponents.

More helpful for the understanding of our human life are the religious movements called into being by Descartes's victorious championship of the modern spirit. Religion is unable to comply with the new demands for mathematical clearness and distinctness; must she, then, fall, or will she find new ways of prov-

ing her truth? Pascal (1623–1662) seeks such proof in *feeling*, which he regards as the root of life and the source of all immediate certainty; if religion takes a firm stand here, then all the doubts of science and the contradictions of daily experience are powerless to affect her. The religious life becomes more tender and emotional, but with all its mildness, it remains vigorous and healthy because it is rooted in the moral sentiment, which it defends against jesuitical sophistry in the most courageous way. Religion brings into our life a constant agitation, a note of breathless expectancy, in that it first awakes men to a full consciousness of the misery of human existence, and then raises them clear above it by enabling them to lay hold on Infinite Love. Its revelation of man's possible greatness is the first thing that brings home to him his littleness, but on the other hand, it is his littleness which first makes him fully conscious of his greatness. "Who is unhappy at not being a king save a king who has been dethroned?" In such a mood there is a marked tendency to oscillate between extremes, to run from one side to the other, to doubt and yet be certain, to seek and yet have. "Thou wouldst not be seeking me hadst thou not already found me." So there arises a religion of personal sentiment and inward experience, a purely individual concern, which does not set up any new spiritual order and is, therefore, not in opposition to any existing ecclesiastical organisation, but finds its place and does its work within such organisations. This was not the Reformation spirit, able to lift the world out of old ruts and set it upon new paths; but in helping to keep alive the true spirit of religion in face of all the outward ceremonial of ecclesiasticism it has rendered and still continues to render very valuable service.

Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) deals with kindred problems, but in a very different spirit. Christianity and Reason seem to him irreconcilably at variance; no religion is so much opposed to a solution in terms of reason. It is especially the problem of evil —the difficulty of reconciling the unspeakable misery of the world with the belief in an almighty and all-righteous God— which is always occupying him and estranging him from any

dogmatic creed. But since at the same time he is filled with a profound mistrust of man's knowing capacity and even of his moral soundness, he is not willing to dispense with the support of religion; only it should be simple and tolerant, and find its main function in the purification of the inward life. But even in his affirmations, he shows so much scepticism, so much biting sarcasm, so much pessimistic understanding of the human soul, that even his personal honour was often impugned, though we believe unjustly. In any case, we have here the origin of a peculiar type of thought which persisted right through the eighteenth century; a no less distinguished person than Frederick II was an enthusiastic admirer of Bayle.

In France, religious development falls into an unfortunate predicament. On the one hand, an ostentatious ecclesiasticism has to be kept up for political reasons, and a court-theology of a showy kind is developed (Bossuet). On the other hand, the wider public becomes increasingly estranged from religion and views its problems with an easy unconcern. But if this outward and superficial treatment of religious things is the outstanding feature of modern France, it is only fair to remember that it is just the French spirit which has experienced a particularly strong reaction against it. Stern monastic discipline, unconditional renunciation, severest penance—nowhere in the modern world have these things had a greater development than in France. "Nowhere do the extremes of the French national character come more clearly to light than in the sphere of religion. The reverse side of its worldliness and pleasure-seeking, its scoffing superciliousness and its audacious denials, has been, in all periods of its history, the seriousness of a stern and often harsh religious sentiment. Verified in the individual's own inward experience, it has schooled countless numbers to penance and purification. In public life, it has waxed into fanaticism, tyranny and persecution, and has left upon French history in the course of the centuries a dark impress of cruelty" (Lady Blennerhassett).

(β) SPINOZA

(aa) *Introduction.*—The remarkable fortunes of Spinoza's philosophy are of themselves sufficient indication of its peculiarly complex character. It is the natural outcome of the Enlightenment and completes certain tendencies of that movement. It is with Spinoza first that the Enlightenment succeeds in producing a really great conception of the world. Spinoza first shows it the way into that which is most inward and essentially human. But in spite of this, his philosophy was not accepted by the period itself nor allowed free room for development. Not only adherents of orthodoxy, but free-thinkers of the broadest type, such as Bayle, flatly refused to consider it. Its opportunity arrived only when people began to weary of the Enlightenment and find its way of thought too narrow. Then began a period of ardent enthusiasm for Spinoza: a new generation had found in him the classical expression of its conviction and its faith. Consequently much has been read into Spinoza, but still there must have been in him something more than the Enlightenment had attained to, or the great German poets could never have held him in such warm veneration.

It is curious, too, that Spinoza should have received honour from such widely different and even opposed quarters. Religious and artistic natures, speculative philosophers and the empiricists of science, idealists and realists and even materialists, have felt a common sympathy in their appreciation of Spinoza. This, of course, was possible only because each saw in him something different, but the possibility of these different interpretations must in last resort be due to something in the philosopher himself. But how can we explain this, seeing that before everything else he strove after unity, and that his system appears to be so eminently self-contained? Let us see whether a closer examination may help us to solve, or at least to lessen, a difficulty which at first sight appears so perplexing.

(bb) *The World and Man.*—It is the relationship of world and man that constitutes the central problem for Spinoza; the rela-

tionship is dealt with more particularly in his great work, the "Ethics." The exposition takes the unexciting form of a mathematical demonstration, but its matter teems with life and movement, so that the fate of man is made to pass before our eyes as though in some magnificent drama. Spinoza begins by waging bitter war upon human pretensions. The world cannot reveal its true nature without a weeding out of all the human attributes that have been introduced into it. And when this process has been completed, we find ourselves left with an entirely changed idea of man: he has dwindled into an insignificant detail in the vast machinery of the universe. But he is not left in this low estate. A path of escape opens out, leading to a new elevation, for he may conceive the world as a whole and become spiritually one with it, so as to appropriate to himself its greatness, its eternity and its infinitude. But this is possible only on condition that he utterly renounces all separateness and all desire after separateness, sinking himself completely in the universal life. Thus the final acceptance is not without an element of stern refusal, and the glad courageous note of the concluding strain is something very different from the voice of mere natural impulse.

In his construction of the world Spinoza seeks to exclude all human contribution as tending to a perversion of the facts, and to find an interpretation of the universe in itself alone. All the oppositions of human thought must, therefore, be overcome within the unity of a single system. First and foremost falls away the opposition between the World and God. These are not different realities, but are related within the one and only reality as existence and essence, phenomenon and ultimate ground, nature as product and nature as producing power (*natura naturata* and *natura naturans*). God is Pure Being, the underlying Principle of all particular forms, containing them within Himself in their entirety. We can, therefore, be more certain of Him than of anything else, and knowledge of Him is a necessary preliminary to all other insight. Understood in this sense, God has no need to go out of Himself in order to work upon things,

but all working is *within* His life and essence. To use the technical scholastic phrase, He is the Immanent Cause of things. So it is truer to say that the world is in God than that God is in the world.

A God of this kind who comprehends in Himself the whole extent of infinity must not be conceived as being in any way like unto man. Even our highest spiritual activities, such as thinking and willing, are far too closely connected with the world of phenomena to characterise that which is infinite and all-embracing. Moreover, it is impossible that God should make the welfare of man His chief concern, arranging everything for this special end, and, maybe, rewarding and punishing man according to his deserts. This would give far too petty and anthropomorphic a picture of the Universal Being, besides being entirely opposed to the testimony of our every-day experience. For experience teaches us that the world pursues its own course in complete indifference to the wishes and aims of man, and that good and evil fortune visit alike the just and the unjust; nor do storms, earthquakes and diseases spare even the best of men. Not only in all this is there no evidence of any special care for man, but, to speak more generally, all purposive action is unworthy of God. It is precisely this which constitutes His greatness, that He wishes for nothing outside Himself, His own infinite being, which amidst all Its activity, unaffected by any temporal changes, is from everlasting to everlasting at rest in Itself alone.

The world had always been pictured as torn and divided against itself, for man is wont to transfer to things themselves the oppositions which exist for his own feeling: as good and evil, orderly and chaotic, beautiful and ugly; in this way he falsifies reality and introduces division into what is really one uninterrupted sequence. If things are no longer thus treated erroneously, but are contemplated simply in themselves without the intrusion of any subjective valuation, everything fits together, and all manifoldness unites to form one single universal life grounded in the Eternal Substance. It is true that in the unfold-

ing of this life, whether in nature or in the soul, we are concerned with purely individual occurrences, but these occurrences are systematically connected; not only are they bound together in an uninterrupted chain of causation, not only are simple and immutable laws at work through all the complexity of events, but the events themselves are in last resort nothing else than unfoldings of the Divine Essence, temporal manifestations of the Eternal Being, wave upon wave in the ocean of Infinity.

Once reality has thus been welded together, we may hope for a transcendence of the opposition between the material and the spiritual, an opposition which Descartes had rendered intolerably acute. At the same time, we have to deal with the relation of subject and object, of thought and being, with the problem of truth. The older thought, reaching right back to Plato, found no difficulty in conceiving truth as the correspondence of our thinking with an object external to it. For the world about us and the nature within us seemed to be akin, our own life expanding through the foreign elements it appropriated. The modern separation of world and subject precludes all such intimate interaction. Is there any means of bringing about a new kind of connection, not, indeed, through Descartes's artificial and roundabout devices, but in a straightforward and natural manner?

Spinoza believes that he can really provide such a means. For him, matter and mind are not different things, but only different aspects of one and the same thing, only developments, presentations, existential manifestations of one and the same fundamental substance. Each series runs its own course in complete independence of the other, without any interaction or mutual disturbance. But they are both in complete agreement, since the event is in essence one and the same whether it fall in the one series or the other. Such a shifting of the dualism from the real to the phenomenal seems to offer an easy solution to a difficult problem, and has the additional advantage of doing no injustice to either side, but allowing each to develop to the full its own peculiar nature.

There ensues a unification of thought and being. They are not constrained to agreement from without, but they are in perfect accord since each is grounded in the one Infinite Substance. In order to reach truth, complete truth, thought has simply to concentrate all its energy upon itself, allow no interference from outside, weed out all confused ideas, obey its own laws, relinquish all anthropomorphism, and become a thought objectively controlled. And this is not feasible till all human prejudices and illusions are set aside. Then only do the order and connection of concepts coincide with the order and connection of things; then only does the logical sequence of ideas answer point for point to the real sequence of events, and the world of thought become a faithful mirror of that which transpires in the world of matter. And this close correspondence proceeds, not from any external adjustments, but from the common grounding of the two series in one and the same substance. Thought-process and nature-process together constitute the whole of reality within which everything moves with calm, inevitable certainty. There are no dark corners left, but all things, even to their innermost recesses, are flooded with light.

(cc) *Man and his Littleness.*—The universe could only obtain this predominance by being completely dehumanized and lifted sheer above the ideas and purposes of man. Man is henceforward merely a part of the universe; he has no longer any special exemptions and privileges; he forms no "state within the state" (*imperium in imperio*). Just as his whole existence is only a single incident, a "mode" in the infinite universe, so his body is only a part of infinite extension, his spirit a part of infinite thought. As the body, so mechanical doctrine assures us, is only a cohesion of tiny atoms, so the spirit is only a plexus of simple ideas; it has no inner unity: the will and the understanding are nothing apart from the individual acts of will and the individual thoughts. Moreover, since willing is not something distinct from thinking, but only an aspect of thought itself —namely, the assertion of reality which is implied in every act

of conception—the whole man becomes merely a mechanical complex of simple ideas, or, to use the philosopher's own expression, a "spiritual machine" (*automaton spirituale*). This is a great advance in clearness. But it is purchased at the cost of surrendering all freedom of action; the decision which is ostensibly ours is really only a product of this animated mechanism; our consciousness of freedom is merely due to the fact that very often, though conscious of our actions, we are ignorant of their causes, and therefore look upon them as uncaused. Accordingly, man's actions and desires should be treated as mere natural units, such as points, surfaces and solids. Commiseration and ridicule are equally out of place here; what we need is to understand.

Such subordination of man to nature leaves man directly subject to natural laws. The same impulse which moves everything outside us regulates also our own activity: the impulse, namely, to self-preservation. It is not merely a characteristic of our nature: it *is* our nature. We can never look away from ourselves, never act in the interest of another, but only in our own interest. But what conduces to the preservation or advancement of the self, we term "useful." Hence all our actions aim at utility: the more capable a man is, the more energetically will he strive for his own advantage.

But in the realm of experience, where individual beings meet and cross each other, now helping, now hindering, there arise numberless complications, and the machinery is in ceaseless movement. Here the passions (emotional dispositions) hold sway; here the struggle for happiness is fought out; here love blossoms forth and hate. Moreover, this whole subjective life of ours varies according to the pressure of the forces at work, and our relationships with men and things are measured by their performance-value, by the extent to which they enhance the fulness of life. Owing to the complex and intricate nature of reality this dependence may easily escape our immediate notice, but philosophical investigation soon discloses the necessary character of what seems to be arbitrary and lends support

to those who would treat human life by the methods of natural science.

The issue involves our pleasure and our pain, but what are we to understand by these terms? Pleasure is the condition which attends the spirit's passage toward greater perfection; pain, that which attends its lapse into a state of less perfection, the degree of perfection being measured by the intensity of the vital process. But pleasure and pain bring love and hate in their train. Love arises when an object is represented as the cause of pleasure; hate, when it is represented as the cause of pain. The quality of the experience stamps that which produced it as either friendly or hostile. Hence, even in love and hate, there is no such thing as caprice; that which helps us, we are bound to love; that which harms us, we hate, and we are unable to change even the least particle of such love and hate. Love and hate, moreover, are not limited to the things which affect us directly. For the procedure of these things depends again on others which, though in themselves alien to us, may affect us indirectly through those things which are not alien. Our feelings may, therefore, be transferred to them, even though it be in a modified form. We love the friends of our friends, as helping those who help us. We love also the enemies of our enemies, because they tend to weaken that which harms us. Conversely, we hate the enemies of our friends and the friends of our enemies. These indirect relations reach further and further till they embrace all that is concerned with our experience, all that refers to it or is in any way an attendant circumstance. Everything that is associated with agreeable experiences or reminds us of such—however outward and accidental the connection may be—occasions us pleasure, as its opposite gives us pain. In this circuitous way, even that which is most remote from us can excite pleasure or pain, love or hate. The sympathies and antipathies which even we ourselves are often at a loss to understand can easily be explained on the ground that the real reason for our love and hate is here veiled from our consciousness. But these passions, notwithstanding, are power-

ful stimuli to action; we are bound to promote what is useful to us, to suppress and destroy what harms us. All the exhortations of the moralists abate not one jot of this necessity. A passion can only be overcome by a yet stronger passion, not by mere appeals and resolutions. So the machinery of the passions is laid bare, their tangled web is unravelled, and we have revealed to us a rich mine of worldly-wise reflections upon human nature.

In all this Spinoza is content with mere description; he allows his subject-matter to unfold itself undisturbed by any obtrusive valuations of his own. But in our retrospective glance over his system as a whole, we cannot avoid forming some critical estimate, and we then see clearly how unsatisfactory is the position he assigns to man. For though it is possible in this machinery of life that the individual should here and there come to the front, yet in the main he is dependent on an alien and inscrutable world. We are incessantly tossed to and fro by causes outside ourselves, even as the waves of the sea are buffetted by opposing winds. Ignorant of our origin and our destiny, slaves of our passions, continually at discord and strife with one another—surely, taking all into consideration, we are in a state of misery and bondage. Is this the final conclusion, or is there a path from bondage into freedom?

(dd) *Man and his Greatness.*—Spinoza in truth effects an important transition, but he has discovered the new path rather than explored it; he could not have gone far in it without finding a radical flaw in his system. He himself looks upon the new movement as a mere development of the original line of effort: he regards it as carrying a natural process to its logical conclusion, whereas in truth it effects a complete revolution and builds up a new world over against nature. According to Spinoza we must still aim at self-preservation and utility, but the utility must be real (*re vera*) and fundamental (*ex fundamento*), not the utility of ordinary life. It must be the utility which only knowledge can give, genuine scientific knowledge. Such knowledge

lights up from within what would otherwise be strange and alien, teaches us to regard it in its fundamentals, gives it us as our possession, and puts us in a position to act with regard to it. We no longer feel things to be oppressive when we can evolve them through our own thinking; we are their masters, and alive with that full activity which means blessedness. But our thinking can have this power only when we look upon ourselves as links in the chain of the universe and interpret our position in the light of the necessary and eternal order of things. This process does not attain its completion till we link everything to God, the fundamental Essence; and since from this point of view our thought conceives all manifoldness as the unfolding of the Infinite Substance, and views it immediately *sub specie aeternitatis*, our knowledge is no longer a knowledge dependent on logical trains of reasoning: it is intuitive. Such intuitive knowledge of God is incomparably the highest good and the ultimate goal of all true effort. It transmutes our whole being into speculative activity and lifts it into full freedom and fruition, at the same time dispelling all sorrow. Even the passions divest themselves of every painful element and become purified activities as soon as we penetrate their meaning clearly and distinctly, for we then see that their message is not one of painful renunciation but of glad endeavour. The whole life now becomes full of force and activity and joyous assertion. There grows up the ideal of a "free man" for whom all painful conditions are an evil. Sympathy, humility, repentance and the like may be useful on a lower level of life, but the higher level knows naught of them; here, we are told, "he who repents of a deed increases twofold his unhappiness and weakness."

This is a high ideal to which we can only approximate by degrees. But even though it be difficult for the true knowledge to permeate us entirely, yet it can be sufficiently clear and distinct to act as a cure for the passions. The more we regard the incidents of our life in their necessary context, the less will they disturb us, the more shall we dwell upon them in the light of thought, till the love and the hate which grew out of them will

be dispelled, and the spirit be led into the peace of pure contemplation. So intuition, free from all will and desire, becomes the great means of emancipation from disturbance and pain, the great means of ensuring to our whole nature a passage into peace and blessedness.

But such an experience can gain the coherency of a life in the Universal, it can become deeply spiritual, only by virtue of a connection with the intuitive knowledge of God, the Eternal and Infinite Being. It is this knowledge alone which is the consummation of our thought and life. Everything which advances our well-being, so we saw, necessarily awakens our love. For God, then, we shall feel a boundless love. This love is far superior to anything else which goes by the name. It is no ordinary love fraught with melancholy and passion, but rests entirely upon knowledge; it is "intellectual love" (*amor intellectualis*). Such love to God is genuine only when it demands no return. For God cannot, by His very nature, love any particular object in the human sense, since this would degrade His Being to a lower level. Therefore we read, "he who truly loves God cannot ask that God should love him in return." Without a complete surrender of all petty egoism there can be no freedom, no exaltation. It is with intellectual love that God loves Himself—*i. e.*, Eternity and Infinity in their fulness—and the intellectual love of the spirit for God is a part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself. The universe thus gains a spiritual depth and an inner life, though truly of a very different kind from the life of the human soul.

This union with God also ensures to man an eternal life. For immortality in the sense of a mere continuation of our natural existence, Spinoza has no place. Only so long as the body lasts can the mind form ideas and remember the past; thus the dissolution of the body marks the termination of this individual and dependent life of the soul. But since the mind has its source in God, it cannot become altogether extinct when the body perishes; in God there necessarily persists an Idea which expresses the eternal essence of it; it is indestructible as being an eternal

thought of God. And the certainty of its imperishability is increased in proportion as it is transferred, in virtue of its true insight, from the phenomenal world to the world of the Eternal Substance. The stronger its imperishable part, the less power has death to touch it. Along this line of thought, the dissolution of the body is really a stripping off of mortality, an emancipation from the lower form of life; "only so long as the body lasts, is the mind liable to passions productive of sorrow."

For our philosopher, however, the importance of immortality does not consist mainly in the hope it holds out of a better future, but rather in its power to lift us directly above all temporal conditions and enable us to lay hold of eternity within the confines of the present. It is with this thought in mind that he writes: "There is nothing on which the free man bestows less thought than on death, and his wisdom concerns itself not with death but with life." In order to act in accordance with the dictates of reason, we do not need the thought of immortality and retribution. Even if we did not know that we were immortal, we should still consider virtue and piety, courage and generosity as supremely important, for the man who is truly free does not act for the sake of reward but because he is impelled to act by a necessity of his nature; it is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself which is blessed. Blessedness consists in the attainment by the spirit of its highest perfection, which can only be attained through the knowledge of God. "So the wise man can never cease to be conscious of himself and God and the world; he cannot die, but enjoys forever the true peace of the spirit."

The life whose final note is one of such full and joyous confidence provides for both ethics and religion a new basis, and a characteristic expression peculiar to itself. It may appear strange that "Ethics" should be the title chosen for his principal work by a thinker who has been at such pains to eliminate all ethical valuations and reduce experience to the status of a purely natural process. But with Spinoza this inevitableness which is

grounded in the Absolute Being is, for man, itself an ideal; we do not move from the outset in a sphere of genuine reality, but have to work our way upward to it. Our life is a battle between surrender to the phenomenal world and ascent to the world of reality, obstinate clinging to a petty individualism and willing absorption in Infinite Being. It is the seat of a momentous decision, a summons to concentrate our being in an act of conversion. The turning to the true knowledge is itself an act, an act of the whole nature. But at the same time it is a moral action. Only, in this case, morality is not so much concerned with this or that particular performance as with a new order of being. In direct contradiction to the doctrine which he consciously holds, Spinoza belongs to those thinkers who press upon man a great alternative and expect to be saved rather by a sudden conversion than by gradual progress. At heart Spinoza is much nearer to Christian thought than is any other philosopher of the Enlightenment.

His fundamental religious convictions, too, are far more closely akin to Christianity than his bitter opposition to ecclesiastical form might lead us to expect. It is quite in keeping with the transparent sincerity of his nature that he should be the first to bring out fully the hostility of the liberal, rational tendencies of modern thought to the old anthropomorphic views dependent on history and tradition. For Spinoza, God is not one particular Being among many, a personality in man's sense. He embraces and pervades the whole world. He does not incline especially toward man, but is active in every corner of the infinite universe. He does not single out particular people for a special revelation, but reveals Himself in equal measure at all times and places, in the nature and the reason which are common to us all. Religion has no need of any historical faith. Spinoza is particularly hostile to any doctrine of the miraculous. He rejects the miracles not only on account of his scientific belief in the uniformity of natural law, but because his religious conviction makes him look upon this uniformity as an expression of the immutability of the divine nature. The common people may.

indeed, oppose God to Nature, and see His power manifested most clearly in such extraordinary events as seem to contradict the course of nature; but the philosopher finds the great and the divine in the common round of everyday life, nor can he admit the validity of the distinction so long invoked in defence of miracles between a supernatural and an anti-natural. For a supernatural *within* the natural sphere is itself anti-natural, and it is within nature, not outside it, that the material miracles are asserted to have taken place. So man's faith in miracles now begins to be shaken; prior to the recognition of nature's essential uniformity, they did not occasion the slightest difficulty; even the most radical thinkers of the Reformation-time never so much as called them in question. Descartes had indeed recognized the principle of the uniformity of nature, but either he did not perceive its logical consequences or he was too prudent to give expression to them.

But, despite all his divergences from its ecclesiastical form, Spinoza is yet very close to Christianity in the central doctrine of his thought—the doctrine of God's indwelling in the world, and the living presence of the Divine Spirit in every place. He does, indeed, find it incredible that God, the eternal and infinite Being, should have taken on our human nature, and he does not consider it necessary to know Christ "after the flesh," *i. e.*, in His historical Incarnation; but "it is a very different thing when we come to speak of that Eternal Son of God, *i. e.*, the Eternal Wisdom of God, Which has revealed Itself in all things, and mostly in the human spirit, and most of all in Jesus Christ. For without it no one can attain to blessedness, since it alone teaches us what is true and false, good and evil." That the human spirit should be exalted above all other forms of being and Jesus above all other men, is a presentation which stands in curious and striking contradiction to the general teaching of the philosopher which proclaims the impartial working of God everywhere in the universe. But Spinoza is greater than his theories, and his world is too rich to be contained within the framework of his ideas. We might even say that nowhere is he

greater than when he contradicts himself, *i. e.*, when the inner necessities of his nature compel him to go further than his own teaching.

(ee). *Appreciation.*—That Spinoza produced a deep impression and still has power to influence men's minds can be partly explained by the character of his system. His thought has a distinct trend toward the great and essential, toward the simple and genuinely human. All his work is inspired and sustained by the objective compulsion of facts; so strong is their hold on the thinker that they leave no room for subjective feeling and reflection; even the mightiest revolutions are all accomplished with the tranquillity characteristic of a natural process. But this does not imply any lack of soul in the system; throughout there is a mighty personality at work, breathing life into the dry bones of concepts and doctrines. It is true that in the elaboration of these concepts Spinoza employs the heavy armoury of science and his thought flows in connected sequences which are sternly closed against all intrusion. There is nothing sudden and immediate: one stone is fitted securely to another. But where his work reaches its highest level, there are illuminating glimpses which break through formal limitations; there are intuitions which set the soul free; and these are not only the best but the most convincing parts of his system. Here more than anywhere else the philosopher greets us as a sage, a sage who treads our modern world and uses modern methods. But the heroism required of this sage was of no distinguished or dazzling kind: he had merely to preserve, in a life marked by renunciation and conflict, that repose and loftiness of spirit which his scientific convictions demanded of him. And this he did. An absolute harmony of life and teaching gives to his career that complete truthfulness which we admire in the ancients even as we deplore its absence in so many modern thinkers.

But to honour Spinoza's greatness does not imply a blind adherence to his system. Often, indeed, we must win our way to what is great in him through many difficulties of interpre-

tation. He shares, too, the failing of his time: when he sees a new ideal which he believes to be necessary, he deems it far too easily and quickly attainable. With one stroke he thinks to cut the Gordian knots which have been the perplexity of every age. His treatment is consequently too meagre and concise; unfortunate complications arise: priceless truths are found side by side with doubtful and even erroneous assertions. But from defects in actual achievement we may turn to the creative and impelling forces of his spiritual nature; and when we sound these depths, we shall recognize in Spinoza, however keen our criticism of his doctrines, a Master who is entitled to our lasting veneration.

Fascinated by the grandeur and self-sufficiency of his conception of the world, Spinoza seeks to eliminate from it every element of division and to fuse all manifoldness into one extremely simple presentation. God and world, soul and body, thinking and willing, must be wholly unified or even identified. Now, did Spinoza's system really reach a unity of this kind? A first impression may incline us to say, Yes, but this impression is not borne out by a closer examination. There cannot possibly be a complete harmony or unity between world and God, so long as individuals have no more than the illusive appearance of independent existence in relation to the universal life. The illusion however, according to Spinoza, persists tenaciously throughout all the phases of human life: we have to exert our utmost force of thought to free ourselves from it. But whence comes its power, if all manifoldness is really only *within* the universal life?

Soul and body, again, were simply to represent different sides of the same being; spiritual life and natural process were to run parallel, one equally important with the other. But in truth Spinoza has nowhere succeeded in giving them this equality; he has subordinated either spirit to nature or nature to spirit, the former in the original outlining of his system, the latter in its conclusion. For, at the outset, he makes nature the core of reality. The laws of her mechanism widen till they become

universal laws dominating even the human soul. This soul is not the manifestation of a new life, but merely a wakening to consciousness of the material world, a reflex activity attendant on natural process. There is an unmistakable tendency here to naturalism, even materialism. The later and concluding parts of the "Ethics" are in a very different strain. There we find that conversion and deliverance can be attained only when thought reaches a level of complete independence toward nature and has a genuine existence of its own in the light of which nature becomes a mere phenomenal manifestation of the primal cause. When life finds its highest completion in the contemplation of God, and the very soul of the world-process is the Divine Love, we have a clear predominance of the spiritual. Thus the attempt at a consistent Monism breaks down, and we are left with two mutually hostile positions.

Again, knowledge and will were to coalesce, for the act of will was completely included in the process of knowledge. But when knowledge takes in the whole life, it becomes more than mere knowledge. When we understand by knowledge man's true means of self-preservation, something that transforms his whole existence into activity, joy and love—then more is involved in it than mere intellectual activity; it serves to develop a profounder life, and to express a wholly self-sufficient spiritual experience. From the attempted solution of the difficulty there springs up immediately a new and more arduous problem.

Reality is, then, too complex to fit into the simple framework which Spinoza provides. Nor should we seek to make the world appear more simple than it really is. But, notwithstanding, there is excellent justification for Spinoza's attempt to discover in the world greater unity and inward coherence. This attempt stands out in striking contrast to the scholastic procedure which sought to solve its problems mainly by relating and distinguishing concepts, till its acuteness had, in the course of centuries, degenerated into the merest artificiality. The dawn of a desire for greater unity, the tendency for the different aspects of reality to come together again, to reinforce and complement each other,

to unite in forming one single, complete life—all this is like a return to the truth of nature, an awakening from lethargy and death. Shall we blame the philosopher because his solution of the problem was too hasty, or shall we rather rejoice in the lasting impetus which his efforts gave to the thoughts of men?

If the world does not admit of such a simple adjustment, then neither can life be so speedily transformed into pure contemplation, nor will the transformation be able to solve all the problems of our existence. But Spinoza, in his desire for a dispassionate knowledge, is really seeking a new basis of relationship between man and reality, a reconstitution of human life. He feels the traditional ideals of conduct to be unbearably small and petty, since, whatever the breadth they may seem to have, they do not take man out of himself and the sphere of his own ideas, interests and emotions. To effect this, we need to acquire through genuine knowledge a closer intimacy with the universe; so Spinoza embarks upon a vigorous crusade against the egoism not only of individuals but of mankind as a whole.

His exertions inaugurate a new phase in the world's development, a phase of reaction against a movement which reached far back into ancient Christendom and had attained its culminating point in Augustine. Augustine, with his consuming thirst for happiness and the natural bent of a strong nature toward comprehensive views of the universe, had subordinated all the expanse and richness of existence to the salvation and bliss of man; in so doing, he had brought a note of passion into every domain of life, had set all being aglow with the fires of will and endeavour. At bottom the conviction may still have persisted that man was created and preserved not for his own sake, but as belonging to a higher grade of reality, as member of a spiritual and divine order; but Augustine's own passionateness of disposition had already been responsible for the admission of much that was human in the pettier sense of the word; and, in the course of time, this meaner element had tightened and confirmed its hold upon human life. Our modern era has from the very outset regarded this conception of human nature as too sub-

jective, as narrow, petty and untrue; but it was not till Spinoza that its struggle for greater breadth and freedom found clear expression and support. Spinoza made it clear that the freedom was not to be gained by the stormy, aggressive methods of the Renaissance; it was an inward change that was needed, the discovery and development of a universal nature within man himself. And this universal nature Spinoza claims to find in knowledge; knowledge, when allowed a free development, puts man in possession of the objective significance of things, and so fills him with its infinity and eternity that all feeling of selfhood is entirely extinguished. It is knowledge which saves man from the petty egoisms and cross-purposes of our human striving, and leads us upward by a sure path into the clearer, purer air of reality and truth.

But if the universe, immeasurable and unchangeable as it is, is to take such exclusive possession of our life, we are at once deprived not only of all choice but of all freedom; and the power of pure fact, of natural necessity, of fate, acquires an overwhelming predominance. Antiquity had fully recognized this power, but Christianity had undertaken, as the greatest of all its tasks, to lift man from a kingdom of fate into a realm of freedom. In the history of Christendom, however, we find the problem far too lightly considered; the opposition was not so much met and overcome as lost sight of in mystic exaltation. Spinoza enriched the conception of truth and gave deeper meaning to life by again insisting on the part played by nature or fate in our human existence. It is true that he thereby inclines to place exclusive stress on nature as the whole reality and to consider the truth of the material world as external to and distinct from our spiritual life, but the new turn which he gave to thought is important enough to outweigh any errors of detail.

Moreover, here, as elsewhere, Spinoza's real meaning goes much deeper than his formal statement. It is not nature merely which he seeks, but something in and behind nature, a substantial life and being. According to him, our ordinary life is far too superficial, and prone to self-deception and illusion. Our

action can be true only in so far as we put into it our own being and individuality. We must, therefore, reach down to what is genuine in our nature. And this necessitates a reversal of the previous position, an appropriation of the eternal and infinite universe. It is just this which constitutes Spinoza's greatness, that for him the problem does not lie in this or that detail of human life, but in the whole of it, in the man himself, and that he feels the necessity of outgrowing all the punctiliousness of a narrowly personal outlook, all that commonly passes as happiness —in fact, all considerations of use and purpose.

Spinoza's thought is profoundly stimulating and suggestive. But it has often to be disengaged from the abstruse form in which it is expressed—a fact which sufficiently explains why his greatness was fully appreciated only when he came to be seen in proper perspective and his ideas were freely handled and discussed. Under such treatment it was natural that his meaning should be resolved into its various implications, so that he would appeal to different people on very different grounds, and the more so because in him many different lines of thought converged, tending toward unity but not reaching it in any definite and conclusive fashion. So the controversies over Spinoza are likely to continue. But he will be ever revered as great by all who demand from philosophy not so much a closed system of concepts and doctrines as a fuller grasp of what is real in human nature and a fresher insight into the underlying mysteries of life.

(γ) LOCKE

Locke's work (1632–1704) was carried on in an essentially different environment from that of the other leaders of the Enlightenment. He was one of a nation engaged in struggle for civil and religious liberty, a struggle in which he himself bore a decided part and which directly affected his personal fortunes. His thinking bears upon it the strong impress of a society whose distinctive genius he himself did much to strengthen and accentuate.

Locke is by no means a complete exponent of the English

spirit—in every great civilised nation there are reactionary forces running counter to its average type—still he undoubtedly represents the prevailing national tendency. The English school is averse to all bold speculation, and to any attempt to build up a new world. It frankly accepts the world as it finds it, seeks in a practical way to understand it, and to make life reasonable and happy without ever going beyond it. Attention is mainly concentrated upon man and his lot; the English poet (Pope) is but expressing the popular conviction when he designates man as the proper study of mankind. The individual is regarded both as he is in himself and in his social relations, and the attempt is made to render both soul and society intelligible by reconstructing them from their simplest beginnings. It is this which constitutes the peculiar merit of the English Enlightenment. The keener scrutiny and more accurate review of experience tend in the direction of excluding whatever has no sure hold in fact. Theory is closely linked with practice: the clearer light thrown upon what we really have and are necessitates a corresponding refashioning of life. All this may indeed limit the sphere of human life and endeavour, but at the same time, it shows that within these limits are possibilities hitherto undreamt of: the content of experience is rich enough in itself to satisfy every reasonable wish. Hence arises a characteristic mode of thought and conduct which works its way into the different departments of life and makes itself a social force. It is as developed in England that the Enlightenment has become a world-power, and its later phases cannot be understood apart from the history of this English movement.

Now Locke is the clearest and most effective exponent of the English type of thought. His chief concern is with the problem of knowledge. A philosophical discussion leaves him with a keen sense of the dire confusion of our present state of knowledge, and this conviction impels him to undertake a thorough investigation of its origin, validity and scope. The result of this investigation constitutes the first systematic attempt to depict the growth of knowledge in the mind of the individual.

For an inquiry into the sources of knowledge means for Locke the tracing of its origin and growth in the mind: and the mind means nothing more than consciousness—conscious life. This conception of the problem—and it never even occurs to Locke that any other is possible—determines at once the character and outcome of the work. We are concerned with seeking out in consciousness the simplest elements of knowledge and tracing their gradual growth step by step till the whole structure becomes perfectly intelligible and at the same time the limits of our human faculties are clearly marked out. It is obvious that consciousness does not bring its content with it ready-made, but only obtains it through contact with things; so there is an end to the doctrine of a fixed original endowment of the reason, the doctrine of innate ideas. Experience is the sole source of knowledge, experience obtained through the observation either of external objects or of our own inner states. The mind is like a blank sheet of paper which has yet to be filled in, or like a dark room into which light comes through the windows of the senses. The irreducible elements are the simple ideas: it is through their combinations and interrelations that the more complex mental structures are gradually built up. No knowledge is so complex as not to be explicable along these lines. Nothing must be admitted that cannot claim a place in this scheme: all that oversteps the limits assigned by such a conception of the problem must be set aside as illusion. Whether Locke carried out his fundamental principle with perfect consistency, whether a knowledge of truth can be attained at all along these lines, is indeed a doubtful matter; but even he who denies it is bound to admit the fact that this empirico-psychological treatment opens up a new and most fruitful view of the life of the soul and of human existence generally. To trace the actual development of the soul gives us a more intelligent view of our existence and a clearer notion of our powers. The problems of our life yield themselves far more readily to a practical and even to a technical form of treatment. Man wins power over himself and his environment.

That knowledge of this kind cannot pierce to the real essence of things is Locke's settled conviction. What things are, as distinct from what they seem to be, remains sealed from us forever. But there is no need to mourn this limitation, since the knowledge we have is quite sufficient for the main ends of our life which are practical and moral. We do not need to know all things, but only those which concern our conduct: "morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general." It would be foolish to despise the candle-light offered us and to demand bright sunshine when the candle gives us all the light we need.

But here we come upon a contradiction. According to Locke's fundamental principles, life is to draw its whole content from experience; but in developing this point of view he introduces the reason, and this reason, which is conceived as independent of experience and exalted above it, increasingly tends to become the dominant factor. At the outset the supreme goal and the end of all endeavour is taken to be happiness in the sense of subjective well-being, and the value of an experience is measured by the happiness it brings with it: "things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure and pain." This was bound to lead to Epicureanism in one form or another. But at the same time Locke presents man as a reasonable being, with an independent inward life, and therefore with new problems and new standards. His real greatness is his faculty of resisting all merely natural inclinations at the call of the reason. "The great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs as best." Were it not for the fact that the English thinkers generally have supplemented experience by reason in some such fashion as this, they could hardly have been so effective as they were.

Locke's views on human life, however, find clearer embodiment in his sociology than in his detached utterances on ethics. But here, too, only small treatises are available, and there is no attempt at systematic elaboration. Still one characteristic fundamental conviction runs through all the variety of his thought,

and it is this conviction which underlies the whole theory and philosophy of modern Liberalism.

In tracing the development of the political and social community Locke starts from the individual as being the element immediately given and most clearly apprehensible. It is only by thus starting from the individual and continually referring back to the individual that he can clearly define society and give it a reasonable meaning. The rooted idea of the State as prior to the individuals whom it embraces and welds together is rejected as confused and misleading. But the individual who now is to be responsible for society and to dominate it is not the mere natural man protrayed by Hobbes, but a reasonable personality; and the characteristic of the reason is its power of deliberation, decision and self-direction. This implies a complete revulsion from the idea which the ancients held concerning the reason. For they made reason to consist in the power of forming general ideas and acting according to them. The replacing of this conception by a conception of independence and the power of personal choice reveals the spirit of a new world. Even law is a support to freedom, despite its restraints. For that alone is to be recognised as law which has been determined by the power that makes the laws, and this power is, in last resort, the will of individuals. So the restraint is self-imposed, not enforced from without.

In this building up of society from the individual we see very clearly the development of the modern conception of society as a free association; even the State is nothing more than a kind of society with definite aims and sharply-defined boundaries. The main task of the State is to safeguard the rights of its individual members and secure their freedom against all interference from without. Now since the independence of the citizen is more particularly bound up with the question of property, Locke considers that the function of the State is simply to safeguard property. This seems a great fall from the old conception, and it paves the way for that self-seeking of the propertied classes into which the later Liberalism has often degenerated. But we

must not forget that in the old Liberalism there was always, behind this question of property, the independent man of action to whom property was but the means of self-realisation. This gives the whole movement an idealistic turn, and supplies a motive for incessant social activity. It is a great gain for the forcefulness and sincerity of life when the functions of the State are confined within narrow limits and as much liberty as possible is conceded to the individual. The national type of the Anglo-Saxon gives us the complete development of the State as the Enlightenment conceived it—a State founded on justice and individual freedom, as opposed to the State of the Renaissance founded on authority and tradition.

But if a State is to be founded on justice and freedom, it must begin by clearing its path from the obstructions offered by existing conditions; and here political theory comes to its aid with a close and penetrating analysis of the traditional order. It refuses to bow in blind obeisance to things as they are. It does not acknowledge authority *quā* authority, but insists that it shall be founded on reason. Only that which has justified itself to the reason and at the same time won man's free assent can exercise an inward control over his nature. Now the only justification for authority is its actual serviceableness: the place of the individual in the community is to be decided by the degree of his usefulness. There can be no authority, then, apart from reason, much less in opposition to it. Even paternal authority does not arise out of some mystic ordinance of nature, but is justified by the actual care of the father for his as yet irresponsible child. With this view a patriarchal system of government or a kingdom by the grace of God is wholly incompatible. The kingly office must justify itself by its services to the community. Property too must not be held arbitrarily; it is the reward of work. He who first claims something and expends his energy upon it has a right to hold it as his own. The economical value of things is also to be measured by the amount of work they exact; in proportion as civilisation advances, emphasis comes to be laid not so much on mere material as on the form given to it by

human labour. Locke has here provided a philosophical basis for the modern movement in the direction of the technical and industrial arts.

A strict adherence to this demand for reason, a development of all political and social relations from the starting point of the individual, and the insistence upon service—*i. e.*, tangible and effective service—as the only true ground of individual preferment would naturally bring the ideal State of Reason and Justice into harsh collision with the State of History and Tradition. The total elimination of every historical element, all tradition, hereditary title and so forth, would inevitably bring about a revolution. But Locke is far removed from any such rigorous consistency. The fundamental framework of society he tacitly accepts as reasonable; but in its detail finds much that is defective and doomed to decay. Reason and history are not yet entirely dissociated as in a later phase of the Enlightenment; it is not revolution which is called for, but reform.

Moreover, in establishing the independence of the individual, Locke does not mean to isolate him. It is only in union with other individuals, only as a member of society, that he can develop his reason and attain to happiness. Locke indeed recognises the power of social environment as it had never been recognised before. In addition to the law of God and the law of the State, he admits a third power, the law of public opinion, which he regards as a sure expression of reason. In our moral education, also, the judgment of our fellowmen, their approval and disapproval, is a most important factor; the arousing of a right sense of honour is the chief means of educating our moral character. "Reputation comes next to virtue." So the sense of political freedom—and this is characteristic of English life generally—is balanced by an equally strong sense of social obligation. The social constraint may not be so apparent, but its influence perhaps reaches even further and deeper.

It is in the province of education that Locke has rendered greatest service. Ratichius and Comenius before him had striven to establish a rational method of instruction. But the

new leaven had hitherto been working within the old material, whereas with Locke it is brought directly to bear upon the facts of the living present. It is true that he gets no further than general outlines, and does not carry his principles to their ultimate consequences. But he initiated a movement which only needed to be taken up and carried further, to issue in the programme of Rousseau.

The phase of the Enlightenment represented by Locke has a unique and distinctive character. It does not concern itself with the fundamental relation of man to reality, but disposes of this problem by accepting immediate impressions as true, and devoting itself to the fashioning of a life-scheme within a world already given. Locke's tendency to seek out the simplest elements or powers, and to derive thence the complex fabric of acts and events, naturally leads us to expect a complete dependence of life upon reason. We may take it that these powers do indeed tend to make life reasonable. Still to suppose that they can supply an adequate *rationale* of experience is to be indeed optimistic and to ignore all the more perplexing problems of the mental life. The view, moreover, lacks inward coherency. Its chief characteristic is that it makes all salvation depend upon the illuminating work of thought, but thought is not alone in the field; thought is constantly being supplemented, limited and modified by the constitution of our social life. If logical consistency demands a break with this constitution and a complete reversion of social arrangements, then logic must give way. Immediacy of impression and a practical knowledge of men soften down all angularities of abstract ideas. Moreover, in Locke's views there is a dualism not merely of method but of content. The whole content of life is to be drawn from its immediate environment, *i. e.*, experience; but all unobserved, just at the most critical points, a reason above experience is invoked, without any attempt being made to justify it, or to distinguish it from experience. Thus an empirical and a rational, a realistic and an idealistic standpoint are constantly coming together; sometimes the one predominates, sometimes the other. The

authority he allows to mere impressions which have not been subjected to the clarifying processes of science makes Locke as a philosopher far more popular than any other important thinker, and, indeed, threatens to confuse the philosophical with the common-sense standpoint of every-day life. Thought and life are here set on a plane of mediocrity, which, compared with lower levels, is estimable enough, and suited well the requirements of the time. The common-sense treatment becomes a source of danger and detriment only when its limitations are looked upon as final, and further exertions are discouraged through the treating of very doubtful solutions as obvious and inevitable. No one, however, can fail to appreciate Locke's rich suggestiveness, or the seriousness, truth and sincerity which breathe in every page of his writings.

(δ). LEIBNIZ

(aa). *The Distinctive Character of his Thought.*—The Enlightenment first makes its appearance in Germany with Leibniz (1646–1716), and at once assumes a very remarkable form. Astonishing breadth and universality—tenacious of everything, disdainful of nothing—a strong tendency to systematize and to stand by any idea once accepted, however much the immediate aspect of things might seem to be against it, a method which starts from the soul's inner life and seeks to explain everything from this standpoint—all this indicates a bold flight of creative spiritual activity and a radical transformation of the world as immediately given to us. At the same time a movement of this kind has dangers from which its predecessors were exempt: the danger of weighting itself with useless ballast and desiring to reconcile what is essentially irreconcilable; the danger of overlooking the immediacies of experience and of wandering in the trackless regions beyond; the danger, in short, of a self-opinionated, self-tormenting subjectivity. Where, however, these dangers are successfully met, we have creative work of the very highest order, which has lifted man's thought and endeavour to a sensibly higher level.

Nowhere else in the Enlightenment do we find such breadth as in Leibniz. No other thinker lays such firm hold on the inward nature of things and strives so hard after systematic thoroughness. In him the Enlightenment lays aside all the narrowness of mere opposition, nay, more, seeks to comprehend all oppositions and all manifoldness within itself; it would fain be just to the traditional scheme of life and fit old and new into a single world of thought. There are great dangers, no doubt, in such a course. Instead of reconciliation we may have mere compromise. A desire for uniformity may all too easily dull the edge of what is characteristic or distinctive; and, in the endeavour to be just to all other types, the thinker may easily be unjust to his own. Moreover, it cannot be denied that there was something of the courtier in Leibniz, the desire to avoid giving offence and to put things in the most conciliatory, comfortable and pleasant way possible. But at the same time we must admit that his attempts at peacemaking not only evince a lofty conception of the problem and a complete superiority to all the narrowness of mere party views, but also that they were prompted by an imperative necessity of his nature. The two worlds which he wished to reconcile were each part of his own life. On the one hand, he was strongly attracted by the new movement in mathematics and the natural sciences which stirred his creative genius into fruitful activity; on the other hand, he had a sincere and native affection for the traditional forms of morality and religion, as only those can deny who fail to pierce to the ultimate motives of his work. The problem he propounded was in no sense artificially devised; it was forced upon him for his spiritual self-preservation—that the unity of his nature might be safeguarded. Whatever our doubts as to the plan and method of his undertaking, we are bound to hold his personal truth and honesty in the very highest esteem.

There is another consideration which also leads us to exempt Leibniz from the charge of weakness usually characteristic of these obsequious compromises; his natural sentiment is allied with a thoroughly characteristic technical mode of thought

which paves the way for a very original handling of his subject-matter. The key to this characteristic mode of thought is found in mathematics, or rather in the mathematical way of thinking. Mathematics had always played an important part in the Enlightenment, influencing both its abstract thought and also its general attitude toward life. But it is in Leibniz that we first realise the full extent of its influence. It was mathematics which had at the outset been the essential factor in determining the peculiar direction of the Enlightenment and supporting one of its most cardinal contentions; for, in the case of mathematics, it seemed proved beyond a doubt that we possess a knowledge which is innate, a store of eternal and universal truths within the soul. Nor are these merely isolated truths. The mind shows itself able to produce from its own resources a coherent system of thought. In the building up of this system a method is adopted of a very different kind from that of the scholastic logic. It is not content to be forever working upon a given material, but is constantly seeking to expand its material and promising ever new glimpses into the truth. In mathematical creation thought manifests itself as incontestably a productive power. The world of thought within us does not constitute a separate domain from the world outside. Rather the truths of mathematics are at the same time the fundamental laws of nature. Mathematics brings spiritual activity into close union with the outside world, and gives to thought the proud consciousness of carrying within itself the key to the universe, of apprehending directly in its own life the life of the great whole. This attitude of assertion involves negation in two directions: on the one hand, it is opposed to all blind subjection to tradition and authority; on the other hand, by teaching us to see things according to certain forms of thought, it strikes at the very roots of naturalism and materialism. Mathematics, more than any other agent, has taught reason to stand on her own feet and rejoice in the consciousness of her power.

Such views as these were peculiarly congenial to Leibniz, and he developed them in a characteristic way. We must bear

in mind that he was a mathematician before he became a philosopher, and especially that the discovery of the differential calculus preceded the formation of his philosophical system. To the systematisation of his philosophical convictions he brought a mind saturated and possessed with ideas such as that of the infinitesimal, the potential, the continuous. He felt himself impelled to refine upon the previous views of the universe, to substitute flux and change for rigid inflexibility. Facts as we see them are not the whole. Away behind them lies the realm of possibility, of germinating force. Only through possibility and the conjunction of possibilities does the nature of actual fact become intelligible. Our conception of reality must be widened to include possibility—an expansion of a most vital and far-reaching kind. This recognition of possibility seems to lift from man a dead weight and immeasurably to extend the scope of his free initiative. There is also the discovery of the infinitesimal, a discovery that Leibniz is particularly proud of. It is true that he is here taking up a line suggested by the whole trend of modern science, but he goes a great deal further than any one else, lifting the conception of the infinitesimal out of the realm of experience into that of metaphysics, and from the heights thus reached prescribing for experience the ends it should endeavour to realise. Still—through the newly opened-up world of the microscope and especially through the discoveries of Leeuwenhoek—it seems to him that even experience is seen to confirm, as far as it can do, the hypothesis of the infinitely small; so he boldly denies that there is any point at which matter ceases to be either divisible or organised. Behind every atom there is another and yet another, just as a harlequin takes off one dress only to reveal another beneath. Why should the limits of our perception be also the limits of nature? Moreover, closely allied to this conception of the infinitesimal, is that of an all-pervading variety. Nowhere does nature repeat herself; nowhere are two things or two occurrences exactly alike. It is only a shallow, superficial view that thinks to detect complete likeness; as a matter of fact, the supposed likeness is only a dif-

ference of a less obvious kind, which, even at the limit, is still a vanishing and not a vanished quantity.

And just as here an apparent opposition is resolved into a difference of degree, so, generally speaking, Leibniz's mathematically disposed mind is always endeavouring to change supposed oppositions into gradations, and for differences of kind to substitute differences of degree. Kepler had already made this point of view familiar, and now, through the concept of the infinitesimal, or infinitely little, it could at last be thoroughly and systematically worked out. Even the apparently irreconcilable admits of reconciliation by this method. For example, rest may be looked upon as the vanishing phase of a movement that has been continually growing less and less; the oppositions of good and evil, of true and false, are similarly handled. All rigidity and exclusiveness is banished from this world of thought; everything is brought into solution, and all opposing tendencies are completely reconciled. The idea of a continuity of all being and all life becomes vivid and impressive as never before, so that Leibniz has good reason to regard the Law of Continuity as his own especial contribution to philosophy. The attempt, again, to reconcile the natural and the spiritual admits of being viewed in quite a new light. For must not a closer examination show that here, too, there is a continuous gradation, an inclusion of both nature and spirit in a single universal life, an intimate relation between terms which at first sight seem mutually exclusive? It is indeed a bold thought, but a great one. Whether it can make good its claim and avoid splitting upon the rock of an either—or, underlying our whole existence, is another question. Leibniz's arguments impress us by their marvellous skill and dexterity, but we do not always find them convincing. His general tendency, however, toward more finely graded and less rigid distinctions is far more important than any special way he may have of applying it. It belongs essentially to the movement of our modern world, in which he is one of the most influential thinkers.

(bb) *Cosmology.*—Leibniz's cosmology has points of connection with Descartes's, but it was impossible for him to rest sat-

isfied with Descartes's solution. There were two reasons why he should find it unsatisfactory: firstly, his own impulse was to seek a union beyond the separation of world and soul; secondly, in both these domains Descartes's conceptions seemed to him crude and rough-hewn. Accustomed as he was by his mathematical training to contemplate the world intellectually, matter had already lost for him its sensual, tangible reality. The philosopher of movement and of the infinitesimal found himself compelled to pursue his research even beyond those small bodies into which mechanics had resolved the universe. These bodies themselves must be subjected to further analysis and shown to contain a nucleus of independent life. So he presses beyond the physical elements to the metaphysical—to living unities or "monads." There can be no being which does not possess an "immanent" activity, a being-for-itself. Inward force, spiritual essence, is the fundamental constituent of all reality. There are not two worlds, the one seen, the other unseen, but the so-called natural world is but a "well-founded phenomenon." It is a projection of the unseen for the benefit of us finite spirits, who cannot grasp reality as a coherent whole by a purely spiritual intuition. An Absolute Intelligence would not have any external world. This view regards the body as an aggregate of souls, that which is usually termed the soul being merely the central monad. This opens up a new solution of the problem of soul and body, spiritual and natural existence; they are not put side by side upon an equal plane, but are related rather as essence and appearance. In the more detailed development of his doctrine Leibniz deviates considerably from this idea, and often allows the material world more reality than it can consistently claim. But this does not detract from the originality of his system. Nature in her own domain suffers no disturbance, no interference; but the whole of this natural domain is itself only the phenomenal aspect of an underlying reality. All the mechanism of nature is purely in the service of spirit. This conception of the world will never become popular: it goes too directly in the teeth of our immediate impres-

sions. But for the intellectual few, it has ever had a profound attraction.

In a world so conceived, the conception of process must undergo a corresponding change. The interaction theory had presented no difficulty to the earlier thinkers; but for the Enlightenment, with its sharp separation of soul from body and its more stringent delimitation of the different spheres of life, it had become a very difficult problem. In his treatment of it, Leibniz, like Spinoza, strikes out for himself. If the monads, the ultimate constituents of reality, are self-subsisting entities, they can be affected only by their own states, and they cannot possibly be susceptible to outside influences. The monads have no windows of communication with a world outside them. They are not empty tablets to be filled in by some strange hand. Rather, all their movement originates from within; their development can only be self-development. Since the fundamental faculty of the soul is its power to frame ideas, and so concentrate the manifold into a unity, it follows that all vital process is at bottom a presentation of ideas, the unfolding of a realm of thought; all progress, a progress in clearness and an emancipation from primitive confusion.

The doctrine of monads cannot thus transform our notions of reality without itself giving rise to a difficult and apparently insoluble problem. Each monad must live out its own life, educe all its content from itself, and be unaffected by any outside influences. But, at the same time, the very meaning of life is that it should represent the world around us and become a mirror of the universe. How then can that which has a self-contained existence at the same time represent the world? How can life as it is unfolded within us be the same as the life of the world about us? How can my thought be attuned to the world? This is a crucial point, but nowhere does Leibniz's logical imagination rise to a greater height of audacity and self-confidence. There is one way in which the inner life, while running its independent course, may yet correspond to the outside world. A higher Power, dominating soul and world alike, must so have

arranged everything beforehand that each monad, in the process of its own development, produces an exact representation of that which transpires in the real world outside it. The clocks must have been so cleverly designed by the great Artificer that they always keep time with each other, though there is no physical connection between them, nor are they regulated from outside. Thus there would be an exact correspondence between our conception of the sun, for instance, and the actual sun. This dizzy hypothesis soon became part of Leibniz's definite teaching, and constitutes the much-discussed doctrine of a "pre-established harmony," which seems to him to give us the grandest and therefore the worthiest conception both of God and the universe.

We, his successors, are more struck by the artificiality of the conception than by its grandeur. But, in several important respects, this doctrine has undoubtedly aided the expansion of the realm of thought. This is particularly true in regard to the idea of the soul. If the soul is to contain a world within itself, and develop a world out of itself, it must be more than mere consciousness: we must penetrate beyond, and recognize the existence of a subconscious life of the soul. We have only to observe ourselves more closely to see that there is such a life, and that the act of presentation and the becoming aware of the object presented are two very different processes. Our sensations very often arise from a summation of small impressions which, taken singly, altogether elude observation. But they must be there, or we could never become conscious of their total effect. For example, we should be unable to hear the soft murmur of the sea, because the small waves which give rise to it are not audible individually. Thus, what our consciousness registers is never more than a fraction of our total being and experience. The psychical life consists of innumerable presentations, endlessly interwoven. It is no mere barren soil, but is full of tiny shoots just beginning to make their way upward. Consciousness is only the climax of a process which reaches down into unfathomable depths.

This discovery of the subconscious is Leibniz's chief support for his doctrine of the universal diffusion of psychical life. For it leads to a distinction of different stages in the process of integration, different degrees of clearness in the form of presentation, varying from haziest confusion to the most perfect distinctness. There is unbroken continuity of psychical life, and every part of it is subject to the same laws; but at the same time there is plenty of room for individual differences, and particularly for the attribution of a very special dignity to man. He alone has a self-consciousness, a principle of unity from the heights of which he can review all different isolated events and connect them together. This increased systematisation is naturally accompanied by the rise of a moral, as distinct from a merely physical, identity. We have the emergence of personality, responsibility, free action, a moral world. With personality, the indestructibility of the monads becomes an individual immortality. Man attains an individual significance, while still indissolubly linked with the universe. He is closely bound to nature, while at the same time raised above her. Far as we are from being the centre of the whole, yet by virtue of our reason we can be as gods, imitating after our humble fashion the Architect of the universe. As free citizens we can advance the welfare of the whole. Man is "not a part, but a counterpart, of Godhead, a representative of the Universe, a citizen of the Kingdom of God." "In our selfhood there is a latent infinity, an impress or an image of the Omniscience and Omnipotence of God."

The expansion of the soul till it becomes itself a world full of infinite life tells most powerfully against any limitation of our knowledge to mere sense-experience. Now at last it is possible to understand how the soul can possess something without having received it, and how, despite all differences of opinion, men can still obey certain common principles of thought and action. In each rational being there is a buried treasure of eternal and universal truths, and to bring these out into the full daylight of consciousness is the main task of philosophic science. Happiness, too, strikes deeper roots as the soul's life in its growth

transcends the limits of consciousness. "He who is happy does not indeed experience his joy at every moment of the day, for sometimes he rests from thinking, and commonly, too, turns his attention to befitting occupations. It is enough that he can experience it as often as he wishes to think about it, and that in the intervals a joyousness which springs therefrom is visible in his actions and character."

Whatever thus raises the level of humanity as a whole implies for Leibniz a corresponding elevation of the individual. For as every single thing has its own distinguishing characteristic, so the particular human being is by no means merely a sample of his species. It is true that we all reflect the same universe and reflect it according to the same laws; but each one of us reflects it in his own peculiar fashion, or to give this the more modern turn which we find in Leibniz—referring to the doctrine of perspective—each one looks at the universe from his own particular point of view. At the same time, we are circled round by an all-embracing truth. It is Leibniz who introduces the mediæval term "individuality" (individualitas) into our modern world. He is the originator of the saying that the individual encloses the infinite within itself (*l'individualité enveloppe l'infini*).

Individuality, then, receives at Leibniz's hands a richer and a profounder significance. But this added significance is not something won once and for all. The winning of it is a task which is always confronting us and requires incessant renewal of effort. The depths of the individual nature must first be reached and wakened from their slumber into active life: since the task is endless, it can only be achieved by endless progress. This progress presents itself to Leibniz, as his doctrine of continuity would lead us to expect, in the guise of a slow but uninterrupted process. There are no gaps, no skipping, no backsliding. What seems to be a sudden revolution was really being prepared long beforehand. When we might seem to be checked or driven back, we are really only concentrating our energies for a further advance. Moreover, nothing being radically evil, there is no need for a complete revolution: the moral life consists in gradu-

al improvement and a slow ripening to maturity (*se perfectionner*). Self-development is taken to be merely the unfolding of a nature already existent; it is an ordered progress, not a conversion. And as with the individual, so it is with history as a whole. For the first time we are presented with a clearly developed philosophy of history, that romance of humanity, as Leibniz terms it. The present enables us to understand the past because at bottom the same thing happens everywhere (*c'est tout comme ici*); but as the degree of its development is different in different periods, these periods naturally present very different characteristics. All periods, however, are bound together in unbroken sequence; they are all parts of the same structure. The present has its own safe niche in between the past and the future. "It is weighted with the past and pregnant with the future." The possibilities of the immediate present are confined within very narrow limits. The goal cannot be swiftly won by stormy and aggressive methods. But however small our share in the work of the centuries, it is yet an indispensable item of the whole structure, and nothing of it is wasted. Leibniz more than any one else has shown the inner fitness and historical necessity of the conception of perpetual progress and firm faith in a more ideal future, items of supreme importance in the spiritual inventory of our modern world. The opposition of reason and history, so familiar to the Enlightenment, gives way before the discovery of reason *in* history, and a new path is opened up for developments of far-reaching importance.

In the world of action this conception of progress finds expression in a strenuous industry. The seething ferment of the Renaissance is clarified and calmed, but its energy is unimpaired. Even the form of knowledge, which gives to the whole psychical life its peculiar stamp, changes its character; it is no longer either a wrestling with the universe, as in the Renaissance, or a calm intuition as with Spinoza. It is rather an unwearied effort to secure clearness in every department and detail, a dissecting and laying bare of all traditional ideas, an endeavour to find a sufficient reason for what men ordinarily

accept as given, an illuminating analysis even of ultimate axioms; in all these respects it marks a vast extension of the field of thought. And as the consciousness of life deepens, its activities become more strenuous. Not only does thought prove a more effective stimulus to outwardly directed activity: it becomes more and more a purposive activity in itself. Leibniz is forever cogitating and brooding over possible improvements, through better knowledge, both in the inner and outer conditions of man's lot. He would fain devise new methods for the improvement of our powers of thought, inference and memory; he would like, too, to create a universal language; but he still has time to spare for devising improvements in domestic utensils, mail-coaches, and so forth. Nothing is too big for him and nothing too small. Everywhere he finds incitement to new ideas and fresh proposals. The utilitarian bent of the Enlightenment is nowhere more clearly revealed than in his personality and work.

This restless industry may seem at first sight to compare unfavourably with the calm greatness of Spinoza's endeavour after the One and the Eternal. But Leibniz in no wise wastes himself on mere multiplicity and movement, however important they seem to him; he would have them firmly rooted in a Unity that is eternal. Only by thus grounding the finite in the infinite can he justify his own peculiar doctrine of a thoroughly coherent world-system, of the homogeneity of all existence, of the correspondence between soul and universe. There is even an approximation—more particularly apparent in his German writings—to the inwardness of mysticism with its conviction of the immediate presence of God within our nature. It is in such a mood that he must have written: "God is at once the easiest and the hardest to know: the first and the easiest where the path is bright, the last and the hardest where the path is dark."

It is, then, a gross injustice to attribute Leibniz's support of religion to a desire for ecclesiastical favour. The real truth is that all his confidence in the human reason rests upon his belief that it is grounded in a divine reason; otherwise we cannot

hope to reach those eternal truths which alone give value to our life and endeavour. The whole earth "cannot minister to our full perfection unless it gives us the opportunity to discover eternal and universal truths which must be valid in all worlds, at all periods, and even for God Himself from whom they eternally proceed." It is this conviction which keeps him, despite the natural mobility of his mind, from a destructive doctrine of relativity. While he allows each individual to view the world from his own standpoint, yet the Absolute and Divine view is ever for him the ultimate and infallible criterion.

(cc.) *Reconciliation of Religion and Philosophy.*—If it is so necessary for thought in its own interest to base itself upon God, we can scarcely be surprised that Leibniz should also seek to bring his philosophy into touch with Christianity: in this way he might reasonably hope both to give an additional support to philosophic science, and to increase the influence of the established religion which already, as an historic fact, had strong claims on his regard. For in religion, as in life generally, clear knowledge seemed to him the goal of all thought. The love of God, which is the essence of religion, can be neither genuine nor enlightened unless it rests upon the knowledge of God. "It is impossible to love God without knowing His perfections." Only through such knowledge can religion become a conviction and a sentiment that can dominate the whole man. Belief without insight is but idle repetition and acceptance at second-hand. On the other hand, an emotional religious life unguided by reason easily tends to confusion and exaggeration. Knowledge is the only way of winning for religion the allegiance of the whole soul. It does not exclude other spiritual activities; in particular, it does not place itself in opposition to feeling; but it is the completion of the whole life. It was this temper that enabled Leibniz and the older German rationalism, which took him as its model, to feel thoroughly at one with Christianity, holding it to be the purest and most enlightened of all religions, the religion of the spirit. Through Christ, he maintains, the

religion of the wise became the religion of the people; natural religion was ennobled through a new sense of obligation; the Godhead became not merely the object of our fear and veneration, but also of our love and heartfelt allegiance.

From this starting-point the reconciliation of Christian faith and philosophic insight did not seem to Leibniz overwhelmingly difficult. There was much in his philosophy which was akin to Christianity: the grounding of the world within a unity that transcends it, the identification of reality with the soul's experience, the central position assigned to man, the due recognition of moral values. All this needed only to be expressed in the more vivid language of history to be in complete agreement with the Christianity of Leibniz's day. Still it was all rather a theory of moral and spiritual values than a power to renovate and reform the soul. There are two points in particular from the establishment of which Leibniz hoped to effect a complete reconciliation between philosophical teaching and religious conviction: the freedom of the will as the fundamental condition of a moral order, and the reasonableness of reality as the expression and proof of a divine Providence.

The treatment of the problem of will is a striking illustration of the extent to which a philosopher can deceive himself as to the nature of his own teaching. Leibniz is keenly opposed to determinism. He wants to demonstrate—and thinks he has demonstrated—the truth of freedom. But in reality he leaves no room whatsoever for freedom: he transforms the whole psychical life into a mechanism of the intellect. For when he proves that all activity is self-determined, and that, so far from following uniform laws, it reflects even in detail the peculiarities of the individual; when, moreover, he maintains that the distinguishing characteristic of man is his capacity to act as his rationally determined psychical experience dictates—then we cannot but feel that, though determinism may lose something of its bluntness, yet no victory has been won for freedom.

Again the doctrine of the best of all possible worlds, however stimulating and suggestive, is significant rather as betokening

the heightened vitality of the age than as a contribution to philosophy. It could only convince where there was already conviction. In his estimate of the existing order Leibniz already reveals his optimistic temper. He makes no attempt to deny that the world contains much imperfection, evil and pain; and that ills, metaphysical, moral and physical, are all too prevalent. But these ills are not so great as they seem to the peevish and embittered souls who scent evil everywhere and put poisonous interpretations upon even the noblest actions. Generally speaking, the good outweighs the ill, just as there are more dwelling-houses than prisons. The fact is that both in virtue and vice a certain mean is the rule. Saints are exceptional, but so are rogues. Taken as a whole, the bad does not constitute a kingdom of its own, but plays a merely subordinate *rôle* in the world's development. But even when confined within these limits, it is still a serious objection to a doctrine which makes the world rest upon an Absolute Reason. It was necessary to go further and show that the world with all its evil was better than a world would be without any evil. Such a proof is actually undertaken in the Theodicy, Leibniz's most considerable work, which originated in his conversations with the gifted Queen, Sophie Charlotte.

If the question is to be rightly answered, it is essential that it should be rightly put. It must be put from the point of view not of the part but of the whole—and even the whole human race is only a part of the universe. Perhaps this shifting of the centre of gravity may transform philosophy as it did astronomy which, since learning from Copernicus "to place the eye in the sun," has brought our planetary system out of a state of chaotic confusion into one of complete orderliness. The world, as the creation of the All-powerful and All-good Spirit, must be the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz has sought to make this statement credible rather by refuting objections than by bringing direct evidence in support of it. He endeavours to find a standard of value which shall transcend all particular qualities taken individually, and he finds it in the idea of perfection, the

perfection, that is, of active being, of vital force; regarded in this way, the world is the best possible because it is the system in which life is most fully developed. We see this in nature; everywhere she employs the simplest means and takes the shortest paths, while the rules that she obeys are adjusted to each other in the most economical way. We see it again in the spiritual life of man, with its challenge to personal decision and unwearying co-operation in the process of the world's development. If the goodness of the world be contested on the ground that every life has its troubles, the natural reply is that we are not concerned with individuals but with the whole. That which is best on the whole is not best in every detail. As on a draught-board the individual pieces can only move in a way that suits the whole plan, so, in real life, the individual must be subordinate to the whole. If the question is not so much what is possible in itself (*le possible*) as what is possible in conjunction with other possibilities (*le compossible*), it may very likely be true that a union of inferior units is more productive than where the units are of higher value. "A mean thing joined to another mean thing can often bring about a better result than can be accomplished by the union of two other things, each of which is in itself nobler than either of the former. Here lies the secret of election by grace, and the problem is solved." Evil itself can find a place in Leibniz's system, thanks to his mathematical and quantitative way of reasoning. From evil a greater good may very probably emerge, if not for the individual himself, at least for others, and in this way the total sum of good may be increased. Was the greatness of the Roman state possible apart from the horrors occasioned by the fall of the kingship? If, in forming our judgments, we are not guided by immediate impressions, but carefully trace the consequences and connections of events, the reasonableness of the whole will assuredly be established. There is so much reason in what we do see that we can take comfort and apply to the universe Socrates's remark about Heraclitus: "What I understand pleases me; I believe that the rest would please me just as well

if I could understand it." By the power of thought man can share the life of the universe in all its richness, and in so doing, forget all the afflictions of his particular lot. The true knowledge lifts us to a height whence we "can see things beneath our feet as though we were looking from the stars." We must also remember the incessant progress of the world's development, and the fact that the soul belongs to an eternal order. "If we add to this that the soul does not perish, nay, more, that each perfection is bound to persist and bear fruit, then for the first time we can rightly see how the true bliss, springing from wisdom and virtue, is overwhelmingly and immeasurably superior to all that the heart of man can conceive."

Objections to this way of thought are not far to seek. Leibniz suggests possibilities, and, in so far as they do not admit of being convincingly disproved, regards them as certainties. Their realisation is a matter of faith rather than evidence. But the faith is itself the expression of a keen and buoyant vitality, and it is in the light of this sentiment that we must interpret the doctrine of the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz is important for his manifold suggestiveness, and still more important through his insistence on certain main principles which only needed liberation from their scholastic setting to become the confession of faith of our classical literature, and, more generally, the guide of our modern life. But the detail of his system cannot fail to excite opposition; it leads, in fact to other goals than those which he himself contemplated. His own consciousness is absorbed by the problem of establishing a right relation between nature and spirit, the physical and the moral world. In all that concerns details, nature must supply her own principle of explanation, but viewed as a whole her basis is spiritual and she must serve spiritual ends. In the course of working out this conception, however, Leibniz achieves the very opposite result to that which he intended. Concepts proper to the natural order intrude into the spiritual life, and subjugate that which they were meant to serve. All being centres in the

life of the soul, but this life is transformed into a mere fabric of presentations, as the familiar analogy of the timepiece sufficiently shows. The quantitative form of treatment proper to the study of nature is relentlessly extended to that of mind. Even the distinctions between good and evil, true and false, are turned into mere differences of degree, so that the new metaphysics threatens to degenerate into a mere extension of physics; while, through insistence on the increment of force or of vitality as the supreme test, the moral gives place to a dynamical form of valuation. The worst contradiction of all, however, is that while Leibniz insisted most emphatically on the self-immediacy of the psychical life, he could do no better than depict it as mere cognitive reflection of a world outside it. Surely this is to destroy the conception of inwardness, or at least to reduce it to an empty futility.

So, again, intellectualism overshoots the mark and we are driven to find another solution. This is just what the later developments in Germany have attempted, thereby giving full effect to what was really fruitful in Leibniz. His attempt to blend old with new, which, when followed up, leads to incessant contradictions, is yet in itself significant and fruitful as contributing to a larger and steadier outlook. Any one who places a value on historical continuity will count it a great matter that through Leibniz's unwearied efforts the old order was able to pass quietly into a new, and spiritual life in Germany was thereby preserved from all abrupt changes, whether revolutionary or reactionary. We may not agree with all Leibniz's doctrines, but this does not affect our indebtedness to him as a thinker.

(c) *Enlightenment: Period of Decline. A. Smith*

The leaders of seventeenth-century thought had already outlined the main features of the Enlightenment; but it remained for those of the eighteenth to work them out in detail and apply them over the whole of social life. The past must no longer

burden the present with its mere authority: it must show its credentials, and all tradition opposed to the revivifying, rejuvenating spirit of the present must be set aside. A clarifying, emancipating movement invades all departments alike; throughout, the supernatural and transcendental view yields place to one that is natural and immanental. This is true alike in religion and ethics, in politics and economics, in the philosophy of history and in æsthetics. Innumerable slumbering forces are discovered and wakened from sleep, and with the heightened vitality comes a proud consciousness of power, a glad self-confidence. The contradictions of the early stage, though now for the first time fully realised, are yet powerless to discourage. They rather act as a spur urging men to put forth their utmost energy and bring in a better future. Speaking generally, cosmological problems yield place to those which concern the condition and work of man; metaphysics gives way to psychology. The Age of Reason can be ushered in only through the liberation and development of the individual. We are bound to admit that this view makes our whole existence richer, fresher, more alive. But at the same time the mere individual often claims for himself what can really belong only to spiritual life as a whole, and thereby lowers and impoverishes his own condition. Men's minds are dominated by the idea of a reason unfettered by history, but this idea is itself the product of historical development and forms a necessary transition from a state of bondage to one of freedom. We can transcend this eighteenth century only in the atmosphere of freedom which it created for us.

The English are the leaders in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. In France, the doctrines of Descartes, or such of them as had really proved influential, had soon become so overlaid with scholasticism that English influence was necessary to enlist the general feeling of the nation in support of the new movement. In England, owing to the exciting political and religious struggles of the seventeenth century, men's minds were much more alert, and with the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne, the Enlightenment attained its greatest breadth

and freedom. So Berkeley could truly say: "Thinking is the great desideration of the present age." All questions of human interest were eagerly discussed, the dialogue form being especially favoured, now as a polemical weapon, and again as a means of presenting philosophical truths in a popular way. Through the medium of the periodical a new literature sprang up. The growing significance of the individual and his relations with other individuals found expression in the modern novel, which also, for the first time, contributed a realistic picture of social relationships. Everywhere there was a vigorous attempt to go back to the psychical bases of our social life, a praiseworthy and industrious effort to secure a reasoned view of life and improvement of social conditions; and all this involved an ever-increasing dependence upon the immediate environment. This social culture, however, was of an unmistakably bourgeois and simple character, in direct contrast to the pomp and glitter of Louis XIV.'s court.

The transforming power of this movement is equally apparent in the spheres of morality and religion. All its teachers agree in rejecting mere authority, and in building upon a foundation of personal knowledge. They agree, too, in opposing all supernatural intervention: the ends we aim at must be determined by our own nature and our relationship to the environment. All inquiry begins and ends with the individual. Ethics is based not on theology or metaphysics, but on psychology. It is the task of science to lay bare, by means of a penetrating analysis, those fundamental sentiments which, when intensified, give rise to moral relationships. Most of these teachers consider that morality consists in working for others; true virtue is to work with heart and hand for the welfare of society. Again, most of them agree in transferring the motives of action from the next world to this. We are not to be influenced by any prospect of divine punishment or reward for our actions, but the reward is to lie in the value of the action itself and in the feeling of self-satisfaction which it engenders. This feeling is further heightened by the self-respect natural to a free man who seeks within

himself his centre of gravity and does not recognize any external authority. The most complete exponent of this type of thought is Shaftesbury (1671–1713). He represents man as a being endowed with a moral sense which may be developed, through training, into moral discernment. Virtue consists in a right adjustment of the selfish and the social impulses; the latter must be strong; the former not too strong, and well-subordinated to the social impulse. Harmony is here the supreme end; or, to put it more generally, the good is also the beautiful. This is why it is pleasant for its own sake and needs no other reward than the joy which abides within it. Virtue and happiness are inseparably united. Thus the self-sufficiency of morality and its value as an end in itself have their ground in the very nature of moral experience—a clear point of connection with Greek Ethics, and a distinct advance upon the general trend of the Enlightenment. It is not only in England that these doctrines have made themselves felt. They have also exercised a lasting influence over eminent German poets and thinkers.

In the sphere of religion, we find the individual placing the utmost confidence in his reason and mainly occupied with a searching criticism of received beliefs. First there is an onslaught against all that is unreasonable, and then against all that is supernatural. In the end, the only content left to religion is morality: to be virtuous becomes the one true way of worshipping God. To rest satisfied with this conclusion required a strong optimism—and this, indeed, we find. It was generally assumed that the benevolent impulses were strong by nature and could easily gain the upper hand over the selfish impulses. Happiness was far more widely diffused than unhappiness: "Take the whole earth at an average, for one man who suffers pain or misery, you will find twenty in prosperity and joy, or, at least, in tolerable circumstances" (A. Smith). The same writer tells us that to be healthy, out of debt, and of a good conscience is all that is essential to happiness; and this condition, he opines, despite all the suffering in the world, is man's natural and ordinary lot, the condition of the majority of mankind.

Such a platitude is sufficient to show how many questions of morality and religion were left untouched by the English Enlightenment. And yet we must not depreciate it. It gave the first impulse toward grounding morality and religion in man's own nature. It failed to sound any great depths because it considered man as merely a part of a given world, not as a member of a spiritual order embracing and transcending the world. This step was reserved for German Idealism, but German Idealism could scarcely have taken it had not England cleared the way.

The most important work of the English Enlightenment is Adam Smith's (1723–1790) treatise on economics. This, in its own particular department, gives classical expression to the ideas of the Enlightenment, and at the same time develops a general theory of life and action which, for the first time, allows to economical considerations the dominant and central place in the world's work. All human existence is regarded from the economical stand-point of material subsistence, just as at other times it has been viewed from the stand-point of religion, of art or of science. This new attitude is so rich in consequences, and so influential even to-day, that it requires a more detailed presentation.

It is in Smith that the economical doctrines of the Enlightenment receive their clearest expression and are most systematically worked out. The older doctrine, as it had been handed down from antiquity through the Middle Ages and right on into modern times, did not recognise the independence of the economical point of view, but made it directly subservient to ethical ends. Nor did it consider economics as an organic whole, but merely as a collection of isolated facts. Moreover, it had no idea of a national economy, *i. e.*, of any connection between economical and national relations. Aristotle, in particular, set forth the presuppositions of this doctrine with great distinctness. They are presuppositions which modern life has shattered and destroyed. Now that material goods have of themselves the power to awaken dormant energies and stimulate activity,

they cease to be the mere means of existence and become a factor of prime importance for life. The care spent on them is ennobled by the fact that economics is looked upon as a matter of national policy. The Renaissance had already paved the way for a revolution in this direction. It had produced great results, especially in the France of the seventeenth century, and was influencing the thoughts of men more and more. But no work had yet been done along these lines which could compare in any way with that done by Adam Smith; he was the first to treat the problem in a universal manner, and to give to modern conviction on the subject a thoroughly befitting expression.

Smith begins with the fact of division of labour. This is no contrivance of man's wisdom, but arises out of his natural bent toward barter, and its tendency is to expand and develop indefinitely. It makes it possible to do everything more skilfully; it saves considerable time and incites men to the discovery of machines; in all these ways it immeasurably advances economic productiveness, and therewith the welfare and well-being of mankind. It is the main factor in the development of society from a savage to a civilised state. Division of labour, however, does not mean any dissociation of the individual members of society, but rather a tightening of the bonds which hold them together. In fact, it is only possible for an individual to persist and prosper in so far as he contributes to his fellows something worth having. He must make some solid contribution of a useful kind, and this more than anything else drives him to put forth all his powers and apply them in a purposive manner. As to what is purposive, he whose welfare—nay, life—is at stake, is surely a better judge than any stranger. On the whole, the relation of supply and demand will regulate everything in the best possible way. Where a need arises, there will be an immediate flow of energy to the required spot; where, on the other hand, there is a surplus, there will be an equally speedy withdrawal of energy. The freer the movement, the swifter will be the process. There is no stronger motive to work than competition. There is no need of any oversight on the part of State

or Corporations, since customers themselves are the most effective instrument of control. In fact, all intervention of the State, whether it be in the way of helping or hindering economic processes, is, under normal conditions, an evil. For all artificial guidance cannot but divert the currents of activity from their natural channels, retard their flow and lessen their productiveness. Monopolies and privileges may further the well-being of particular classes, but they are harmful to the prosperity of a nation taken as a whole. The natural condition of such prosperity is "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty" allowing each man to "pursue his own interest his own way." Moreover, it is the idea of the independence of the free individual which gives soul to life and action. To take the conflict on one's own shoulders and look dangers straight in the face has far more spice and charm than a safe bed of another's providing. But conflict demands of necessity the right of perfectly free movement on the part of individuals. They must be free to choose their work as they will, and to change one trade, or place of business, for another. In this process there is certain to be much friction and misunderstanding, but the process itself contains all the remedies for the evil and in the end offers every man a measure of happiness.

But that each individual should exert himself to the utmost in his own interest is the best way of insuring the prosperity of the community. For since the individual can only advance himself through the excellence of that which he produces, and competition involves the spurring on of one by another, the condition of the community is bound to make continual progress, and all the more certainly because it is the unchanging natural instincts which support the whole structure. So a reasonable result can be reached without any conscious seeking for it on the part of the actors themselves, an idea familiar to us as taken up and developed by Darwin. Still, division and conflict would be unavoidable, were it not for a solidarity of interests between the various classes and callings, which insures that the gain of the individual shall in the end conduce to the advantage of his fel-

lows. That this is so is with Smith an adamantine conviction. He never for a moment doubts that the gain of one man is, directly or indirectly, sooner or later, the gain of his fellow-men. In particular he singles out the industrial progress of Great Britain and attributes to it the much improved condition of the working-classes. The reality of this mutual aid is at once obvious, if only we cease to fasten our attention on individual occurrences and direct it rather to the system as a whole.

But what is true within the State can also be applied to the wider field of international relations, and here it constitutes a strong argument for an unrestricted free trade. Perfect freedom in the exchange of wares is to the interest alike of buyer and seller; in "natural" trading, the one does not gain at the expense of the other, but both are gainers. The one realises his goods at a profit; the other is given a chance of using his to greater advantage. This is particularly true in the exchange of manufactured articles for raw products. Thus trade, from being a fertile source of discord and animosity, becomes a bond of union and friendship. The prosperity of our neighbour profits rather than harms us. Industrial solidarity expands into the solidarity of nations. We have a picture of peaceful rivalry and perpetual progress.

And these considerations apply to spiritual no less than to material labour, so that in the end it is the rivalry of individuals which supports the whole fabric of civilisation. Lofty ideals seldom draw us by their own charm. Rivalry and competition are essential to progress. This is particularly true of religion, science and education. They have the surest footing and the best chance of progress when they are left entirely to themselves, when their representatives have to fight hard and do solid work in order to win recognition and insure a continued existence. All conferring of privileges, everything that gives immunity from care, makes for laziness and deterioration. So it is easy to understand how religions are more powerful at the commencement than in their later phases, how private schools show better results than schools under public management, and so on.

Everywhere the vital interests of individuals are the mainspring of action and the sure guarantee of progress. The doctrine of economics expands into a general scheme of life.

The merits and limitations of this view have been much discussed during recent decades. To us the doctrine is chiefly interesting as expressing an aspect of the life-philosophy of the Enlightenment. Its method at once proclaims the closeness of the connection. The writer seeks, by means of a penetrating analysis, to resolve the economic process into its simplest elements, to bring these together, and thus from the elements derive a picture of reality as a whole. This certainly brings clearness and lucidity into a domain which otherwise would be a scene of dire confusion: Adam Smith's theoretical elucidation of the economic life constitutes one of the most brilliant triumphs of the Enlightenment. The content of his doctrine also reveals the spirit of this period. Everywhere it is nature which is called upon: commerce is reduced to the play of natural instincts; all human initiative is expressly ruled out. It is quite in accordance with the spirit of the Enlightenment to make prosperity depend entirely upon the free movement of natural forces. Moreover, the optimism which permeates this system is in complete accord with the Enlightenment. The system stands or falls with the conviction that the individual, once set free from artificial restraints, has sufficient strength and insight to win for himself a suitable place in life; and also with this other conviction, that those who buy are both willing and able to choose the really superior article. For if the inferior were to command approval, a blow would be struck at the very roots of progress.

Both Smith, however, and the English Enlightenment with him, tacitly presuppose the particular conditions of their time and place. Their system professes to be an outcome of mere theory and therefore universally valid: but in truth it is largely the product of the peculiar circumstances of England at that particular period. The theory is constantly accompanied and supplemented by a mental picture, the picture of a thriving

nation making sure progress toward increased power and more widely diffused prosperity, and just in the act of substituting machine-work for hand-labour. Smith's great work appeared in 1777. In 1767, Hargraves invented the spinning-jenny. In 1769, Watt invented the steam-engine, and in the same year Arkwright invented the roller spinning-frame driven by water-power. It is precisely these years which mark the commencement of that revolution in modern labour which later was to change the whole face of human existence. But all these vast complications lay yet undreamt of in the far distance; and since Smith presupposes simpler conditions, a milder type of economic struggle, and a more leisurely process of barter, it is quite possible for him to expect nothing but good from the free movement of natural forces. As yet there was no rift between capital and labour. The rending shocks and displacements occasioned by the ever-increasing rate of traffic were still quite beyond his vision. He has no fear, for instance, of any dangers that might arise from the importation of foreign corn: the difficulties of transport are so great that even in times of scarcity he thinks very little would be imported. In all these respects his system shows clearly its close connection with a specific historical setting. It shares the general error of the Enlightenment, which is to mistake a demand of one particular age for a need of all time.

But it is as a general policy and philosophy of life that Smith's system is least satisfactory. It leaves out of count all inward joy in work, all inward growth through the progress of work. Life is looked at from the outward point of view, and is gauged by its external progress, its material acquisitions and gains. Whatever may be the extent to which free movement and the full development of individual power may conduce to the qualities of independence and manliness, yet in its more inward aspects the level of life is lowered in every single department—religion, science and education. There is a vast gulf between true inward freedom and that freedom of external movement whose greedy rivalries and harsh competitions rivet a man's attention on his environment, keep him from rising above its

level, and make him the docile slave of the public interest. Thus Adam Smith's work, philosophically considered, has very important limitations. But, as a typical way of viewing the problem of human life, it has a lasting significance.

The French Enlightenment, in all its main features, follows in the steps of the English; it works on borrowed capital. But it gives to the borrowed material a new and original shape: in the first place, it ignores historical conditions, whereas these had a marked influence over English thought, now tempering its exuberance, now supplementing its deficiencies. In the second place, it works out its principles more abstractly and is more rigidly consistent in its deductions. At the same time, the style of presentation is fresher, wittier, more piquant; nowhere else is the peculiar versatility and impressionableness of the French quite so brilliantly displayed. One and the same impulse pervades every department of life, the desire, namely, to let everything explain itself according to its own nature. Political and historical occurrences are divested of all supernatural elements. It is human nature which is to give the key to all political developments and diversities of constitution. A rational philosophy of history is built up deliberately in opposition to the traditional religious interpretation of human progress. At the same time literary work gains immensely in power of expression and artistic elegance. It is to France that the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century owes its world-wide influence. But despite all its freshness, charm and grace, it became poorer and poorer in spiritual substance, and more and more definitely individualistic. Though of great importance for its own day, it has contributed little of lasting worth to our common spiritual treasury. Our task in this book, therefore, allows us to touch on it but lightly.

It is a period in which the Subject reaches a maximal degree of independence and practises the most outspoken criticism. All rigid distinctions are melted down; even the hardest, dryest material is stirred and freshened, but at the same time broken up.

In a personality like Diderot's the serious aspect of things seems to have entirely disappeared; existence, for him, is but a graceful pastime; a slave to each passing impression, he runs through one phase after another, and—a true epitome of his age—presses ever further in the path of negation. In the case of other thinkers, we find a desire for systematic unity stronger than in any one of the English school, and a more vigorous attempt to eliminate all hyperempirical elements. Condillac, for example, simplifies the empiricism of Locke by building up all psychical life from sense-impressions, and, in the course of carefully tracing the individual stages of this process, he proffers many fine observations and fruitful suggestions.—Helvetius is of coarser stuff: he will not allow that an original instinct of benevolence has anything to do with morality, but bases all action on the interest of the individual, rightly understood (*l'intérêt bien entendu*). Since we are nothing but what the environment makes us, the power of external influences becomes overwhelming, and therefore, too, the power of education, so that the final conclusion is: "Education can do everything." New horizons dawn upon our view as the feelings and all the impulses that lead to action come to be derived from physical sensibility.—For cleverness, wit and argumentative ingenuity there is no one like Voltaire. Against all philosophical systems, nay, more, against any kind of learned discussion, he directs the most biting scepticism, and finds a special outlet for his wit in Leibniz's doctrine of the best of all possible worlds. He is still more violent in his denunciation of all dogmatic and authoritative religion, and also of superstition, which he regards as the worst foe of the human race. At the same time, his honest conviction drives him to reject atheism, but the religion he wants is a religion "with much morality in it and very little dogma"; and by "moral" he means that which conduces to the welfare of society as it happens to be constituted for the time being. So, though he distinctly recognises the value of morality in itself, yet his exposition of it reveals a relativity which everywhere introduces change and flux. Voltaire's greatest enthusiasm is for toleration, from

which he expects the only peace that man can hope for. Taken all in all, the Enlightenment in France stirred and moved humanity to an incalculable extent, nor was its influence by any means exhausted in its own day. Only later did it begin to affect other nationalities, and in our own land it still exercises an immense power.

Germany was the last to participate in the work of the Enlightenment. Here, more than anywhere else, the ground was cumbered with useless survivals, and Germany entered upon the task of removing them with much more gravity and seriousness than had been shown in France, and at the same time with a manifest desire to save and secure the good elements while sifting and weeding out the worthless. German life, therefore, has been spared any violent catastrophes. But with its greater sobriety, it is at the same time much tamer and more bourgeois. There is lacking, not only the easy versatility, but also, for the most part, the fine taste and the sparkling wit of the French. The leading spirit of the German Enlightenment is Christian Wolff (1679–1754), a man of great renown in his own day. His merit is that he systematically covered the whole ground along the lines prescribed by the Enlightenment and presented his results in a form intelligible to every one. He produces a kind of encyclopædia of modern knowledge: with the most tenacious perseverance he develops the main ideas into their minutest ramifications, forms a well-organised system of concepts, and creates a German vocabulary for their expression. At the same time he defends his convictions right manfully against powerful opponents. Moreover, it is largely his influence which has brought the German universities from a mediæval into a modern atmosphere of thought, and has thus paved the way for the important position which they now hold in the spiritual life of Germany. But he can only be considered great from the standpoint of his own age and in close relation to it. When once we take him out of the context of his time, with its ideals of sobriety and clearness, we find his tasteless circumlocutions and self-

conscious pedantry altogether intolerable. It was imperative that the German Enlightenment should free itself from such pedantic narrowness, and in the process, marked by the appearance of Lessing, it reached a particularly high level. Lessing's ideas are in the main those of Leibniz, but they have been clarified and rejuvenated, and bear throughout the impress of a strong personality full of youthful freshness and joy. At the same time the language in which they are expressed has been polished till it is clear as crystal, so that the ideas are far more intelligible and effective. Freed from musty pedantry, they have power to stir the whole being and help forward a life that is universal. And this power is the greater in that a strong sense of truth permeates Lessing's work, an attitude of inexorable opposition to all shams. Moreover, in several important points he develops in a very forcible way the ideas which he has taken over. The universal nature of the individual is more clearly brought out, and his superiority to the social environment. The connection between God and the world is depicted as more intimate and inward. But, above all, fresh light is thrown on the relationship of reason and history, and a way thus prepared for movements of great importance, more especially in the sphere of religion. According to Lessing, our ultimate convictions cannot possibly rest on an historical basis: "accidental truths of history can never be the proof of necessary truths of reason," "accidental," like "empirical," being used here in the sense of "actual." Thus Lessing is the most convinced opponent of all rigid orthodoxy. But he goes far beyond the ordinary level of the Enlightenment in his endeavour to discover a reason in all historical conditions, nay, more, to understand the whole process of history as man's education in reason. This induces him to enter sympathetically into all the manifold forms of tradition, and never altogether to reject anything which opens up new prospects and new problems. It is along this path that the nineteenth century has reached its most striking results, and thus Lessing constitutes the most important link between the older and the newer way of thought.

C. THE BREAKING-UP OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW SOLUTIONS

We have spoken of the Enlightenment as a leading factor in the great modern movement which aims at opening up the whole realm of reality and pouring its riches into the life of man. Its distinctive contribution was the ruthless dissection of first impressions, the clear distinction between mind and nature, the apprehension of the smallest elements as alive; in a word, the systematic reconstruction of the given, based on a thoroughgoing analysis and involving a fundamental transformation of primitive material. With the enrichment of thought went also an enrichment of life. Strenuous toil increased man's control over nature as over himself. The accurate understanding of nature was crowned by triumphs of technical achievement. In the world of politics and of economics, the free play given to the exercise of individual powers was at the same time a challenge to greater independence of action. And in the more general conduct of life, the result of starting from the individual was to give an impetus toward greater freedom, freshness and activity—as is clearly shown in the spheres alike of religion, morality and education.

In all these respects the Enlightenment has left an indelible record in the history of humanity. It is a stage which cannot possibly be omitted; he who wishes to get beyond it yet dare not ignore it. But its very strength betrays its one-sidedness and its weakness. The reluctance to synthesise, the inward separation of man from the universe, the exaggerated value attached to knowledge, the subtle worship of the minūte with its consequent dangerous optimism, the limitation of utilitarian ideals—all this was bound to reveal itself sooner or later by that process through which the limitations of human ideals are usually revealed in the course of the world's development, the process, namely, of their own realisation. The very unfolding of a movement forces its inherent elements of negation and narrowness to become ex-

plicit. In proportion as the great impulses which set it going become merged and lost in the mediocrity of ordinary life, the weaknesses are ever more and more exposed, till at last a revolution ensues and every one rejects and denies that which formerly inspired and dominated all. It is only at a later period that a balance of judgment can reassert itself. The continuance of the dispute about the merits of the Enlightenment shows clearly that such a period has not yet arrived, and that despite all reactions and counter-movements, the Enlightenment is still a force to be reckoned with.

I. REACTIONS AGAINST THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

(a) *Hume*

Hume (1711–1776) shows a way of escape from a serious inconsistency of the English Enlightenment. It professes to take its stand entirely on experience and thence derive not only all knowledge but also all rules for the guidance of life. But as a matter of fact it supplements experience by drawing largely upon man's spiritual capacity; only it so confuses the two sources that it becomes difficult to distinguish clearly between them, as when the theory of knowledge, for instance, treats the fundamental laws of thought—causality, in particular—as derived from things. In the practical direction we have a still more striking example: the free personality outgrows the limitations of experience, and in politics, ethics and religion, human nature becomes intellectualised and idealised as it has no right to be on the assumptions of the system. Even in the concept of nature itself there lurks an ambiguity, a contradiction.

It is Hume who clearly penetrates this contradiction and with dogged energy works out the conception of a pure experience, at the same time giving his own very original and well-defined interpretation of life and reality. According to him, there can be no such thing as causality, in the sense of a real connection of events. For a connection, as the old Sceptics were shrewd

enough to see, cannot possibly take place through the mediacy of things, but must emanate from ourselves. It really means nothing more than a customary sequence of our ideas in virtue of which similar situations lead us to expect a similar issue. Thus causality, from being a cosmic law, becomes merely a psychical phenomenon; it gives no information whatsoever as to the actual nature of things. Even the concept of "thing" can no longer keep its former value. Bodies, souls, things generally, cannot be perceived, nor can they denote anything lying beyond the sphere of our perception. They are merely the products and supports of our perception. The soul, for instance, is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." Our perceptions are not copies of a reality independent of them. The so-called degrees of reality are merely degrees of an indefinable force and liveliness with which perceptions strike upon the mind. Hence, in last resort, all our convictions are reduced to feelings. Mere argument can never give us any assurance of reality. All connections have their origin in some necessity of feeling, and are, therefore, matter of belief, a belief which naturally has nothing to do with religious belief or faith. Now feeling develops chiefly through custom and use, and the development is more properly an affair of the sensitive than of the reflective side of our nature. The process of perception is not regulated by some directing unity and is not the product of conscious purpose; it is a strictly necessary process, governed by simple laws of association. So everything metaphysical is ruthlessly expelled and empirical psychology becomes all in all.

And equally in the other departments of life, reason loses her position of supremacy and the forces which sway us are shown to be thoroughly irrational. It is not reasonable deliberation, but feelings of pleasure and pain which impel us to action. The so-called victory of reason over feeling is nothing more than the victory of a tranquil feeling over a violent one. Reason cannot of her own strength either help or hinder; she is only a slave of the

feelings. Virtues are distinguished from vices not through any theorising reflection, but through the immediate satisfaction or dissatisfaction, pleasure or displeasure, which the contemplation of them calls forth. Thus morality becomes a question of taste. The treatment of religion also is entirely revolutionised. If the Enlightenment had been minded to base it upon knowledge, Hume seeks to root it in human emotion—in hope, and still more, in fear. Thus he becomes the subverter of English Deism.

In this way the whole of our life is carried back on to a sense-basis which is firmly adhered to in the building up of social relations. Everything that might seem to claim an independent footing is either forced into agreement or else eliminated. Thus the whole aspect of life is changed, together with the problem which it presents. We see at once that existence becomes something quite subjective and relative, that immediate impression is more important than thought, feeling than theory. At the same time, there is no longer any motive for optimism. There is nothing to hinder us from recognising to the full the irrational element in human action and procedure. The dark and painful side of life is powerless to move or disturb us, when once the relativity of things has been fully grasped. Hume's system is not incompatible with energetic action in the outside world; it allows of a vigorous conflict against error and vain imagining. But at the heart of it there is a deep passivity, amounting even to icy indifference.

This system of thought gives us an original presentation of reality, worked out with admirable consistency. The Positivism of the nineteenth century, with all its resources of natural science, technical achievement and social experience, did nothing more than develop the system a little further, without always preserving the extreme precision of Hume's ideas. It is no small merit to have thought out definitely and clearly such a pure and unadulterated empiricism. Whether there is anything final in the presentation, whether it does not rather itself reveal its own limitations, is another question. In any case, its most important result was the stimulus it gave to the thought of Kant.

(b) *Rousseau*

With Rousseau (1712–1778) there begins the full reaction of feeling against the intellectualism of the Enlightenment, a reaction which finds in him its most extreme form of expression. For though Rousseau was no great philosopher, nor the originator of any deep-laid system, yet he was the inspirer of a new order of feeling, and initiated a movement of immeasurable import. The strength of his influence may be partly accounted for by an unsolved contradiction in his own nature. He is poet and thinker in one: as thinker he inclines to sober logic; as poet, to dreamy romanticism. He is conspicuous for his power of abstraction and inference. Connected thought is as easy to him as child's play. His individual sentences are like pearls rolled together to form a chain, and the whole result appeals to us with the force of inexorable consistency. From this point of view his work appears to be merely a development of perfectly obvious premises. Everything is so simple, so illuminating, so convincing, that it seems quite impossible to contradict it. But when we scrutinise the premises themselves more closely, we find a very different tendency at work. Here there is something immediate, intuitive, determined by feeling. A subjective influence is at work of a strongly excitable, emotional kind, passing thence into things themselves and investing them with an inner life, with tone and colour, love and hate, feeling and passion. But so gentle is the transforming touch which makes of them something other, better and more spiritual than they are—so deftly is the magic garment of the artistic imagination thrown around them, that the poetry is never recognised as such. The new blends with the old to form an apparently complete unity, and, despite its daring originality, has all the convincing force of a purely logical deduction. It is as poet rather than thinker that Rousseau has exercised such compelling and dominating power.

The form of presentation corresponds completely with this inward temper. Clear and simple as it is, it appears to be just

the plainest possible expression of necessary fact. But at the same time it is eloquent through and through of a susceptible and dreamy nature. It voices persuasively all its moods and impulses, its glowing indignation and stormy passion no less than the tuneful vibrations of its tenderest feelings. It has, in particular, a marvellous power of giving expression to moods only half avowed, which halt poised between contradictory emotions. It lets us hear the overtones, and in all the stress and strain of active life fills us with a longing for better things, a desire for loneliness, a quiet melancholy. All this is not accomplished without art, but the art is so skilfully concealed that it has the effect of perfect naturalness.

When we pass to the content of his work, we find that Rousseau for the first time discloses the radical spirit of the Enlightenment, which had so long been concealed by an optimistic view of the relation between nature and society. From the very outset it had been the aim of the Enlightenment to find a way of life that was reasonable and conformable to nature, but it fancied that the goal was near and the way easy. The traditional civilisation, with all its mistakes and errors, did not seem diametrically opposed to nature. Only let the husks of prejudice and superstition be stripped off and surely there would appear forthwith a solid kernel of incontestable worth. To the men of the Enlightenment it seemed perfectly possible, without any noise or fuss but simply by means of clear insight, honest endeavour and diligent work, to make reason everywhere supreme. The goal they set before them was not an entirely new order of life only to be obtained through painful upheaval, but an active shifting of existing conditions, a purifying and freshening of life as it is. Consequently, there is no unchaining of elemental passions, and society is not shaken to its foundations. The Enlightenment rather starts on the highest level of social life and thence penetrates slowly but surely to the lower strata. By quiet progress everything seems to be levelled upward and the interests of all classes to be more and more identified. Even the negative movement assumes a moderate and beneficent character. Reform,

not Revolution, is the watchword. The men whose youth belonged to this period, as, for example, Goethe, never felt themselves really at home in the political and social atmosphere of the later epoch.

It is this later epoch which begins with Rousseau. With vivid distinctness he shows up the gulf which exists between the natural conditions demanded by reason and the actualities of our social environment. It is not merely that the latter is incomplete and defective. The whole spirit of it is contrary to reason; it is rotten to the core. Thus Rousseau's accusations are not directed against any particular faults and flaws, but rather against the whole structure of a civilisation which is partly traditional, partly social. The ideal of simplicity, immediacy, truth to nature, which the English representatives of the Enlightenment had thought it possible to realise even in society, is now seen to be really hostile to society and engaged in a life-and-death struggle with it. The discerning toleration and good feeling of the earlier time are laid aside, and the sharp contrast of truth and semblance awakens the fiercest passion. No longer can one man stand sponsor for another, but each is summoned to co-operate, each must win happiness and truth for himself.

This view entirely changes the value of society for the individual. So far the Enlightenment had seen in society nothing but good. The social condition seemed to be the natural outgrowth of our rational nature and to be immeasurably helpful to the individual. Under the protection of law, freedom seemed to have a much better chance than could possibly be afforded it by the unbridled liberty of a state of nature. But now the other side of the picture is disclosed. Society, enslaving as it does the individual to his environment, is felt to be a serious menace to the happy and harmonious development of his powers.

Civilisation makes a man weak and insincere, and distracts his energies. Its sole criterion of worth is outward performance. Hence, through its influence, a man is alienated from his own

true nature, diverted from his own individuality, and all his thought and reflection is made to depend on the judgment of others. To secure an outward effect it is unnecessary to go beyond seeming: so hypocrisy continually gains ground and falsifies even the inmost nature of the soul. There is no room left for strong feeling and energetic willing, but every emotion is toned down to the dead level of social requirement; there is no chance for the development of an independent individuality; uniformity is imposed upon all. A man does not ask whether he himself is pleased with what he does, but only whether other people approve. "No one dares to be himself." "We must do what others do," is the ruling maxim of wisdom. "This is usual, that is not usual," is the ultimate ground of decision. Thus we are estranged from ourselves. Our desire is no longer focussed on what is near and simple, but on the distant and the complex, and it becomes faint and weak in proportion to the breadth of the area over which it is dissipated. We trouble ourselves about many things till "our individuality is only the smallest part of us. Every man makes himself, so to speak, commensurate with the whole wide world and has all this vast area of sensibility to pain. Can we wonder that our afflictions multiply when we have so many vulnerable spots?" We look abroad, but our own home is strange to us and our nearest neighbours of no concern. "Many a philosopher loves the Tartars, that he may not have to love his neighbours."

Conditions of this kind cannot produce strong action and manly character. They are, moreover, fatal to our happiness. Happiness for a man means not so much great enjoyment as little suffering. Now our suffering increases in proportion as the gulf widens between our wishes and our capacity. To make this gulf less wide, to set before ourselves goals that are attainable, is the path of our true wisdom. But social life takes the exactly opposite course: it entangles us in the most distant concerns, excites impossible desires, leaves us wholly at the mercy of outside things.

Life consequently becomes wretched, devoid of sincerity and

independence. The weeds of conventionalism choke everything that is genuinely natural and human. And when at last the desire arises to return to the simplicity and innocence of nature, to live a stronger and a happier life, it finds itself in utter incompatibility with the existing social conditions. The artificial structure must be razed to the ground and a wholly new one set in its place. Nature pure and undefiled is to be its motto. Nature must develop in perfect freedom without any interference or aid from us. All life must be grounded on simple human feelings, and so remain "natural" through all its manifold developments. Here we have a stirring appeal, a demand for nothing less than a complete renewal of existing conditions.

This is the very soul of Rousseau's endeavour, but it is just here that the most serious complications arise. His negative position is quite clear, and so long as he keeps to it he is perfectly sure of himself; but when he turns to constructive work, his meaning is no longer so certain. What does he understand by "nature" and in what way does he think we can reach it? It can only mean for him the original condition of life, that which remains when we strip off all the disguises and shams of civilisation. But there is no clear and precise picture of what such a condition would be: it is merely an impressionist sketch of a very idealising kind. Nature is invested with a romantic charm. Plainness and simplicity are transfigured into something pure and noble. In striking contrast to his unsparing criticism of society, Rousseau has a sentimental faith in a natural unspoilt goodness of the individual. "Everything good we can educe from beautiful souls by trust and frankness." The saying goes back to Plato, but it was Rousseau who first gave it its vogue. Also, from the intellectual point of view, Rousseau's natural man is anything but the undeveloped product of nature. He is the result of centuries of civilisation, from which he deliberately turns away to come back upon himself. Here we have to do with the finest flower of civilisation, a human being absolved from harsh necessity of toil and gently restored to nature's em-

brace. It is this romantic transfiguration of nature which makes Rousseau expect a higher standard of worth and purity from the common people who live simply and constitute the great mass of the nation. External nature also, undisturbed by the rush and hurry of man, is looked upon as a kingdom of truth and peace.

Rousseau, then, never seriously contemplates shaking off civilisation and going back to a crudely primitive nature. What he desires is a thorough remodelling of civilised conditions so that they may allow of individual independence and simplicity of life. He wants a new society that is more in touch with nature; he wants a rejuvenation of our whole existence. This line of thought obviously tends again in the direction of the older Enlightenment, but from this it is distinguished by the fact that Rousseau's criticism applies not to a few detached phases of life but to the whole of it, and that it is the result not of reasoned reflection but of immediate feeling. Hence, the violence of the movement, the passionate impulse toward revolution and renewal.

Its main concern is not to effect this or that particular reform, but to change the individual himself, to make him strong, simple, and happy, not dependent on other men and things, but enjoying the true freedom of an independent, healthy nature, "only desiring that which he can do, and only doing that which pleases him," always putting forth the whole of his energy. Such an individual will be conscious of himself as a human being, and not primarily as a member of some particular caste or order.

The main requisite for the production of such people is a new kind of education. Education should not aim at securing external conformity from the pupil and bringing him up for purposes in which he has no native interest. It must, especially at the outset, allow nature to develop freely, and follow her bidding obediently (*laissez faire en tout la nature*); it must appeal everywhere to immediate experience and encourage the exercise of the individual's own powers. It must work securely from near to far, from simple to complex, and ground even its moral training on

the simplest natural impulses. By these methods it will produce independent, busy, happy men. At the same time, the work of education itself is lifted on to a higher platform. Its business is not so much to transmit a ready-made culture as to build up a new one, by emphasising the simplest elements of life. Thus education is the chief agent in the formation of a new humanity, and is put upon an independent footing as distinct from other departments of life.

It would, however, be impossible for education alone to accomplish this task. Fresh life must also be infused into every other department by a strengthening of the link which binds it to the individual's immediate experience, and by bringing it into closer touch with nature. This is Rousseau's real work. He develops the antithesis between nature and society through the whole range of human existence, everywhere rousing enthusiasm or hostility, everywhere compelling man to decide one way or the other.

Religion, he finds, is in sore need of reform. As customarily observed, it lacks inwardness. "The belief of children and of a good many grown-up people is just a matter of geography. Will they be rewarded for being born in Rome and not in Mecca? When a child says that it believes in God, it does not really believe in God, but rather believes Peter or James who tell him that there is something called 'God.'" Philosophical speculation again can help us but little. The really important factor is the inward voice of feeling. The truths of which it furnishes assurance are fewer and simpler, but on that account all the more fruitful. It gives us an immediate and therefore a sure hold upon God, Freedom and Immortality. A natural religion like this needs no learning; all honest people can share in it. Christianity approaches most nearly to its ideal, that is to say, Christianity in its primitive and simple form, Christianity as conveyed to us in the lofty and attractive personality of Jesus, and not as interpreted by a degenerate civilisation.

Art also stands in need of a transformation. A false and luxurious civilisation has severed it from nature and made it effemi-

nate, corrupt and untrue. All the true ideals of æsthetic taste are given us by nature. Luxury and bad taste go hand in hand. The perverted art of modern times concerns itself only with grand people and far-away things. Comedy does not draw its material from the people at large, but from the narrow sphere of aristocratic life. Tragedy seeks to interest the Parisians in Sertorius and Pompey. And is it not also a pity that in seasons of joy and festivity we should so studiously isolate ourselves? "Exclusive enjoyments are the death of enjoyment. The true pleasures are those which we share with the people."

Here, too, we should mention the revolution effected by Rousseau in the feeling for nature. It is not so much pleasure and refreshment that he seeks in nature as a means of escape from human pettiness into a purer atmosphere. Grace and proportion attract him less than power and vastness. The sentiment of the sublime thrills and purifies the soul. Hence, springs an emotion of a new kind—the passion for mountains. "There our thoughts attain a certain grandeur and loftiness corresponding to those physical objects which inspire our emotion. It is as though in rising above the dwelling-place of man we left behind all low and earthly feeling, as though in drawing near to the spaces of ether, the spirit caught some hint of their inviolable purity." Throughout, the feeling for nature has a distinctly sentimental character: Everywhere she seems to breathe forth purity and peace, but as we contemplate her calm and tranquillity, a feeling of melancholy often steals over us. This tender, dreamy, rhapsodic feeling for nature is well exemplified in the descriptions of the Lake of Geneva. Here we have the origin of a conception of nature which is at once romantic and optimistic, and long wielded an irresistible influence.

Rousseau's politics are less soft and sentimental. Even here there is indeed no lack of romanticism. It is especially apparent in the firm belief that the main body of the people always desire the good, though they do not always see where it lies, a belief which is an essential and indispensable part of Rousseau's theory. But when we follow his treatment in detail, we see him

throughout as the abstract logician who is carrying the fundamental ideas of the Enlightenment to their extreme consequences. Not only does every right originate with individuals, but it is theirs for ever. A right which is sanctioned by tradition must give way before the eternal rights of man: as soon as it comes into collision with these, it is no longer a right. But should the individuals agree to bear the social yoke, the decision cannot but revolutionise their status as individuals. The union of individual wills results in a wider Ego, a collective body which obtains an absolute power through each member's abdication of his separate rights. There is, however, one indispensable condition for this subordination of the individual to the community, and that is that within the community all the individuals shall enjoy perfect freedom and equality. Their sovereignty is only collective and it is impossible for them to delegate it to individual persons. Moreover, one man cannot represent another. If the nation becomes so large that it can only act through delegates, the delegate must not be considered as representing his electors, but merely as bearing a mandate from them. All he has to do is to convey their will and intention; he must not give expression to his own convictions. The executive must be entirely dependent on the power that makes the laws. This is quite in keeping with Rousseau's general tendency to treat political life as first and foremost an institution for applying law, and to look upon the subsumption of a particular case under a general rule as the main business of politics —a view which does scant justice to the historical and personal element in political life. The main object of the state is no longer as the English Enlightenment conceived it, the protection of particular callings, but rather the welfare of the whole. That this implies a strong, almost despotic, oppression of individual freedom is observable even in Rousseau. But he looks upon the judgment of the people or majority of the people as a judgment of God, as the expression of an Absolute Reason. As a matter of fact, this French Radicalism only recognises freedom and equality within the state; it knows of no freedom in opposition

to it. It really offers a classical expression of the doctrine of the state's omnipotence, clothed though it be in a democratic garb. Rousseau's optimism is strong enough to silence any doubt that may arise as to the practicability of his ideas; it is assumed that man will be good and reasonable as soon as he is set within the new dispensation.

Briefly, it is the sharp antithesis between their pessimism and their optimism which gives to Rousseau's political doctrines their abnormal power of awakening revolutionary zeal. For the bad, our social conventions are mainly responsible; the good is supplied by the individual. Left to follow our own nature we might be noble and happy; it is mainly the perversions of our social order which stand in our way. The conclusion is not far to seek. It comes in the form of a demand; the obstacle must fall, fall utterly. It is the emphasising of this contrast between the misery of our temporal conditions and the intrinsic goodness of human nature that has made Rousseau the apostle of the Revolution.

A criticism of Rousseau is no very difficult task. To show up the inadequacies and ambiguities of his constructive work, we only need to press home the problems involved in the concept of "nature." It is easy to point out how lightly he takes up the hypothesis of the natural goodness of mankind, and how dependent he is in this respect on the Enlightenment. It can at the same time be shown that his unmistakable desire for spiritual depth and a self-dependent inward life never gets beyond the stage of ferment and unrest, never leads to tangible results. Very often for spiritual content we are offered mere subjective feeling. Yet none the less Rousseau holds a pre-eminently important position. The profound influence he exerted on the best among his contemporaries is of itself sufficient to prevent us from valuing him too lightly. He has been immeasurably helpful in the work of quickening and rejuvenating life. His earnest desire for a regenerate humanity is at heart ethical. However unsatisfactory his solutions, his problems, at least, are profoundly significant, and we cannot but admire the vigorous

insistence with which he presented them. In many cases he simply took over ideas from the Enlightenment, set them free from their scholastic wrappings and converted them into common property. But he also opened up quite new avenues of thought. From him we may date the movement toward immediacy of feeling—the sense of tension and conflict between individual and society. He stands on the dividing-line between two epochs.

The revulsion in favour of feeling which succeeded upon the intellectualism of the Enlightenment took Germany also by storm. The younger generation was feverishly eager to escape from the bondage of social convention into full individual freedom, to pass from the limitations of traditional formulas to the freshness of immediate impression and the unfettered development of every power, to turn from the artificial adornments of human existence to the truth and simplicity of nature, to replace cautious reflection by swift intuition and bold creation, adhesion to authoritative standards by a free and fertile originality. The individual asserts his autonomy; every one wants to be uncommon. The notion of genius gains currency, and becomes a favourite subject of discussion. He who has none is put down as a "philistine." For Lavater (so W. von Humboldt tells us) every one passed as a philistine whose work though it possessed "right ideas, accurate expression, elegant style, yet showed nothing that could really be called genius." The emancipation from intellectualism assumed in Germany a very different form from that which it had taken in France. It did not shake the foundations of state, society and religion, but had rather a literary and personal character. It claimed free outlet and expression for individual feeling and entirely rejected the fashions and tyrannies of social life. On the other hand, it took little interest in the facts of politics and economics, and when it did occupy itself with religion it was not in order to submit religion to any radical criticism, but rather to release it from intellectualism and hand it over to feeling. In so far as all this remained merely a negative movement it had no inward self-sufficiency nor any

compensating power of construction. It could not give rise to a new conception of life and the world. But it did remove hindrances and prepare the way for a greater movement to come. Without this season of storm and stress, German Idealism and the creations of its genius would have been impossible.

With Herder the movement assumes a more settled, less turbulent character, and we are already approaching the zenith of the classical period. He, too, repudiates the Enlightenment and has a strong leaning toward what is vital and intuitive, toward freshness of life and immediacy of feeling. But he puts the movement upon a firmer footing and gives it a greater solidity, since he does not rest in feeling only, but penetrates beyond to the conception of human life as an organic whole. In the harmonious co-operation of every power he sees an ideal of universal brotherhood; moreover, he puts the individual in the larger setting of his historical and social connections. At the same time, his heart goes out to nature and he longs to revive the conditions and surroundings which are natural to our humanity. Many are the links that are forged between nature and spirit. The individual is shown to be related to the race, and in the race a characteristic individuality is disclosed. The world of reality is in constant flux, and all progress is from within. Here in all important features we have the way prepared for the romantic writers and the historical school. It is true that Herder is content with mere outline and does not attempt to fill in details; but his wonderful many-sidedness and assimilative power, and more especially his capacity to see things as a whole, have been in the highest degree stimulating and suggestive. Herder is an indispensable link in the chain of German development.

II. GERMAN IDEALISM

(a) *Kant*

(*a*) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

With Kant we again come upon a great thinker, one of the greatest of all thinkers. The approach to him is particularly difficult, more difficult indeed than in the case of any other philosopher. This difficulty is not due so much to his involved and cumbersome style—we Germans are notoriously well-accustomed to clumsiness of style—but much more to the fact that his philosophy is in sharp contradiction with our customary modes of thought, and calls for revolutionary changes in both our theory and our practice without clearly specifying what the new systems are to be. Still Kant could never have taken such deep hold upon men's minds, never have had so strong an influence upon man as man, were it not for the fact that his life-work gives expression to certain simple truths which appeal to every one. Our easiest way of penetrating to these truths is to represent to ourselves the insistent, underlying needs of his nature, needs which his spiritual self-preservation required him to make explicit. For this is the motive-power of a great man's life and work: he is possessed with a belief, with a profound conviction which demands imperatively something that his environment cannot give, something that is foreign—nay, even opposed—to the thoughts and perceptions of the world into which he has been born. The inevitable result is collision and conflict, and the self-centred personality can only be victorious in so far as it produces a new world answering to the requirements of its own nature. The struggle and the final triumph furnish us with a wonderful drama. Nowhere do we find a more clear and convincing proof that man is not merely the product of his environment, not merely a precipitate of his social atmosphere.

Now Kant's mental constitution led him to make two important demands which seem at first independent of each other, but which his system brought finally into very close alliance. He

demands a new kind of knowledge and a new kind of morality. What had hitherto passed as knowledge seems to him to rest upon a very insecure foundation and to drift helplessly between an excessive demand upon human capacity on the one hand, and on the other, a destructive scepticism. Morality, likewise, as ordinarily conceived, lacks both a sure foundation and a genuine content. Nevertheless, Kant is absolutely convinced that a true knowledge and a true morality are perfectly possible. A belief so inwrought in our nature, so inspiring to our work, must be capable of being fully formulated and made into an inalienable possession. For Kant, this problem became the all-absorbing occupation of his life and a motive to indefatigable industry. But the greatest triumph he achieved was to show, by means of a radical change of method, that the two problems had but one solution. The new view allowed of no quarrel between true knowledge and true morality, but made it clear that each required the assistance of the other. This, however, was only rendered possible by the introduction of new standards and new values, by the breaking up of the old Order, and the clear and confident inception of a New.

(β) THE CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE BREAK-UP OF THE OLD INTELLECTUAL ORDER

All knowledge aims at truth, but whether truth is in any way possible to man has become a matter of ever-growing uncertainty. To primitive thought and the primitive science which accompanied it, truth was merely the correspondence of our ideas with a reality outside them. Such a correspondence presented no difficulties so long as no gulf had as yet opened between the world and the soul, so long as the world was regarded as alive and the soul as essentially related to material things. Modern thought, however, has put an end to that immediate connection; by separating soul and world and bringing them into sharp antithesis it has made the old idea of truth untenable. The thinkers of the Enlightenment had not failed to see this; but it was Kant

who first showed clearly and forcefully that to wish to know a thing as it is independently of us is arrant absurdity. For things in the process of becoming known to us must inevitably change their character. And even if the object did correspond to our image of it, how could we be aware of the fact, since it is impossible for us to put ourselves in a third position outside both object and image? Moreover, how, on this view, should we find a place for the attributes of universal validity and necessity, without which there is no true knowledge? We should have to give up all hope of such knowledge if our ideas had to conform to objects outside us.

But there is also another possibility, and it is the rigorously consistent working-out of this possibility with all its various implications that constitutes Kant's greatest achievement. Might it not be possible, he asks, that instead of our ideas conforming to things, things should conform to our ideas, that we should know things only in so far as they enter into the forms of our thought and intuition, know them only in the shape given to them by our own mental constitution? This is the famous revolution which Kant effected and which he himself compared to the victory of the Copernican over the Ptolemaic conception of the universe. Kant, like Copernicus, transferred the centre of observation from the observed to the observer. Truth so subjective in origin can of course have validity only for the Subject: it can only be true for man. We cannot go beyond the realm of our own presentations, *i. e.*, the phenomenal world. Our only chance of securing truth lies in restricting ourselves to our own sphere, and resigning all claim to a knowledge beyond it. The product of our mental activity could only be regarded as absolute truth if, in knowing, we were also creating, producing reality through the very movement of our thought. But this we cannot do. Human thought, in order to know anything, must have an objective stimulus of some kind; to this extent it is always strictly dependent on experience; if it overstep the limits of experience and assert a truth in which experience is ignored, it simply falls into a void. To put it in another way: the forms of

knowledge have a subjective origin, but the matter must be furnished from outside. Without this datum, knowledge is impossible, but what we make out of the datum is our own concern. We do not find a universe ready-made, an experience already organised; it is we ourselves who must shape it from within. The orderly sequence of the phenomenal world, which we speak of as nature, we ourselves bring into it, and we should never have been able to find it there if we had not put it there. This helps us to understand the proud saying: "The understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but rather imposes them upon nature."

So far this is all mere assertion which still lacks proof. The whole of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is occupied with furnishing this proof. Kant shows, step by step, how everything that helps us to give unity to multiplicity and to make reality coherent, originates with us and not with things, has its source not without but within. The proof completely revolutionised the traditional conception of reality. For the fact that our subjective contributions had been attributed to things as their own properties, and that the subjective world had been changed into a realm of objective essences existing independently of the subject, had given rise to endless illusions and misconstructions of reality. Kant's recognition of this fact results in a most fundamental change of values throughout the whole domain of knowledge. One point strengthens and supports another. From learned, pedantic, sometimes wearisome beginnings, there is a painfully cautious advance, step by step, till at last an appeal is made to the whole man and he is called on to fashion his thought and life anew.

Space and time were formerly held to impose themselves upon us as given forms to which all things were subject. A close scrutiny of their content and the manner in which they come to be, now makes it clear to the investigator that they are really furnished by man himself, that they are nothing more than subjective forms of intuition through which we order our impressions. We do not take over these forms from some other world,

but within them we fashion a world of our own which is valid only for us. This conclusion seems to be attested with quite peculiar force and clearness by the universal validity and necessity of mathematical propositions both in geometry and arithmetic, a validity which could not have an external origin. Thus the assumed substantiality of the sense-world falls to the ground, and we seem to have lost all sure anchorage.

For a long time it seemed to Kant that it was possible from this upheaval of our sense-life to take refuge in thought: thought might surely open up a valid realm of truth. But later on, the subjectivising tendency invaded this field also. Here, too, try as we may to press forward, we can never overstep the limits of our own sphere; from the smallest thing to the greatest, it is our own thought which is shaping and fashioning that which once seemed an independent datum, an inherent quality of things themselves. "The understanding is essential to all experience and to the very possibility of experience; its primary function is not to make the presentation of an object clear, but to make it possible." The concept of a thing is framed by our understanding, in order to give stability and unity to otherwise disconnected impressions. Moreover, all the coherency that we observe in phenomena is our own work; it is not ordained or imparted from without. The causal connection, in particular, as Hume had already seen, is not something externally given, nor yet is it, as he thought, a product of mere association and habit; it is a fundamental law of our mind, without which it would be impossible for us ever to connect phenomena together according to any fixed and universally valid laws. Kant proceeds to prove this with the most unwearying care. He shows that it is through thought that impressions which otherwise remain vague and formless are welded into experiences, that it is thought and not mere sense that gives us a coherent reality; and in this proof he furnishes us with a most fundamental refutation of materialism, since materialism holds that both things and their relations are externally given. In fact, through his rigid distinction between what is palpable to sense and what is logically convincing, Kant

sealed the fate of materialism, showing it to be the unscientific view of the untrained mind.

So far we have been moving entirely within the sphere of experience. But experience, no matter how dependent on it all our human knowledge may be, cannot constitute the ultimate boundary of our thought. It seems rather as though our reason possessed the power to drive us forcibly beyond it, to set us in opposition to it, inciting us to apprehend it as a whole, and ascertain its ultimate base. Over and above the conditioned world of experience we cannot help seeking for something that is unconditioned. But though this impulse undoubtedly betokens an incomparable greatness of nature, it yet lands us in the most serious difficulties. We are not equal to the task from which we find it so impossible to desist. We can never succeed in winning to a secure stand-point beyond experience, whence we may find our way back to it. Despite the overmastering impulse to pass beyond it, we are thrown back on it again and again, till at last we are bound to recognise that our effort to reach ultimate conclusions must always be limited by our own reason, and that we have no right to take the subjective necessity of certain connections among our concepts as an objective necessity in the connections of things in themselves.

This conviction, however, is bound to have a profoundly disturbing effect, since the endeavour to reach a unifying principle and ultimate settlement concerns just those questions which are most vital to man: the problems of God, Soul, and the Universe. We cannot understand our psychical life without some unifying centre to which we may refer all its varied experiences; it was from a central unity of this kind that the old speculative psychology used to construct a science of the nature of the soul, attributing to it qualities of simplicity, indestructibility, and so on. As a matter of fact, the unifying principle must be within the world of our thought and experience, and therefore the question as to the nature of the soul is for ever unanswerable; unanswerable, too, the other question as to whether the soul can possibly exist as an indestructible unity after death. Moreover, we

seek to combine the multiplicity of phenomena into a coherent world-system, and to throw light upon the constitution, the fundamental forces, the general structure of this system. But in the process we fall into hopeless contradictions; every assertion that we seek to make is at once confronted with an equally forcible negation. Assertion and negation are each strong enough to counteract each other, but neither is strong enough to establish its own claim. For example, if we think of the world as limited in space and time, the conception is too small—too great if we think of it as unlimited: in either case, inadmissible. But since no third alternative is available, we clearly cannot escape the inference that the world we thus picture to ourselves is no reality existing outside us, but something we have been attempting to construct out of our own mental resources, with the result that in the process we have experienced the clash of colliding interests, and have been left oscillating between two incompatible conclusions. Again, in regard to the most ultimate of all problems of this kind, the idea of God, we have a similar experience. If there is no ultimate, self-contained Ground of all Reality, there can be no resting-place for thought; but we can suppose ourselves to have obtained an objective proof of such a Being only through surreptitiously transforming subjective impulses into objective necessities, and making a bold leap straight from the idea to a reality existing outside it.

Everything, then, combines to make it impossible for us to transcend the sphere of our own thought and reach a knowledge of the real nature of things or the ultimate grounds of reality. What seemed to us to be imparted from a reality beyond us is really what we ourselves have put into a world which baffles every attempt to pass beyond it; it can never become an objective truth for us.

The impression first made upon us by this displacement from the objective to the subjective stand-point is of necessity disturbing and disheartening. For it was clearly the consideration of truths as entirely independent of us which gave them their significance and value. From truth in the old sense of the term

we are now completely shut out, and shut out for ever. No advance of knowledge can effect a change in this crucial particular. The sphere of individual experience may become wider and wider, but we can never get beyond it.

It is true that we also gain much from the change. The Subject cannot give form and consistency to a world, cannot leave the moorings of experience and reach out after ultimate grounds without gaining in the venture a peculiar breadth and grandeur. The sharp distinction of form from matter, and the exclusive assignment of form to the soul, leads us to regard the soul as of a much finer texture than had hitherto been supposed. Even its apparently simplest operations now reveal a wealth of complex organisation. Minute observation leads us to recognise a system of intricate connections where once there was thought to be only a point. How very much more, for example, has Kant taught us to see in the process of sense-perception! Moreover, the transference of all agency to the purely psychical domain helps to bring out more clearly the peculiarities and distinctions of the psychical life, and separate them more sharply from each other. Kant is especially strong in his discovery of qualitative differences and oppositions—very different in this respect from Leibniz, who sought to arrange all manifoldness in a continuously graduated scale. Thus Kant distinguishes more clearly than any one before him between sensibility and understanding, understanding and reason, the theoretical and the practical reason, the good and the beautiful, jurisprudence and morality. All these distinctions, varying from great to trivial, make our view of reality incomparably richer, more living and more determinate.

But Kant does not only understand how to make distinctions; he can connect together the results of his analysis, and bring them all under a unifying principle. His adoption of the subjective stand-point makes this task incomparably easier than it was before. For it is only when that which was once regarded as coming from without is seen to be contributed from within that all the possibilities can come under review and receive a

systematic and exhaustive treatment. Comprehensive totalities emerge—as, for example, the whole of experience—in which each individual thing has its especial task and its appointed place. Apart from the adoption of this subjective stand-point Kant's thought-world would never have been the greatest constructive system which the history of philosophy has known. From no other centre can the whole wealth of reality be so readily transmuted into an organised system of thought. It is from this centre, above all others, that the idea of system has developed into a power which nothing can resist.

The increased emphasis laid on the part played by the subject changes also the aspect of the subject itself, and makes of it a spiritual nexus, a coherent, complex whole. By "subject" Kant means not so much the particular individual as a mental structure common to all individuals. His subjective presentation of the world is not the work of the isolated individual, but of mankind as a whole. Thus it is characteristic of his work generally that he never asks how the individual man attains to science, morality, etc., but in what sense, science, morality, etc., are possibilities of our mental life, and what capacities and systematic connections they demand and reveal. Thus if Kant closes to our knowledge the world of things, yet he sets it the new task of investigating the faculty wherewith man constructs his own world. From a knowledge of the world and a search into the nature of things, we turn to the self-knowledge of the human mind and to an investigation of the process by which it builds up the world of experience.

Thus Kant's theory of knowledge is as rich in suggestion as in achievement. Still the fact that it limits man to a separate sphere of his own would prevent us from ever attaining to anything more than a truth purely relative to man, and this can never be the truth which we have been accustomed to seek and cannot cease from seeking. Thus if Kant's work had closed with his "Critique of Knowledge," he would have ranked among the predominantly critical thinkers. This, however, it does not do

Compared with his whole achievement, the Critique is a mere propædeutic to his final convictions and opens up to us the domain of the Practical Reason.

(γ) THE MORAL WORLD

The adoption of the subjective stand-point which is the fundamental characteristic of Kant's whole philosophy assumes, in his treatment of action, an aspect quite different from that which it wears in his Theory of Knowledge. In the latter domain, the activity of the subject is dependent upon and directed toward an inscrutable world, but this in no wise precludes the existence of another domain where it can act independently and finally produce a world from itself. This however, it can only do in so far as it secures its independence from everything external and finds its main problem within itself alone. There can then be no possibility of life and action of this kind being realised through the pursuit of happiness; for, in pursuing after happiness, man is referred to something outside himself which becomes his master; it is only experience which can teach us what conduces to happiness. In order to be independent, "autonomous," we must act without reference to any subjective ends. Action must find its guiding principle in its own formal nature.

The question now arises whether the sphere of man's activity reveals any such autonomous action, and it is answered with a confident affirmative, on the ground that the moral law, the unconditional ought, the idea of duty, is a fact of our experience. The essence of morality is that it demands of us certain actions and sentiments solely for their own sake and without any regard to the consequences for us. The moral law does not speak to us conditionally, but unconditionally, as a "Categorical Imperative," and the fulfilment of its demand is not regarded as a special merit, but as a simple duty and obligation. Implicit here, however, we have an important problem, the solution of which opens up a new world. Whence comes this law which speaks to us with such confident authority? If it were a command imposed from without, it could never influence our wills

and claim obedience as a duty; for anything that comes from without, even were it a command of God Himself, must depend for its justification and execution on some consequence external to the action, must excite to action or discourage it by means of reward or punishment. But this would destroy it as a moral good, since nothing can be morally good that is not pursued for its own sake. Thus the law must originate within us; it gives voice to our own rational nature; it is our own will that makes the moral command into a duty. This, however, sets the soul in an entirely new light. It gains a profundity of its own, and an inner gradation. There is an "intelligible" nature within us which appeals to our empirical self as an Imperative, but as an imperative of our own being, as a self-realisation. There is a rift in man's own nature: he is at once too great and too small; small, when set over against that law whose stern demands his conduct is so far from realising; great, immeasurably great, in so far as he co-operates with the law, recognises in it his innermost will and being, and becomes himself the law-giver and the part-founder of a new order. It is in the light of such a context that we can understand the well-known words: "There are two things that fill my mind, the oftener and longer I dwell upon them, with ever-fresh and ever-growing admiration and awe: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. Neither is veiled in mystery or lost in immensity so that I need to seek them beyond my sphere of vision and merely surmise that they are there. I see them before me and link them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. . . . The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is traceable only by the understanding."

The moral law, however, can only reach this height by rigidly respecting its own independence and refusing to amalgamate with any alien element. Only the mere form of the law, the universality of the maxims, must control our action; we must act in such a way that the maxim we follow could at any time be erected into a principle of universal legislation, and that our

motives, raised to the status of universal laws, should never conflict with each other. We must act out of mere respect for the law, as vessels and instruments of the law, but a law of which we are the law-givers. It is only consistent that Kant should distinguish clearly between moral action and natural inclination; nay, more, that he should make action contrary to inclination the very sign and token of a dutiful disposition. This does not mean that he pronounces inclination to be wrong, but that he places the moral law far above it as something essentially higher. It is just this rigorous conception of the problem of life which allows us to think so highly of man as an autonomous being. "It is autonomy which gives dignity to human nature and every rational being." Autonomy, and not mere intellect, first differentiates man from the animal; "if reason in man is made to serve the same ends which instinct serves in animals, it can do nothing to lift its possessor above the merely animal state." At the same time we have a clearer and more precise elaboration of concepts which from old have occupied mankind, but which hitherto have lacked the coherency given to them by a scientific conviction—concepts such as those of "personality" and "character." The mere capacity to think is not sufficient to constitute personality; there must also be the capacity for moral responsibility, and this implies an independence of all merely natural mechanism. Character, however, is neither "a purely natural aptitude nor an abiding effect produced by habitual action, but the absolute unity of the inner principle which regulates life's changes."

The crucial point of the whole position lies in the idea of freedom, freedom as the self-determination of the rational will, as the capacity to initiate a state from within. It is the presupposition of all morality; as certainly as morality exists, so certainly does freedom exist; capacity must go with obligation. "You can, because you ought." To this idea of freedom the sequence of causal phenomena was inexorably opposed, so long at least as this sequence was supposed to be a law inherent in things themselves. The "Critique of the Reason" showed,

however, that it was the work of our own minds, valid only for the phenomenal world, and allowing plenty of room for another order of things should the motives for postulating such an order be found sufficiently forcible. Now morality furnishes us with such motives, so that freedom becomes the fulcrum of Archimedes "at which the reason can apply a lever." From the starting-point of freedom a new realm opens out opposed to the purely natural domain. Morality no longer appears as a product within an already given world, but as the making of a new world with values of its own, not dependent on experience for support, even daring to face direct contradiction from experience. For "in the contemplation of nature, experience gives us rules ready to hand and is the fount of truth; in regard to the moral laws, however, experience (alas!) is the mother of illusion, and it is extremely undesirable to derive the norm of what I ought to do from that which actually is done or to let this fetter my action in any way." So morality, untroubled by the outside world and the ways and works of men, has simply to follow her own path, convinced that her world alone contains the things that are really good and make life worth the living. "We can think of nothing anywhere in the world—no, nor even out of it—which can be considered unreservedly good, except alone a good will." "All good that is not grafted on to a morally good disposition is nothing but illusion and wretchedness glossed over." "If justice perishes, then it is no longer worth while for man to live upon the earth." Thus moral action is triumphantly emancipated from the world as given, securely founded in itself, made entirely independent of external results.

This valuation of the moral world is supported by the conviction that here, at the heart of things, we have at last not merely something specifically human but something absolutely valid. For the freedom which is at the root of morality is not a special quality of man as man, but it belongs to the essence of reason, and gives access to an absolute truth common to all rational beings. In this way we have glimpses, "however weak our vision," into the world of the supersensual, into the deepest

abyss of reality. Kant finds here a sure answer to the question as to the ultimate meaning of the world: it cannot be other than a moral meaning. It becomes perfectly clear that in the domain of thought Kant's negation issues finally in an affirmation and is subservient to it.

But even in this bold venture, he preserves the caution and self-criticism which characterise all his work. The ideas developed in this new field remain fundamentally different from all theoretical doctrines; they are always based upon personal conviction and presuppose the full recognition of the moral law; they are, too, not so much a matter of knowledge as of faith, *i. e.*, a faith of the reason, very different from faith of an ecclesiastical or historical kind.

So much for the idea of freedom, the fundamental presupposition of all morality. But there are also two other ideas which, according to Kant, are the necessary outcome of morality —the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The moral law demands a strict fulfilment, a completely holy life; and this is an altogether insoluble problem for the individual man within the confines of his earthly career. Still, we could never put forth our whole strength in the endeavour to reach something which we knew to be absolutely unattainable, so that our action needs to be fortified by the conviction that after this brief span of life we go on living to all eternity. Again, the natural constitution of things often puts a wide gulf between virtue and happiness. It often denies to the deserver of happiness the happiness which is his due. And yet we could never work whole-heartedly for the realisation of the good, if we thought it to be powerless and ineffective, so that the idea of the good necessarily gives rise to the demand for a moral order superior to the natural, and therewith for an All-powerful moral Being, namely, God. In these developments Kant's work falls short of its usual level, and they give very unsatisfactory expression to what is deepest in his own conviction. Nowhere more than here are we conscious of the extent to which the prose of the Enlightenment still cleaves to him.

The morality which Kant enforces is of a strong and manly type; it is even rigid and austere. It disdains all connection with mere feeling and considers itself pure only when the Idea of Reason acts directly on the will. The virtues, again, which Kant holds as especially binding are of a similarly severe kind: they are veracity and justice, veracity concerning chiefly the actor himself and justice his relation to his fellow-men. We must practice veracity not primarily to others, but to ourselves. Everywhere it concerns us to be perfectly open with ourselves, to regulate our action by our own conviction and independent decision, and not by reference to fluctuating opinions and external authority. Even the most painful conscientiousness may not succeed in guarding us from error, but its moral value is not thereby impaired. "It may well be that not everything which a man holds for true is true (for he may be mistaken), but in all that he says he must be veracious." As for the mutual relationships of men, they must be shaped in accordance with the idea of justice. Each man, as a member of the Order of Reason, has an inalienable independence and the moral dignity of being an end in himself; we must, accordingly, show mutual respect and never treat each other as mere means. This requirement entails distinctive political and social arrangements in which we can trace some influence of the English ideal of a society of free citizens. But the German conception goes much deeper than the English, since the doctrine which found little favour in England, the doctrine, viz., that our morally rational nature transcends experience, is now clearly formulated and developed, and society, moreover, finds its supreme end not in well-being, but in justice. Kant has extended this desire for justice to international relationships, and opposed to the incessant state of war the demand for an abiding peace—not so much on account of the material damage of war, its loss and devastation, nor yet from a compassionate feeling of humanity, but because it seems to him revolting and intolerable that rational beings should found their social life on cunning and force instead of on justice and reason.

Though in detail Kant's exposition of this view bristles with problems, yet it undoubtedly gives clear expression to the majesty and dignity of the moral law. A no less distinguished critic than Goethe counts it Kant's "immortal achievement," "to have rescued us from the sentimentality into which we had sunk." It is in keeping with this greater seriousness that there should also be greater strictness in the judgment of man's moral condition. It had been the tendency of the Enlightenment to see in evil a mere defect of our sensual nature, which would disappear in proportion as the reason became stronger. Kant, on the contrary, traces evil to the will: for him it is not a mere falling short of the good, but is in direct antagonism to it; it is not dependent on outward conditions, but is "radically" evil. The problem thus becomes more acute, but the philosopher is not thereby constituted a believer in the dogma of the Fall and Original Sin, that "most unseemly of all conceptions." For man has also a permanent disposition toward goodness, and this must be energetically called upon to confront the foe. Instead of hoping and tarrying for a miraculous rescue, let the reason which is ever present within us be summoned to unfold all its power. "To challenge courage is already half-way toward inspiring it; but on the other hand, (alike in morality and religion), the lazy thinking which has no trust in itself and waits pusillanimously for outside aid, relaxes all a man's powers and makes him unworthy of the aid when it comes." Thus a wide gulf separates Kant, with his confidence in man's own activity, from Augustine; nor is there much in common here between Kant and Luther, despite their many other points of agreement. Kant says: "You can, because you ought"; Luther, "You can draw no logical inference from Ought to Can" (*a debere ad posse non valet consequentia*). Kant is primarily a moral, Luther primarily a religious personality, for with Kant, religion, being "the recognition of all our duties as commanded of God," is only an intensified morality; it has no separate sphere of its own, and however high its subjective value, it occupies but a low place in the world of thought.

(δ) THE SPHERE OF THE BEAUTIFUL

Generally speaking, Kant subordinates every aspect of life to the idea of the good; it is this which must control and direct the shaping of life in its various departments. To the beautiful, however, he gives an increased independence and distinctiveness. Even though in last resort he subordinates the beautiful to the good as being only a "symbol of the morally good," even though he understands by "taste" a "capacity to pass judgment upon the sensuous representation of moral ideas," yet his moralising tendency has never laid hold upon the central doctrine of æsthetics. He recognises the beautiful as something independent, and extricates it from the confusion in which it has hitherto been involved. A more exact analysis of the distinctive character of the beautiful leads us to distinguish clearly between satisfaction in the beautiful, on the one hand, and on the other, satisfaction in the pleasant or the good. The former is disinterested, whereas interest always enters into the satisfaction we feel in the pleasant or the good. There are also other important differences. The pleasant is that which satisfies the senses by the immediate feeling it excites, and cannot, therefore, claim universal validity. The good is that which, by help of the reason, can give satisfaction through the mere conception of it. But the beautiful is that which, apart from any conception, is presented as the object of a satisfaction which should be the same for every one.

This universal validity of the æsthetic judgment can only be understood when the judgment refers exclusively to the form of the objects and this form is regarded as not inherent in the objects, but as something introduced by ourselves. So in the beautiful we are apprehending and experiencing not an outside world, but the condition of our own souls. We call things "beautiful," not on account of their own constitution, as to which we are perfectly in the dark, but because they have the power to stir our mental faculties, particularly the senses and the understanding, into animated and harmonious activity.

Thus, in æsthetics as in morals, man is freed from the oppression of an outside world and is referred to his own inner experience.

This subjective nature of the beautiful is brought out by Kant with especial vividness in his treatment of the conception of the sublime. The sublime rouses in us a feeling of sharp contrast—this is its distinctive mark; but we could never experience this feeling of contrast, if the contrast were between us and an outer world and did not rather belong to our own soul. In the sublime, it is not our relationship to things outside us that we are aware of, but our inability, even by straining our imaginative faculties to the utmost, to grasp the infinity of the idea of reason. The impressions of sense can only be called sublime in so far as they arouse this inward movement: "the true sublimity is in the spirit of the person who passes the judgment, and not in the natural object."

Thus Kant has found a basis for the beautiful in man's own spiritual nature, and has therewith secured its independence from outside influence and its triumph over mere utility. It is this which has drawn our poets to him so strongly and made them feel such close kinship with him. A notable instance is Goethe, who could find that the great central ideas of the "Critique of Judgment" were in entire agreement with his whole previous experience, whether in thought, action or artistic creation. For Kant, however, the beautiful furnishes a connecting link between the lofty world of the moral idea and the realm of phenomena which is all around us; it gives coherency to the sharply-defined divisions of his system, and softens down the austerity which is its dominant note.

(ε) APPRECIATION AND CRITICISM

It is no easy task to pass any confident judgment upon Kant. His influence on the history of thought is sufficient to show how differently he may be interpreted, and how various are the incentives that may be derived from his work. Fichte and Herbart, Schleiermacher and Schopenhauer, the Neo-kantians and

others, have all appealed to Kant and claimed to be his spiritual successors. His power to dominate men's minds and to attract the movement of thought ever back again to himself is due not so much to any finality in his achievement as to the haunting nature of the problems he has raised and the impossibility of putting them by. The first note of Kant's work is one of ruthless negation. Not only did he force us to give up many individual beliefs of which we had never thought to be dispossessed —he made our whole previous manner of viewing the world altogether untenable, and by his vigorous attempt to give more precision to ideas, degraded what had hitherto passed for scientific thinking to the status of prescientific speculation. It is true that he also gave us something which should have been sufficient to compensate abundantly for what we had lost. But he was never able to endow this positive contribution with the final and convincing character of his negative criticism. He leaves it full of problems which challenge us imperatively to a further development. Divisions of opinion, partings of the ways are here all too easy, and the average man is left with a strong feeling of insecurity. That we should be obliged to leave one bank without safely reaching the other, puts us in an intolerable position. It is no wonder that so much force of intellect was required in order to escape from it and, by the gain of a secure standing-ground, to make the Yes as powerful as the No.

At this juncture we must limit ourselves to the one point of fundamental importance which dominates the whole of Kant's philosophy and determines its peculiar character: that is, the shifting of truth and reality from object to subject, from the world to the soul. Kant, in this respect, was taking his place in a movement of more wide-spread and historic import than he himself was aware of. He for his part regarded his critical tendency as in implacable opposition to the "Dogmatism" hitherto prevalent, but as a matter of fact, the modern era contains from the outset the germ of this subjectivising movement, and has sought with ever-increasing energy to bring it to maturity. Modern thought no longer regards man in the old way as part of a

world which embraces him in its vast framework; the movement is no longer from an object to a subject which responds to it by virtue of an inner relationship, but the subject is the starting-point and the mainstay of life; this is the basis from which the world must be built up and receive its content. But at the same time, the subject itself becomes a problem and the most difficult of all problems. So long as it was thought to be merely one single point, it was hopelessly unequal to the task of building up a world; an impenetrable universe stood over against it blank and rigid, with which it could not undertake to wrestle for want of an inward unity in its own life. Now Kant effects here an advance of great importance; the subject for him is not so much one single point as a connected vital system, a psychical fabric, a spiritual structure. By virtue of this transformation it does become strong enough to develop into a world of its own, to make itself the central point of reality, to complete that revolution whose accomplishment is the dream of the whole of our modern era. Kant's thought moves laboriously upward through much painstaking work, hypercritical reflection, acute analysis. Nowhere else, perhaps, are such resources of intellect brought to bear upon a problem. But however slow and tedious the work, it leads surely on to the point where the new view opens before us; there is revealed a new world of fact, and the surprise that bursts upon us does not lie outside us but in our own nature; what hitherto seemed simple and obvious now becomes a problem, and leads us to recognise a greater depth in life than we had before suspected. Even science now becomes aware that man's inward life is an organised inner world.

At the same time a prospect unfolds before us of a life which is self-contained, independently pursuing lofty aims, decisively rejecting as degrading the standards which had hitherto satisfied the majority of men. The discovery in man's own soul of a spiritual depth, an infinity, a realm of absolute ideals, results in lifting him clear above all the narrow and petty elements in humanity, and freeing him completely from the ordinary selfish interests and aims of everyday life. There is scarcely any thinker

who has done so much as Kant to raise man's spiritual level, no one who has done more to increase reverence for human nature and place man's centre of gravity within himself. Moreover, no one since the great days of old has so clearly depicted the destructive tendencies of a pursuit of mere utility as the thinker who is responsible for the saying: "Everything, even that which is most sublime, becomes small in the hands of men, so soon as they turn the idea of it to their profit." If, however, Kant has so deepened the significance of man, put the most elemental facts in a new light, and at the same time changed our fundamental relations to reality in such fruitful ways—then he was certainly a productive force in the spiritual world, a truly great thinker with an inexhaustible wealth of influence, the initiator of a new era in philosophy.

But it is just where any intellectual achievement is greatest that its most knotty problems usually lie; and Kant's adoption of the subjective stand-point, the increased emphasis he lays on the subject, stirs up various questions, each of which affects the whole universe of thought. With regard to the subject, it is impossible to allow that it has an independent sphere of operation, without making it very much more than the mere individual of immediate experience; but exactly what it is that differentiates it from this individual, what it is that gives to its activities a universal validity, Kant does not clearly show. The inner world cannot be the creation and possession of the merely isolated individual, and yet we do not see how it can be anything more. Further difficulties are involved in the sharp distinction drawn between theoretical and practical reason, scientific thought and moral action, as also in the fundamentally different relationship to the world which obtains in these different spheres. In the one domain, our mental activity is strictly limited to a world impervious to the reason; and, as the result of such limitation, the truth it enjoys cannot have any validity outside the human sphere. In the other, the mind is to produce a world from its own resources, a world which has no touch of human idiosyncrasy, a kingdom of absolute truth. In the one sphere,

our activity has a world standing over against it; in the other, itself is the deepest and most ultimate expression of the world. If our life can be thus partitioned out into dependent and independent activity, then do we not feel that on the one hand man is unduly depreciated and that the idea of a truth valid only for him is a contradiction in itself, whilst on the other hand, he is unduly exalted, and his power to construct a moral world overestimated? The one sphere demands of him the most cautious reserve and profoundest resignation, while the other lifts him to the consciousness of a transcendent grandeur and dignity. But can both these moods dwell permanently together in the same soul? Will not the one conquer and make away with the other? The division, moreover, has the further disadvantage of not giving a satisfactory unity to the new way of thought, thereby depriving it of its greatest strength. If its contentions can be dealt with separately, they are far more likely to give way before doubt and opposition. Moreover, if the soul's function is purely formal, how can we attain to an independent world, a self-contained life? That such a world can be won in the sphere of the practical reason seems to be due solely to the fact that here Kant introduces the more concrete conception of personality, a conception which goes far beyond that of mere form and opens up an essentially deeper world of experience. But even when supplemented in this way, Kant's morality is still far too much a morality of law, though it be an inward law. Mere morals have far too much space allotted to them. Finally, in close connection with the distinction between form and matter—and in the strong emphasis he lays on this, Kant is far nearer to the ancients than to the moderns—is the treatment of the part played by the soul as in all essentials stereotyped and unchangeable. The basal structure of the mind is presented as perfect from the outset, and as operating in a uniform manner. Thus there is no recognition of the fact that man has to work his way into what is fundamental in his nature through hard toil and much experience; the genetic aspect of these ultimate questions is not given its just due which yet can scarcely be denied to it in the light of the

experiences of the nineteenth century. Lastly, there is a question which here we can do no more than indicate: if this freedom, Kant's most important doctrine, is really to bring forth a new world, must there not be something more behind it? Does not the new form require a new content?

The upshot of the whole matter is that we can only regard Kant's work as a first and not as a final step. To pin our faith to the actual words of the master seems in this case to be more than usually perverse. The old Kantians, like Fichte, who in their zeal went far beyond Kant himself, were better justified than many moderns who erect criticism into a dogma, and would fain keep all thought and all life in bondage to it for ever. "Back to Kant" is an excellent motto when it means that from our manifold confusions we must climb with him into the clearer air of a world-historic movement and gain direction from him as to our own task. But if we are bidden cleave to all the cumbersome machinery and learned scholasticism of the Kantian system, if we are bidden deny that the rich and versatile nineteenth century has made any contribution to the ultimate questions of truth, if we are told to rivet on our own age, with its seething ferment and unrest, the forms and formulas of the past—and whether the past be nearer or more remote does not alter the impropriety of the dependence—then we say No! and again No! and to the challenge "Back to Kant!" insistently reply "Away from Kant!" "Beyond Kant!"

(b) *The German Humanistic Movement and Its Ideal of Life*

(*a*) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Golden Age of German literature, culminating in Goethe, though it presents every variety of personality and production, has yet a common stock of fundamental convictions. Implicit in all its creations are certain peculiar views of life and the world, and its poetry is directly interwoven with reflection on weighty problems.

This literary movement presents itself first and foremost as

a movement of opposition to the Enlightenment, completely transcending its point of view, the point of view at least which it had eventually adopted. Instead of resorting to discussions which appeal merely to the understanding, it seeks to grasp and rejuvenate man's nature as a whole; in opposition to utilitarian ideals, it claims that action has a value of its own; as against the practical and ethical interpretation of life, it upholds the universal interpretation of art; instead of placing a gulf between world and man, it craves union with the universe. By the aid of art man passes beyond the purposes and necessities of a narrow provincial world to a new reality, a kingdom that is shaped from within, a world where all is pure and beautiful. And the peculiar condition of German society plainly indicated this as the only course open to the younger generation. For political and social life, with its factions, its pettiness, its meanness, could offer no attractions to noble minds. In the Germany of that age, there was, as Mme. von Staël so aptly put it, "nothing to do save for him whose concern was with the universe." Thus the best power of the nation was diverted to the channels of thought and literature. These were not to furnish a mere embroidery to life, but to open up a new life, a life of man purely as man, a life in the depths of the soul, removed from all the limitations and sordidness of external conditions. To be man —with the freedom this implies—becomes an ideal and the highest of all ideals.

For the attainment of such an ideal we must rely chiefly upon art, especially literary art. And the reason is that art alone can free itself from the dead weight of matter under which we otherwise lie crushed. It is in the realm of the beautiful that struggling form first wins its way to complete self-expression, and the diversity of life is gathered into a living unity. It is art that first makes of man a spiritual organism, a coherent whole, and brings all his powers into complete harmony. It is when we are thus brought to realise the creative power of art within our own experience that a new world dawns, a reality which, though invisible, is immediately present to us. We realise that

our life proceeds on two different levels. We separate clearly between the externalities of life with their canons of necessity and utility, and the realm of the beautiful with its noble culture—between the worldly wisdom of the understanding and the creative power of reason—between mere civilisation as "the peaceful ordering of outward existence" (F. A. Wolf), and the genuine culture of spiritual life.

Now, if literature, with its interfusion of thought and art, helps to emphasise and establish this higher level of existence, then it is easy to see how it may become the very centre of life and attract man's best energy and devotion.

Moreover, the distinguished position assigned to man in no way severs him from his connection with the universe. For it is one and the same life, one and the same fundamental law, which embraces alike man and nature. Everywhere it is the inward powers that prevail, that take shape and form, and work together to produce a whole. But in nature the process takes place unconsciously; it is subject to a law of necessity and conditioned by the growth of mysterious powers and impulses. It is in man first that the vital process becomes clear, self-conscious and free. "Nature is limited to the inferior part of a compulsory fulfilment of Reason, but the kingdom of the Spirit is the kingdom of Freedom" (Hegel). And if this explains how the life of the world first becomes self-conscious and realises its own truth, it explains no less how man is at once closely linked to the whole universe and yet exalted above the other parts of it. His liberation, however, requires the help of beauty as the twin-sister of truth. Beauty does not entice us into a foreign realm, but discloses to us the intimate and inmost nature of reality.

This many-sided culture, rooted deep in man's own nature, necessarily pervades the whole of life, filling every part of it with the spirit of truth and beauty. Schleiermacher shows its effect on religion; Pestalozzi and F. A. Wolf its bearing upon education. The primary function of education is not to minister to the purposes of social intercourse, but to develop and complete man's spiritual nature and secure the even cultivation of all his

powers. The educator must not be dictatorial, but must be content to assist the workings of the pupil's own mind and lend a hand where needed. Again, it is only in the light of the spiritual and artistic temper of the time that the task undertaken by speculative philosophy, that, namely, of understanding the world from within, becomes really intelligible.

In comparison with the realisation of this spiritual culture, the more ordinary concerns of life seem of secondary or no importance. Among these are to be reckoned all political interests, more especially matters of foreign policy. These may be left to look after themselves. Why should a man "embroil himself in the quarrels of kings" (Goethe)?

> "Für Regen und Tau und fürs Wohl der Menschengeschlechter
> Lass du den Himmel, Freund, sorgen wie gestern so heut." [1]
> —*Schiller.*

The State appears as something inhuman, a vast machine, a soulless contrivance, keeping both culture and individuality from their due. All real progress in the purely human sphere will come, not from the State and its organisation, but from the initiative of great personalities. It is in the light of such convictions that Wilhelm von Humboldt undertakes an inquiry into the "limits of state-efficiency," that Fichte, in one of his earlier writings, lays it down as the aim of all government "to make government superfluous," and that Friedrich Schlegel warns us "not to lavish our faith and love on politics, but to dedicate ourselves to the divine world of science and art, laying our life upon the sacred altar of an imperishable culture."

This absorption in what was essentially human brought with it a sense of superiority to all international feuds and rivalries. Even a man like Fichte, who later did so much to arouse the spirit of German patriotism, declares, on the eve of the Prussian defeat at Jena, that the Fatherland of the truly cultivated European is, broadly speaking, Europe, and, more particularly, that

[1] "For rain and dew and the weal of the sons of men
Let Heaven take thought, my friend, as in days agone."

State which, in any particular epoch, is pre-eminent in culture"; and he adds: "With this cosmopolitan spirit we can afford to be perfectly untroubled about the fate of the different states." Goethe's indifference to movements for national independence is matter of common knowledge. It must have been a very poor comprehension of the moving forces of political life which could allow him to say in the year 1812, at the very time when Germany was preparing to throw off the French yoke—that Prussia was a State which it was "past all power to save." In the most perilous crisis of her history, Germany found her greatest poet indifferent to her national fate.

We do not desire to condone this defect; but it is, after all, only the weaker side of the distinctive virtue of this period: its unwearied labour in promoting the spiritual culture of man as man. It was this very indifference which made it possible, amid upheaval and revolution, to keep a stable equilibrium, and to pursue all undisturbed the work of literary creation as a kind of religious service in the temple of Beauty and Truth.

This concentration of effort upon spiritual culture gives a central importance to the individual. Each individual, to borrow Schiller's expression, is at once "fitted and destined for a pure ideal manhood." The attainment of this ideal requires from us the most zealous self-cultivation, a clear understanding of our own strong points, and a concentration of effort upon our own peculiar gifts. But when once, through self-examination and self-knowledge, we have ascertained what these are, then we may—nay, must—trust confidently to our own genius, and not try and adjust ourselves to the dead level of any social environment. As far as possible, the individual must put his own individuality into every phase of life. This emphasising of individuality results in a strong aversion, not only for all conventional forms, but also for all method that makes for restriction and uniformity. This is why F. A. Wolf distrusts educational technique and lets all advice to the teacher culminate in the requirement to have intelligence and evoke it. The age did really, as a matter of fact, produce a remarkable number of

striking personalities, who, even down to details of language and style, substantially recast their environment in a distinctive and original manner.

The social relationships of the period show the same individualistic tendency. In the interchange of intellectual confidences and spiritual experiences, there grow up the closest friendships, and the expressions of one's deepest convictions in letters to friends is recognised as a part, and not the least important part, of the serious business of life. Again, outside this circle of friends, there grows up a cultured society, a community of those who, though not themselves creative artists and leaders of thought, yet by receiving and spreading the ideas of such, contribute to the establishment of the new order. Within this intellectual sphere there is an understood agreement in the valuation of enjoyments, in the principles of judgment, in the canons of taste. It is a resurrection of the social culture of the Renaissance, but in a quieter, less turbulent, more inward form.

All that this cultured circle does is inspired by a courageous and joyful outlook on the world and life. Not that there is any subscribing to a comfortable optimism, which smooths away all problems from the outset. The problems are deeply realised and life is seen to be full of difficult tasks. The optimism lies in this, that our mental force is deemed equal to the tasks, and the shock of collision is felt as taxing our capacity to the utmost, but not as barring or stultifying our effort. It is impossible to place any high value on mental work, unless we believe that it has a cosmic setting, and that behind human undertakings there is the support of a Divine Power. Thus religious conviction is looked upon with no disfavour, but it is rather an admission of infinity into man's finite life, an acknowledgment of an unseen order of things, than a movement toward a new world not to be gained save through shock and revolution. There is much closer kinship to Panentheism, the creed of the noblest minds of the Renaissance, than to the distinctively Christian view which these men incline to look upon as a mere refuge for the weak and sickly. Religion for them is rather an invisible Presence

which attends their work than a specific form of spiritual experience. The breadth and freedom of their temper is in some danger of evaporating into a flimsy sentimentality. On the question of immortality they are inclined to take up an affirmative position. Their creative work renders them so conscious of their superiority to mere time-limitations, gives them such a feeling of being possessed by a Power which cannot perish, that they find it impossible to admit the entire reversion of man to nature, or to hold that death implies the complete extinction of the spiritual life. Nevertheless, it is mainly in this life that they realise their immortality, and it is by virtue of this realisation that they oppose to the familiar *Memento mori* a "Remember to live!"

> "So löst sich jene grosse Frage
> Nach unserm zweiten Vaterland,
> Denn das Beständige der ird'schen Tage
> Verbürgt uns ewigen Bestand."[1]

The danger, no less than the greatness, of this German Humanism, is clear enough: the danger of aristocratic exclusiveness, reluctance to face the forces of evil and darkness in the world at large, lack of strength, robustness, firmness of character. For such defects, however, the peculiar circumstances of the age are largely responsible, and in any case we can rejoice unreservedly in the advantages which have accrued to humanity from the work of these poets and thinkers. For with wonderful strength and tenderness they have deepened the self-consciousness of life, rejuvenated and ennobled the whole expanse of being, thought out man's most intimate relations to himself, his companions, and his natural environment. They had so fine a perception of what was essential to life, and expressed themselves with such simplicity and dignity of style, that their work, taken as a whole, ranks among humanity's best and priceless possessions. Moreover, the spiritual force of this

[1] "Discovered lies the land of our rebirth,
A world of rest within this world of strife;
The steadfastness that bears the life of earth
Reveals already the immortal life."

small band of workers showed itself quite capable of strong action in the outer world as soon as there was occasion for it. It was, indeed, mainly from the ranks of these seemingly visionary dreamers that those men came forward, though not without much heart-searching and division, who, after the swift Disruption, mustered strength, courage and skill sufficient to lift their country up again and shape its destinies anew. Napoleon himself, the Arch-Realist, ascribed his downfall not primarily to the diplomacy of statecraft or the power of the bayonet, but to the resistance of the German Ideologists (*Ideologen*). And Germany would never have been capable in the nineteenth century of such great achievements in the practical world, had not the quiet work of its poets and thinkers in the world of thought put at its disposal the resources and the educative influence of their vast treasure-house of inspiration.

(β) GOETHE

Goethe, though closely connected with the general movement of German Humanism, is yet far too distinct an individuality and too far above the average of the movement not to require a separate treatment. In such a treatment we must from the outset bear two things in mind. Goethe's philosophy of life, no less than his art as a whole, is not to be taken as a doctrine or teaching of universal application, but rather as a personal revelation. It is just the expression of a highly characteristic individuality and is only completely true in reference to this individuality. And since in Goethe we are dealing with such a thoroughly individual character, we must never take his doctrine and work as supplying norms and rules for the majority of mankind.

Moreover, considerable misunderstanding is caused by a failure to recognise the deep seriousness of Goethe's life-work and the inner development which it underwent. He does not admit us into his confidence till his experiences have been cast, with marvellous artistic skill, into the clearest possible form. And the result is that we tend to look upon it all as an easy gift

of fortune, a merely natural process of evolution, instead of recognising its real origin in the reaction of his intellectual and moral nature.

For Goethe the secret of life lies in the relationship of man to the universe. Our life has its source in the universe and our nature develops through interchange of activities with the universe. Goethe has the most pronounced aversion to dwelling among the trivialities of life or imprisoning himself in a web of conventional relations. Such a course seems to him to involve not merely limitation but a falling from truth, since truth can be realised only through a vital interchange with the universe. This bias toward breadth and greatness brings Goethe very close to Spinoza. In his longing for emancipation from human littleness and readiness to yield all to the Infinite, Goethe feels himself to be Spinoza's pupil. But a closer scrutiny reveals a great difference between the two men. Spinoza as far as possible absorbs man into the universe and would fain preserve reality from every anthropomorphic defacement. With Goethe, man is more independent. It is true that his nature can only develop through contact with the universe, but he has some inward contribution of his own to make which enables him to react upon the influences that reach him from without. Life is not a mere passive appropriation of the world: to the world and its intrusion it opposes a defensive resistance, and in this way becomes more alive to the joy of action than was consistent with the more severe conceptions of Spinoza.

With Goethe, the influence of the world in giving clearness and shape to man's character causes him to regard it as itself ensouled. The whole environment becomes inwardly alive and akin to us. An intimate exchange of relations arises in which the world unlocks to man its once sealed nature and acquaints him with its inmost life and work. This is primarily an artistic view of life, which regards even natural science as only great and distinctive in so far as it is dominated by the artistic impulse. Its closest historical affinities are with classical antiquity. It is, above all, a revival of Platonism with its union of soul and

world, though the Platonism appears in a fresh garb, transformed no less by modern conditions than by Goethe's unique personality. If, from his period of storm and stress, he turned to Greece for refuge, this was not a surrender but a reassertion of his innermost nature. We may add that his attempt to assimilate this foreign influence was only approximately successful.

Since soul and world are thus closely linked together in life's process, it is natural that the world should express on a larger scale the experiences of the individual. Now Goethe does not mean by the world some vague problematic abstraction, but a fact which carries with it its own explanation. It encircles us with powers transcending our own, and yet does not crush us. Our work is to understand and appropriate this reality, but we must not seek to change it, to assign to it an origin external to itself, or go beyond it for an explanation. Thus reality appears primarily as nature, and we must conceive life as determined before we can think of it as free. We must not seek to get behind the things whose nature we are studying; we must not look for something beyond phenomena; but must rather work our way into them till we reach primitive phenomena, which explain themselves and ought, therefore, to suffice us. "Theory is nothing in and for itself, except in so far as it induces a belief in the systematic character of fact." "We must not seek anything behind phenomena: the facts themselves are the theory." Thus there is a rejection of all "transcendental philosophy," an aversion to all destructive analysis, a vigorous attempt to grasp the world about us as a whole.

Life, no less than scientific investigation, is confined within impassable barriers. All man's activity rests upon a given natural order; his work can only succeed when it strikes out in the direction prescribed by nature; it becomes empty and artificial if it tries to sever its connections or to act in opposition to nature. "Let man turn whither he will, undertake no matter what; he will ever come back again to that path which nature has mapped out for him." Our nature, however, does not evolve of itself apart from our activity; it is not so clearly dis-

cernible that there is no chance of mistaking it. It must first of all be found and won. So our fate becomes a task for our own achievement. How difficult Goethe found it, with all his talents, to ascertain clearly the bent of his own nature, how it was only after much agitation and painful uncertainty that he came to any definite conclusion as to his real bias, we know; and we know, too, that his belief in nature as immanent in man is far from inducing an indolent quiescence or implying an easy and comfortable ordering of life. But the existence of such a nature certainly does place a fixed limit to the restlessness of our movements. We seek and in seeking are already pressing back to the starting-point; however keen our activity, life is yet free from violent shock, abrupt transition and drastic innovation. Through all change there runs a vein of permanence: no amount of fluctuation can imperil the primitive basis of nature. Thus, even in the chequered fortunes of mankind, Goethe sought to trace and to promote continuity. A foe to revolution, he would fain link all action closely to precedent and develop existing tendencies in a spirit of peaceful progress.

Goethe's poetic manner is in complete accord with his own personal feeling. His heroes experience no inward development through conflict with their environment; amid all change of circumstance they preserve their original nature. The change gives them constant opportunities of disclosing new aspects of this nature and working it out more forcefully, but they are not inwardly transformed by any sudden revelation of unsuspected possibilities. Their final salvation usually comes through a return to their true nature which has only been obscured by temptation and error. Through their lack of an inward history Goethe's heroes are not really dramatic characters, though they are certainly endowed with marvellous vitality and are perfectly individual and distinctive creations. This, too, would explain why he has created so many splendid women and so few genuine men.

If the nature of which Goethe makes man the offshoot is thus given and unchangeable, then it must be mainly the constitution of this nature which determines the character of our life. Now

in the first place, nature is no mere juxtaposition of phenomena, but a spiritual whole. As an invisible nexus of relations she encircles and animates all the diversity of the visible world. This brings us to the thought of an All-pervading Deity. On this point, Goethe went through various stages from a Pantheism tinged with Naturalism to an approximation to Theism; but throughout he was consistent in apprehending the Divine as in intimate union with the world rather than in opposition to it, in seeing Nature in God and God in Nature. God does not act upon things from an external stand-point, but he works from within their own being, and they do not attain to fulness of being until they become part of the Universal Life.

This sense of being rooted in a universal life not only gives to the individual existence a glad confidence and reposeful security, it at the same time engenders a feeling of organic unity with all other beings. Herein lies the force and justice of Goethe's love for everything living and especially for human nature, for the Divine Immanence leads us to recognise everywhere the germ of something precious and imperishable, and not to be shaken in the value we attach to it by all the world's need and guilt. "God is always meeting Himself; God in man meets Himself again in man. Therefore no one has any reason to disparage himself even in comparison with the greatest." It is a peculiar merit of Goethe's that, however much he may be repelled by universal, abstract creeds, he is yet able to see and recognise God in every place, and to reverence Him with gladness wherever and however He reveal Himself, in nature as in man.

This, indeed, is Goethe's central conviction, that the Universal Life does not swallow up manifoldness nor extinguish differences, but that it is the only means of bringing to its full development the detailed content of reality; in particular, that it does not attempt to abolish the great oppositions of life and world, but takes them up into Itself and brings them into fruitful relations to each other. If it be true that nothing stamps a philosopher more surely than his attitude toward these oppositions,

then it is natural that Goethe's distinctive individuality should here find particularly clear expression. And the surmise is verified. One opposition, however, does not suffice for him. The world is rich enough to supply him with a whole series of oppositions. One member does not dominate and crush the other; the different aspects are far enough apart for each to develop fully its peculiar nature, and at the same time sufficiently near in the all-embracing unity of life to be able to act most effectively on each other. By thus transforming existence into a tissue of opposites which stand out clearly and boldly against each other, while yet there exists between them a mutual attraction and a vital sympathy, Goethe builds up a wonderfully balanced system of movements and counter-movements, spiritualises, clarifies, ennobles our whole existence, gathers all life, nay, more, all reality, into one great artistic synthesis.

The individual has his place within the whole, whence he draws his individual life: but this life he models in a way peculiar to himself, and so has a truth proper to himself. Each has first to create his own world from the world as given. But since all manifoldness is difference within a unity, the individual spheres do not fall asunder. "Each can have his own truth, and yet truth remains ever the same." While each individual has a particular mode of development, yet he is also an expression and symbol of that which is most universal. When we are striving for our own individual development, we are at the same time laying hold upon Infinity.

> "Du sehnst dich weit hinaus zu wandern,
> Bereitest dich zu raschem Flug.
> Dir selbst sei treu und treu den andern;
> Dann ist die Enge weit genug." [1]

Thus freedom and necessity find their reconciliation. We are all subject to eternal, immutable laws, which suffer no resist-

[1] "Why seek to cleave the distant blue,
Or let far fields thy steps entice?
Be to thyself and others true,
So narrow ways all needs suffice."

ance. Throughout the whole of nature's work there are fixed types which dominate all the variety of life. Yet, rigid though nature's laws may be, they allow scope for individual culture and personal action. "Our life, like that whole of which we are a part, is a mysterious blending of freedom and necessity." Power and limitation, caprice and law, freedom and measure, are constantly seeking and finding a mutual adjustment.

There is no rigid antithesis between time and eternity; but the Eternal, the Imperishable, which contains all life within itself, is manifest in time, altering its fashion from moment to moment so as always to preserve its unique character. We must lay hold of it in its present immediacy, treat the moment as representative of eternity. Not that we should hurry on greedily from one moment to another; our existence loses all meaning and value if one day is simply the progenitor of the next, and each instant swallows up its predecessor. Amid all our untiring activity we should have assurance and repose. While awake to the claims of the living present, we should feel that we are spiritually akin to the great souls of every age.

"Die Wahrheit war schon längst gefunden,
Hat edle Geisterschaft verbunden;
Das alte Wahre, fass' es an!" [1]

No antithesis is for Goethe more important and no reconciliation more fruitful than that of Inner and Outer. Though the dominant tendency of the age was to construct only from within, yet Goethe attributes far more independence and value to external factors. It is only through the combination of internal with external factors that life and creative activity become really productive. Inner and Outer mutually imply each other; it is in the Outer that the Inner first finds form and expression, and the Outer only reveals its real nature in so far as it is spiritually appropriated. It is their mutual contact and interpenetration that produce forms instinct with life and energy. This

[1] "Truth is old, an ancient bond
Of brotherhood for noble souls.
The old truth,—cleave to that, my friend!"

experience of his artistic nature became for Goethe an intimate necessity of his being. In the interaction of Inner and Outer he found a focus for all his creative energies and a clue to all his problems. Everything that gave him joy or pain or otherwise preoccupied him he must needs make into a picture, a poem. This detachment of the emotional element and its embodiment in literary form gave peace to his mind and complete satisfaction. These intimate self-revelations contained in his artistic work we can scarcely look upon as a moral unburdening. But they were undoubtedly a most essential element in giving to Goethe's work the grand sincerity and marvellous simplicity which mark him out from all other writers and well entitle him to say of himself:

"Teilen kann ich nicht das Leben,
Nicht das Innen noch das Aussen,
Allen muss das Ganze geben,
Um mit euch und mir zu hausen.
Immer hab' ich nur geschrieben
Wie ich fühle, wie ich's meine,
Und so spalt' ich mich, ihr Lieben,
Und bin immerfort der Eine." [1]

This is very closely connected with the objectivity of thought and creation, which is perhaps what we admire most of all in Goethe. This objectivity is no mere counterfeiting of some outside object, but the object is transplanted into the soil of the mind where it develops an inner life, in virtue of which it is able to reveal its own nature and make its appeal to the consciousness of men. Thus it is not that a subjective mood is imposed upon things, but that their own mood is either stolen or wrested from them; to the poet's soul their innermost nature is disclosed.

[1] "Whole my life must ever be,
Inwardly and outwardly.
To each of you I give it free,
To dwell with you as erst with me.
Ever true has been mine art,
True to thought and feeling's claim;
Though in twain myself I part,
I yet am evermore the same."

The poet appears as a magician who, in his journeyings through nature, makes the once dumb beings speak, to whose spiritual perception the whole vast world reveals itself, who discloses to each thing the native depths of its own being and detects in each its vital, essential, effective elements. This inner quickening of reality allows of no opposition between man and world, suffers no chasm between being and appearance, but the ultimate deeps of existence open before it, as it gathers into one great synthesis world and spirit—a synthesis "which gives us the most blessed assurance of the eternal harmony of existence." Thus there is good ground for the poet's conviction:

"Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
Alles ist sie zu einem Male,"[1]

and

"Wir denken, Ort für Ort
Sind wir im Innern."[2]

Such a conviction does, indeed, distinguish between the truth of art and the reality of nature, but the new reality built up by art does not cut itself loose from things; rather, it constitutes their innermost, essential nature, to which we can win only through a deepening of first impressions. Since, according to this conception, art is everywhere extricating the pure form, the central reality, from that which conceals and disfigures it, it is able to penetrate the whole of life and disclose to it its own true nature.

It is precisely because Goethe regards art in this way as the soul of life that he never brings art into collision with morality, or upholds an æsthetic culture and philosophy at the cost of the ethical. It is true that art should be independent and that the culture which art gives should follow its own free course. Neither poets nor any other human beings are to have their freedom fettered by "conventional morals" or by "pedantry

[1] "Nor husk nor kernel Nature hath,
Everything at once is she."

[2] "We think, and are ourselves the space
Where our mind travels."

and prejudice." But, like all great artists, Goethe cannot hold artistic work in such high esteem as to find in it the very soul of his life, without at the same time seeing its ethical aspect and making ethical and artistic culture mutually complementary. In any work of art it is always the truth and nothing but the truth which is held worthy of honour. The demons of self-conceit, hypocrisy and factiousness must be banished from its precincts. Thus creative art itself assumes a moral character. And what is true of individual works of art is equally true of life as a whole. Inasmuch as it has the power to draw out clearly and forcibly all the active possibilities of a man's nature, to develop his distinctive individuality and rate his capacity at its true value—it is in itself the greatest of all works of art. But this vital shaping of the individual demands so much self-knowledge, self-limitation, self-conquest, such a spirit of resignation and submission, that we cannot fail to discern in it also a moral task of the most strenuous kind.

Finally, it is through creative art that man comes to realise personally his membership of a divine and universal Order and to be penetrated and dominated by the realisation. The work of art requires a religious disposition, since it demands a pure and innocent contemplation of the object amounting even to an actual reverence for it. "He who will not begin with wonder and admiration will never find entrance into the Holy of Holies." For his discoveries, his syntheses, his happy inspirations, the artist has to thank not his own reflections but a Superior Power. On the pile of wood heaped up with care and toil, the lightning from above must descend if the flame is to leap up clear and bright. All real success comes in this way. Let it be received joyfully and gratefully honoured as a gift of grace. In truth, a mood of joyful gratitude pervades all Goethe's life and work. And with it goes a firm trust in a Reason at the heart of things, a faith born of confidence in a great, mighty and inscrutable Being, and felt as a strong sense of security against all present and future emergencies. This is the source whence springs that sentiment "which none brings with him into the world, but on

which it entirely depends whether or not a man shall be in all respects a man"—the sentiment of reverence.

This final note brings Goethe's philosophy of life back again to its starting-point; for it will be remembered that it was just this intimacy with the great Universal Life that gave the key-note to his whole system. But, in the interval, what rich and varied forms has life assumed! What new depths of reality have been sounded! There has been no sharp break with the world of immediacy, and yet existence has been purified, ennobled, brought back to its true centre. It is the crowning greatness of Goethe's genius that with a perfectly open and free mind he gathered in all the rich variety of being and doing, and with quiet but strong hand stripped off the husk of sham, convention and prejudice, so as to bring to full maturing all that was true, vital and genuinely human. Life is purified and exalted. From seeming we turn to being. Reality is invested with a new spiritual dignity. Possessions which humanity has owned from time immemorial become new and effective as ever, while all the spurious growths that have clung around them fall away and allow their true nature to appear. And with this added profundity, life also gains an inward freedom, a capacity to work from within. It is this inward freedom that Goethe regarded as the fountain-head of his creative activity, an inexhaustible source of life welling up for man's refreshment. Who can gainsay him when he says: "The man who has learnt to understand my writings and my general mode of thought will have to admit that he has won a certain inward freedom."

(γ) SCHILLER

Schiller's view of life has not the breadth, the independence, the wealth of experience, which characterise Goethe's; but it is noteworthy for its vigorous concentration. Though surrounded by illustrious friends, Schiller strikes out an original line of his own and pursues it with extraordinary force and intensity. In the literary circle of his age he is before all else the man of

action and of deeds. It is this character which, stamped as it is on all his work, makes him by far the greatest German dramatist, lends to his scientific expositions a well-knit structure, a power of antithesis, a dramatic movement—and, finally, directs his philosophical thought mainly to ethical problems, making him an enthusiastic supporter of Kant's doctrine of freedom. He is in close and complete sympathy with Kant's exaltation of man above the mechanical system of nature, with his manner of arousing him to a proud consciousness of membership in an Unseen Order. And since, in the passionate soul of the poet, the Kantian ideas put off their scholastic garb and step close to the immediacy of feeling, they reveal to the full their emancipating and elevating power. Kant's harsh severity is softened; a new joy is brought into our mood, a larger gladness into life, and yet there is no forfeiture of earnestness, nor any tendency to indulge in the trifling, into which at times even a Goethe could lapse.

This earnestness, however, and this deep note of ethical conviction are accompanied by an intense desire to fashion life artistically, and so bring the good into closest relation with the beautiful. The forms under which this *rapprochement* is attempted are indeed open to objection, and at different periods of his life Schiller gave a somewhat different rendering of the relation of the good to the beautiful: but both were always conceived on a grand scale, and it was always the whole life that was to profit by their union. The morally-good is never degraded to a mere aggregate of isolated precepts, but always signifies a new manner of being, a translation into a new world. It is never a mere negation, but before everything else, a strong and glad assertion. The beautiful, on the other hand, as "freedom in its phenomenal form," is anything but a mere occasional means of enjoyment. It effects a real ennoblement of life; it is an indispensable constituent of all true culture. If history in general is always showing the ethical and the artistic ideals as in dire opposition to each other, we have all the more reason to welcome as something great and remarkable Schiller's attempt

not merely to reconcile them, but to prove them mutually indispensable allies. "The exalted purity of his moral outlook, in conjunction with the fullest recognition of the freedom of artistic endeavour, is the peculiarity—nay, more, the sole peculiarity—of Schiller's thought" (Kühnemann).

It would have been impossible for Schiller to transcend these oppositions, had he not entertained exalted notions of humanity and human nature, had he not been possessed with the idea of a spiritual culture leavening and uplifting our whole being. The belief of the age in man's greatness and dignity has nowhere found nobler expression than in Schiller. The thought of humanity gives a glow to all his conceptions and welds firmly together all his varied effort. But Schiller, no less than Kant, is very far from any light-hearted idealisation of man as he is. It is rather the Idea of Reason—an idea which is indeed vitally operative in each individual—that first gives value to man. A fact of this kind is not merely a fact; it is something we must always be achieving. Man must first discover his own nature and struggle to realise it, summoning every faculty to the task. Schiller, moreover, has no idea of representing the average human lot as good, or even as tolerable. He describes the unreason in nature and history with an almost harsh realism, closely bordering on a gloomy pessimism. If he never falls into this pessimism, but continues to preach joy in the face of all that is dark and gloomy, this is not because he has come to terms with the world, but because he has risen above it into an unseen realm of the reason in which the self is independent and superior to the world, where he can find realisations of good that make those of our world of immediacy dwindle by comparison into mere nothingness. It is this combination of happy trust with a full recognition of the irrationality of our immediate existence that gives to Schiller's thought such power to stir our emotion on the one hand, and steel us to endurance on the other. From his thought and life there breathes a heroic mood, an invincible youthfulness, a strong incentive to personal conflict and victory. Goethe could confess with gratitude that Schiller had called him

back from a too exclusive contemplation of outward things and their relations to his inmost self, and made him young again. In like manner, Schiller has exercised an emancipating, uplifting, rejuvenating influence over the whole German nation, an influence which will grow and widen, despite all changes that time may bring.

(δ) THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

A detailed delineation of the Romantic movement lies outside the scope of our work. But its effect on life, no less than on philosophy, has been too significant to justify our passing it over in silence. Let us endeavour, then, as well as we can, to select from the motley crowd of personalities and the swift succession of historical phases a few characteristic features.

A critical treatment of the Romantic movement is difficult, if only on account of its great complexity. In the first place, it is strongly subjective—the product of an age which can no longer strike a balance between the work done and the mind that does it, between object and subject, an age whose subjective tendencies can no longer find satisfaction in the tasks which are commended to it. What other resource has it but to turn inward upon itself, severing itself as far as possible from outside things, and finding in its own development some prospect of at last giving meaning to life? But the mere adoption of the subjective stand-point is not sufficient to produce a romantic movement. In the sphere of religion, for instance, a mystic, emotional life might grow up which would have, at the most, only a few points in common with Romanticism. An essential element in Romanticism is the relation to art, the development of an artistic plan of life. The Subject, which would otherwise become a mere empty name, finds its task and its enjoyment in giving its subjectivity artistic expression, shaping personal experience into a work of art, the enjoyment of which is, therefore, really self-enjoyment. This attempt is, from the outset, involved in a contradiction. For since man's spiritual life can only be

developed in contact with the universe, it is impossible for him to abstract it from this and, starting from a merely individualistic centre, weave his inward states into a valuable work of art. No amount of talent or genius on the part of individuals can overcome this inner inconsistency and produce a great, pure, true artistic creation. But even movements that aim at the impossible may have important results if they serve to elicit new powers: much of undoubted value has been reached in the course of striving after the unattainable. And thus Romanticism, in following after the mirage of a subjectivism made supreme through the help of art, did conspicuous service in intensifying the depth and susceptibility of man's spiritual nature, besides originating much fruitful work in other directions.

Romanticism in Germany found a great artistic movement already in progress; but, by bringing the Subject into stronger relief, it made the new literary and philosophical life more self-conscious, definite and independent. All that savoured of idiosyncrasy in German Humanism was brought out and intensified till it became downright one-sidedness. Art—the word being applied chiefly to literary creation—now appears to be the only thing worth having in life. Æstheticism in theory and practice is preached with audacious exclusiveness. The alliance between art and morality is dissolved. The highly gifted individual scorns to be bound down by convention, and, in virtue of his artistic faculty and fine taste, believes himself infinitely superior to the rest of mankind.

Thus all the doubtful elements of a purely artistic culture are brought out and emphasised. On the other hand, many advantages accrue from the heightened consciousness of the self and the increased freedom of movement. The Romanticists felt that they were the pioneers of a new era; they were the first to win full recognition for its peculiarities, and it was they who introduced the idea of "culture," which was new to Germany in this sense. They were even the first to dignify the term "culture" by using it to designate an intellectual state. They levelled their attack on the Enlightenment with a masterly cleverness

and wit, which dealt a fatal blow to its popularity with the public. They raised literary reflection and criticism in Germany to a degree of eminence and power hitherto undreamt of. In all these respects they did indeed effect the introduction of a new mode of thought.

In so far, however, as they undertook creative work along original lines, they were mainly absorbed with developing their subjective states and giving artistic shape to the vague indefiniteness of feeling. The objective element in the work became in the process the mere means or tool for showing up subjective capacity. The object had its sole *raison d'être* in the service of self-feeling, while even this self-feeling consisted less in the feeling of actual impressions than in an endless brooding over feelings already experienced. Thus the Romanticists became more and more wedded to their own inner states; they wished to re-perceive their perceptions, re-enjoy their enjoyments. The reflection is reflected again and yet again, until all content and substance is thinned out of experience. Life is over-refined and over-etherealised; retreating ever further and further into a shadowy background, it loses all its simplicity and haply its truth.

But amid all these dangers and errors there is much that is fresh and valuable in the new order of life. The individual calls on his creative genius to assert its full sovereignty, bidding it exercise the fullest freedom in the choice both of form and material. The imagination scorns all fetters and barriers: at all costs it must escape from the everyday prose of life, and struggle out of its immediate environment into the vast world of the unknown, into a new realm full of marvel and magic. The poetry of legend grows up, a delight in mystery and adventure, in dawn, and dusk, and dreams. It even seems as though our world had points of contact with another loftier world of mysterious powers, a world inaccessible to sober reason, but making known its presence by hints and tokens. Thus our whole life assumes a symbolic character. In their essence, things are more and better than they seem. The unconscious

is not considered as a lower stage, but as the primeval fount of life. This view is liable to take a morbid turn. It welcomes with sympathy everything opposed to simplicity and naturalness. The more paradoxical the assertion, the more the picture is inverted, the more significant does it appear. For Novalis, Romanticism consists in giving a mysterious aspect to ordinary things, the dignity of the unknown to the known, an illusion of infinity to the finite. Still the longing to escape from a petty, everyday atmosphere—so natural in the German of that age of provincialism—opened man's eyes to new aspects of reality. It is the Romanticists who aroused a taste for the poetry of the forest and of moonlight, for the charm of historical, and particularly of patriotic, reminiscences. It is they who, by suffusing the natural and historical environment with their own emotion, brought it spiritually near to us.

The opening up of new material went hand-in-hand with an increased range and nicety of expression. The Romanticists are mainly concerned with giving shape to their vague and fleeting moods, bringing them as much as possible into the foreground of consciousness, arresting them on the wing, as it were, reducing their chaos to form. This conception of the artistic function gives rise to much trifling and exaggeration. But the attempt to portray the immediacies of the soul's life had at least this good effect: it brought every power into play, with the result that a highly individual style was developed and the resources of expression were vastly increased. There is more softness and richness, soul and resonance; the language becomes more plastic and supple; the tone and rhythm gain swing and lilt; they are full of music and alight with colour. The most delicate feelings can be described with exquisite accuracy, particularly those intermediate shades of sentiment which tend to merge into each other. They are caught and fixed in all their vague fluctuation and floating uncertainty; and over all the creations of art a tender fragrance is diffused. On the other hand, there is a corresponding incapacity for bold design and systematic construction. There is a tendency toward the

fragmentary and aphoristic; nor is there any desire to avoid it. Logical consistency indeed is looked on as an actual evil. This, therefore, was no soil for masterpieces of the highest order. And yet all the further developments of German literature, even the very revolt from Romanticism, took advantage of the greater wealth of expression which had resulted from its labours.

The Romantic movement provokes the full strength of our opposition only when it takes that which has in art a certain justification and makes it fill and dominate life to the exclusion of everything else. It then becomes evident that the unfettered expansion of feeling is unable to give a satisfactory meaning to life; that the "infinitely free subjectivity" lacks steadiness and virile force; that the vain mirroring of self and love of abstraction are a wearisome burden; and finally, that the contempt for morality, usually characteristic of this school, together with its incapacity to picture morality save in caricature, is merely a sign of its own shallowness. It becomes ever more and more obvious that this vague subjectivity lacks spiritual depth and that there is not much substance beneath all the shimmer and sparkle. As the movement develops, it is seen to be ever more slight and worthless, more and more involved in subtleties of barren sentiment. This is why some of its prominent representatives have had in the end to resort to external supports and submit to some form of ecclesiastical authority, not indeed without casting about it a halo of romance in ways quite foreign to the historical spirit. How was it possible for strong and upright personalities to grow up in such an atmosphere?

It is, however, only the extreme type of Romanticism which has thus preyed upon itself. The movement also assumed a more moderate form in which it proved very fruitful and stimulating. The modification consists in this, that the subject does not maintain an attitude of direct opposition to things, but comes back to them, shares with them its own deepened spirituality, and thus endows them with a life of their own. It is true that even so the central emphasis still rests on the subject;

things do not reveal their own soul, as Goethe held, but rather receive it as a loan from man. Still, the mere subjective mood does get some kind of counterpoise in things, while these again are grasped in a more living fashion and brought inwardly nearer to us. It is from this point of view in particular that history has gained such significance, history in its most various branches: the history of home and nationality, custom and law, language, art, and religion. The movement of history is throughout represented as charged with its own life, independent of all human reflection. A quiet process of growth is at work in it; great systems arise which embrace and unite all diverse elements after the manner of an organism. It is not for man to control and regulate historical results according to his own views; he must rather adjust himself to them and follow their lead. Law and State come to be conceived organically; the modern idea of nationality arises with its stimulating, quickening, and sometimes dangerous power. The work of the individual is linked throughout with the work of his predecessors. We have indeed left the eighteenth century far behind! But on closer inspection we cannot fail to be conscious of an inner inconsistency. The inward life, the organic connection which seem so independent of man and his thinking, so securely rooted in things themselves, are really after all read into them by man. Our relations are not with the object as it is, but with the revised version of it prepared by the subject himself.

Yet however clearly we recognise the inconsistencies of the historical tendency, its proneness to a predominantly passive attitude, its danger of paralysing all forceful, vigorous action, it has nevertheless great merits. It has made life richer, fuller, more concrete, and has sought to found it on a broader basis. He who refuses to regard the movement as final must still recognise its widening, enriching effect upon life, and so give Romanticism its due.

(c) *German Speculative Thought in its Relation to the Problem of Life*

The great systems which arise at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century must be interpreted in the light of their age and purpose. Otherwise there is the aggravating possibility that men like Schelling and Hegel, with whom even a Goethe could associate on equal terms, should be regarded as mere adventurers in the kingdom of thought, or even as half-insane. There will be no danger of committing this error if we regard them as the offspring of an age which, in revulsion against all mere systems of external adjustment, sought to realise a self-contained, spiritual realm; an age which had the highest reverence for human nature and its possibilities, and found in free creation, after the manner of art, the culminating glory of life. Such creation, as conceived by the leaders of philosophical thought, does not mean the fashioning of a self-spun world of dreams existing side by side with the real world; it means the discovery and firm grasp of the essentials of the spiritual life, and a fruitful concentration on these central issues. The whole reality is thereby to be reclaimed and spiritually reillumined, the whole world drawn into the one aspiring movement of spiritual life. The fundamental ideas were sound enough; the defect lay rather in the hasty and almost presumptuous manner in which they were carried out. With one bold stroke the heart of reality was to be reached, and man's spiritual life regarded as absolute. This implied an unduly narrow and anthropomorphic conception of reality. Not only did the much-abused world of sense protest against it, but the spiritual life itself refused to submit to so summary a procedure. It was indeed mainly in the spiritual interest that a counter-movement became necessary, a reaction against this over-tension of our human capacity. But however true it is that the problem requires to be treated upon a broader basis and with greater circumspection, we yet must admit a peculiar value in these bold, cosmological speculations, which cast all

their creations in one mould, match personality against the universe, and give so vigorous and characteristic an interpretation of reality. Not only do they contain a boundless wealth of suggestion and inspiration on this point and on that, but they give our whole thought a trend toward largeness and systematic unity. He who submits himself without prejudice to the influence of these men with their trenchant, thoroughly individual and characteristic style, will be clearly conscious of the superiority of their reasoning to all the clever argumentation of those smaller minds that follow in the wake of genius, and are so much stronger in criticism than in construction.

From among these leaders we shall select here Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Schopenhauer. The four first, whatever their differences, agree in giving a positive value to the world, viewing it as an expression of Reason, while Schopenhauer is equally decided in viewing it negatively as a realm of Unreason. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel make a bold attempt to reproduce in the form of an unbroken evolution of thought the very way in which the cosmos came into being, in a word, to "construct" the world; while Schleiermacher pursues the same object in a quieter, more circumspect, and, it must be admitted, less forcible manner. The most important philosophical expression of nineteenth century culture is found in Hegel, and it is he, therefore, who will occupy our main attention.

(*a*) SYSTEMS OF CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHT

Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, despite their differences, are yet all three sharers in a common movement: one fundamental conviction underlies all their work. To understand this conviction, we must go back to Kant, particularly to his discovery of spiritual syntheses and the organic character of spiritual life, with which is bound up the development of a "transcendental" method in philosophy, as distinguished from the experiential. Kant himself had assigned very definite limitations to this method and used it only under clearly specified conditions.

His successors were bolder. Full of the fresh energy of youthful aspiration, thrown back upon themselves by the ferment of the time in which they lived, they aspired to see thought free from all such limitations and to make it the centre, the growing-point, of reality. It seemed to them that they had only to exert all their strength in order to draw to themselves—or rather draw from themselves—the whole infinite universe.

The spiritual life, however, cannot be required to undertake creative work on this vast scale, unless the ordinary conception of it be materially widened. It cannot be the possession of this or that individual: it must cut itself loose from individuals and establish an independent existence of its own. There is an ever-increasing tendency for it to become a self-governing realm, requiring man's fealty and submission, not swayed by any purposes of his, but simply by its own necessities. At the same time, it can no longer rest in its own perfections, but must make continual progress, develop under the inspiration of its inward forces, be ever moving upward in unresting, steady advance. It is a process which draws in the whole of reality, and is therefore essentially alive and plastic. History in particular, as the anvil on which spiritual life is forged, gains an added significance. Moreover, the upward movement is soon seen to be subject to one simple and fundamental law, which is that progress is made through the development and transcendence of oppositions. In the ascent of the spiritual life, each assertion at once gives rise to a negation; from their conflict a synthesis emerges. More antitheses and syntheses follow, and again more, till at last all reality is embraced by the movement and transmuted into the life of thought and spirit.

As the spiritual life thus becomes independent of man, the outlook and problem of human experience undergo essential changes. At the outset, the spiritual process was still closely connected with man and directly influenced by his feeling. He was the sovereign lord of things, able, so he thought, by a supreme exercise of his powers, to conjure forth the whole of reality. But in proportion as the spiritual life develops into a

self-governing kingdom independent of man, in proportion as man is obliged to submit to its laws and recognise a sphere of fact in which he can have no initiative, its processes pass more and more out of the control of the immediate psychical experience. If through all these phases spiritual activity is still the essence of reality, its position with regard to man, and therefore its relation to reality, is none the less entirely changed, and there is a corresponding change in the way of regarding and treating the various activities of life.

The three leaders of the movement, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, are not to be figured as the mere stages of one continuous process culminating in Hegel; each of these thinkers seeks in a different direction for the essence of spiritual life and thought. For Fichte, thought is a kind of moral action which subdues the world to lofty ends; for Schelling, it is an artistic construction, changing reality within and without us into a living work of art; with Hegel, we see thought spontaneously unfold a process of strict, logical dialectic, embracing all that the world in its evolution has achieved, and reaching its consummation in the thought of thought. Each looks at the world in his own way; each emphasises different spheres and different problems; each has his peculiar mental atmosphere. Together they have made so rich a contribution to human life, provided such a wealth of suggestion and inspiration, that, though their influence may at times be obscured or disregarded, it can never suffer permanent eclipse.

(aa) *Fichte* (1762–1814).—Fichte's thought is pre-eminently an expression of his personality, a wrestling with the problem of his own being. His natural bias was all in favour of forceful self-expression; but so long as Spinoza's influence compelled him to see in man a mere link in a rigidly causal sequence, he was unable to strike out for himself along congenial lines. From this position of painful uncertainty he found a means of escape in the Kantian system with its emphasis on the subject, its transformation of causality from a cosmic law into a function

of the mind, its exaltation of the practical reason. His adhesion to Kant, however, leads directly to a further advance upon Kant's position. Fichte would make the activity of the self supreme in the theoretical as well as in the practical field, and consequently the Kantian exclusion of this activity from the noumenal world comes to be felt as an intolerable dualism: the "Thing-in-Itself" must be given up once and for all. The practical reason is made the root of all reason. Action is involved in thought itself, possessing as it does the power to quicken and illuminate reality. We may confidently undertake to educe the whole world out of our own activity and thus bring it entirely within our power. Throughout our lives we are confronted with an Either-Or, with a choice between freedom and non-freedom. Throughout it concerns us to base our existence upon our own deeds, *i. e.*, to rest it upon clear ideas, and to shape it in accordance with these ideas. Never must we blindly obey regulations externally imposed, never trust to mere authority and tradition, but our own deed must be at the back of everything, and we ourselves must be part of all our work. The adoption of the stand-point of freedom exercises the profoundest influence on state, society and religion. Everywhere men are shaken out of their old ruts and their lazy acquiescence, everywhere summoned to manly independence and a rational ordering of life. Culture is now the goal of all life's energies, culture in the sense of "the bending of every power to secure complete freedom, complete independence of all that is not truly ourselves."

The stirring, urgent quality of his appeal makes us think of Fichte as a very strong, tempestuous nature; but his effort is directed primarily not outward, but inward. He aims at an inner concentration and a searching self-criticism, at attaining independence both of life and thought. His work is primarily a scientific construction, a philosophy; and only later is it applied systematically to life. For "the power which really enslaves man is false illusion"; therefore we are told that "to live truly is to think truly and to know the truth." Moreover, our activity, when turned inward upon itself, finds in the depth of its own

nature a conformity to law. All action is motived by an Ought, by the idea of Duty. The recognition of this conformity to law gives to life in all its developments a severely moral character; its nobleness is its obligation, its obligations give it nobility. Morality does not make man small and weak, but big and strong; it does not mean that life is hedged about by troublesome police regulations, but that it is promoted to full self-activity, originality, freedom from the bondage of the world.

Fichte accordingly implants in the human soul strong and fruitful impulses, which have had no small effect in making life —primarily the life of the German people—sound and healthful. He is not so successful, however, in translating these impulses into effective action, and does scant justice to the wealth of reality. However admirable the energy with which in later years he spins a whole world out of the Ego, which he looks upon as a source of perpetual movement, yet this world is unmistakably abstract and formal, and becomes more and more shadowy in proportion as thought gets further from its starting-point.

Fichte only enters into closer relationship with things when for him the Ego has become the Absolute Life, exalted above all individual existence. Even so we are still concerned with giving a reasonable shape to reality through our own unwearied activity, but now human action is included within a cosmic process, and we must find our right relation to the whole before we can be successful at any particular point. Thus life assumes a distinctly religious character; we have the development of a new mysticism which bids man seize on the "Eternal One" as that which alone is essential in his individual life and being.

> "Das ewig Eine
> Lebt mir im Leben, sieht in meinem Sehen."[1]

But however inward the sentiment, this religion remains entirely a religion of reason and the living present. Fichte cannot away with any idle tarrying and hoping for a Beyond: "through the mere process of being buried no man can attain blessedness."

[1] "The Eternal One
Lives in my life, the light of all my seeing."

Again, he will have no intermixture of historical dates with the necessary truths of reason. "We may not say: What harm is there in holding to this historical fact also? There is always harm in placing accidentals on a level with essentials, or, as so often happens, in passing off accidentals as essentials, thereby obscuring the latter and troubling men's consciences."

This further development of Fichte's thought gives a higher value to history and social life. History is now regarded as the collective work of humanity, as its solution of the problem how to give to reason, which, though obscured and limited, has always been operative among men, a thoroughly clear expression and a foundation in personal activity; how to order all the relations of life so that they may be consistent with freedom and yet in harmony with reason. Especially important to Fichte—the very thinker who had laid it down as the aim of all government "to make government superfluous"—is the political community, and in this matter his thought moves through various phases. From the free state with which he starts he passes first to the "closed industrial state," whose aim is to secure economical prosperity to all its members, then to the state, whose main watchword is civilisation, whose duty it is to assist, without being in any way dictatorial, every kind of spiritual activity; and finally, after the Prussian overthrow at Jena, he inclines to the conception of a national state. This is the first time that the idea of nationality enters within the philosophical purview, and we must therefore explain Fichte's position with regard to it somewhat more closely. Man, he considers, can only truly love that which he can conceive as eternal and absorb into the responsive eternal element in his own heart; thus his earthly life and work would be deficient in genuine love and power, if it could not show him some form of solidarity which might secure continuity to his effort through all ages to come. Such solidarity he can find only in his own nation, "that particular spiritual offshoot of humanity from which he himself has sprung, with all his thought and action, and belief in these as eternal, the nation which gave him birth,

educated him, and made him what he is." "This national individuality is the Eternal, to which he entrusts the immortality of his life and work, that Eternal Order of things to which he confides his own immortality; he cannot but desire that this individuality should continue, since only so can the short span of his life here below be extended even here below into a life of endless duration." A man who thus links the thought of nationality with humanity's very highest ideals will naturally lay stress not on external power and expansion, but on inward culture and a strongly marked spiritual temper. Thus, even as a politician, Fichte is still a philosopher and continues to regard things in their eternal aspect. German life and character he deems especially valuable, because in it he seems to detect a specially strong bias toward that which is innermost and most elemental in man; and he is therefore the first to assign to the Germans the largest share among the nations of the quality we may term "heart." Historical evidence of this he finds mainly in the Reformation, in the German philosophy with its construction of reality out of the spiritual activity of the self, and in German education with its tendency to mould man from within.

Fichte was a man of few, though great, ideas, and even in regard to these few ideas, his skill lay in framing the general conception rather than in carefully elaborating it. Born, however, in an age which was as critical for the life of culture generally as it was for his own nation in particular, he found his mission in the awakening of men's minds, and he discharged it with a loyal devotion. His constructive work, at once stimulating and strengthening, and the constant direction of his effort to the deep things of life, together with his stern inculcation of the qualities that make for manliness, have indeed exercised an enduring and imperishable influence.

(bb) *Schelling* (1775–1854).—If in this little band of thinkers Fichte is pre-eminently the active and ethical personality, it is Schelling who is the artist and æsthete. For even when he

turns his attention to other domains, as, for example, nature, his enquiry is only important and suggestive in so far as it is sustained by the artistic interest; removed from this, it becomes forthwith whimsical and ineffective. It is only in the light of an age of great artistic ferment, and as the expression of a personality with strong artistic leanings, that Schelling's philosophy of nature becomes at all intelligible. The ideal of artistic intuition—to see nature as a realm of vital forces and inward connections—must now serve also as the ideal for science. This transference cannot be effected without a very summary, arbitrary, violent treatment of the material in question; but through all the errors of Schelling's procedure there runs a vein of quickening, stimulating thought. Nature is represented as a spiritual whole, embracing all manifoldness within a single life. She is, however, no fixed and stable being, but a constant becoming, a process perpetually advancing through self-development, the motive-power being the opposition of positive and negative forces, attraction and repulsion. Thus there is no such thing as an isolated, fixed form; all forms are borne along on the stream of an infinite life. "Nature is not merely the product of an incomprehensible act of creation; it is the creation itself. It is not only the appearance or manifestation of the Eternal; it is also the Eternal Itself." At heart, nature and spirit are one and the same; only what happens unconsciously in the one sphere attains to consciousness in the other. Thus we may legitimately hope and endeavour to approach the meaning of nature through the study of thought. "What we call 'nature' is a poem, written in a mystic hieroglyph, so that its meaning lies hidden from us. But if it could be deciphered, we should recognise in it the Odyssey of the mind, as it seeks itself, flees from itself, and undergoes strange illusions. The sense-world is like the words through which the meaning peers, like the mist which half reveals and half conceals that visionary land to which our souls aspire."

The majority of scientific thinkers have felt an instinctive and decided aversion to this train of thought, but on an artistic

nature like Goethe's it exercised a profound influence. When the Goethe of later years reflects that his earlier conception of nature had lacked "appreciation of the two great motive-powers in nature—polarity and progress"—to whom is he indebted more than to Schelling for the remedying of the defect?

Schelling's artistic conception of nature was at a later period extended so as to take in the whole universe. Reality is represented as a work of art, self-poised and self-renewing. In this work of art, all the oppositions of life—sense and spirit, rest and movement, particular and universal—are included and transcended. It is to humankind, however, that art opens up the ultimate depth of reality; to us it appears as the "only and eternal revelation, a miracle so great that, had it only existed for a moment, it were sufficient to convince us of the absolute reality of our highest ideals."

The natural accompaniment of such a belief is the endeavour to fashion human existence, both in its general and its special aspects, upon artistic lines. The ideal is not, as with Fichte, the moral character, but rather the individuality of genius. If it was Fichte's idea that the whole of existence should consist in self-determined action, Schelling's motto is "Learn that you may create." Even the sciences find their culminating expression in the artistic re-shaping and contemplation of the universe. This is especially important for the treatment of history, which Schelling would like to see regarded as an art. In his legal and political doctrines he is in close touch with the Romantic school, not only absorbing its convictions, but developing them still further. His aim is nothing less than to rid these fields of research of all human theorising, and base them entirely upon an indwelling life of their own and an inherent necessity of their constitution. The whole is to take precedence of the individual. Greater than all conscious activity is the process of unconscious growing and becoming. Schelling, therefore, as compared with the Enlightenment, is in closer touch with experience, and has opened up an inexhaustible mine of

intuitable fact. But his attitude is too one-sidedly contemplative, too passive; and through desire not to be anthropomorphic, he is in danger of stultifying individual initiative and falling under the sway of merely natural concepts.

A closer scrutiny of Schelling's artistic attitude forces upon us a problem which points back indeed to Goethe, the problem attaching to the relationship between ancient and modern art. The art of German Humanism was primarily an expression of soul. Its best and most influential work was lyrical. It was saturated with thought. The artistic form, however, which it gave to its ideas was mainly determined by the plastic arts, especially by sculpture. This opened a passage for the entrance of Greek feeling into modern life, though the complete blending of two such entirely different tendencies was not to be expected. With Schelling, as with Goethe, whose creative work was so largely moulded by Schelling's ideas, the Greek influence remains something that is never perfectly assimilated, that is even alien in character.

Schelling's artistic conception of the world was sustained by his belief in the rationality of the real, by the optimistic mood which animated the whole epoch of the German classical literature. This attitude it was impossible to maintain at a later time, when personal experience had clouded his view of life and the world, and the irrationality of the universe seemed too great to be overcome, save by a deep-reaching transformation of the world as given and by the help of Powers higher than ourselves. Thus art must yield place to religion, and Schelling becomes mainly occupied with the problem of bringing about the "rebirth of religion through the agency of science in its supremest form." Nor is it his own problem merely, but, so he declares, "the problem of the German spirit, the appointed goal of all its strivings." In the prosecution of his design, Schelling strikes a new and a deeper note. Evil becomes more real: there is a tendency to dwell on the mysterious element in human existence. "All nature is wearing itself out in incessant toil. Man also takes no rest. It is, as an old book says: every-

thing under the sun is full of labour and sorrow. And yet we do not see any advance made, anything really attained, anything, that is, in which we can rest and be satisfied."

Schelling's own contribution to the solution of the problem consists of some daring speculation on the origin of evil and a theory of a progressive divine revelation, a theory which finds room for all the various religions. Some of his ideas are highly suggestive, but there is so much that is fantastic in them, his attempt to explain the irrational rationally is so impossible, that his contemporaries had a very good excuse for roundly rejecting the whole system. Schelling alienated himself more and more from the feeling of his age and from that living, moving present he had so boldly thought to guide.

Moreover, in his life-work generally his suggestions far outweigh in importance his actual achievements. He is too swift and hasty ever to be mature. Nevertheless, such is the brilliancy of his genius, the versatility of his effort, and the attractiveness of his style, that he has had a great influence in enriching life and widening the spiritual horizon. He broke down many obstinate prejudices, brought together much scattered material, and softened the asperity of many oppositions. In particular, he set the oppositions of sense and spirit, intuition and thought, in a far friendlier and more fruitful relation than had been suggested by any previous writer.

(cc) *Hegel* (1770–1831).—In industry and systematic strength Hegel is far and away superior to Schelling. He has at his disposal all the resources of a completed system, and this has enabled him to make so deep an impression on the life of the century that it cannot escape his influence, however hard it may try. Again and again we hear that Hegel is outworn and superseded, and that he is separated from us by an impassable gulf. And yet he still wields power over the minds of men, still makes converts. In our work, our ideas, our problems, his influence is latently active, though it may often be unrecognised. Thus Hegel both attracts and repels us. We recognise in him one of

the forces of the century, as well as a sign that is universally spoken against. It is an alluring paradox!

However high-handed a superiority Hegel's system may assume, it is yet but a simple fact and an old truth which it takes up and develops, the fact of the thought operative within us. Thought, though belonging to our own nature, exercises at the same time a control over us. Even in the individual it develops its consequences without any regard to his will. It demands imperatively that contradictions which have been recognised shall be solved. It is truer to say not that we think, but that thinking goes on within us. Socrates had already distinguished clearly between thought on the one hand and mere individual presentations on the other, and found in thought a sure support for knowledge and for life. Hegel, however, does not stop at the thought of the individual thinker; he is concerned with thought as it presents itself in the life of humanity and the process of the world's history. The result of this new departure is to make thought not something that is once and for all and can rest in its completeness, but a process that is now in progress and developing in conformity with its own laws. It is not something which exists side by side with things, but it is that which embraces them all and projects them from itself. The thought-process, accordingly, by claiming as its own all the products of the world's history, becomes a world-process, the true substance of all reality, subjugating to its logic the whole wide world.

This attempt of Hegel's necessitates an emancipation of thought from everything that is distinctively human. To effect this emancipation, we must be sufficiently strong and courageous to put aside our own ideas and perceptions, rise to the height of objective thinking, and merely follow where it leads us. Then forthwith our limitations fall away, and human reason becomes one with the Divine. Nothing less than this justifies us in trusting to the power of thought, and, without such trust, it is impossible, according to Hegel, to put any heart into philosophical work. "Courageous trust in truth, faith in the power of mind,

is the primary requisite of philosophical study. Man must respect himself and esteem himself worthy of the highest. He cannot think too highly of the greatness and power of mind. The secret nature of the universe is powerless to resist a courageous trust in knowledge. It is bound to open its doors, reveal its riches, and bid us rejoice in their possession."

The transformation of reality into pure thought follows, however, a certain method: there are inherent contradictions in the concepts, which call urgently for a solution and provoke the formation of new concepts. The process repeats itself, and thus the movement widens out till it brings everything alien into its circle, lights up all that was obscure, and transforms all assumption into well-grounded insight. "The True is the Whole. The Whole, however, is nothing more than Being perfecting itself through its own development." The method is really just the self-developing movement of the concept. For, truly speaking, each concept is a "unity of opposite moments"; in everything real there is a coming together of being and not-being, and therefore "all things are implicitly self-contradictory." The development and solution of these contradictions make the concept ever richer in content, till at last the mind knows the whole infinite universe for its property, and therewith reaches the summit of complete self-consciousness.

In this process every step is but a point of transition; no one thing can seek to establish a separate existence without immediately becoming stereotyped and false. Precisely at the moment when it reaches its highest point of development, its downfall begins. How should it go on living when its work is done? Life, on this view, is a process of incessant decay. But the decay does not imply utter annihilation. When something disappears from view, it is not therefore extinct. That which has to give up its separate existence, be "transcended" in the sense of "negated," remains as a part, a moment, of a higher stage in which it is "transcended" in a more positive sense. The individual succumbs to the tidal forces of this stupendous process, only to find within the Whole a new and imperishable existence. Thus

the victory rests finally with life, but in the annihilation which is demanded of it there is a profoundly tragic note.

The vigorous prosecution of this method results in a thoroughly characteristic representation of our world of reality. Not only are all things in a state of flux, but they are all linked together and referred to each other: their meaning can only be ascertained from their mutual relations and connections. Everywhere we advance through conflict and collision, and not through a process of quiet accumulation. Our life is strained to the utmost tension of activity. The apparently external world of sense is now proved to be merely the mind revealing itself to itself in phenomenal form; nowhere has matter an independent value of its own. Throughout the mind must draw upon its own resources. Its work transcends all merely human purposes, transcends, too, the capacity of the fleeting conscious life. Man, while still in his own sphere, comes under the influence of higher Powers. All spiritual activity, however, is concentrated in the conceptual labour of thought; accordingly, the essential thing is to refer complex states to the unifying concept, and let one illuminating idea flood a whole region with light. It is these ideas which are the pivot, we might even say the propelling mechanism, of history. The various regions again are reunited in one comprehensive system; they become stages and manifestations of one single truth. In this vast process of spiritualisation all things become closely bound and linked together; all life is cast from one mould. Throughout the welter and turmoil of the movement we feel the singleness of the point of view from which it is regarded, and it is this which changes the storm and stress of existence into the repose of a life that is lived *sub specie æternitatis*.

This process is primarily a matter of the intellect, and not of the moral nature. But it in no wise lacks a moral element. Such an element is involved in the surrender to objective truth, to the movement of ideas which go on their way, develop and die, with no regard to the weal and woe of individuals. They make use of man, even without his knowledge and against his

will. They are "cunning" enough to make a tool of him, even when he is pursuing his own ends and gratifying his passions. "The passions are mutually destructive; Reason alone keeps watch, follows up her ends, and carries them through." But let a man adopt these ideas into his own will, and he will then realise his true greatness and understand the real meaning of morality. "The great men in history are those whose own private ends embody the will of the World-spirit."

Hegel develops these ideas with much more success in some fields than in others. Nature for him is always a kind of step-child, and he is not very happy even when dealing with the psychical life of the individual. His strength lies in the sphere of history and social life. He is indeed the most important philosophical exponent of the historical movement in the nineteenth century. Above all others, he is the philosopher of our modern life and culture. No one else has worked out its intellectualism, optimism, and belief in progress with such masterly thoroughness.

Hegel's sociology gives particularly clear expression to his trend of thought. Consistently with his subordination of the individual to the whole, the state, as an expression of the whole, takes emphatic precedence of the individual. He does indeed find that the essence of the more modern state consists in the fact that "the universal is bound up with the full freedom of the particular and the well-being of individuals," but the primacy of the universal is never for one moment questioned, and the contrast to the State of the Enlightenment with its basis of individual justice and freedom is glaringly apparent. Moreover, even though Hegel is convinced that much of importance is effected not by collective action, but by the work of particular men of genius, yet these men do not stand outside their age; they are the product of it, and are merely making consciously explicit the aspirations of the community at large. "Public opinion is a mixture of truth and falsity; to sift out that which is true in it is the work of the great man. The great man is he who is the mouthpiece and executor of his age."

At the same time Hegel deprecates strongly the deep-rooted tendency to criticise the state from a merely subjective point of view, and find a satisfaction in pointing out the errors which are unavoidable in human affairs. What is of far more importance is to live into the spirit of the whole, and interpret its utterance in the light of its own inner nature. Just as everywhere it is the mark of a rational insight to come to an understanding with reality, so the state also is to be understood and portrayed as intrinsically rational. It is not the primary business of philosophy to tell us what the world ought to be like, but to recognise the rational as real and the real as rational. The philosophical attitude, however, is proper rather to the end than the beginning of an historical epoch. "Being reflection about the world, philosophy does not make its appearance until reality has passed through its formative stage and become complete. Only at the approach of dusk, does the owl of Minerva begin her flight."

Thus Hegel has inculcated a higher conception of the state and has taught us to invest it with more important functions. On the other hand, he is largely responsible for that mystical exaggeration of the idea of the state, which threatens more and more to turn the spiritual life into a mechanism. He who with Hegel sees in the state "the realisation of the moral Idea," "the divine Will effectively differentiating itself into the reality and organised structure of a world," must end by viewing it as an "earthly-divinity" and refusing to allow that it has any limitations.

The more detailed elaboration of the view sets throughout in a very clear light its main and fundamental position. Thus Hegel endeavours to trace the power of logical opposition in the life of society. For example, he understands punishment as the negation of that negation of justice which the delinquent has committed; he recognises in love at once a surrender of one's own being and the acquisition of a new being through self-denial. "Love is the most tremendous contradiction, impossible for the understanding to solve." "Love at once sets

the contradiction and solves it." Contrary to the usual tendency of philosophy, Hegel even defends war as "an indispensable means of maintaining the moral health of the nations, preserving their plasticity, and counteracting the tendency of settled habits to degenerate into conventional routine."

His ideal of government is the rule of intelligence, exercised by officials who have been philosophically trained and are full of interest in spiritual problems. The representatives of the people must not interfere with affairs of state, though it is their duty to insist upon the government giving an account of its procedure, thereby lifting political life on to a higher plane of consciousness.

Hegel, however, does not regard the individual state as having its terminus within itself. It is only a tributary in the stream of the world's history. There is always one nation which takes the lead in the development of its epoch; each civilised people has its day. But it maintains its lead only for a limited time and then hands on the torch to another. All the achievements of particular nations and particular periods subserve but one idea: the development of spirit to the point at which it becomes conscious of its freedom. Alike in constructive and destructive processes, the spirit is simply finding itself, coming back upon itself, and so achieving its highest perfection. A freedom of this kind which takes in the whole content of life is fundamentally different from the merely natural and subjective freedom which is only just embarking on its work. This higher freedom is only to be won at the cost of endless toil. For "the development which in nature is a peaceful process of growth involves for spirit a hard and ceaseless struggle against itself. The real aim of the spirit is to realise its own idea, but it conceals this idea from itself, and is full of pride and pleasure in this alienation of itself." But at the same time we may "rest assured that it is the nature of truth to make its appearance when its time comes, and that it only appears when this time has come, and therefore never appears too early nor finds the community unready."

The way in which the separate epochs form sections and stages of this world-historic process has been developed by Hegel in a concise though powerful treatment, and traced right up to the present era in which he sees the victorious finale of the whole drama, the full self-consciousness of spirit. He concludes with the joyful assurance: "The development of the Spiritual Principle is the true theodicy, for this it is which makes us see that Spirit can only be free in a spiritual medium, and that all that has happened and happens every day not only comes from God, but is the work of God Himself."

The culmination of life Hegel finds in the kingdom of Absolute Spirit, which he separates into the departments of Art, Religion, and Philosophy. These are all expressions of one and the same truth; the self-discovery and self-appropriation of spirit through its own movement; but art presents this truth in the form of sense-intuition, religion in the form of imaginative representation, philosophy in the form of the pure concept. Everywhere it is the thought-element which is essential; the work of art is the embodiment of an idea, and the degeneration of religion into a vague feeling is strongly deprecated. "Thought is the very nerve of feeling; only when the thought is true is the feeling also genuine." All the departments must find their place in a scheme of historical development, wherein the present figures as the climax and conclusion of the whole process of advance through opposition. What gives a living content to religion is the idea running through the whole system, of the absorption of the individual into the totality of the thought-process, and his regeneration through its power. The life and influence of religion Hegel describes in glowing terms: "This is the region of the Spirit in which flow those waters of Lethe whereof Psyche drinks, in which she sinks her sorrow, changes all temporal hardships and obscurities to the fashion of a dream, and transfigures them with the radiance of Eternity." He becomes, however, strained and artificial when he tries to show that this immanental religion of the Absolute Thought-Process is identical with Christianity.

The culminating point is pure philosophy, the philosophy of concrete knowledge, philosophy understood as "spirit knowing itself in the form of spirit, or knowledge that has a grasp of the whole." Philosophy is not something separate from its history, but simply the movement of the history itself, when comprehended into a unity and illumined by thought. The doctrines of particular philosophers are not chance views and conceits of mere individuals, they are necessary stages in the process of thought. Each has its own sure place and finds in the whole alike its course and its outlet. And even when we take the philosophers singly, all their diversity of thought ranges itself under one main idea which alone gives it value. The progress of the movement obeys here, too, the law of opposition, of ascent through thesis and antithesis. Here, too, strife is the father of all things. Looking from the present as from a final summit, we can see clearly all our earlier stages and recognise the justice of each. The whole now appears as "a circle rounding back upon itself, and presupposing its beginning, though it attains it only in the end." The fever of advance now turns to the bliss of a contemplation that is at rest with itself.

The secret of Hegel's power is largely this: that he combines a rigid, apparently iron-bound system with a wealth of intuition, which breaks through again and again with spontaneous freshness and force. In order to do justice to this latter factor, we have made a point of frequently quoting his actual words. Our final judgment must depend mainly on whether the system and the intuition combine to form an inward unity. We cannot say that they do. The intuition does not carry on and supplement the system, but reveals rather a fundamental conviction of a different kind—richer and broader. The system, if forced to abide by the position it has taken up, can offer nothing more than a thought of thought, a radiation of the forms and powers of thought into the universe, a transformation of the whole of reality into a tissue of logical relations. And this necessarily destroys the immediacy of life in all its forms. It

banishes all psychical inwardness and at the same time all spiritual content. It is a dire contradiction of this main tendency when, after all, a world of sentiment is recognised, a spiritual depth, a realm of ethical values. Everything of the kind ought really to vanish before this logical machinery. Our being ought to be so entirely absorbed in it that not the smallest space should be left for any experience of the process, for any transmutation of it into deed and personal possession. The advance of the thought-process would thus tend more and more to swallow up all inward life and make of man a compliant tool in a process of intellectual culture. As a matter of fact, this tendency is at work in Hegel, and, in so far as it gains the upper hand, is a victory for empty form, abstraction, and soullessness.

But there is a counteracting influence constantly opposing it—the rich intuitive genius of a man of mark, the power to take a comprehensive survey over vast tracts of time and assimilate in his own way the experience of the world's history. Here the Dialectic is no longer a consuming Moloch, but a friendly power, helping life to work out its meaning and itself subserving a larger whole. It is in this way that Hegel's philosophy of art is enabled to draw upon the vast resources of our classical literature, that his religious philosophy is suffused with the glow and inspiration of Christianity, that his political ideas are enriched by the facts of modern civilisation, that his thought becomes throughout fruitful and penetrating whenever the mere movement of the concepts is counterbalanced by a living intuition of spiritual reality.

On the other hand, when his intuition fails him, as it notably does fail him in dealing with nature, when the constructive power of the idea is left to its own resources, he forthwith becomes formal, empty, intolerable, and his still unabated pretensions merely provoke antagonism. For here we have a most illuminating illustration of how little can be done by the mere manipulation of concepts; it is like turning a screw in a vacuum where it meets with no resistance.

Thus in Hegel we are face to face with a serious contradiction: the progress of his work involves the destruction of that, the retention of which is essential to its greatness. In Hegel himself the contradiction never becomes explicit, because his personality is always able to restore a fairly satisfactory balance between his method and his insight. But once away from his personality and its work, the forces of dissension are let loose, and the system falls hopelessly asunder.

And yet despite all that may be problematic and defective in Hegel, we cannot deny the towering greatness of his achievement. He secured recognition for the more universal truths, truths which even his opponents are bound to admit. Irresistibly powerful and fascinating is his idea of an all-embracing system, uniformly moulding and shaping every department, the thought of a life in perpetual movement, individual forms in ceaseless flux, changing in response to the changing conditions of the whole. Overwhelmingly impressive is his idea of a reality which refuses to accommodate itself to our likes and dislikes, his portrayal of the rise and conflict of independent thought-systems completely beyond the control of this school or of that. It is he who makes us aware of the tremendous power of negation in our lives, of the rousing, stimulating force of contradiction, and of the advance of the spiritual movement through opposition. All these ideas are in the highest degree fruitful, and a system which thought to dispense with them would be wofully the poorer. Nor does Hegel present them merely as a programme, but as an achieved construction, well organised and firmly compacted. If, however, while admitting all this, we are compelled to dissent from his interpretation of the world as mere thought, and look upon it as an error of momentous import, we recognise at once the inconsistency of the total impression. There seems to be a hopeless mixture of that which is fruitful and necessary with much that is perverse and untenable. We are at one and the same time attracted and repelled.

To contradiction, the inward dialectic of the concepts, Hegel has assigned a central place in the process of thought; and he

has himself come under the power of this dialectic. His intention was, by a clear, connected treatment of the world's development, to exercise a reassuring, calming, pacific influence. The system, as we see it at first, with its tendency to prove the real to be rational and the rational real, has a thoroughly conservative stamp. But as a matter of fact, it has kindled the most violent passions, and been the cause of most destructive upheavals, particularly in religious, political and social matters; it is the strongest radical force of modern times. How can we account for this discrepancy between intention and achievement?

Primarily, on the ground of an inherent contradiction in the Hegelian position, a contradiction which the philosophy of history brings home to us with special force. It consists in this, that while the whole of reality is transformed into a process of restless evolution, the process is still viewed from a stand-point which transcends it; there is thus a tendency to combine the stability of an ultimate conclusion with the relativity of an unlimited progress. The illimitableness of the Thought-Process requires a perpetual progress in time; it would be impossible for the movement to terminate at one particular point of time. Thus the present must be regarded as a mere link in a never-ending chain, and must be prepared to see all its endeavour swing round into its opposite in accordance with the law of contradiction. But this inference Hegel cannot admit at any price, since it would imply the surrender of the central point in his system, and deprive him of any right to a speculative survey. For such a survey requires that we should be able to review the whole movement; only from the point of view of the whole can the oppositions be overcome and integrated. This review of the whole, however, is impossible unless we step out of Becoming into the sphere of Eternal Being and find ourselves transplanted into a realm of ultimately valid truth. A conclusion in this sense is therefore indispensable for Hegel, if his philosophy is to be more than a mere expression of a particular age, if it is to review the whole history of culture. These two

tendencies, then, are sharply opposed; in the particular connection we have been discussing they are quite irreconcilable. In Hegel's own mind the conservative tendency got the upper hand, and led him to take a peaceful, contemplative view of the world. With his successors, on the other hand, as the character of their age would lead us to expect, the radical tendency was victorious, and drove them in the direction of tempestuous upheaval and rampant relativity. With them truth becomes merely an offspring of the age, a tool at the service of the necessities of life and its ever-changing requirements.

But though the seeds of radicalism and relativity were latent in the system, their quick maturing was due to a change in the social environment. Just at the time when Hegel died, a movement was in progress which was directing the current of life toward the problem of visible existence, and consequently turning philosophy from idealism to realism. Up to Hegel's time preponderating emphasis had been laid on questions of the inward life, and man's whole importance was due to his creative spiritual capacity. Now, on the other hand, attention begins to be focussed on the man of our immediate experience, man as he actually is. His relationship to his physical and social environment offers serious problems and complications, which so engross our thoughts and efforts that the world of poetry and speculation grows dim, and if it does not altogether vanish, is at least degraded to a merely subsidiary position. If the Hegelian ideas can still maintain themselves under these conditions, then the powerful intellectual resources of the movement all come under the control of the individual. Its enhanced appreciation of the logical faculty, the fluidity of its conceptions, the sublimation of all its material, the advance through contradiction, all this serves to aggrandise the power of the individual. He can venture now to use things in this way or in that as it pleases him. Unfettered reflection is allowed to soar free of all objective compulsion. There is a tendency to talk of "stand-points" and "points of view," and to maintain that they are all equally justified, a movement toward a modern Sophis-

tic, just as the old Sophistic sprang out of the kindred system of Heraclitus.

When, moreover, simultaneously with this change, material interests began to make themselves felt—and all the more strongly for their long suppression and neglect—they found at their disposal the magnificent thought-apparatus of the Hegelian system, the whole armoury of the logico-dialectical method, to use for their own ends. For example, the theory of social democracy supplies a materialistic rendering of Hegel's philosophy of history. Materialism in Economics would never have gained the power it did but for the weapons it borrowed from Hegel.

Thus Hegel himself supplies a particularly apt illustration of the destructive power of the dialectical method. From the outset there were daimonic powers at work in his world of thought, but for a while his spiritual force kept them in check. The peaceful, almost bourgeois character of his personality exercised a calming influence. Their sphere of operation, moreover, lay outside the needs and passions of every-day life: it was a conflict of spirits in the pure ether of thought. But the control vanished with Hegel. The daimonic powers broke up their previous connections, and sought, recklessly, each his own path. At the same time, they descended from their heights into the workaday world, mixed with its interests, infused into its movements their own passion, their own boundless craving for life. Our own age is still under the influence of the problems thus suggested. Will it be sufficiently strong to tame these forces of disruption, and bring the truth they contain into line with reason?

(β) SCHLEIERMACHER (1768–1834)

Among the leaders of German Idealism we must not omit to mention Schleiermacher. He lacks, indeed, the penetrating and renewing power of the men we have just been discussing. He does not fashion and colour his conception of the world in such a characteristic and vigorous way. But he is also free from their vehemence. His fine, susceptible nature gives a more

fresh, ingenuous welcome to the rich influences that pour into it from the stores of the universe. In the interchange between soul and world an artistic conception of life grows up; rigid distinctions melt and blend; the most diverse elements are wrought into one pattern. Schleiermacher touches nothing that he does not ennoble. We must especially admire his capacity for bringing into mutually complementary relation opposites which are wont to stand as mutually exclusive alternatives. It is in this spirit that Schleiermacher develops his "Dialectic" as an artistic theory of thought. This, like the rest of his philosophy, owes its greatness not so much to what it completes or achieves as to its quickening, educative influence on the progress of thought, its power to take comprehensive views, to classify and co-ordinate. It is pre-eminently the philosophy of the temperament which leans at once toward art and the universal.

His cosmic theory, such as it is, is closely related to that of Spinoza, who possessed an extraordinary fascination for the leading spirits of this epoch. There is in Schleiermacher, as in Spinoza, an intense longing for a unity transcending all oppositions, for an inclusion of the individual in the universal life, for an exaltation of our human lot above all merely human aims. But Schleiermacher's Spinozism is no mere imitation; it is Spinozism as adopted and transformed by Platonic thought. For into Spinoza's rigid forms, impervious to all human feeling, Schleiermacher breathes the warm breath of life, and this life gives to reality an artistic form. No sooner do things enter into a realm of artistic freedom and spiritual mobility than they lay aside their material ponderousness, flitting, and chasing each other in easy, charming fashion. The Greek freshness and grace of spirit have never been so strikingly reproduced in any other of the German thinkers.

It is particularly in the spheres of ethics and religion that Schleiermacher has made notable contributions. This is the first time that a completely independent status has been accorded to religion by the more modern philosophical thought. Modern thinkers hitherto had regarded it either as a stage of

knowledge, or as a means of moral training, and this subordinate position was almost certain to result in a decay of its inward life. Schleiermacher ensures the independence of religion by recognising that it has a spiritual basis of its own, namely, feeling. But we must carefully bear in mind the position that feeling holds in Schleiermacher, if we would rightly estimate the significance of this departure. Feeling, for Schleiermacher, is not just one mental faculty among others, but as "self-consciousness in its immediacy," "the original, undifferentiated unity of thinking and willing," it is the very root of all life; in feeling we are not cut loose from the world, but inwardly linked with its infinity. A religion thus based on feeling, on the consciousness of unity with the Eternal, is centrally related to the whole development of life, but at the same time maintains, in virtue of its purely inward nature, its own domain and sphere of thought. Whatever doctrines it lays down cannot possibly come into conflict with science and philosophy, because they are not statements concerning outward things, but simply helps toward the expression of the religious feeling. This expression may very likely vary with the varying phases of historical development, but religion itself is untouched by time. Thus the way is prepared for a recognition of the historical factor in religion, and a reconciliation facilitated between religion and the work of civilisation. All this has made Schleiermacher more influential than any other philosopher in stirring and quickening the religious life of the nineteenth century.

Ethics is also deeply indebted to him. Kant and Fichte had, with great force and vigour, aroused in their age a responsiveness to ethical impulses, and shaken it out of its soft effeminacy. But great as this achievement undoubtedly was, it was not without a strongly marked tendency to one-sidedness, harshness, rigour. The idea of duty, if it did not entirely suppress all other points of view, at least put them so much in the background that even the individuality of the agent was accorded but inadequate recognition. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, aims at proportion. He is a universal thinker, in that he recognises equally the dif-

ferent aspects of ethical life, its blessings, virtues and duties; universal again, in that he looks at the whole of life ethically, and understands morality in the widest sense as the natural expression of the reason; and finally, universal, in that he is able to reconcile completely the admission of a common reason with the significance and distinctive rights of individuality. The fact of cardinal importance for his philosophy is the individualisation of reason, "the establishing of reason, which remains in itself one and the same, as a separate form of existence," man's self-realisation as a personality, a unique manifestation of humanity. We may indeed question whether, in the endeavour to conceive morality broadly and rescue it from mere subjectivism, Schleiermacher has distinguished it sufficiently from nature, but the greatness of the service he has rendered to ethics is not thereby impaired. Here, as in his work generally, he has not been boldly aggressive and opened up new paths, but within a wide, rich tract of already cultivated ground he has sought to smooth away difficulties, and has exercised a quickening, unifying, ennobling influence.

(γ) SCHOPENHAUER, AND THE REACTION AGAINST RATIONAL IDEALISM (1788–1860)

In Schopenhauer we have the beginning of a strong reactionary movement, a reaction from the belief in the rationality of the real, which had inspired the creative activity of German Humanism and given it its characteristic form. And since this belief finds its maturest philosophical expression in Hegel, the systems of Hegel and of Schopenhauer stand in the sharpest opposition to each other. In Hegel, thought, in Schopenhauer, feeling, is the fundamental form of the psychical life. Hegel takes the first impression, essentially remoulds it, and finally displaces it altogether. Schopenhauer, on the contrary, dwells on it and deepens it. Reality, with Hegel, is systematised through a chain of logical sequences; with Schopenhauer, through the force of feelings which extend their influence over the whole range of experience.

Experience secures far more recognition from Schopenhauer than from Hegel, yet he is not primarily an empiricist, but a metaphysician; he reaches a stand-point from which he can survey experience and map it out from his own peculiar point of view, a stand-point from which the world of immediacy is wholly inverted and turned into a mere phenomenon. Large intuitions, emotional moods, are here the all-important factors, and the glimpses they afford into the world around us are rather coloured by their own peculiar quality than faithfully descriptive of the world itself.

The essential element in human nature, and finally in the whole of reality, consists, according to Schopenhauer, in a mysterious impulse toward life, a blind restlessly struggling will wholly unguided of reason. There are a thousand indications alike in the human sphere and the great world of nature, that this will and not knowledge is the all-impelling agent. In nature, intelligence yields place entirely to this vital impulsion; such knowledge as is here developed merely subserves the interests of self-preservation. With man the intellect is certainly freer, but the dominance of the will and its interests is obvious even here. Even in the most elevated scientific work, knowledge may easily be diverted from its proper channel, if once the personal aims of the investigator are allowed to interfere.

From convictions such as these there grew up an entirely novel view of nature, a view in which sensibility plays an important part. The classical epoch had conceived nature as a world cast in an artistic mould, the home of aspiring reason. Romanticism had glorified it into a realm of reposeful grandeur and blissful peace; but now, in direct contradiction to both these views, it becomes the arena where the blind forces of life surge and do battle with each other. Through the whole of nature there runs a ruthless instinct of self-preservation, an unqualified Will to Live. Little as this life offers, yet the little is grasped with tenacious greed. So narrow are the boundaries of existence that the competing organisms are ceaselessly urged and incited one against the other. A creature like the carnivorous animal cannot

exist at all without continually tearing and destroying others. The victor soon falls a prey to a still stronger rival. Thus each creature is in constant danger, constant agitation, and the whole with its restless, meaningless motion is a tragedy of the most piteous kind.

Does man fare any better? Undoubtedly in man's case a new factor comes into operation: the will becomes enlightened by intellect; life becomes conscious, the outlook freer, the sensibility finer. But the development tends to unhappiness rather than happiness. The limitation and misery of life are now for the first time felt in all their bitterness. Man with his finer nerves, more active intelligence, and lively fancy, not only experiences the misfortunes which actually befall him, he must experience in imagination every possibility of evil, pass through all his sorrow a thousand times over in anticipation. Even in his moments of prosperity cares flit around him like ghosts. How much more vivid and tormenting is his thought of death than that of the dull vegetative animal! Nay, if we look at the matter more closely, there is not only a preponderance of unhappiness, but there actually is no real happiness. Our only positive sensation is pain; what we call joy is really only the removal or alleviation of a pain. We are conscious of sickness, but not of health; of loss, but not of possession. Our joys are limited to short transition periods such as convalescence, to the time when we are just attaining well-being. Soon we again become listless, unoccupied, bored. The insatiable appetite for life which is always craving some fresh distraction, seeks something new and different, and so incurs new pains. Thus life oscillates like a pendulum between pain and ennui. All the arts of society are, in last resort, directed merely to conjuring away this ennui, the emptiness of ordinary humdrum existence. That pain is in truth the only real factor in our lives is demonstrated also by the poets, in that they can paint the tortures of hell in most vivid colours, whereas for heaven nothing is left but monotony.

All this might be borne if we could still be satisfied with ourselves, and take refuge from our troubles in the consciousness of

moral integrity. But this we cannot do. The motives that are base in us far outweigh those that are noble. The self-seeking which is natural to all creatures becomes in man actual badness and wickedness. In everything that happens around him, in all that befalls his friends and relations, the point of primary importance for him is what advantage or harm he himself may derive. Hypocrisy is rampant; every one is anxious to appear noble and unselfish. Vanity and folly are universally prevalent. Men care about the most worthless things, and are mainly concerned with raising themselves in the estimation of their fellows, to whom, but for their vanity, they are so profoundly indifferent. And all these vices hold us in a remorseless grip; there is no possibility of an inward change, a moral purification. For strive as we may, the character which prompts the striving is unchangeable. Outside influences can affect our knowledge, but not our will. "Willing cannot be learnt" (*velle non discitur*). Evil impulses may be modified by advancing culture, and assume a form less dangerous to their owner, but in their substance they are unchangeable. Neither from history nor society can we glean any promise of a change for the better. The history of the world, with its purposeless activity and its weight of woe, must seem to an unprejudiced observer nothing more than a disordered dream of humanity. As for social relations, they are an epitome of unreason rather than reason. In particular the political freedom men strive for conduces far more to an unbridled exhibition of selfishness and party passion than to an inner elevation of life. Thus the historical ideals and hopes of the nineteenth century here meet with sharp rebuff. All hope of salvation seems to vanish. But enchained and entangled as we are in the machinery of the universe, we yet have a feeling of responsibility which we cannot shake off. The climax of our misery is just this, that we cannot help referring it to our own free agency and looking upon it as our own fault.

This contradiction between freedom and necessity, while it grievously complicates our existence, at the same time forces us to see in it a much deeper meaning. Since this life is unintelli-

gible taken in itself alone, it cannot have an ultimate value; it must originate in some free activity, in a self-assertion of the will. It is this self-assertion which has called into being existence as we know it in space and time, and, through the self-diremption it involves, has engendered those countless, mutually hostile beings whose collision is responsible for all the sorrow of the world. This is the origin of that unfathomed misery of which we are so painfully conscious, which holds us so fast in its remorseless grip.

And yet the philosopher does not despair of help. In the first place, there is some hope for the alleviation of misery in the cultivation of a contemplative attitude toward the world. Art and science both foster the development of such an attitude. They both focus attention on the objective aspect of things, and absorb us in the intuitive contemplation of it. The restlessness of willing is allayed, the passions appeased; self-interest, with its agitations, cares and pains, vanishes quite away. And this is all the more true in that Schopenhauer, arbitrarily enough, sees in the elemental forms of nature beautiful shapes, resembling the Platonic Ideas, and so gives to merely ordinary contemplation the dignity of an artistic outlook.

The emancipating power of this artistic contemplation is manifested best in genius, which in its intuitions and creations attains complete objectivity, and therewith forgets entirely the world and its ways. Even those who are not geniuses have their moments of contemplation, like oases in the desert of existence. This reference to pure intuition gives to science and art a wholly different character from that which they had for Hegel. Hegel sought in every spiritual product one illuminating idea; Schopenhauer lays the whole emphasis on the overmastering strength of the immediate impression, the awakening of a mood free from all volition. Thus science, for Schopenhauer, approximates to art; and supreme among the arts is music, for music reproduces all the emotions of our inmost soul, without the pain involved in their actual realisation. Drama, on the other hand, with its tragic issue, makes all life appear like an evil dream,

and fosters the conviction that there must be another existence quite different from that which here surrounds us.

This, however, is no solution of the problem; it only pushes it a little further back; it is a palliative of misery, not a cure. Moreover, it is a method not available always and for every one. The only thing that can effect a real emancipation is a complete breaking of the will to live, and this again can only be effected by a strong and genuine compassion for everything that lives and suffers, not only for humanity, but for every sentient creature. In so far as this is true, the way of salvation is not through science or art, but through morality, Since, however, compassion of this kind makes us feel the sorrow of others exactly as though it were our own, and so concentrates in one single point the whole weight of the world's misery, the suffering becomes too great to bear. All hope of escape must vanish, all pleasure in life be destroyed. If life is all a fiery furnace with the exception of a few cool spots, the only hope for the individual is that he may light upon just those spots. But as soon as his sensibility widens its range so as to take in all other beings and recognise himself in them all, this hope is gone. The will withdraws into itself; life no longer has a positive content; it becomes negative. And what happens in man, the crown and roof of things, justifies us in hoping for a revolution in the universe as a whole. This whole existence will break up, as indeed it was only through the unrestrained, tumultuous vitality of the will that it arose in the first instance. Thus here we have a glimpse of a great deliverance, a haven of peace and rest, which yet is not a blank nothingness, save for him to whom this immediate world of seeming is the true and ultimate reality.

Our judgment of Schopenhauer will vary, accordingly as we base it upon the value of his contribution to the evolution of history, or look upon his results as in themselves final. In the former case we must regard his ideas as a justifiable and important reaction from the optimism and enthusiastic faith in civilisation characteristic not only of the Enlightenment but also of the German Humanistic movement and, we might even add,

the whole modern period. A strong buoyant vitality had induced man to represent reality as a realm of pure reason, to look upon the bright side of things, to overcome the contradiction of immediate impressions by placing them in the setting of some artistic or logical system. This tendency was bound, by its very advance, to overreach itself and elicit a protest. It was Schopenhauer who voiced this protest with admirable independence and gave it classical expression. He carries our convictions unreservedly with him, when he makes us feel at every point the irrationality of our world. He brings into the foreground fresh aspects of experience, fresh groups of facts; he not only criticises but constructs, indicating new views and new problems. His decisive rejection of the solutions hitherto attempted works, and will continue to work, as an antidote to shallowness and superficiality. Philosophy, on its own ground, here deals a deadly blow to all easy optimism and rationalism. The tendency to represent the world and life as fairly smooth and tolerable to man is given no quarter whatsoever.

But it is one thing to recognise Schopenhauer's importance in this respect, and quite another to revere him as the master whose word is unconditionally and finally valid. This position is quite untenable in face of the fact that his treatment and valuation of things is, at least, as one-sided as that which he has declared war against, and even more subjective in character. If emphasis was then laid too exclusively on the light, there is now an actual courting of shadow. The philosopher revels with undisguised satisfaction in his gruesome colouring. Just as, in general, man finds in reality what he brings to it, so here this discrepancy in the judgment passed upon experience points to a fundamental difference in the way of looking at life. It was the predominance of the active impulses that made the world so important to the earlier thinkers, for it was in the world that their activity could develop and find its best expression. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, relates all that happens to the subjective life, to sensibility and emotional disposition; his attitude toward reality is rather contemplative than active. And since in him this tendency is

allied with a suspicious and timid disposition, he reaches a view of reality as a whole that is certainly very characteristic and has a considerable amount of justification, but he is never able to look at it impartially and do justice to its various aspects. He exposes it to a glaring slant-light, whose sharp contrast effects, while exciting the emotions, yield a very one-sided and even distorted picture.

Man, as Schopenhauer represents him, is a mere combination of crude natural propensities and over-refined but ineffectual spirituality. With his defencelessness both from outside foes and internal attack, he is like Prometheus bound to his rock. Schopenhauer recognises no reasonable will, no ethical personality, but only a blind desire. He can find no place for a movement from within, for a thorough regeneration of human nature through sorrow and love, through work and faith. Thus at every critical point he shows a poverty of spiritual content, and puts the soul under the dominion of an insatiable thirst for happiness, which can lead only, for well or for ill, to a final renunciation.

Yet never would Schopenhauer have acquired the influence he has had if there had not been some other tendency at work in him, of a better and deeper kind. He possesses a tremendous energy of metaphysical conviction, which brings into clear consciousness the mysterious element in human existence and degrades the outer world of immediacy into a mere realm of appearance. He has given admirable expression to certain fundamental ethical feelings. He is a great artist, not only in virtue of the fresh, transparent, penetrating quality of his style, but above all, in the skill with which he transforms all this mysteriously complex world into an ideal construction æsthetically designed. Everything becomes thereby ennobled and a counterpoise is provided to the weight of the real world which otherwise would crush man down and destroy all his initiative. Is it not true that, in virtue of this metaphysical, ethical, artistic contribution, the spiritual life becomes vastly more active than Schopenhauer's ideas, if taken strictly, would allow? Is this not another

instance of a man's thought being much wider and richer than his system?

The predominance of the negative element in Schopenhauer is, however, quite sufficient to explain why he was so slow in attaining recognition and influence. So long as a glad confidence in life prevailed, and men could overcome all opposition by summoning their spiritual energies to the task, Schopenhauer's system could not seem anything more than an odd piece of eccentricity. It was only when idealism had been worsted by realism and the limitations of realism had shortly afterward made themselves felt—only when men's energies were relaxed and a spirit of doubt was abroad, that Schopenhauer's day came, that there was room for pessimism. As a protest, however, not only against passing tendencies, but against the main drift of modern culture, his work will not so easily become obsolete.

III. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD REALISM

In German speculation and in German Idealism generally we have the culmination, and at the same time the close, of a movement in which all civilised nations bore a part, but which in Germany was far more highly developed than elsewhere and conspicuously rich in creative genius. This movement was an immanental idealism, which sought to hold fast to the spiritual inwardness of the old religious view of life, but at the same time aimed at extending its range over the whole of human existence, thereby raising it to a higher level. On the other hand, right from the dawn of the modern era, there had been a counteracting influence at work, tending to concentrate all human activities within the immediate world of sense, and to fashion accordingly the life of man. Already in the eighteenth century this realistic movement was active both in England and France, and had achieved important results; but the peculiar conditions of life in Germany, tending as they did to encourage an intellectual and literary culture, militated against its success in that country. Thus when in the nineteenth century realism became the

dominating influence in human culture, it was in Germany that the revolution was most keenly felt. It would be almost impossible to understand how, from being a nation of poets and thinkers, the Germans could so quickly assume the leadership in technical and industrial matters, did we not remember that in yet earlier times they had shown themselves both strong and skilful in practical affairs, and that not till the Reformation had the stress been laid so predominantly on the development of the spiritual faculties. However that may be, it is certainly in nineteenth century Germany that we have the most obvious instance of the suppression of the old order by the new, of idealism by realism.

The shifting of the emphasis was particularly manifest in the years just before and after 1830. The natural sciences, in which the Germans had hitherto lagged behind, became now a leading force in the national life, and influenced its whole attitude toward the world. In 1826 Liebig set up in Giessen a chemical laboratory on a new model; and in the winter of 1827–1828, Alexander von Humboldt delivered in the University and the "Singakademie" at Berlin public lectures on physical cosmography, which were intended to attract a wider public toward the study of the natural sciences. The same period witnessed technical discoveries which immeasurably lessened the difficulties of intercourse, gave fresh impetus to economic production, and entirely revolutionised the conditions under which production had hitherto been carried on. In 1827 there was the invention of the screw-propeller, which first made steam navigation an effective means of world communication; in 1830 the railway was invented. England here led the way, but the other nations were not slow to follow. At the same time, the July Revolution in Paris was sowing the seeds of similar movements in Germany as well as in the other European countries. The desire of the citizens for greater political freedom, for more share in matters of public concern, was never again to be lulled to sleep. From the economic point of view, the rise of Germany's power dates from January 1, 1834, the date of the establishment of the German "Zoll-und-Handelsverein." Meanwhile the giants of the previ-

ous generation were passing away, without leaving any adequate successors. In 1827 Pestalozzi died; in 1831, Hegel; in 1832, Goethe; in 1834, Schleiermacher. Clearly one period was waning and another dawning. And nowhere were the changes greater than in Germany. No nation had more difficulty in re-establishing the balance of its inward life. Still Germany only affords a particularly clear illustration of what was, after all, the common lot and common problem of all the civilised peoples.

The new movement seeks to rivet man's interest entirely upon his environment; his relationship to the environment is to determine the whole course of his life and thought. The conception of the world is now influenced less by speculative philosophy than by the natural sciences. Attention is no longer directed so much to the cultivation of the individual mind through art and literature as to the bettering of political and social relations. This involves a corresponding change of method. No longer, forgetful of sense-existence, do men seek for undiscovered worlds in bold, imaginative flight; they must bide closely and faithfully by the matter in hand. Their procedure now bears the unmistakable stamp of work. Hardly anything is so characteristic of the nineteenth century as the increased importance of work. It is true that great industry and diligence have been shown in other centuries also, and that even quite early periods offer remarkable examples of it. But in the nineteenth century, the character of the work itself changes very materially; it is no longer concerned with the inner life and aims of the individual, but is intimately bound up with a world of objects; it busies itself with the structure, laws and necessities of this external world, and champions it victoriously as against man. It effects what is, perhaps, the greatest emancipation of the nineteenth century, an emancipation from man, and makes him the mere pliant tool of its own unresting advance. As work thus assumes an independent status, it forms itself into complex organisations which assume gigantic proportions. This is true of industrial work with its great factories; of commerce, with its world-wide ramifications; and also of science with its growing tendency to specialise. The

individual must find his place within these complex organisations; he is insignificant and powerless so soon as he tries to sever himself from them. But the limitation of individual power means a corresponding increase in the collective capacity of mankind. Nature reveals to advancing knowledge forces and connections hitherto undreamt of, and technical skill places them all at the service of man. Again, in man's own peculiar sphere, reason asserts itself more and more, and the irrational is eliminated. Life gains in richness and variety. The organisation of labour makes it possible to deal with political and social problems which hitherto had seemed quite intractable.

Work, however, could not have become so potent and productive but for the support which it obtained through a strengthening of the elemental bonds of reciprocity and tradition, through a growth of society and history. It is particularly in this respect that the nineteenth century presents such a direct contrast to the eighteenth. For the eighteenth was mainly occupied with the emancipation of the individual from the general body of social ordinances, which, in the lapse of time, had become enslaving fetters. To authority and tradition it opposed the claims of the living present, and fell back for its defence upon a timeless reason. Already there had been protest and reaction even within the idealistic camp. Romanticists and philosophers alike had united to do honour to history, till, with Hegel, the revulsion of feeling had resulted in an almost dangerous exaggeration of the value of the State. But all the time, history and society had at the back of them a spiritual world; their value lay in the fact that they were expressions of this world, and not in any virtue of their own. Realism, however, drops all connections of an unseen kind, and finds in history and society, in their immediate practical aspect, the workshop in which all spiritual life is produced, the only sphere with which man has any concern. Our existence is stamped far more clearly than before as partly historical, partly social, and the near world at our feet, so often looked down upon with contempt by idealists, gains wonderfully in richness of content and energy of movement. It is only because the philosoph-

ical century was succeeded by one of predominantly historical and social interests that realism has been able to take over the guidance of life and fashion it in accordance with realistic standards.

But what distinguishes modern realism from all previous movements of a realistic kind is its insatiable desire for supremacy, and its concern for positive results. The older realism was critical in nature, a movement or opposition, a reaction against accepted traditions of life; it was not an independent, constructive force. Modern realism, on the other hand, aims at assuming the whole direction of life and shaping it to its own ends. It does not question the ideal requirements of humanity, but it reads them in a different sense, and in this sense hopes to be able to satisfy them completely.

The aim and hope of this modern realism is to make life throughout truer, richer and stronger, by calling man away from his castles in the air and placing him on the solid rock of sense-experience. Life passes thus from a region of toying and trifling into a realm of truth, and gains fresh strength and coherency in readjusting itself to a resisting environment. This change in general attitude cannot fail to affect the various departments of life taken individually. This is quite obvious in the case of science, but it is not less true of religion, morality and art. The development of a positive system of religious belief is hardly possible for realism, limited as it is to the sphere of the visible world, but it seeks to understand religion, and is prepared to admit it as a necessary phase and stage of human development. On the other hand, the new order of life naturally gives rise to fresh moral problems and incentives. Since work, the giver of insight, has as its basis the whole structure of historical and social relations, it exacts from individuals complete submission, glad readiness to sacrifice self in the interests of the whole, indefatigable co-operation from each worker in his own appointed station. To raise the standard of general well-being now becomes the main end of action. The ethics of self-realisation gives place to the ethics of "altruism," of action for others. There is an

ethical element too in that greater respect for the existing order which is exacted from the individual. While recognising the limitations of this order and resigning himself to much that is inevitable, he must still realise the energy and joy of work. Art also must adjust itself to the realistic mode of thought. It must not seek to portray new worlds, but rather content itself with teaching us a more accurate observation of reality as it is.

A new life of this kind will naturally give rise to new ways of looking at life; nor need they lack variety, since the visible world has many different aspects, and we can, therefore, choose our own stand-point, and in particular allow either nature or society to dictate our general attitude. There are, accordingly, three main currents of thought: Positivism, seeking a reconciliation of nature and society; Evolution, introducing a new conception of nature, and social theories, particularly those of Social Democracy, demanding a regeneration of society.

There is a solid support for these views of life in their close connection with the work of the period to which they belong. They also have the further advantage of keeping in close touch with immediate impressions, and so affect life more directly, and extend their influence more rapidly. It can scarcely be doubted that they contain and suggest much that is valuable even with regard to the broader issues of experience. But it is, nevertheless, a crucial question whether they can make good their claim to supply unaided a complete theory of life and satisfy all human needs. Does not the attempt imply an intolerable degradation and restriction of human life? Could it have achieved what it has done without borrowing largely from the very Idealism which it so vehemently attacks? But we must first study these views in their own setting, endeavouring to show what new light they throw upon reality and what fresh stimulus they afford.

(a) *Positivism*

We are here taking Positivism in its larger meaning, including as Positivists all those thinkers who, from the stand-point of experience, were anxious to keep nature and society together and

equally emphasise both. In this way we can discuss men like Mill and Spencer, without imputing to them any relation of mere dependence upon the French Positivistic movement.

(*a*) FRENCH POSITIVISM. COMTE

The leading ideas of Positivism originate as far back as the eighteenth century, and are mainly traceable to English thinkers, but it is Comte's peculiar merit to have welded them together into a system and made them fully effective in every department of life.

The essential meaning of Positivism is sufficiently indicated by its name: it is the strict limitation of thought, and also of life, to that which is "positive," *i. e.*, to the world of immediate observation and experience. Every attempt to get behind this world and explain its constitution with reference to some other world appears hopeless from the outset, and no less foredoomed to failure is the endeavour to establish practical relations with another world. A limitation of this kind has in many ways a strongly negative implication. There is no room here for a religion, with its belief in God and a future life. However true it may be that the sphere of our experience, being purely concerned with relations, cannot make up the whole of reality but must have something else behind it, yet the nature of this Beyond remains shrouded in impenetrable obscurity. We must, therefore, give up all religion in the old sense of the term, and not only religion, but speculative thinking as well. For speculation also, with its ideas and principles, oversteps the limits of experience and leads us astray. By the portrayal of absolute ends, attainable in one upward sweep, it excites in us vain hopes, useless agitation, and bitter disappointment. We must ask no longer, Whence? and Whither? but strictly limit our whole action—its aims and its methods—to the world immediately about us.

This world, however, once rid of all illusions, becomes incomparably more significant for both knowledge and action. The illimitable network of relations, which is the aspect it now assumes,

is no mere chaotic confusion; amid all the diversity of events there is uniformity in sequence as in co-existence, that is, conformity to law. Each single event constitutes a particular case of a general law. To ascertain these uniformities, these laws, becomes the main task of science. It is true that they are no explanation, but merely a description, of events. Still the power to grasp in this way the fundamental features of the universe is not only a great gain in itself; it paves the way for effective action and ensures a higher standard of living. For to grasp the connections of things enables us to infer from one fact to another, and to foresee what will happen; and he who foresees can likewise calculate, and shape things to his own ends. Foresight is the lever of power. Thus theory and practice are but links in a single chain. The aim of all true knowledge is to see in order to foresee (*voir pour prévoir*). We may, accordingly, expect that the limitation of life to experience will result in a great increase of happiness and a satisfaction of all the essential requirements of our nature. We give up a visionary, and gain in return a real happiness.

This limitation of life's sphere brings man back to his true position in the universe. It was only possible for us to transcend experience so long as we read our own nature into the universe, ordered it according to our wishes, made ourselves the centre of reality. Now this delusion must go; it is we who must accommodate ourselves to the universe, and recognise that it is only through the development of our relations to the environment that we can use our powers rightly and hope for any true happiness.

But, we may ask, is this simplification, this recognition of our limitations, anything so very new? Is it important enough to give rise to a whole new system of life? A study of the past, a philosophical review of history, justifies us in answering Yes. For it shows most unmistakably that this enlightenment is only the culmination of a long process, that only very slowly has humanity moved from error toward truth. The process has been accomplished in three main stages: religious, metaphysical and positive. When man, released from the pressure of

physical needs, first began to think freely and venture to form a general picture of reality, he could not do otherwise than read into the universe human traits and human conditions—ascribe to things, just as children do, a life similar to man's, and, in a word, personify them. This is the stage of religious belief which considers the universe to be governed by gods resembling men, and is mainly concerned with the winning of their favour. This religious stage runs through several phases, varying from a crude fetichism to a refined polytheism—according to Comte, the highest type of religious belief—and so on to a theism, in which the sensuous and human element is already growing dim, and the transition to the metaphysical stage is beginning. At this stage abstract principles become increasingly potent, concepts such as reason, nature, purpose, force and so on. The grosser forms of anthropomorphism are overcome, but only to be followed by an anthropomorphism of a subtler and perhaps more dangerous kind. The struggle now centres round principles; it is through the energetic pursuit of abstract ideas that men think to win happiness. At length this metaphysical stage with its revolutionary temper gives way to the positivistic belief, which had been slowly maturing for a long time, and at last in the nineteenth century makes a bold bid for power. Positivism assigns the control of life to natural science, which, on its theoretical side, moulds our ideas, and on its technical side, our work, making possible for the first time a work which is really work, a purposive manipulation of the environment. There is still room for philosophy, but it is to be limited to the task of reducing the results of natural science to their most general expression, systematising them, and at the same time setting forth the general theory of true scientific method.

The view of historical development which is here suggested is extremely one-sided and open to criticism. But rooted as it is in a unique conviction, which is maintained and developed with vigorous persistence, it puts things in a peculiar and often unexpected light. Comte's general view of history is in many ways akin to that of Leibniz. All progress is effected through a slow

and continuous growth; the later stages are already implicit in the earlier; the changes that pass for revolutions are the product of a gradual development. Thus the possibilities of the present are strictly limited. We may not snatch with violent hand at the improvements which are reserved for some future age to effect. And yet no work is in vain; even the most insignificant contribution is an indispensable stone in the whole structure of history. It is intelligence which is the propelling power of the whole; the stage of development which it happens to have reached determines the peculiar character of the work done and the form which life generally assumes. But whereas with Leibniz knowledge was an inward illumination, with Comte it is the right adjustment of our relation to the environment. Greater stress is thus laid on the relativity of things; we are more strongly urged to seize on the present and fulfil its demands. He alone can wield an effectual influence over his age who has accurately understood its peculiarities and adjusts his action accordingly. Comte finds the maxim as true for his own age as for its predecessors.

Now Comte found already in existence certain positivistic tendencies which had been steadily growing during the past few centuries. His problem consists in bringing these to full self-consciousness, and elaborating them into a system. To this end, all relics of the previous stages, all such abstract ideas and abstract theories as are still in force, must be banished, and the new mode of thought introduced even into domains which have hitherto been closed to it. Thus it becomes important to pass in review the various departments of science and ascertain what has been accomplished in each, and what is still lacking. Now Comte distinguishes five main disciplines: Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology (a word newly coined); each discipline standing in greater need of positivistic reconstruction than its predecessor in the series. Astronomy and Physics, under the guidance of Mathematics, are already in practical accord with the new requirements; Chemistry is still full of confused ideas and subjective explanations. Biology also, the main scientific contribution of the nineteenth century, is still in the making; but

it is, above all, social life, the final and culminating stage of experience, which awaits scientific treatment. Such treatment is indeed imperatively necessary, in view of the problems and complications of present-day life.

Comte's description of this life refers primarily to the social condition of France during the bourgeois monarchy of Louis-Philippe, but it also applies to features which are common to the whole of the modern period. It is a lively and incisive piece of writing. The main source of all evils is intellectual disorder (*désordre intellectuel*). Each thinks as he wills and does as he likes. Egoism, material interests, political corruption find no adequate, counteracting force. There are no great unifying ideas: it is an age of half-beliefs and half-volitions. Life becomes shallow, swayed as it is by the fugitive moment and the passing impression. Rhetorical and literary skill have far more influence than solid achievements. Whereas judges and scholars once took the lead in France, the ascendency now passes into the hands of lawyers and literati. It is true that technical work is ever on the increase, but man is very far from growing correspondingly in importance. As specialisation increases, the teachers become of very much less value than their teaching; the building is vastly more important than the architect. This condition of intellectual cleavage is unfavourable soil for art, since art cannot accomplish anything great so long as creator and recipient are not bound together by the tie of a common conviction. Religion again is chiefly concerned with inspiring in its adherents an instinctive and unconquerable hate toward those of a different persuasion. Moreover, the modern man is apt to regard religion as indispensable for other people, but superfluous for himself. Finally, political life suffers grievously from the fact that thought is tending in two different directions, conservative and progressive. Conservatism finds to-day its chief support in the traditional religious and metaphysical systems of thought, systems which we have discarded from a scientific point of view, and are, therefore, bound to look upon as reactionary. The more modern convictions, on the other hand,

which support the progressive ideas, are apt to assume a revolutionary character. Everything calls for the creation of a new social order.

How, then, is this to be effected? Comte, true to his conviction that all real progress is bound up with "intellectual evolution," holds that science alone can give us help. Science brings all human life under the sway of positivist convictions, makes it understand itself, and yet links it more closely than ever with its environment. Before all else, the isolation and mutual hostility of men must be overcome. This can be best effected by aid of the concept of organism, understood not in the artistic sense with which Greek thought has familiarised us, but in the sense in which the natural sciences now employ it. An organic complex is an intricate combination of separate elements, intimately and inextricably woven together, and, for weal or woe, action or inaction, existing in closest mutual dependence. For this concept we are indebted chiefly to Biology, especially to the histological branch of it; but the highest form of organism is human society. For here the individual is so closely bound up with his fellows that he cannot even exist without them. There can be no development of human life apart from social intercourse. The condition of society determines the character and happiness of the individual. Even to his dreams and desires he is the creature of his environment, his social "milieu." It remains for Comte to take up this thought of society as an organism, and, by the help of modern science, work out its meaning more precisely and develop its implications more rigorously. The consciousness of being primarily a member of an organism must become more strong and insistent; it must strengthen the "altruistic" impulses in opposition to the egoistic, which are by no means altogether objectionable, though they usually make themselves too prominent. Each one should consider himself not a mere private individual, but a public official, and the rich man should feel himself to be the "trustee of the common property." Modern industry, with its "systematic direction of man's activity to the external world," is philosophical in tendency; it demands

a wider division of labour, and in so doing links men more closely together and strengthens the feeling of a universal solidarity. One of the main problems of government is to avoid the dangers of a division of labour, and, more especially, to see that each man is apportioned a position and a function suited to his capacities. If, however, social life is to be rescued from the fluctuating influences of the moment and the selfishness of party strife, there must be a division into temporal and spiritual power (*pouvoir temporel et spirituel*), just as there was in the mediæval Catholic system, that "political masterpiece of human wisdom." The spiritual power must have direct control over education, and, by focussing it on essentials, save it from the changing currents of political life; in every other department it must influence only by counsel, by the exertion of its moral authority. Comte pictures this spiritual power as making Paris the centre of its activity, and establishing a permanent Council of the Positivist Church, to which all civilised nations shall send delegates. Evidently, Positivism has become a kind of religion, a new faith (*foi nouvelle*), a faith which replaces the idea of God by the idea of Humanity. This idea of Humanity, however, is not only the centre of religion, but of all ideal endeavour. Art, for instance, is to occupy itself mainly with portraying the feelings which are distinctively characteristic of human nature, anticipating in vivid colouring the hoped-for better future of man, and therewith satisfying his idealistic longings (*besoin d'idéalité*). Again, the idea of the infinite progress of the species allows the individual an immortality which he could not have as a mere individual, for it means that his work is preserved and embodied in the whole. The final note is one of joy and hope; as society becomes more harmonious, material conditions improve, and nature is brought under greater control, humanity will become increasingly noble, increasingly worthy of veneration.

Here, then, we have a comprehensive realism, a system admirably worked out and thoroughly distinctive, even to its terminology. A large part of its influence it owes to its determinateness. It is, above all, original in its attempt to do justice to all

human ideals and bring about a thorough regeneration of social conditions by the sole aid of a right understanding of experience. Comte's best energies were devoted to this task. But he cannot be said to have been really successful. For a more accurate examination of his system never fails to show that in the course of his inquiry his main ideas develop into something more and other than they were at the outset, that, all unawares, they absorb just those idealistic ways of viewing and valuing things, which, as a pernicious delusion, were rigidly excluded from the general plan. Is it consistent with a strictly realistic system to raise humanity, the "great being" (*le grand être*), to divine honour, or even to go so far as to weld humanity together into an organic whole which imposes exacting duties upon the individual? Can this realism so much as conceive any need for ideality and immortality? We can see again that Comte's thought has been undergoing a readjustment, we might even say a revolution, from the fact that his description of the pure actuality of human experience passes into a drastic criticism, an actual attempt at reform. When we come to the crucial point, the transition from knowledge to action, realism no longer trusts to its own resources; it is only with the help of idealism that it succeeds in surmounting this difficulty, and passing from the mere Is to an Ought.

We are, moreover, bound to recognise a very grave discrepancy between the defects which Comte points out and the remedies he proposes. He has portrayed the defects of our modern life with an impressiveness that carries conviction, but by way of remedy he can only propose that we should clear up our ideas and fall back upon an organisation which is much more old than new; for what he offers us is nothing else than the system of mediæval Catholicism without its religion, as though it were quite a logical thing to accept the form, while rejecting the content. Comte has discovered weighty problems at the very heart of life, and has thought to solve them by mere changes of external arrangement. He affords a striking instance of that tendency, so common among the French, to exaggerate the power of organisation.

Moreover, Comte's main end—the establishment of a close relationship between the methods of science and of sociology—contains an implicit contradiction, which is really to a large extent responsible for that shifting of stand-point to which we have just drawn attention. The more loyal we are to the methods of natural science, the more does our work become merely descriptive, a mere statement of that which is happening around us. On the other hand, when we come to deal with society, we find a very imperfect condition of affairs which calls loudly for reform; in this field, description cannot be the end, but only the beginning, of the work. A Positivism that desires to be a reforming movement is a self-contradiction. Indeed, the contradiction is not peculiar to Positivism. It affects the whole science of sociology, in so far at least as sociology attempts the twofold task of bringing social life under natural law and at the same time improving it.

But, however much Comte may challenge criticism, he is yet a great and stimulating thinker. With marvellous energy he has woven together all the main threads of realistic thought, carried its leading ideas into every field of inquiry. He consistently applies one distinctive method to the whole content of reality, and shows unerring skill in the framing and developing of his divisions. His system forms in certain respects a realistic counterpart to Hegel's: Comte's influence, like Hegel's, extends far beyond the limits of his own school; it has affected the whole of our social life. There is much in Comte which cannot fail to strike us as extravagant; it is easy, too, to allow oneself to be repelled by the exaggerated self-consciousness which attends the exposition of his doctrines. But we can reconcile ourselves to this in view of the fervid desire, the passionate longing for truth and happiness which breathes through all his work. Even though it involve the system in grievous complications and at length divert its founder from the course he had originally adopted, yet it forces us to recognise in him a great man, remarkable despite all his defects, a man to whom nothing human seemed strange or alien.

Comte's theory of society and the social milieu would never have obtained a hearing so quickly nor exercised so wide an influence had it not been accompanied by a more exact and detailed treatment of the same problem, such as we find for example in Quetelet. Quetelet's investigations open our eyes to the fact that the individual does not bring into society a definitely marked character, but rather is himself moulded by society. Through the observation of a large number of instances certain average values are detected—a certain order in the chaos—and even in the phenomena which are usually accredited to chance, regularity is found to prevail. We see how alike individuals are, despite all apparent deviations, how their differences are confined within a very narrow range. Everything points to the need of concentrating effort upon social matters, and thinking less of influencing the mere individual than of bettering the general conditions, though improvement of these would indirectly involve the happiness and success of the individual. Thus modern science supports Positivism in its tendency to make the condition of society its main concern and to treat ethics as entirely social in character.

(β) ENGLISH POSITIVISM. MILL AND SPENCER

Even though the plan of our work forbids us to describe in detail more than one from the group of Positivist thinkers, we yet must make some brief mention of the peculiarities of English Positivism. It is more firmly rooted than the French in national tradition, and has carried out its task of developing a comprehensive system of thought on the sole basis of experience with far more quiet circumspection and more openness of mind toward impressions from without. Moreover, it has been preserved from the restraints and limitations of a hierarchical system like Comte's by that regard for freedom and individuality which, from of old, has characterised the Anglo-Saxon race.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was brought up in closest touch with the positivistic tendencies of that later phase of the En-

lightenment proper to the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century. His life-work may be described as consisting primarily in the continuation and development of these tendencies. His theory of knowledge and methodology do not so much contribute anything new in principle, as bring the traditional empiricism into closer touch with the rapidly growing and ramifying progress of science. They present an acute analysis of the complicated processes of thought, and open up a wealth of new views and suggestions not only in the field of experimental inquiry, but also in politics and economics. On the political and practical side he was greatly influenced by the theories of men such as Bentham and Adam Smith, and it was with genuine enthusiasm that he seized upon the ideas of economic freedom and utilitarianism. Nor, in the course of his indefatigably active career did Mill ever formally break away from this school. But he had that rare order of mind which is kept by its thirst for truth in incessant activity and is ever impelled to put itself into the position of its opponent and make a constant study of his principles. In this way it came about that in many respects he altered or supplemented his own doctrine; in fact, that in certain important particulars he arrived without knowing it at conclusions directly opposed to the premises from which he had started. For example, the very foundations of the utilitarian doctrine are shaken by the expansion of the idea of utility to include even the striving after truth for truth's sake, as also by the essential distinction drawn between intellectual and sensual pleasure. A warm sympathy with the actual living human being makes Mill increasingly inclined to mistrust any transmutation of economic life into a mere natural process, or any tendency to regard human labour in a commercial spirit; it induces him also to welcome state intervention more and more. His concern for freedom makes him keenly alive to the dangers which threaten it from the levelling influences of modern life and the increased power put into the hands of mediocrity, and it drives him to long earnestly for more individual independence and greatness. "With little men you cannot do anything great." Finally, a sympathetic

and unprejudiced experience of human conditions and destinies leads him further and further from his original optimism, and brings him into closer touch with religious feelings and reflections. If then Mill often fails to reach a satisfactory conclusion, and does not think out his principles to the finish, yet not only does the inner sincerity of his effort merit our most genuine admiration, but his life-work is of great interest from another point of view: it illustrates the main respects in which the developing life of the nineteenth century was driving men beyond the position which in the earlier half of the century had been held by the very people who felt, and had a right to feel, that they were in the vanguard of progress.

When we turn to Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), we have, despite many points of likeness, a very different picture. In an age of incessantly increasing differentiation and specialisation he displays the most extraordinary energy in bringing the whole domain of knowledge under one dominating idea and thereby illumining it afresh. Now this idea is the idea of evolution, in the sense of the term peculiar to Spencer. For that only this special sense of the term is new, and not the idea of evolution itself, is perfectly patent to any one who has even a slight acquaintance with German Idealism. Whereas hitherto "evolution" has always been used in a metaphysical context, it is now, quite in accordance with realistic ideas, based upon experience and developed in an original way under the influence of natural science. The one universal fact, leading to a complete unification of knowledge, is evolution—as integration of matter and dissipation of motion. This alternates unfailingly with a period of dissolution, marked by absorption of motion and disintegration of matter. The evolutionary period is characterised by a change from homogeneity to heterogeneity, a progressive specialisation and differentiation, beginning from the universe as a whole and proceeding to the heavenly bodies, to human society, to civilisation, to the individual. In the period of dissolution the reverse order is observed. Through all transformations, however, force persists unchanged under its two forms, matter and motion,

though its real nature remains wholly unknowable. The introduction of these main ideas into the various departments of thought yields much that is new and suggestive; but all our appreciation of Spencer's logical industry cannot blind us to the fact that he is presenting his subject-matter in schematic form rather than casting fresh light on it, and that, throughout, the content of reality receives from him a much too summary treatment. The generalisations in which he indulges have the effect of changing the world into a realm of pale shadows and phantoms. In the practical field he shows more life and vigour; he is indeed the most uncompromising champion of complete individual freedom. How to reconcile this with the idea of an evolution conforming to natural law is not quite easy to see. But whatever our attitude may be toward Spencer's method and results, the fact remains that he has reinterpreted the whole realm of knowledge in the light of certain convictions of his own, and, by this construction of a completely comprehensive system, has won a unique place among English philosophers.

(b) *Modern Science and the Theory of Evolution*

The main features characteristic of our modern science were already familiar to the seventeenth century; the nineteenth century has only to fill in the sketch which was then so boldly outlined. Such a mere outline, however, was too abstract to allow of the scientific view of the world becoming part of the general scheme of life. In particular, the Golden Age of German poetry and speculation was so full of the dignity of man and so exclusively occupied with fostering it, that nature came to be regarded merely as a background. Take, for instance, a system like Hegel's, which treats spiritual life and man's spiritual life as interchangeable equivalents, and maintains that the Absolute Spirit realises itself in human history; would such a system be conceivable save from a geocentric stand-point? Now the advance of Realism changes all this. Natural science, from being one particular province, becomes co-extensive with the

whole realm of thought. All the changes which the work of previous centuries have effected in our conception of the visible world at last become fully operative upon the convictions of mankind. And the changes were many: far-reaching modifications had taken place in that older outlook which had seemed so convincing to mediævalism and even to the Reformation, which had become so closely interwoven, too, with religious ideas. Even the change in our way of regarding the external world reaches much further than we are wont to admit. While the earth was still regarded as the centre of a finite universe and the action of man could determine the fate of the whole, his significance and the significance of humanity in general was bound to be incomparably greater than when he became merely the inhabitant of an apparently not very considerable fixed star in the measureless tracts of space, and when, consequently, from the point of view of the universe, the whole sphere of his life dwindles to a tiny point. There is, however, just as much change in the inward as in the outward view of nature. Once she had seemed to be filled and even dominated by quasi-psychical forces, and human life had moved within a sphere that was inwardly akin to itself, enjoying friendly intercourse with its environment; but now the new knowledge has robbed her of her soul, thereby alienating her from man. At first, it is true, the dualistic way of thinking that had been characteristic of the Enlightenment made it possible to mark off a separate sphere, wherein the inward life might develop freely, but as the mighty kingdom of nature developed more and more and drew man to itself by myriad threads of connection, this sphere was constantly encroached on, till at last its very existence was threatened. More and more irresistibly was man assimilated to nature, more rigorously subjected to her laws; more inevitably was his soul transformed into a mere aggregate of mental processes, into a mere helpless part of the world-machinery.

This change in the relation of man to his environment has been brought about mainly by the idea of evolution. This idea has had a curious history. It is quite foreign to the main tendencies

of classical antiquity, whose artistic creed demands that the fundamental constitution of the world, and in particular its organic forms, should be unchangeable. All the changes we experience are here attributed to a rhythmic movement in the life of the universe, which, in continual ebb and flow, is ever returning to its starting-point. Christianity, with its assertion of the uniqueness of the world's history, was bound to reject the idea of periodicity and the endless repetition of worlds. In the place of this conception, religious thought elaborated a doctrine of development which regarded the whole world with all its multiplicity as the unfolding, the "unwrapping" of the divine Unity, as the temporal manifestation of eternal Being. Following upon this religious doctrine of development there came, with the modern tendency toward pantheism, an artistic doctrine, which represents the universe as a whole, growing from within outward and attaining ever to more perfect self-expression. This is the view of Schelling and Goethe. Both doctrines gave the visible world an invisible setting. The world, far from sustaining its own development, was merely the arena in which forces of a deeper order came into play.

Now our modern science with its exact methods has entirely reversed all this. What is produced within experience is conceived as the product of forces which are themselves active within experience. Being is explained by Becoming, by its historical genesis; the advance of the world is held to be due not to the action of any transcendent, external Power, but solely to the clash of elemental forces. Such a conception places the doctrine of evolution in direct opposition to all explanations which proceed on the assumption of an unseen and supernatural order.

In the very first sketch of a scientific cosmology—that given by Descartes—we are introduced to the idea of a gradual building up of the world from very simple beginnings by the forces inherent in nature herself, an idea developed later along sounder lines by Kant and Laplace. Modern Psychology from Locke onward had strenuously sought to understand the psychical life of the individual as a gradual growth and progress from small

beginnings. Nor was there in the eighteenth century any dearth of attempts to view the historical status of man in the light of its own development, without passing beyond the limits of experience or having recourse to any religious or metaphysical assumptions. But, until well into the nineteenth century, this attempt to apply the genetic method consistently was checked by one serious obstacle, the apparently unchangeable and underivable character of organic species. An impassable limit seemed here to be set to a strictly scientific explanation of reality. Anthropomorphic ideas and love of the marvellous could always retreat upon this ground and find there a safe asylum. Thus when men like Lamarck and Darwin extended the method to organic species, it affected profoundly the whole conception of the universe. Darwin, who carried the matter to a victorious issue, brings together, as is well known, two main ideas: on the one hand, there is the more general assertion of a gradual development of organic life from certain primitive types, the introduction of the historical explanation into the realm of organic nature, in short, the doctrine of descent; and, on the other hand, there is the more detailed specification of the ways and means of development, the theory of natural selection, namely, involving the ceaseless conflict of all created forms in the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest through the persistence and accumulation of such variations as favour survival, and the explanation of highly purposive forms without reference to any conception of purpose. This more detailed exposition makes the general idea of a gradual evolution far more vivid and convincing.

We are not concerned here with the theory in its scientific aspect, but merely as it affects our attitude toward life. From this point of view it is of paramount importance to keep the two stages of the doctrine clearly distinct. It is mainly the theory of natural selection that has ventured to come forward with a new and original view of life. By completely assimilating man to nature, it leaves the shaping of man's life with the forces which appear to control the formation of natural types. Life is thereby robbed of all that had given it inner worth and dignity;

the form which it takes is determined solely by circumstance and is maintained only in so far as it proves serviceable in the struggle for existence. Advance is only made when properties which chance has brought together are maintained on account of their usefulness, inherited, and in the course of time wrought into the species. But since there can be no inward appropriation of this gain, there can also be no joy in the good and the beautiful for their own sake; all we win is simply an added means of self-preservation. We have already seen in Adam Smith the effect of a doctrine of mere utility in lowering the status of the inward life, and here we see it in its extreme form. The inward life loses all independent value. The only right is the right of the stronger; all humaneness, in particular all care for the weak and suffering, would simply take the heart out of the struggle, and therefore be a piece of pernicious folly. If in this blind medley of conflicting forces there be anything at all left for us to do, it can only be to make the struggle for existence as hard, persistent and ruthless as we can, so that all the unfit may be weeded out and the process of selection be made as speedy as possible.

All this, indeed, only ensues when we think the theory out to its logical conclusion, as its supporters rarely do. For, all unseen, persuasions of another sort steal in and cause them to regard this inward revolution quite differently, to look upon it as an emancipation from a stifling narrowness of view, to welcome it as ennobling human life. All unawares, these new ideas are transplanted into an atmosphere which has been saturated, through the efforts of centuries past, with spiritual values, and they absorb from this atmosphere just what suits them. Only through being supplemented in this way do they succeed in yielding even a tolerable presentation of life and in blinding us to the fact that it cannot be other than absolutely senseless, if it be fashioned as they suggest. For all the toil and struggle, the labour of centuries, the growth of civilisation, could not hope to make the inward man one whit better, or extend in any way the borders of reason. All effort would be concentrated on producing ever stronger individuals, creatures better adapted to the

struggle for existence. But who is to profit by this existence, that causes so much trouble and claims such sacrifice of life? No one gains by it, neither the survivor nor any one else. Nothing is won despite all the effort, save what was given already at the outset in a far more convenient form. This refusal to see in the theory of natural selection the master-key to the problem of life in no wise robs it of all importance. It still remains true that it was the first effective means of bringing home to men the influence of environment in moulding the inward life, and the cumulative effects of small changes operating during long periods of time. But all this needs to be put into a larger setting, if it is to serve truth and not error.

In natural science, at the present day, the theory of natural selection is being confined within ever narrower limits, so that it can hardly claim to supply a guiding principle for the whole of life. But it is very different with the more general idea of the theory of descent. Since this is establishing itself more and more firmly in the domain of science, the general philosophy of life is bound to come to terms with it, no less than it did with Copernicus, and, in so doing, to be considerably influenced by it. The extension of the historical method to the treatment of organic forms not only makes change the law of the whole universe; it also draws man nearer, knits him more closely, to nature. For the genetic explanation cannot possibly apply to the whole of nature and then suddenly break down at man. But to admit this does not compel us to accept a doctrine of fickle relativity or a naturalism that is a foe to spiritual life. For if the organic species are developed gradually, they cannot be the mere casual result of a chance collision of the elements; their formation may involve timeless conformity to law. That which now appears at one particular point may, nay, must have been potentially present in the system as a whole. It is not movement in itself that is destructive, but only movement that is controlled by no inward law. The recognition of a movement in which fixed laws prevail does not lower our conception of nature, but gives it greater dignity; it does not indeed solve the problem of origins, but it dis-

tributes it over a wider area and takes away its magical character. Moreover, the closer approximation of man to nature may have diametrically opposite results according to the meaning which we give to his life. If there be nothing essentially new in it, if its inward forces do not lift it above the level of nature, then the forging of that closer connection must end in naturalising it completely. On the other hand, if in man we recognise a new stage of reality, an independent spiritual life, then his closer connection with nature can only have the effect of lifting nature, giving her a deeper basis, making her part of a larger system. In this case, man is not lowered through nature, but nature is lifted through man. So, generally, it is not natural science that leads us into naturalism, but the weakness of our spiritual convictions, the suspicion that there is perhaps no spiritual existence at all: this it is that enables a popular philosophy to twist natural science into a materialistic naturalism. Here, as elsewhere, our final verdict does not depend upon individual facts, but on the systems into which they have been woven, the character of the whole life to which they are adjusted, the nature of the inward process which informs outward experience and gives it its significance.

(c) *Modern Sociology. Social Democracy and Its View of Life*

We must beware of identifying modern sociology and the social democratic movement. Still it was undoubtedly the increased influence of social life over the work and the valuations of the nineteenth and the latter part of the eighteenth century that paved the way for the efforts of Radicalism to set up a new social order, and put the Radical movement upon a broader foundation. A continually increasing number of people were grounding their whole philosophy of life on the basis of the social conditions which they either found already about them or themselves sought to establish. There was Adam Smith, for instance, and again Bentham's (1748–1830) utilitarian movement, which made the greatest happiness of the greatest number its dominat-

ing principle, and judged of all action by the way in which it served this end, that is to say, by its outward effect and not by its inward quality. Open to attack as this fundamental idea undoubtedly is, Utilitarianism has yet done good service. It broke up old and out-worn systems, won more freedom of movement for the individual, and introduced more charity and tolerance into social and international relations. But though these early social reformers found much in the traditional ordering of society that called for criticism and change, yet they never dreamt of interfering with its fundamental structure. It seemed to them that a close, faithful adhesion to natural forces and instincts would inevitably result in the victory of reason. It was not necessary, they thought, to found a new order, but simply to remove the obstructive elements of the old. At the same time, they looked upon the middle classes as the chosen representatives of the collective social interest. In all these respects the nineteenth century effects a profound and far-reaching change. Louder and louder becomes the demand for a completely new order of society, such as cannot proceed from a gradual reform, but only from revolution of a drastic kind. The movement passes from a stage of chaos and confusion, such as is revealed in the doctrines of Saint-Simon, to a perfectly elaborated system such as we find more particularly in the German Social Democracy. It is then only this latter movement that need concern us here.

Socialism—we are thinking more especially of the meaning given to it by Marx—is particularly zealous in its championship of the conviction which ever since Adam Smith's day has been gradually permeating modern life: the conviction, namely, that the whole character of life is determined by economic relations, by the way in which wealth is acquired and distributed, and that whether our existence shall be rational or otherwise depends on the way in which this problem is solved. We are given a scientific formulation of the socialist doctrine in a materialistic, or rather economic, philosophy of history. Here the economic struggle is regarded as the one propelling force of history. Even

religious systems, such as Christianity, or revolutionary movements like the Reformation, did not originate in any longing for spiritual things, but in the desire of the down-trodden masses for improved conditions of life. The ideas were merely tools, or reflexes, of economic changes. On this view, the supreme goal is the improvement of economic conditions, and the whole worth of life varies according as these conditions are reasonable or the reverse.

In one important point, however, Social Democracy effects a complete break with the older realism: it transforms the crass optimism which had characterised the older movement into an equally crass pessimism. Adam Smith fully expected that the complete emancipation of the individual and perfect freedom of industrial competition would have the happiest effect on the constitution of social life. What he saw in the struggle was mainly the greater freedom and power of the individual; the movement as a whole he viewed as a steady progress to higher and yet higher levels. The more detailed description of economic life was likewise full of optimistic assumptions. It never occurred to any one that the transformation of existence into a mere complex of natural forces would act prejudicially upon the inward life.

The revulsion from this point of view was mainly due to the radical changes which had taken place in economic life during the nineteenth century. It is no longer so simple and innocent as it was. Work stands at the mercy of the machine and the wholesale producer. The annihilation of distance facilitates the speed with which movements in different places affect each other, and thus renders the economic struggle visibly more acute. The tool, and with it the nature of the work, is always being altered. Gigantic combinations of capital and labour have arisen. Thus we are landed in the most grievous complications; opposing forces meet and clash with superhuman force and passion.

But great as these changes are, they would never have been so violent in their effect had they not been taken up into more inward movements and borne forward on their stream. Since

Adam Smith's day, the subject had grown in importance, the subject, too, of immediate experience, man in his actual feelings and enjoyments. This subject becomes more keenly interested in relating his experiences to his own welfare and computing his share of happiness and enjoyment. Moreover, it is not a few favoured classes that make their voice heard, but the great mass of the people. Thus general dissatisfaction prevails and a tendency to view the existing situation in the gloomiest light. There is a disposition to dwell upon abuses; if anything unpleasant is discovered, it is at once generalised and painted in most lurid colours. The whole picture is conceived in the gloomiest vein.

At the same time the difficulties are intensified by the tendency to treat all questions as universal, as matters of principle, a tendency quite in accordance with the whole trend of the modern period, and more especially associated in the nineteenth century with Hegel. For those who think in this way, all questions merge in one large question, and work thereby with vastly increased power. The very expression "social question" at once stamps the whole existing order as problematic. These gigantic combinations of thought exert an independent power and authority before which anything that can be done by individual resource and good-will vanishes into nothingness. They push their logical development to its extremest issue; they carry their point and none can gainsay them. Capital and labour here stand out as two most deadly foes. Capital—meaning chiefly capital in money—shows an ineradicable tendency to grow in power and importance and degrade labour more and more to a condition of slavery. What gives added bitterness and passion to the conflict is the assertion that the capital has not been honestly earned, but is stolen from the worker.

To abolish capital and make labour supreme would, it is held, introduce a change which would be entirely for the better, and wholly revolutionise the existing order. Such a change is confidently expected on the ground that historical development follows the dialectical method. According to Marx, the "capi-

talist phase" is "the first negation of the individual, of private property acquired by personal labour." This negation will be itself negated through the inward development of the dialectical movement, and through transcendence of the oppositions a higher stage will be reached.

If pessimism was the prevailing note in descriptions of the existing order, this higher stage is portrayed with a corresponding optimism, as delightful as the pessimism was gloomy. The installation of work in its true position, the regulation of all social relations from the point of view of the whole, the impartial providing for all individuals alike, will, it is thought, give complete happiness and satisfy even ideal needs. Society is now regarded as an organic system, the source of ethical energy. So long as it remains democratic, it is thought that it may safely increase in power without in any way imperilling individual freedom. Often—especially in Lassalle—there is an idealising of the people, a disposition to think more highly of the man whose lot is cast in a lowly station. Rousseauism revives. Man is at heart good and unspoilable. Bad social arrangements are responsible for all the evil. If we allow all individuals to develop their powers freely, we shall insure the victory of reason. The general level of life will be infinitely higher, and we shall have better, happier, "all-round" men, a loftier ideal of education, family life, and so on. In short, the old utopian dreams revive amid all the realism of the age. Naturally, there is the less room for religion. It is apt to be summarily rejected as a mere invention in the interests of the privileged classes, and complete misunderstanding prevails as to its true nature and historical working.

It is no part of our present task to discuss the technical aspect of this doctrine. Taken as a whole, it is a movement which we cannot afford to treat lightly, if only for the reason that it sets in a clear though prejudiced light the far-reaching changes which labour has undergone and the exceedingly complicated character of the economic struggle. At the same time it raises important

problems, which we cannot easily forget now that they have been so ably put and have become so wrought into the general consciousness. It is not easy to overlook the request for a wider diffusion of mental and spiritual culture, for a larger individual share in the collective profits of the community. He who cannot detect in it a note of idealistic aspiration, he who never feels it to be a crying pity that only so few should be given the opportunity for a full development of their spiritual powers, will never be able to appreciate this movement at its true worth. It is a movement which, in many respects, is only the extreme expression of tendencies which characterise the whole of the nineteenth century. The whole period is influenced by this firm belief in the omnipotence of political and social arrangements. The state of society has become the all-important problem. Every one thinks that if only the programme of his particular party is strictly carried out, mankind will become perfectly happy and virtuous. There is not nearly so much scope as formerly for the free play of the individual. The concern for a freedom within the state is so great as to make men almost forget that there is a freedom which can assert itself against the state. Moreover, with the progress of a highly complex civilisation, material goods have increased in importance and value. Socialism seizes on these tendencies, brings them to a point, and aggressively uses them for the furthering of its own cause. In virtue of the unifying work it accomplishes, and the appeal it makes to the whole man, it wields an authority which the ordinary vacillating temper that is driven helplessly this way and that can never hope to obtain.

With the socialist solution we must indeed join issue. From the philosophical point of view it merits the sharpest criticism. All thought and all effort are made to serve the one end of satisfying the loud demand of the masses for a larger share of power and happiness, and the scope of human experience is thus unduly narrowed. Socialism, by eagerly seizing and using everything that promises to further its main end, takes up and masses together quite uncritically the most diverse and even contra-

dictory systems. Materialism and sensualism of the shallowest kind find favour because they seem to be most thoroughly subversive of the traditional religion, and yet these movements in themselves, being products of an over-ripe civilisation, are certainly not adapted to the task of fostering enthusiasm for new ideals. Rousseau is valued because he has glorified the people and proclaimed the rights of man, but the romantic, sentimental feeling which prompted his effusion is now remote indeed. Hegel again finds recognition in so far as Socialism seems to gather assurance of victory from his doctrine of history as a dialectical movement advancing through one opposition to another. That this conviction implies a transformation of the world into a process of thought, and so into an inner life, is hardly so much as suspected.

This confusion of naturally antagonistic systems is sufficient to show that Socialism never goes deep enough, and it fails to do so simply because it forms a wrong conception of the main problem of human life. This problem, as Socialism conceives it, is how best to order social relations, and particularly how to distribute economic wealth. If these relations be revolutionised, then it is expected that existence generally will become reasonable and happy, and human life attain an ideal form. An expectation of this kind, however, implies certain peculiar convictions concerning the life and happiness of man, which run directly counter to the experience of history.

If a particular kind of social environment is to make man completely virtuous, then there must be no spiritual complexities in his nature. If the new order is to satisfy completely all his wishes, then these must limit themselves to restricted hours of work and emancipation from the cares of gaining a livelihood. Now without subscribing to any doctrine of a Fall and the corrupt nature of man, we can yet see that his being is involved in a serious, spiritual complexity. Man transcends nature once and for all, and begins to rise toward the higher plane of the spiritual life, *i. e.*, an inner life that has its world within itself. This new life makes new claims upon his feeling. It demands work, surren-

der, even sacrifice, for ends outside the sphere of his individual interest. But on the other hand, the increased intelligence and power which accompany this transition intensify the natural instinct of self-preservation till it becomes an unrestrained, destructive egoism, a boundless lust for possession, enjoyment and dominion. Thus opposing forces keep us in constant tension: fateful decisions are forced upon us. A moral opposition pervades and dominates the whole of our lives, not, perhaps, in the form depicted by theological dogmas and philosophical speculations, but revealed to us none the less in our most inward and intimate experiences. Anything that tends to obscure or weaken this opposition lowers and relaxes our inmost nature, however stirring and stimulating its outward effects may be. It is very apt to produce a result exactly opposite to that which it intended, since it diverts the attention and industry from the very point where they are most particularly needed. Even from remotest times there have been theorists who expected a complete social regeneration to ensue from the abolition or restriction of the divisions between classes. More than two thousand years ago Aristotle met them with the objection that the complication goes deeper than they think, that the worst crimes are not the result of need, but of wantonness and a "greed for more," and that even though a new social régime might remove or remedy certain defects, it would be sure to introduce or strengthen others.

And if morality cannot be treated as a mere corollary to the social problem, no more can the problem of happiness be solved by the freedom we are promised from material cares and worries. As certainly as man is a spiritual being, and just in proportion as he is spiritual, that goal can never suffice him. All the material comfort would only mean emptiness of soul. As a spiritual being, he cannot reconcile himself to a life devoid of content, and such content he can only find by going back upon his fundamental relation to reality, making the world his own by an act of spiritual appropriation, grounding his life and his whole being in a realm of truth and love. But in doing this, he

gives the primary place to those very problems which the socialistic view of life regards as secondary.

We thus find ourselves unable to accept what is most characteristic in Socialism. But we must not fail to recognise that there is much more in the movement than can be confined within this narrow framework. Side by side with the ordinary craving for happiness, there is a longing for a higher development of man as man, for an ennoblement of human existence. That which gives real power to the whole movement, quite independently of any particular party-doctrine, is the desire which to-day is permeating human life more and more, the desire of the masses for a larger share of happiness and of goods not merely temporal, but also spiritual. The path this desire will take depends largely on the answer to another question. Will humanity, in all the commotions and upheavals of the age, find the strength which is requisite for spiritual concentration and a regeneration of the inward life? Then and then only can the movement be guided by reason. Otherwise it must fall a prey to sinister passions and prove itself a destructive foe to all genuine culture.

There are great differences between the various schools of realistic thought. In certain important respects, indeed, they stand in directly antithetic relations to each other. But, despite all their differences, they have one fundamental point of likeness, and that is their way of regarding life. For them, its main relationship is its relationship to the world, to the sense-environment of nature and society. To understand nature and subdue her to the purposes of man, to free society from the blemishes which have been sanctioned by tradition, and to help all its members to attain as much happiness as they can—this seems to the realists the highest and the supremely satisfactory goal of human endeavour. It is easy enough for them to win the sympathy of their contemporaries for this belief of theirs, because it simply states as a matter of philosophical principle the persuasion which is actually dominating the life of the period. Moreover, it does not presuppose any complex hypotheses, but works apparently

with quite obvious and intelligible data. This fact is very favourable to its advance, especially at a time when the masses are pressing eagerly forward and boldly venturing an answer to the most difficult and ultimate questions. From this point of view we may regard the struggle of realism with the traditional idealism as a collision between the living present and the dead past, and therefore the most radical methods would seem to be the best.

But though its elevation to the rank of a philosophical principle may strengthen the position of realism, it at the same time leads to the recognition and realisation of its limitations. It makes it increasingly obvious that realism's most dangerous foe is not the traditions of the past, but the fact of our immediate life as it springs up anew in each one of us. In the light of this we cannot but regard as a stupendous error the attempt to construct the inward life from without, to make reality an external world, and consequently to change man's relation to himself into a merely outward relation. In last resort, even the understanding of nature and the fashioning of society are matters of inward experience, and the denial of this experience would involve the collapse of realism. If realistic systems succeed in reaching a passable conclusion, despite their repudiation of an independent inward life, that is merely because, all unobserved, they draw upon idealistic resources to supplement their own deficiencies, and indeed do so the more in proportion as they approximate more closely to complete systems. Remove their supports, and they soon lose coherency and reveal their emptiness and dearth of meaning. Man's soul is a fact: who can deny it? It is, indeed, the fundamental fact which must take precedence of all others. If it can allow itself and its problems to be overlooked for a time, yet it will not be ignored for ever. It will again and yet again assert itself as the most important thing and claim its due place in the whole scheme of life. Realism can attract men only so long as their thoughts are dwelling on certain isolated points and they are not trying to frame any picture of the whole. If once they should ask what is the purport of life as

a whole, what sense and meaning can it have, then the realistic conception of it will soon prove to be unsatisfactory past all bearing. What it offers us in the way of knowledge of the world and happiness for man will never stand the test of being looked at in relation to the whole. If this that it offers were really all, there would be nothing left us but gloomy resignation and utter despair. It is also a noteworthy fact that the most important realistic philosophers, the great positivists themselves, Comte, Mill and even Spencer, the soberest of them all, were in their later years unable to stifle the doubts that persistently rose within them. Comte was compelled to give his thought a fresh development; Mill and Spencer were both haunted by the presence of an unsolved problem, and their position with regard to religion underwent in consequence a far-reaching modification.

Thus to dispute the supremacy of realism does not imply any denial of its significance, or any failure to recognise the changes which it has wrought in life, and which will have to be taken into account by all succeeding developments. It links man much more closely with his natural and social environment, and consequently changes in essential respects the conditions which regulate his life and his creative work; his peculiar temperament and limitations are of much more consequence than formerly. His life is no longer a process of peacefully unfolding an already given content, but the content has to be acquired through hard struggle against resistance and gradual overcoming of opposition. Realism, moreover, inspires the desire no longer to limit spiritual privileges to the favoured few, but so far as possible to bring them within the reach of every member of the human family. With an ideal such as we have described, and a still wider range of suggestive influence, realism may well serve as the forerunner of a truer and purer idealism. But this happy relation between the two schools is still far from being realised.

IV. THE REACTION AGAINST REALISM

The realistic movement of the nineteenth century had completely revolutionised the old ideals. But from its first inception the movement contained the germs of a reaction against its own tendencies. The century had found its true greatness in work. It was through work that man seemed to achieve happiness and realise his proudest ambitions. But work itself was found to obey the inward dialectic of all human undertakings; its very development revealed its limitations and threatened to stultify the purpose which it was originally intended to realise. In proportion as the work became more complicated and differentiated, and more rapid in its processes, did the individual tend to become a mere inept feature in a soulless routine: his sphere of expression grew more and more restricted, his connection with the system more and more binding. The whole care being bestowed upon outward results, the inner life was starved and all its energies contracted. But this involves a contradiction which vitally affects the system of realism, not only in its logical but also in its historical aspect. Men had been attracted to the movement by the hope that, through entering into closer relations with their environment, they would increase the richness and resource of life, and pass from the shadowy existence they had hitherto endured into the full experience of reality. A strong emotional bias influences in this sense the whole development of realism. But now the world which was to provide the basis and means to such a life turns ominously against the soul which was to realise it. He who aimed at being the lord of his own labour is now in danger of becoming its slave. He is subdued by the work of his own hand. The point of vantage whence he might transform events into experiences becomes more and more visionary and unattainable. The whole system thus falls to pieces. Through the collapse of the inward life, that so-called reality which was to have dispelled the shadowiness of existence becomes itself a shadow. With the loss of all self-communion, our life ceases to be in any real sense our own: it becomes the

mere rôle which nature and destiny have thought fit to assign to us.

Such a movement was bound before long to meet with opposition. The opposition came from two different quarters. It came both from the side of a new idealism, which was bent on upholding against all dissuasions to the contrary the claims of a spiritual cosmos, and also from the side of a subjectivism, which made salvation depend on a self-withdrawal into the unchartered freedom of a purely subjective experience. In any given person the two tendencies may meet and mingle till it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other. But in their own nature they are distinct, and call, therefore, for separate treatment.

(a) *Idealistic Movements in the Nineteenth Century*

Many streams of tendency have united to swell the current of the idealistic movement of recent times. But amid much ebb and flow we detect the persistent impetus of the older movement, though reinforced by other propulsions of a new kind. The idealism of the German poets and philosophers did not by any means disappear with the progress of realism: it spread to other nations, bringing into being new movements, whose form of appearance varied with the type and condition of the nation affected. Were we not still drawn, as in the previous course of our inquiry, to give the problems that lie nearer to us precedence over those that are more remote, we should have been strongly tempted to make a study of the far-reaching influence exercised over human life by the German Idealistic movement, and to trace how its different aspects attracted different peoples, and how the movement, in being thus variously assimilated, suffered changes of a corresponding kind. For not only did each nationality appropriate the new material in its own way, it sought also to accentuate essentials, grasped the detail more clearly as a whole, and gave due effect to the leading ideas. Thus to take a special instance: while the Germans have inclined to emphasise the contrast between Kant and Hegel, the English have been mainly

impressed by the agreement between the two thinkers; and it is only another illustration of the same tendency that they should find it easier than we do to effect a sympathetic rapprochement between our classical and our romantic writers. For our neighbours, the manifold differences between the two schools are less significant than the ideal of life which is common to both, the life which transcends all merely utilitarian considerations and within the depths of our own personality opens up a new world.

The greater attention devoted by the nineteenth century to the study of history and society served in many ways to encourage the shaping of life in an idealistic direction. The revival of the past in all its breadth and fulness, and above all, the increased familiarity with its heroic epochs, were in themselves an immense enrichment of the general life; and as the work of the time was seen to affiliate itself with that of remote antiquity through an unbroken chain of connecting links, a broader basis was won for life and at the same time greater steadiness and stability. We need only refer to religion, law and art to see how effectively the historical movement has brought out the fulness and the force, the concreteness and the individuality of the spiritual life.

The expansion of life from an individual to a social centre, from the single self to the social organism, has brought about very similar results. It is not only the state, but the churches as well, that have gained in power and influence through their more stable organisation and the greater energy they have shown in grappling with social problems which incessantly grow more formidable and insistent. And in proportion as these systems have developed, they have striven to awaken the individual member to a sense of his intimate connections with the life of the whole, and, avoiding all exercise of outward compulsion, have sought to induce him to shape his own life for himself. These tendencies are plainly operative in the life of the state; but the church demands no less a broad and liberal basis. In the words of Cardinal Newman, the church can no longer afford to be a mere "institution of gentlemen for gentlemen," and as the writer proceeds to show, the desire for greater spontaneity of life

may be true sister to the longing for historical solidarity, for an all-sustaining tradition.

Finally, it is through a conjunction of historical and social motives that the idea of nationality has won its elevating and cementing influence. Art, both literary and plastic, has found, through its close alliance with national history, a perennially fruitful vocation. It has been able to body forth the cherished memories of a people in living shapes that speak with power to the soul, and by casting the halo of romance over ordinary life has relieved it of its emptiness and unreality.

In these, as in many other ways, the tendencies that mark the movement of the nineteenth century have worked in favour of idealism and its advocacy of a spiritual order. Of especial importance for the furthering of idealistic conviction was the fact that no longer, as in the days of the Enlightenment, did the spiritual life appear to be concentrated within a number of solitary individualities, but was felt to be diffused through all the connections of the great corporate whole, whose solidarity is made manifest in history and society. The inward life now fully self-organised thus assumes the cohesion of a world, and can effectively cope with the organisation of nature. Such consolidated advance of the spiritual life is in itself sufficient evidence that the progress of the nineteenth century does not respond exclusively to the Realistic Idea. But other influences have militated against the dominance of realism. The century has come to see that its subservience to realistic standards has been cramping its development, and reactions against a realist order of life, reactions that have become ever more and more pronounced, have, accordingly, arisen within the very movement of realism itself. Nor is it the mere form of life that has proved unsatisfying, but also its content. Men have felt more and more poignantly how unsatisfying is all action that is merely utilitarian, and, as such, persistently thwarts the spontaneous development of life from within, attaches it to supports outside itself, and will not vouchsafe to it any value for its own sake. There is born a yearning which takes deeper and ever deeper root for what is both in-

wardly and expressively beautiful, beautiful in the more universal sense of giving joy in itself, and beautiful also in the narrower sense of yielding a specifically æsthetic satisfaction; there arises a longing that the whole life may be invaded by that authentic loveliness which transcends and chastens the appetites and all their joys. This aspiration meets us in the thought and art of all the civilised nations, and in the case of such men as Ruskin it crystallises into a creed.

Corresponding to the movement from utilitarianism to beauty for beauty's sake, there is a change in the disposition of life itself, a movement from social solidarity and its historical basis to the self-sufficiency of personality, of individuality. The tyrannical pressure exerted by society—a pressure which tells more heavily against freedom than the mere fiat of a despot can possibly do—could not fail to provoke a reaction through the painful feelings excited by its smoothing, equalising, levelling propensities. A strong desire for independence asserts itself, a desire for individual importance and distinction. Personality becomes again the first and foremost consideration. And by personality is meant a concentration-centre of the spiritual world, a point of convergence for countless threads of existence, a point, again, at which life acquires the immediate certainty of its own existence, is exalted to a state of pure self-immediacy, and can at the same time gather itself together for resolute action and energetically challenge such abuses as its environment offers. However, the intellectual expression of these convictions is treated as of secondary importance. They have value only as radiations of the life's own process, and therefore share in the activity and the freedom of the life itself. These views give rise to a new type of idealism, to a personal idealism, of which Carlyle and Emerson may be reckoned as the chief exponents. Both start from the basis of Protestant Christianity, nor do they ever break away from this point of departure, but they throw off all allegiance to doctrinal formulas, regarding them as mere symbols and nothing more. They hold to life itself as the one supreme fact, and, having grasped its essentially human element, set it forth with the

utmost clearness. In Carlyle's case, these convictions take a form which is somewhat harsh and austere. The forces of personality are here mustered in full strength and defiantly establish their superiority to the world. In the fervour of heroic thought they wage relentless war against all the wrongs and insincerities of the age. Emerson's temper is more gracious and friendly, and though it meets us fresh from the upper reaches of thought, its keen intellectual refinement never impairs the earnestness of his message. The human note he strikes, the vital thought he breathes, are laden with glimpses of reality potent to harmonise man's spirit with itself, with the world in which he lives, and with the nature that is around him. This personal idealism, with its wealth of stimulus and its close relation to modern life, is in no sense a mere echo of the German Idealistic movement, though it stands in manifest connection with it; it takes its place as an original systematisation of life, as a unique achievement of the nineteenth century.

But whatever value we may continue to attach to this form of idealism, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that it does not really vindicate its own contention—the thesis, namely, that a self-dependent spiritual cosmos envelops the whole being of man—but rather reaffirms positions held by previous thinkers. Nor can we deny that it gives us rather the experience and confession of certain unique individuals than an organised life in which all forces co-operate for the common good, and that in this respect realism has, indeed, the advantage over it. The movement may succeed in weakening the force of realism, but it is powerless to subdue it once and for all. If Realism is to be radically dealt with, it is not enough to insist on its limitations, its rights must also be respected. Realism can be conquered only through being assigned its proper place within some larger and more generous scheme of life. Who could wish to deny that we are still left with questions yet unanswered, and problems that are yet unsolved?

(b) *Subjectivism. Nietzsche*

Subjectivism is more closely related to realism than to idealism in this respect, that it restricts the whole life of man to the sphere of immediate experience. But within this sphere it is radically opposed to realism, since reality, as subjectivism conceives it, lies primarily in the individual's own subjective condition, and not in outside things. Moreover, its main aim is not, as in realism, the subjugation of the external world, but the full unfolding of the Subject. Now the capacity to take refuge in subjective feeling, and in this retreat to fortify oneself against all outside disturbance, is the inalienable birthright of a man, nor can the advance of realism, however irresistible, deprive him of this right. Thus the path of subjectivism became the highway for those who sought escape from the pitiless encroachments of realism, and it was followed up with ardent enthusiasm.

As this passion took root and grew, the scheme of life which it evolved proved in all respects antagonistic to the corresponding scheme of realism. A concern for one's own individual condition runs counter to the temper which troubles over the state of society; the emphasising of the peculiar, the distinctive, the unique, conflicts with the requirement of a universal order, and with the demand for corporate, collective effort; the contention that each man must be characteristically himself and that every sphere of life is *sui generis* contradicts the counter-claim that all men shall be equal, and all spheres alike. Political and social activity yields place to artistic and literary creation, which now asserts itself as the chief means for insuring to the individual full self-possession and enjoyment. Subjectivism appeals to art, apart from whose aid, indeed, it would speedily have become a shadowy schema, empty of all content. And art, summoned to the new task of giving shape and fixity to subjective moods, assumes an appropriately peculiar form: its main aim is no longer that of faithfully copying the object, but rather of stirring the soul intensely and begetting ecstasies of emotion. Everywhere, so far at least as the influence of this movement extends

we find outline sacrificed to colour, the drama to the lyric. Such plays as do exercise a potent influence over the mind of the time owe their success, above all, to the appeal they make to the emotions; and even when the dramatic interest bears on problems affecting social relations, the dramatist cares less about giving a true and faithful rendering of the facts than he does about vividly portraying the effects produced by these facts upon the mind. We must, however, admit that subjectivism has herein a certain advantage over idealism, that it is able to abandon itself to these impressions and emotional agitations without either prejudice or ethical bias. Here for the first time the inward life seems able to unfold its rich resources without let or hindrance, and each individual being seems at last to enter into the full possession and enjoyment of his freedom.

A movement so broadly influential as this, affecting as it did all the civilised peoples and rich in literary inspiration, was bound to find expression in some philosophy of life. Such a philosophy we have in Nietzsche's (1844–1900). Conflicting as may be the judgments passed upon this remarkable thinker and artist, it is at least certain that the influence which he exercises would be unaccountable apart from the existence of a widespread temper answering to his own, a temper which not only finds itself reflected in his writings, but also ennobled, ennobled by artistic genius. And what is here so brilliantly set forth, exercising on the heart already tuned to the message a magical fascination, is the complete sovereignty of the self-sufficing subject, proudly repudiating all connection with a non-ego; it is the limitless rights of the artistically gifted individuality. A deep-rooted, variously motived aversion to the prevailing tendencies of the time here finds a concentrated expression: indignation at a stereotyped, hidebound civilisation which depresses all life to a dead, soulless level; a rebellion against the sacrifice of individuality to the enslaving requirements of conformity and practical utility; a profound dislike to the self-complacency and arrogance of the bourgeoisie, whether lettered or unlettered; a dislike of the tendency, all too marked in the habits of the

German races, to shut oneself up within the narrow limits and barren seclusion of the philistine's world; and finally, a native repugnance to all moral and religious ties, the spiritual meaning of which is, however, wholly lost sight of. With the repudiation of these ties there grows up a vehement desire for a wider life, a longing for the unrestrained development of all one's faculties, the will for authority and power. Everywhere we find the individual called upon to limit himself and practise self-sacrifice: he is to submit himself to the control of others, to adjust himself to others, sacrifice his interests to those of others. Yet for what reason and to what end? And how, indeed, are these ties to persist once they have been inwardly outlived by the progress of civilisation? Let the individual exalt his own life, and make the realisation of this his one supreme end. Let him strive above all else to enjoy and to aggrandise himself, to raise his lot above the average and increase to his utmost capacity the distance between himself and the common herd. Civilisation reaches its climax, not in the moderate well-being of the majority, but in the striking successes of the few. Submission to a stereotyped past must give way before a full and vigorous appropriation of the living present. The outlook bears promise of a new life, incomparably richer, sincerer and more animated.

It is extremely difficult to give any just estimate of this whole movement. Those to whom this philosophy appeals are too apt to lose all power of criticism in their admiration for it, whereas those whom it repels are inclined to reject it root and branch. We must be particularly on our guard, however, against judging and condemning the system on the ground of the rabid character of some of its utterances. A philosophical emotionalism such as Nietzsche's would be untrue to its own nature, did the passing moment fail to chronicle the passing mood; and the system being what it is, it was inevitable that the thinker, in rejecting what he felt to be foreign and hostile, should support the rejection with the whole force of his passionate nature. There is much that is rude and untempered in Nietzsche, much that may wound contrary susceptibilities, and indeed cannot help doing

so. Moreover, when the thought, as here, follows the mood, glaring contradictions are unavoidable, and to attempt to bring the whole into one teachable system is to attempt the impossible. Still other thinkers have been open to the same criticism, without thereby forfeiting their importance as thinkers; Nietzsche is perfectly entitled to demand that in appreciating his work we shall consider it as a whole and in its most distinctive quality.

The peculiarity of Nietzsche's work does not lie in the novelty of its content; the main thoughts, even the characteristic aphorisms, can be traced back to an older date, and in this respect the thinker appropriated and developed much more than he created. What is new is the form in which this content is presented. A peculiarly refined sensibility and a remarkably vivid and penetrating style give to the old the power of the new, the influence and spontaneity of the present. How ancient, for instance, is the idea of a periodicity in things, of the endless self-repetition of the order of nature, and yet how Nietzsche makes us feel it as though it were a new truth! We might go further and say that Nietzsche's way of referring everything exclusively to the emotional mood of the subject, with his craving for life, sets the whole aspect of being in a new and peculiar light. All things now move and are in flux; the whole splits asunder into forces that work either for or against; the sharpest contrasts are set up; nothing is neutral or indifferent; everything has its strong, emotional colouring and is pressed into party-service. The more deeply the levelling, equalising tendencies of the modern realistic culture were realised, the more would Nietzsche's conception of life appear as a reviving and emancipating force, an initiation into a life of spontaneity and originative power.

But the very circumstance which gives to this whole view its uniqueness and effectiveness, the constant reference to the mood of the individual, the mood in which the individual self-consciously exercises his own freedom, also defines its limits and indicates its dangers. For a philosophy of this mood-centred kind, however ennobled it may be through the power and the beauty of art, is still unable to lose itself disinterestedly in ob-

jects and realise their meaning from within; it cannot do justice to the activities of things from the point of view of their inner necessities and connections, and in consequence of this limitation, it is also unable to distinguish between the essence of any given matter and its realisation through human agency. Impressions are appropriated in the total form in which they are presented, and their worth approved according to their value for the Subject. It is impossible to be just under these conditions, and a philosophy which is bound by them is very liable to fall into exaggerations, whether of approval or of disapproval; and the disapproval, in particular, is apt to degenerate into grotesque caricature.

This subjective emotionalism fails also in achieving its own distinctive end, the attainment of an inward self-sufficiency; for it is only when the human organism is inwardly growing, steadfastly rooted within an inner world and nourished at the sources of the inner life, that such self-sufficiency is realisable. But how can this philosophy claim an inner world? Its rapid flight over the surface of things yields it picture after picture, but no depth of inward meaning. The world as mirrored in the fleeting life of feeling cannot reflect more of the nature of events and their connections than can be fleetingly felt. What it dislikes may indeed be rejected, but it cannot be conquered. It is of course quite possible to indulge in paradoxical expressions of independence, but the paradoxical form may easily conceal a real dependence. Nietzsche is too inclined to be content with merely parrying and returning blows. It seems to him that he has settled the whole question when he has contemptuously dismissed certain superficial views of a popular kind, which were never really held by any one interested in the subject for its own sake. If morality, religion, Christianity were no more than what Nietzsche represents them to be, their rejection could not but be hailed as an act of deliverance; but, in point of fact, at their own proper source whence they flow forth with spontaneous force and freshness, fertilising what is deepest in man's nature, they are something essentially different from what Nietzsche

imagines them to be, and something incomparably greater. And we must remember that this subjective emotionalist obtained the material for his picture from a study of men rather than principles, so that even his rejections imply a dependence upon humankind. We do not deny that Nietzsche's system contains valuable suggestions of a moral and religious nature, but they are left undeveloped, and the balance of his effective influence lies with what he denies rather than with what he affirms.

Nietzsche's work, taken as a whole, reveals rich, spiritual capacity, vitality, freshness, and the most extraordinary mobility of feeling. Thoughts flash and cross each other, interwoven with the most marvellous art, though the art not infrequently degenerates into artifice. Incidentally, too, we come across many genuine truths, though these have no connection with any leading motive. But we find no independent development of the system as a whole, no convincing simplicity of thought, no expression of native spiritual power. And yet without these we cannot hope to overcome the distraction of the present nor win a stable basis for life.

What holds true of Nietzsche holds true of subjectivism in general. The attempt to cut the subject adrift from the world, and make it depend on itself, was certainly stimulating. It opened up new possibilities and shed a new light on many old positions. But this by itself cannot give to life a spiritual substance or an inspiring, unifying purpose. True power of thought tends more and more to degenerate into an artificial subtlety. The individual, in outbidding all others, threatens to overreach himself. Pictures are presented which ravish for the moment, but give no essential assistance to life. In the rush and hurry of many feet the truths that matter are forgotten and the inward coherency of our social life is lost. Thus, despite the rich diversity of its contributions, subjectivism cannot rank as more than a mere passing phase which humanity, under the spur of its own spiritual nature, is even now outgrowing and is destined in time to outlive altogether.

V. THE PRESENT SITUATION

The position at the present moment conclusively proves that the content of man's life is not the easy, unsought product of a natural process of historical development. For after all the weary work of many thousand years, we are to-day in a condition of painful uncertainty, a state of hopeless fluctuation, not merely with regard to individual questions, but also as to the general purpose and meaning of life. Through long ages of experience and many a painful shock of revolution, our western civilisation had won to a stable and coherent system of ideas and convictions which fixed man's relation to reality in a particular way, impressed a definite character upon our life, and assigned to the individual his proper position and task. Now when the modern world took up the problem of life and developed it along new lines and from a fresh point of view, it at first seemed that its activity was in no way directed against the traditional order; it appeared to be rather friendly and supplementary than hostile and subversive. Its later developments, however, revealed more and more clearly its revolutionary character, and the most recent period of all has been especially remarkable for the clearness and force with which it has brought out the latent opposition and compelled attention to it. The old foundations of life have been shaken and the new ones are not yet sufficiently established. Whereas the struggle used to rage round and about such central facts as morality and religion, their basis and their precise signification, now to an ever-increasing extent the facts themselves are questioned; doubt arises as to whether they can really be affirmed as facts at all. And at the same time, man has lost his proud, assured position in the universe. The older thought exalted him to a position of unique grandeur, and required him to concern himself chiefly with the development of the traits peculiar to him as man. The supremacy of man is now more and more disputed, and especially the assertion that his place among the creatures is unique. But if this position be abandoned, what are we to make of the purpose of life?

The problems which arise in this connection are rendered much more acute by the social changes going on around us. Hitherto, spiritual conflict has usually been confined to the limited arena of cultivated society, and the general mass of mankind has not been much affected. Now, however, the people are pressing forward; they not only demand a voice in the settlement of ultimate questions, but require that the whole structure of society shall be regulated with reference to their opinions and interests. They are very liable, moreover, to that harsh intolerance which always characterises big mass movements. The masses are only very slightly and superficially influenced by the experiences and results of the general movement of history; it is small wonder that they yield readily to the impressions of the immediate moment and allow merely surface considerations to determine their policy of life. In a situation of this kind, where a select inner circle of culture is confronted with great social changes, the forces of negation easily gain the upper hand. The public lends a ready ear to the spirits of denial, the "genii with their tokens reversed." Against these stormy forces, a more tranquil reflection and profounder deliberation often have small chance, and we may even seem to have lost all that had been so hardly won through agelong toil.

This is one aspect of the present situation, and an aspect which every one will recognise; but it is not the only, nor the final, way of regarding it. Our whole treatment of the past has been based on the conviction that human destinies are not decided by mere opinions and whims, either of individuals or of masses of individuals, but rather that they are ruled by spiritual necessities with a spiritual aim and purport, and that for man a new world dawns transcending the merely natural domain—the world, namely, of the spiritual life. It is only this conviction that has enabled us to assign to history any positive meaning and to extract from all the efforts and errors of different men and different ages some definite and permanent result. And though these spiritual necessities, this deeper basis of life, are apt at the present moment to be pushed into the background and over-

looked, they have not, therefore, ceased to be operative. The man of to-day is much more than he himself is conscious of being, and the very denial of this deeper nature can only result in emphasising it, and thus provoke fresh proofs of its independence. In proportion as the confusion clears and we can no longer rest content with the usual half-hearted compromises—here Yes, there No—we find ourselves increasingly unable to relegate the fundamental questions of our life and our spiritual existence to a secondary, subordinate position. Even the bare raising of the problem implies a definite rejection of the shallow, self-satisfied negative criticism which measures its success by the extent of its robberies, and actually thinks it exalts man by systematically eliminating everything in him that calls for reverence. The struggle for man's spiritual self-preservation must end in one of two ways: either his nature will become stronger and richer, or he will be reduced to the desperate course of abandoning all his ideals. It is only a shallow, irreflective temper that can conceive of any third way as even possible. But if the balance of power inclines once again to the affirmative position, then again will the agelong struggles of mankind acquire greater significance. Though we may not cravenly seek refuge in the past from the perplexities of the present, we can yet make it live again within us in close communion with our inmost soul, and thus complete its labours by our own. For even as we rekindle it, we can free it from all that was only casual and transitory, and make it reveal to us the eternal verities that transcend our merely human vision. As we scan the story of the centuries, with all their changing currents and shifting experiences, we may feel more convinced than ever that away, untouched by human thoughts and wishes, great spiritual forces are moulding our existence, forces that give us anchorage and guidance, no matter how tumultuous the sea. History cannot, indeed, be a substitute for our own endeavour, but it can, and must, serve to guide it in the way of righteousness and truth.

But the craving for a stronger, deeper life in a larger and a nobler setting is no mere echo of past ages, but an urgent present

need. If to-day it finds but an incomplete and halting expression, yet its presence is unmistakable, and we cannot doubt that it will grow and spread, since it is especially the young, with their quick response to spiritual appeals, who, in every civilised land, feel it most keenly.

That such a motive is really at work is evidenced more particularly by the widespread interest in art. For though fashion may have much to do with this, and the average society person certainly looks to art rather for enjoyment than for inward culture, yet we may very pertinently ask what it is that gives the fashion its power, and why men court beauty so eagerly. And the answer can only be that we are possessed by a longing for more soul in life, more inward joy, and that it is as an antidote to the level monotony of our ordinary environment that we seek to introduce into it the quickening, ennobling influences of art.

The very obvious reawakening of the religious problem points in a similar direction; for it shows up in a particularly clear light the peculiar position of our spiritual life to-day. The main current of intellectual work runs for the most part counter to religion. There is still a steady secession from her ranks, and the secession is spreading from one social class to another. A devitalising rationalism is now beginning to eat its way into the masses of the people. If, notwithstanding, the religious problem is again knocking insistently at the doors of our intellectual life, threatening to push all other questions aside, this points clearly to two things. In the first place, there are other forces at work in man than mere intellectualistic reflection, and secondly, in the higher strata of the intellectual atmosphere quite different currents prevail from those which are influencing the life of the people generally and even the so-called cultured sphere. Do not previous experiences justify us in believing that man's own spiritual work will, in the end, prevail against him, and body forth in some new form the truths that are eternal?

Nor can philosophy escape the influence of this movement. It is true that philosophy to-day is very largely either of the learned professional kind, which hugs the shores of history and

natural science, or, in so far as it aspires to independence, takes by preference the form of an epistemology or critical analysis of knowledge; and there is, indeed, a lamentable deficiency of original production, a dearth of those spiritual creations which define the highways of human progress, raise the level of human life, and give fresh direction to the activities of men. But the aspiration after such creative work grows ever stronger, the limitations of mere learning or mere critical reflection become more and more patent. We feel with increasing force the need to synthesise life afresh, the need of some unifying, sustaining system of ideas. Such a system cannot spring from the facts as they present themselves to us in our ordinary unsystematised experience: we must first transform them, we must have recourse to metaphysics. More than ever do we feel the truth of Hegel's saying that a civilised nation which has no metaphysics is like a temple decked out with every kind of ornament, but possessing no Holy of Holies. Mere learning begins to pall on us no less even than shallowness and negation, for it threatens our spiritual nature and with it our chance of truth. Before all else, it behoves us to secure the foundations of our spiritual life.

There are two ways of regarding times like ours, times which are driven back on fundamentals, and have to struggle in order to safeguard even the bare possibility of a spiritual life. In the first place they are hard, uncomfortable times, distracted and unsettled, hotbeds of dissent and denial; the pettiness of man and the uncertainty of his position are brought home to us with ruthless directness. But, on the other hand, if once we clearly recognise the constraining force of their problems and the spiritual necessities which inform them, they become stirring, progressive, fruitful times, insuring to man a unique dignity and vocation. For they show that only through his own deed can he win to what is fundamental in his nature, that he himself is a co-worker in the building of the whole, that he is lord of his own destiny. Such times constrain him to look problems in the face, to seek no support from outside, but to find it rather in the world which is inwardly present to his spirit. They break

up much, but after all they only break what was from the outset breakable. That which is permanent and essential stands out all the more clearly, and life emerges from the testing in a fresher, truer form. It is times like these which foster the sense of responsibility, and increase the significance of the individual person; showing clearly that, on the high level of the spiritual life, it is not the age that makes the man but the man the age.

Thus, despite all the complexities of the present situation, we may conclude our historical survey without any gloomy forebodings. So long as belief can rise from the contemplation of that which is merely human to the recognition of a spiritual world, we can look on our perplexities as purely transitional, and, while striving to mould life afresh, can still draw much that is of value from the spiritual treasure-house of the past. For the past, rightly understood, is no mere past.

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